老師的讀譜訓練幫助我在真正彈奏前就對曲目有一定程度的熟悉. 後來老師又開始另一種訓練: 告訴我一個故事,然後要我把譜劃出來,然後老師會在鋼琴上彈奏我畫出來的譜. 我記得一開始我所有譜都是從中央C開始畫起, 老師也不置可否.
開始上幼稚園了,每次去上課老師都會問我今天發生什麼事, 然後要我用畫譜的方式把故事講出來. 又過了一陣子,老師會把同樣的旋律用不同調彈出來,然後問我這樣還是不是同樣的故事? 哪一個才是我要講的故事? 同樣的故事為什麼聽起來有不同感覺? 有時候老師會藉由不同和聲把故事複雜化或簡單化, 我想這是我最先學得調性(Tonality)的方式吧! 而且我還自然而然有了所謂的變奏曲等的基本概念.
我不知道對於其他人老師是不是都用講故事的方式讀譜? 老師雖然會把那些記號寫成中文, 我也認得一些簡單的國字, 但卻是一直到上小學才開始學ㄅㄆㄇ.不會注音符號的話可能很難做筆記吧? 因此對於年幼的我, 畫圖是很好的方式. 但是,我的圖畫完全用鉛筆構成, 就算回家之後練習也從來沒有興起著色的念頭. 的確, 我似乎從來沒有把音符和顏色聯想在一起. 聲音或是旋律對我產生的視覺聯想, 例如是故事,是影像,但不是色彩[1]. 而且這可能是個人差異. 我發現我常用影像的方式來幫助記憶. 影像之外, 節拍常讓我聯想到不同形狀. 另外, 有點像是有人用數字來記簡譜, 聲音曾經讓我產生數字的聯想, 而且Do,Re,Mi每次給我的聯想未必總是1,3,5, 不過有趣的是, 我有數次把音符與數字聯想在一起後還自以為是地歸納出一些有趣的結果,不過通用性(generalizability)往往不是很大,只能算是幾個特例. 但是,部分通則竟然到了國中以後在數學課裡學到類似的觀念,這我倒是很吃驚!
指法的部分,一開始老師要我想像手中握雞蛋的樣子把手拱起來,藉由手指抬高後往下壓的力量來觸鍵發音. 此外,老師也不容許有手腕沒有抬起,手指沒離開鍵盤前就又彈奏下個音. 也就是說,我學的是所謂的高位置觸鍵法,而我的第二個鋼琴老師則是所謂的低位置觸鍵法, 開始換老師時我曾經很不習慣. 高觸鍵法的好處是容易把鋼琴音色表現出來. 而手指沒有一根一根抬乾淨的話很容易彈出混濁的音色, 這(壞)習慣也容易伴隨用手腕壓音的彈琴動作. 雖然表面上看起來手腕出力容易,但實際上壇出來的音色很容易有壓迫感, 尤其是音階不平均時手腕就容易酸痛.
我不知道,也無從查證,老師教我高位置觸鍵法的原因到底是因為適合初學者?還是為了保護我的手腕. 不過我猜想後者若不是主因也是重要原因之一,因為每次上課開始彈琴前,老師都要先幫我按摩手指教我放鬆之後才開始彈奏. 相同的,爸媽也非常重視手的保護. 雖然發現我很小就會寫自己的名字,但爸媽一直認為要上小學後等手發育比較完全才開始寫字. 因為這樣的考量,我們都只唸了一年幼稚園,而且我們念的幼稚園是暨不會教ㄅㄆㄇ,當然也沒有作業要寫,只是去吃點心玩遊戲作美勞的那種幼稚園.
爲了確保觸鍵與指法正確,我每次彈琴時老師都會手指揮棒,要是有指法錯誤或是手指抬乾淨等情況指揮棒就會不留情的打一下. 現在回想,單單音階就彈了半年有部分原因應該是在訓練觸鍵與指法. 此外,可能自始如此訓練,我不但不能接受不乾淨俐落的彈法, 也對於過度依賴踏板營造音色的表現手法有些嫌棄.
上了小學後還是一樣去學琴. 老師要求更多,教給我的東西也更多,包含一些我後來才知道的,所謂的"樂理"的東西. 小一暑假時老師偷偷幫我報了名去參加音樂班的甄試. 說是偷偷實不為過. 有一天爸媽說下禮拜不去上鋼琴課,要帶我去考試,然後還帶我去買衣服. 我當時傻傻的不知道要考什麼, 考試前的一次鋼琴課老師告訴我要考哪些, 然後要我照平常練習的彈就可以了.
考試一共兩天. 第一天都是筆試, 就是考樂理等. 第二天是考術科,包括音階, 指定曲, 自選曲, 音感測驗與讀譜測驗. 指定曲其實也是考讀譜的能力. 一進去就是抽籤, 抽順序,然後就到外面等. 等到自己的號碼時,先彈音階, 接著抽譜,然後照譜彈曲子. 下午則是自選曲,也是照號碼進去. 接著音感測試就是像之前老師訓練我的, 一個評審彈了幾小節,要求參試者哼出來,接著講出調性與音符.
可能跟平常訓練很像,又不是特別早知道要考試, 整個考試其實沒有給我什麼壓力. 考完爸媽還帶我去吃冰淇淋算是犒賞我吧. 接下去那次的鋼琴課老師問我考得怎麼樣? 老實說, 我沒有特別感覺. 我還記得剛進去的時候因為用跑的摔一跤, 連評審都笑出來. 而且因為彈完忘記鞠躬, 快走到門口才想起老師的交代又跑回去鞠躬, 又惹評審一陣發笑. 我把這個講出來,老師也沒有特別苛責我就繼續上課.
放榜時已經快開學了! 我竟然考上. 生平第一次名字被登上報紙. 爸媽還把這剪報留著. 當時老師的學生裡除了我之外還有一個也考上, 但是老師自己姪子的小孩(要稱呼老師姨婆)卻只有備取, 必須有學生放棄才能就讀. 那時候我才知道原來老師其實算是名師, 每年都有一些學生是為了考上音樂班而拜師學藝的.
鋼琴課繼續著. 就這樣我唸到小學三年級下還是四年級上(可能是四年級), 我竟然從單槓上摔下來還摔斷右手. 一開始不知道事態嚴重, 就只是覺得痛. 等到回家右手已經整個腫起來, 媽媽帶我去找跌打骨傷的師父,發現是脫臼就把它喬回去. 因為遠房親戚有人因為沒接好以致於後來右手無法往後彎曲, 等爸爸回家後又帶我去醫院照X光看是否接好. 這時候才發現接是接好了,但是有小骨折.
我不記得裹了多久石膏,只是摔斷手對一個學音樂的人來講簡直是不可饒恕的事情. 我一直被問為什麼去玩單槓? 天曉得,我從小一就很愛而且很會爬竹竿,常常爬也沒事啊!? 音樂不學了沒關係, 但是學還是得上.
鋼琴課也因此停了一陣子. 不知道又過了多久, 手好了, 我又回去學鋼琴. 老師講了一個故事是關於一位鋼琴演奏家在戰爭中失去右手,此後只能彈奏有限的曲目. 接著, 印象非常深刻的, 我第一次看到老師嘆氣,說:最近還有個鋼琴家因為生病右手失去功能了. 長大後(大學時才知道的)我自然知道老師講的前者是Paul Wittgenstein,後者是Leon Fleisher. 只是我當初不記得名字,僅知道故事內容.
上了國中, 學區裡的國中有的是舞蹈班, 有音樂班的國中在另一個學區. 雖然在學區就讀, 斷斷續續還是學著琴. 高中後再也沒有學琴,也很少彈琴. 到了大學, 我自發性開始欣賞音樂, 幾度想學提琴,但也只是想想而已.
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[1] 曾經有朋友討論到此, 據說Olivier Messiaen可以把音樂和顏色連結在一起, 而且他還能描述出非常特定而且複雜的顏色, 參考這裡:Val 一月18日的留言. 至於聲音和顏色的關聯也有,例如Scriabin's synesthesia的鍵盤.
音樂欣賞: 3 CD on works for the lef-hand
Leon Fleisher Recital - Bach/Brahms, Scriabin, Saint-SaensKorngold/ Schmidt: Music for Strings & Piano Left HandRavel, Prokofiev, Britten: Piano Works for the Left Hand
Saturday, February 6, 2010
Sunday, January 31, 2010
憶我的鋼琴老師(1)
其實在看完交響情人夢之後曾經想過要寫我對音樂教育的一些感想. 不過我一向懶惰,想想後就算了. 最近跟一些朋友或說是討論或說是聊天談到一些對某些曲子或是欣賞曲目的觀點,又激起我該把欠的文章寫一寫的想法而有此文.
想起來學校的音樂老師不算,我曾經有過三個鋼琴老師. 現在回想,我很多音樂欣賞的看法應該受到第一個鋼琴老師影響. 這篇來記載我對第一個鋼琴老師,也是我音樂啟蒙老師的一些點滴.
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如果沒記錯,我大概是四歲半的時候開始學鋼琴的. 而我只上了一年幼稚園,所以學鋼琴其實可以算是我最早的"學校"教育. 現在回想,我很多音樂欣賞的看法應該受到第一個鋼琴老師影響. 雖然對我影響這麼大, 當初倒不是特別去挑選過, 只因為第一個老師其實是媽媽以前的音樂老師,學琴地點又離家裡近,這麼自然地就成為我的音樂啟蒙老師了.
我的第一個鋼琴老師對指法,拍子,整首曲子,音感都有一定的要求. 我記得一開始剛學琴的時候老師並不急著教學. 先是介紹鋼琴本身架構,她曾打開蓋子,按著琴鍵,抱我站上椅子讓我觀看那黑盒子裡的變化,了解鋼琴是怎麼發音的. 接著老師教我讀譜,還有就是調整節拍器教我數拍子.
有了這些基本了解之後接著彈奏音階. 有兩件事情我印象很深刻. 第一:在學會看譜與最基本的音階之後(由中央C開始上下各一八度), 老師會要我背對鋼琴,由她彈奏然後要我說出音符(例如高音FA,低音DO…),然後相反地她講出音符由我到鍵盤上彈出正確的音來. 事後回想這應該是訓練音感吧?!
另一件跟彈奏音階有關的記憶是上課一開始一定要先彈奏音階十次. 至少一個月吧老師只訓練我彈音階. 當時我心浮氣躁只想趕快學曲目(炫耀?),但偏偏音階彈不好老師根本不教我任何曲目. 彈音階的時候老師的要求是速度,音量與指法都必須正確. 而且左右手的力道必須一致. 這種看似容易其實最難.有點像是蛋炒飯, 要每顆飯粒均勻沾上一樣多的蛋汁而且乾濕一致,火候一致, 雖然是簡單的菜卻最容易看出功力所在.
大部分的人都有慣用手,慣用手會影響施力大小. 今天在朋友部落格提到這點, 讓我想特別講一下左右手必須均衡這一項[1]. 這就是另一個與音階練習有關的記憶了. 我記得的是, 等到我終於可以彈好基礎音階之後, 就是花式的訓練. 所謂花式大抵有兩種: 其一是到某個音或多個音必須依老師臨時指定固定升(降)半音或是調整強弱; 其二是左手彈一個八度的時間右手就得彈完所有音階,然後是左手彈兩個八度音的時間右手彈完所有音階,如此重複到左右手速度一致彈完所有音階,.接著左右手互換.最後就是這兩者的綜合版.
終於通過這關後我想已經是半年了吧! 總之老師開始願意教我彈曲子了.
開始彈曲子之後,老師都會先講故事,一來介紹作曲者,二來介紹作曲的背景. 介紹完後其實並不急著彈奏. 老師通常會帶著我先讀譜. 並且要我譜放在腿上,手先在譜上虛擬彈奏全曲,老師會校正我錯誤的指法,然後等到正確後再讓我在鋼琴上彈奏. 因為已經經過修正, 通常在鋼琴上彈奏時已經不大會有錯誤,頂多就是一些細節的調整.
事後回想這個方法影響我很大. 因為即使後來換了鋼琴老師我還是習慣這種練琴的方式. 大部分的時間我花在讀譜與 “空中彈琴”,所以實際聽到琴音的時間其實不多. 我想鄰居應該很感謝這種方式吧? 不過這方式也曾經引起誤會. 後來換了鋼琴老師之後新的鋼琴老師曾經問過媽媽我每天每首曲子練習幾次? 媽媽回想 “聽到”的次數回答一度造成新老師誤認我是懶散的學生, 但在聽我彈奏後卻又挑不出太多毛病轉而認為我很有天賦,竟然只要練習幾次就可以有這種程度. 其實一切只是誤會.
總之讀譜的習慣影響我很大, 甚至後來我已經不彈琴而只欣賞音樂時,我還是很習慣的在接觸新曲目的時候要先讀譜. 我買的幾本作曲家的傳記也都有譜的片段,或是解釋曲目,或是介紹曲目歷史沿革.
讀譜其實還有許多有趣的回憶. 也許是年紀小, 老師會將各種音符賦予圖形或是影像來幫助我了解. 例如琶音代表爬階梯, 右手兩度和弦代表兩個小朋友牽手等等. 用這種方式下讀一首新曲子的譜時,老師會先讓我用do, rei, mi,的方式讀出, 接著會問我: 那你現在告訴我這首曲子在講什麼故事? 於是乎有: “兩個小朋牽手(右手兩度和弦)一起上了五層樓梯(五個琶音)之後,一個小朋友鬆開手(一指放開)跑下樓(琶音)去應門鈴(裝飾奏)” 之類. 這種讀譜方式非常有趣. 每首曲子也總在讀譜後“栩栩如生” 印在我腦海裡. 另外,聲音強弱則由圖案大小來表示. 等到弟弟也要開始學琴時我打開琴本,最早期的有幾本還有我當初畫的"故事,"自己看了不禁莞爾. 當然,這更有可能是那時我還不大會寫字,只好用圖形來記憶;也或著是因為我記憶的方式本來就以圖像來進行的.
圖像了解法還有另一面, 不過這就等待後話再說了.
(待續)
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[1]不確定是否因為很小就開始訓練,還是基因使然 (媽媽打桌球或羽球尤其是反拍只會用左手),其實我的慣用手是哪手一直不是很清楚. 有些事情似乎我一開始是用左手,雖然大部分是情是用右手做. 但是所有右手會做的事情,包含寫字左手一樣可以做.
想起來學校的音樂老師不算,我曾經有過三個鋼琴老師. 現在回想,我很多音樂欣賞的看法應該受到第一個鋼琴老師影響. 這篇來記載我對第一個鋼琴老師,也是我音樂啟蒙老師的一些點滴.
------------
如果沒記錯,我大概是四歲半的時候開始學鋼琴的. 而我只上了一年幼稚園,所以學鋼琴其實可以算是我最早的"學校"教育. 現在回想,我很多音樂欣賞的看法應該受到第一個鋼琴老師影響. 雖然對我影響這麼大, 當初倒不是特別去挑選過, 只因為第一個老師其實是媽媽以前的音樂老師,學琴地點又離家裡近,這麼自然地就成為我的音樂啟蒙老師了.
我的第一個鋼琴老師對指法,拍子,整首曲子,音感都有一定的要求. 我記得一開始剛學琴的時候老師並不急著教學. 先是介紹鋼琴本身架構,她曾打開蓋子,按著琴鍵,抱我站上椅子讓我觀看那黑盒子裡的變化,了解鋼琴是怎麼發音的. 接著老師教我讀譜,還有就是調整節拍器教我數拍子.
有了這些基本了解之後接著彈奏音階. 有兩件事情我印象很深刻. 第一:在學會看譜與最基本的音階之後(由中央C開始上下各一八度), 老師會要我背對鋼琴,由她彈奏然後要我說出音符(例如高音FA,低音DO…),然後相反地她講出音符由我到鍵盤上彈出正確的音來. 事後回想這應該是訓練音感吧?!
另一件跟彈奏音階有關的記憶是上課一開始一定要先彈奏音階十次. 至少一個月吧老師只訓練我彈音階. 當時我心浮氣躁只想趕快學曲目(炫耀?),但偏偏音階彈不好老師根本不教我任何曲目. 彈音階的時候老師的要求是速度,音量與指法都必須正確. 而且左右手的力道必須一致. 這種看似容易其實最難.有點像是蛋炒飯, 要每顆飯粒均勻沾上一樣多的蛋汁而且乾濕一致,火候一致, 雖然是簡單的菜卻最容易看出功力所在.
大部分的人都有慣用手,慣用手會影響施力大小. 今天在朋友部落格提到這點, 讓我想特別講一下左右手必須均衡這一項[1]. 這就是另一個與音階練習有關的記憶了. 我記得的是, 等到我終於可以彈好基礎音階之後, 就是花式的訓練. 所謂花式大抵有兩種: 其一是到某個音或多個音必須依老師臨時指定固定升(降)半音或是調整強弱; 其二是左手彈一個八度的時間右手就得彈完所有音階,然後是左手彈兩個八度音的時間右手彈完所有音階,如此重複到左右手速度一致彈完所有音階,.接著左右手互換.最後就是這兩者的綜合版.
終於通過這關後我想已經是半年了吧! 總之老師開始願意教我彈曲子了.
開始彈曲子之後,老師都會先講故事,一來介紹作曲者,二來介紹作曲的背景. 介紹完後其實並不急著彈奏. 老師通常會帶著我先讀譜. 並且要我譜放在腿上,手先在譜上虛擬彈奏全曲,老師會校正我錯誤的指法,然後等到正確後再讓我在鋼琴上彈奏. 因為已經經過修正, 通常在鋼琴上彈奏時已經不大會有錯誤,頂多就是一些細節的調整.
事後回想這個方法影響我很大. 因為即使後來換了鋼琴老師我還是習慣這種練琴的方式. 大部分的時間我花在讀譜與 “空中彈琴”,所以實際聽到琴音的時間其實不多. 我想鄰居應該很感謝這種方式吧? 不過這方式也曾經引起誤會. 後來換了鋼琴老師之後新的鋼琴老師曾經問過媽媽我每天每首曲子練習幾次? 媽媽回想 “聽到”的次數回答一度造成新老師誤認我是懶散的學生, 但在聽我彈奏後卻又挑不出太多毛病轉而認為我很有天賦,竟然只要練習幾次就可以有這種程度. 其實一切只是誤會.
總之讀譜的習慣影響我很大, 甚至後來我已經不彈琴而只欣賞音樂時,我還是很習慣的在接觸新曲目的時候要先讀譜. 我買的幾本作曲家的傳記也都有譜的片段,或是解釋曲目,或是介紹曲目歷史沿革.
讀譜其實還有許多有趣的回憶. 也許是年紀小, 老師會將各種音符賦予圖形或是影像來幫助我了解. 例如琶音代表爬階梯, 右手兩度和弦代表兩個小朋友牽手等等. 用這種方式下讀一首新曲子的譜時,老師會先讓我用do, rei, mi,的方式讀出, 接著會問我: 那你現在告訴我這首曲子在講什麼故事? 於是乎有: “兩個小朋牽手(右手兩度和弦)一起上了五層樓梯(五個琶音)之後,一個小朋友鬆開手(一指放開)跑下樓(琶音)去應門鈴(裝飾奏)” 之類. 這種讀譜方式非常有趣. 每首曲子也總在讀譜後“栩栩如生” 印在我腦海裡. 另外,聲音強弱則由圖案大小來表示. 等到弟弟也要開始學琴時我打開琴本,最早期的有幾本還有我當初畫的"故事,"自己看了不禁莞爾. 當然,這更有可能是那時我還不大會寫字,只好用圖形來記憶;也或著是因為我記憶的方式本來就以圖像來進行的.
圖像了解法還有另一面, 不過這就等待後話再說了.
(待續)
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[1]不確定是否因為很小就開始訓練,還是基因使然 (媽媽打桌球或羽球尤其是反拍只會用左手),其實我的慣用手是哪手一直不是很清楚. 有些事情似乎我一開始是用左手,雖然大部分是情是用右手做. 但是所有右手會做的事情,包含寫字左手一樣可以做.
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
[轉載]Taiwan's loss of independence a threat to US: expert
Taiwan's loss of independence a threat to US: expert
By William Lowther
STAFF REPORTER , WASHINGTON
Wednesday, Jan 27, 2010, Page 1
A leading US academic warned that if Taiwan loses its independence and becomes part of China, its impact on US interests would be “complex and dangerous.”
Nancy Tucker, an expert on Taiwan at Georgetown University in Washington, said that the US' place in Asia would “never be the same again.”
Speaking at the “Power in East Asia” conference on Monday organized by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the professor said that a change in Taiwan's status could strengthen China and weaken the US.
“If things go badly across the [Taiwan] Strait, war could develop and the United States, regardless of its preferences, would be involved. But in the event that cross-strait dialogue breaks the current stalemate, resolves the current situation, it will have an enormous impact on the United States' mission in the region,” Tucker said.
The most important gain to such a development, Tucker said, would be peace and an end to threats of intentional or accidental war in the Taiwan Strait.
It would let the US scrap its policy of strategic ambiguity, the US and China could relax about possible military conflict, the US could minimize planning for a Taiwan contingency, and although Chinese nationalism would not disappear, “the emotional quotient would be significantly reduced,” she said.
Tucker told the conference that a general de-escalation of Chinese threats would mean better overall US-China relations and that the incorporation of Taiwan into some sort of association with China could have a “Trojan horse potential” to promote democracy in China.
But there would simultaneously be important losses.
For while there would be peace in the near term, over the longer term there would be a variety of security threats to the US’ position in the region.
China’s regional influence could be enhanced by being perceived as having solved the Taiwan issue and doing it through diplomacy rather than the use of force, she said.
US credibility with friends and allies across Southeast Asia would be diminished, as Washington would appear to have “walked away” from Taiwan, she said. Japan's sea lanes could also be jeopardized, Tucker said.
“Certainly that is one of the main things they worry about in such a situation. Tokyo might indeed give more serious thought to going nuclear. And the US presence in the region, in bases that are already controversial, could seem less necessary if there was peace in the Taiwan Strait,” she said.
Tucker said China would be free to develop more varied military capabilities, making it a less unpredictable and more flexible adversary.
There would be an end to US-Taiwan security cooperation, interoperability and arms sales.
“All of this would end despite Beijing’s assurances that Taiwan would be allowed to keep its own military — both because there would be a perception that arms sales would no longer be needed and also because the US would be less inclined to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan since military technology is already leaking across the Strait, and that would probably only escalate,” she said.
The result of all of this, Tucker said, would be that Taiwan would find itself at the mercy of Beijing if the relationship soured because Taipei could no longer effectively turn to the US once Washington had physically and psychologically removed itself from the mix.
In addition, she said, there would be an “unavoidable surrender” of US intelligence listening posts on Taiwan and that in turn would have broad implications for the US position in the region.
“China's arrogance would be stimulated with a Taiwan triumph, and an associated victory over the US,” Tucker said.
“There would be a potential blow to democracy in Taiwan. Anger and disillusionment of a large vocal minority opposed to any sort of association with China could damage the political system. As in Hong Kong today, there would likely be self-censorship and other kinds of adjustments to a non-democratic Chinese system,” she added.
China would be strengthened as the Chinese and Taiwanese economies became more integrated, and for the US this would be a problem not just because China would become a more aggressive competitor economically but also because there would be the potential for US commercial interests to be excluded, she said.
“In other words,” Tucker said, “shifting power relationships in East Asia would involve a difficult balancing act for the US even as Washington remains agnostic about the final choices made by Taiwan.”
By William Lowther
STAFF REPORTER , WASHINGTON
Wednesday, Jan 27, 2010, Page 1
A leading US academic warned that if Taiwan loses its independence and becomes part of China, its impact on US interests would be “complex and dangerous.”
Nancy Tucker, an expert on Taiwan at Georgetown University in Washington, said that the US' place in Asia would “never be the same again.”
Speaking at the “Power in East Asia” conference on Monday organized by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the professor said that a change in Taiwan's status could strengthen China and weaken the US.
“If things go badly across the [Taiwan] Strait, war could develop and the United States, regardless of its preferences, would be involved. But in the event that cross-strait dialogue breaks the current stalemate, resolves the current situation, it will have an enormous impact on the United States' mission in the region,” Tucker said.
The most important gain to such a development, Tucker said, would be peace and an end to threats of intentional or accidental war in the Taiwan Strait.
It would let the US scrap its policy of strategic ambiguity, the US and China could relax about possible military conflict, the US could minimize planning for a Taiwan contingency, and although Chinese nationalism would not disappear, “the emotional quotient would be significantly reduced,” she said.
Tucker told the conference that a general de-escalation of Chinese threats would mean better overall US-China relations and that the incorporation of Taiwan into some sort of association with China could have a “Trojan horse potential” to promote democracy in China.
But there would simultaneously be important losses.
For while there would be peace in the near term, over the longer term there would be a variety of security threats to the US’ position in the region.
China’s regional influence could be enhanced by being perceived as having solved the Taiwan issue and doing it through diplomacy rather than the use of force, she said.
US credibility with friends and allies across Southeast Asia would be diminished, as Washington would appear to have “walked away” from Taiwan, she said. Japan's sea lanes could also be jeopardized, Tucker said.
“Certainly that is one of the main things they worry about in such a situation. Tokyo might indeed give more serious thought to going nuclear. And the US presence in the region, in bases that are already controversial, could seem less necessary if there was peace in the Taiwan Strait,” she said.
Tucker said China would be free to develop more varied military capabilities, making it a less unpredictable and more flexible adversary.
There would be an end to US-Taiwan security cooperation, interoperability and arms sales.
“All of this would end despite Beijing’s assurances that Taiwan would be allowed to keep its own military — both because there would be a perception that arms sales would no longer be needed and also because the US would be less inclined to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan since military technology is already leaking across the Strait, and that would probably only escalate,” she said.
The result of all of this, Tucker said, would be that Taiwan would find itself at the mercy of Beijing if the relationship soured because Taipei could no longer effectively turn to the US once Washington had physically and psychologically removed itself from the mix.
In addition, she said, there would be an “unavoidable surrender” of US intelligence listening posts on Taiwan and that in turn would have broad implications for the US position in the region.
“China's arrogance would be stimulated with a Taiwan triumph, and an associated victory over the US,” Tucker said.
“There would be a potential blow to democracy in Taiwan. Anger and disillusionment of a large vocal minority opposed to any sort of association with China could damage the political system. As in Hong Kong today, there would likely be self-censorship and other kinds of adjustments to a non-democratic Chinese system,” she added.
China would be strengthened as the Chinese and Taiwanese economies became more integrated, and for the US this would be a problem not just because China would become a more aggressive competitor economically but also because there would be the potential for US commercial interests to be excluded, she said.
“In other words,” Tucker said, “shifting power relationships in East Asia would involve a difficult balancing act for the US even as Washington remains agnostic about the final choices made by Taiwan.”
Monday, January 25, 2010
[轉載]Taiwan’s political liberties not eroded (蘇:台灣政治自由未被侵蝕)
這是新聞局回應1/12Gerrit van der Wees單獨的公開信.新聞局什麼時候變這麼忙了?忙著跟國際友台人士打筆戰?
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Taiwan’s political liberties not eroded
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓 Tuesday, Jan 26, 2010, Page 8
In a recent opinion piece (“Democracy and human rights still regressing,” Jan. 12, page 8), Gerrit van der Wees said Taiwan’s freedom and democracy are being eroded. He also predicted that in the Freedom in the World 2010 survey conducted by Freedom House, Taiwan’s rankings would go down.
On the contrary, this year’s survey accords Taiwan the same near-perfect overall score of 1.5 it received in last year’s survey, sharing the same scores in the political rights and civil liberties categories as Japan, for example, and comparable to those of advanced Western democracies.
In Freedom House’s assessment, our average score of 1.5 is the result of an advance in political rights from a score of 2 to the highest score of 1, offset by a decrease in the civil liberties category from 1 to 2.
The administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is gratified at the survey’s affirmation of our progress. At the same time, we take seriously the criticisms and recommendations of Freedom House and other organizations and individuals concerning human rights. As we continue our fight against corruption, recognized by Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, we shall persevere in giving due attention to possible flaws in our judicial system that may violate human rights. (按:關於貪腐指數引用Transparency Int'l,先前Kagan也已經批評過了!沒想到蘇小賓還是不改其故啊)
Without elaborating, Van der Wees recommended that “if the Ma administration is really serious about human rights and democracy it will need to seriously rethink its approach and move toward much-needed judicial reform.”
In this regard, I would like to point out that reform of our judicial system — augmenting its ability to effectively deal with corruption and other crimes while respecting and protecting human rights — is an ongoing project that has been progressing steadily, and by all accounts quite successfully, over the past two decades thanks to cooperative efforts across the political spectrum.
(按:關於司改,請參考孔傑榮的文章)
Consequently, the independence and neutrality of the judiciary and the sanctity of human rights have become deeply rooted values in Taiwan — a reality evident to observers at home and abroad. Nonetheless, this administration is committed to keep pushing forward on these fronts.
Van der Wees said many observers believe that rapprochement with China has occurred at the expense of democracy and human rights. On this point, this administration’s pledge to put Taiwan first for the benefit of its people most certainly includes the preservation of Taiwan’s free and democratic way of life and rule of law.
As this applies to cross-strait relations, any new mainland policy involving the law must be approved by the legislature. At the same time, government policies and actions are constantly being scrutinized by Taiwan’s free and highly critical media.
Such processes in themselves are embodiments of freedom and democracy. Furthermore, they render it very difficult for any policy that is not supported by public opinion to be implemented. Hence, regardless of one’s views on this government’s policies, one should have faith that, ultimately, Taiwan’s system of government can and will reflect the popular will.
(按:我是有信心驅政府下台灣會很慘啦:P)
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Taiwan’s political liberties not eroded
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓 Tuesday, Jan 26, 2010, Page 8
In a recent opinion piece (“Democracy and human rights still regressing,” Jan. 12, page 8), Gerrit van der Wees said Taiwan’s freedom and democracy are being eroded. He also predicted that in the Freedom in the World 2010 survey conducted by Freedom House, Taiwan’s rankings would go down.
On the contrary, this year’s survey accords Taiwan the same near-perfect overall score of 1.5 it received in last year’s survey, sharing the same scores in the political rights and civil liberties categories as Japan, for example, and comparable to those of advanced Western democracies.
In Freedom House’s assessment, our average score of 1.5 is the result of an advance in political rights from a score of 2 to the highest score of 1, offset by a decrease in the civil liberties category from 1 to 2.
The administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is gratified at the survey’s affirmation of our progress. At the same time, we take seriously the criticisms and recommendations of Freedom House and other organizations and individuals concerning human rights. As we continue our fight against corruption, recognized by Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, we shall persevere in giving due attention to possible flaws in our judicial system that may violate human rights. (按:關於貪腐指數引用Transparency Int'l,先前Kagan也已經批評過了!沒想到蘇小賓還是不改其故啊)
Without elaborating, Van der Wees recommended that “if the Ma administration is really serious about human rights and democracy it will need to seriously rethink its approach and move toward much-needed judicial reform.”
In this regard, I would like to point out that reform of our judicial system — augmenting its ability to effectively deal with corruption and other crimes while respecting and protecting human rights — is an ongoing project that has been progressing steadily, and by all accounts quite successfully, over the past two decades thanks to cooperative efforts across the political spectrum.
(按:關於司改,請參考孔傑榮的文章)
Consequently, the independence and neutrality of the judiciary and the sanctity of human rights have become deeply rooted values in Taiwan — a reality evident to observers at home and abroad. Nonetheless, this administration is committed to keep pushing forward on these fronts.
Van der Wees said many observers believe that rapprochement with China has occurred at the expense of democracy and human rights. On this point, this administration’s pledge to put Taiwan first for the benefit of its people most certainly includes the preservation of Taiwan’s free and democratic way of life and rule of law.
As this applies to cross-strait relations, any new mainland policy involving the law must be approved by the legislature. At the same time, government policies and actions are constantly being scrutinized by Taiwan’s free and highly critical media.
Such processes in themselves are embodiments of freedom and democracy. Furthermore, they render it very difficult for any policy that is not supported by public opinion to be implemented. Hence, regardless of one’s views on this government’s policies, one should have faith that, ultimately, Taiwan’s system of government can and will reflect the popular will.
(按:我是有信心驅政府下台灣會很慘啦:P)
[轉載]Democracy and human rights still regressing(台灣民主與人權依然倒退中)
Many observers both inside and outside Taiwan are concluding that rapprochement with China has occurred at the expense of democracy and human rights.
Democracy and human rights still regressing
By Gerrit van der Wees
Tuesday, Jan 12, 2010, Page 8
As one of the signatories of the letter to president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) by a group of international academics and writers (“An open letter to Taiwan’s president,” Nov. 13, page 8), I was perplexed by the tone and content of the response from Government Information Office Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) (“GIO response to Nov. 13 open letter,” Dec. 18, page 8).(第五號公開信的回函見此)
Instead of welcoming the suggestions of such a distinguished group of international academics, Su went into a defensive mode, used quotes from organizations such as Freedom House out of context and tried to make us believe that all is well with judicial independence and the health of Taiwan’s democracy.
Taiwan still ranked among the world’s “free” countries in 2008 and last year because of the hard work of previous governments — the pioneering work of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and the sustained progress made under former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
The point that minister Su seems to fail to understand is that — in the view of many international observers — Taiwan’s democracy and human rights have regressed since Ma came to office.
The “right answer” would have been to say the government would assess any shortcomings and take steps toward judicial reform.
This has also been suggested by other international academics, such as Jerome Cohen, but the only response from Taipei has been to whitewash the obvious flaws in the system and to assert that “everything is all right.”
In the next few days, Freedom House will issue its report for this year and one can bet that Taiwan’s standing in the rankings will go down.
(按:自由之家的報告顯示台灣整體排名未變,但是公民權利下降,政治自由則提升)
So if the Ma administration is really serious about human rights and democracy it will need to seriously rethink its approach and move toward much-needed judicial reform.
On the issue of cross-strait relations, it is obvious that everyone is in favor of improvement. The question is: At what expense?
Many observers both inside and outside Taiwan are concluding that rapprochement with China has occurred at the expense of democracy and human rights.
It should be obvious to Su and his colleagues that this is not the right way to go about it.
In a separate response to another signatory, Richard Kagan, Su states: “The mantra that democracy in Taiwan is less robust than before utterly conflicts with reality.”
He then quotes the results of the recent local elections to prove his point.
What he fails to understand is the significant reduction in the KMT’s support has occurred because many people have doubts about the government’s adherence to basic principles of democracy and human rights.
If the Ma administration really intends to “significantly enhance the quality of our democracy” (Su’s words) it would be highly desirable if these basic principles were adhered too.
The recent beef problem with the US and the ongoing debate about an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China show that the Ma administration is still following a “top-down” approach, instead of listening to public opinion.
Gerrit van der Wees is the editor of Taiwan Communique in Washington.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
[轉載]TAIWAN’S CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND CHINA’S (孔傑榮:限制被告律師辯護,法務部勿走火入魔)==updated==
前陣子看到一些司法改革愈改愈回去的新聞我就一直在等,等孔傑榮會不會對此作文章. 針對制度面提出見解比針對個案重要且全面,不幸的是阿扁這個個案雖然凸顯問題所在,但此個案之特殊性往往模糊焦點. 由其司法系統幾次試圖追殺扁案的被告律師(見此),這問題實在很難讓人相信司法的公正性. 這在幾次國際學者給的公開信裡也都有所提及. 總之,現在終於等到這篇了!
值得觀察的是日後自由之家與人權組織公佈排名時,台灣的整體的排名會不會有所影響(限制辯護會有傷害被告人權之疑).
以下中文翻譯部分取自中國時報(下面有連結).
==updated==
法務部針對此文竟還發布新聞稿,真有愈描愈黑的感覺...
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TAIWAN’S CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND CHINA’S Jan 20th, 2010 | By USAsialawNYU | Category: Jerome A. Cohen's Blog
An edited version of this text appeared in English in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) on January 20, 2010 under the title “Under Threat,” and appeared in Chinese on January 21, in the China Times (Taiwan) (繁體中文).
by Jerome A. Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen
The Chinese government’s continuing attacks on human rights lawyers rarely make foreign headlines these days. Monitoring, intimidating, disbarring and prosecuting activist lawyers have become routine in China. Even the tragic “disappearance” while in police custody of defense lawyer/political reformer Gao Zhisheng–now feared to be dead–hardly attracts attention.
It is also unremarkable for even non-political Chinese defense lawyers to suffer sanctions. The recent conviction of Beijing lawyer Li Zhuang for allegedly counseling his client to lie and bribe witnesses would not have been noted abroad if the case had not involved Chongqing’s extraordinary campaign to suppress organized crime.
By contrast, the Taiwan government’s new interest in curbing vigorous defense lawyers does constitute “news”. Although Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-Jeou recently took the occasion of the island’s Law Day to call for greater government efforts to promote judicial reform and human rights, his Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has been moving in the opposite direction.
相較之下，近來台灣政府開始對限制辯護律師感興趣，這倒是一則「新聞」。雖然馬英九總統上星期在台灣司法節慶祝大會表示，政府將更努力推動司法改革以落實人權保障，但其下法務部的作為卻與此背道而馳。
Last year, the Ministry, concerned about the conduct of ex-president Chen Shui-Bian’s defense lawyers in its ongoing corruption prosecutions against him, failed in its efforts to impose disciplinary sanctions against one of Chen’s lawyers for supposed ethical violations. Now it is trying to introduce legislation to punish “obstructions of justice” that will inevitably restrict defense lawyers’ activities.
The MOJ has proposed to amend the criminal code in several ways that threaten the modified adversarial legal system that Taiwan adopted a decade ago. Instead of supporting the equal contest between prosecutors and defense lawyers on which that system is based, the MOJ proposals, reflecting traditional Chinese distrust of defense lawyers, would subject Taiwan’s lawyers to some of the same dangers confronted by their counterparts in China, including significant prison time.
法務部提出的刑法修正草案，在幾個方面都將危及台灣十年前所採取的「改良式當事人進行主義」。法務部草案反映了中國傳統對辯護律師不信任的態度，草案不但未支持當事人進行主義的基礎｜檢察官與辯護律師的平等對抗，反而將使台灣律師面臨中國大陸律師所遭遇的一些危險，可能包括長期的牢獄生涯。
One amendment would punish anyone, including lawyers, for abetting defendants or others to “fabricate, alter, destroy or conceal” important evidence in criminal cases, even when their advice has been ignored and caused no harm! Further, it would punish anyone for abetting defendants to make false statements concerning important facts in trial or investigation. Thus, if a court rejects the defendant’s claim that his pre-trial confession was coerced by police, his lawyers might be prosecuted for having urged him to repudiate the confession. This “Sword of Damocles” hangs over Mainland lawyers, sometimes intimidating them from giving such advice, despite the prevalence of pre-trial torture.
修正草案其中一條擬處罰「使」被告或他人「偽造、變造、湮滅或隱匿」於刑事案件「有重要關係之證據」之行為，處罰對象包括一般人和律師。草案針對的是唆使行為，即使是被唆使的人沒有著手實施犯罪，也沒有任何實害發生，唆使行為也會成罪！此外，草案也懲罰「使被告」於審判或偵查時「就案情有重要關係之事項為虛偽陳述」之行為。如此一來，如果被告抗辯說審判前的自白是警方刑求而來，但法院不予採信的話，被告律師可能會因為建議被告推翻自白而被起訴。在中國大陸，這樣的風險像「達摩克里斯之劍（Sword of Damocles）」一樣，長期懸在律師的頭上，時刻威脅著律師，因此，即使刑訊逼供在中國相當普遍，律師有時也不敢建議當事人提出刑求抗辯。
Equally troublesome is the proposal to punish “illegitimate use” of important evidence outside of court. But what use is “illegitimate” and what evidence is “important”? The MOJ has stated that the provision is meant, among other things, to prevent documents from public trials being revealed at press conferences. Yet this would prevent freedom of speech and information essential to monitoring of the judicial process by the media and the people. Such restrictions, to the extent they exist in other democratic societies, are generally justified by the need to protect jury deliberations against media pressures, but Taiwan has no juries.
另一條草案條文同樣令人擔心，該條要懲罰將「相關證據資料之重要部分」於訴訟程序外為「不正當之使用」，但甚麼是「不正當之使用」？甚麼又是「相關證據資料之重要部分」？根據法務部的說明，此條文是為了避免例如召開記者會公布卷證資料等行為（即使是公開審判程序）。然而，這將會壓制人民和媒體監督司法程序所不可或缺的言論自由和資訊自由。這些限制，即使在其他民主社會有類似規定，其正當化理由通常是為了避免陪審團的決定受到媒體壓力，可是台灣並無陪審制度。
Even more problematic is the proposal to punish lawyers not only for contempt of court but also for contempt of prosecutors! Legal systems require effective and fair procedures for punishing refusal to heed reasonable court orders. But, in a system where lawyers and prosecutors are supposed to be equal competitors in their efforts to persuade a neutral judge, it is ludicrous to punish lawyers for failing to obey prosecutors.
更加有問題的是，法務部竟然在「藐視法庭罪」加上藐視檢察官罪的規定！誠然，法律制度需要有效、公正的程序來處罰拒絕遵守法院合理命令的人。但是在當事人進行主義下，律師和檢察官透過法庭攻防說服中立的法院採信其主張，雙方是處於平等的地位，如果律師因未能聽從檢察官的命令，便要被科以刑罰，十分荒唐。
MOJ officials do not seem to realize that, under Taiwan’s new adversarial system, for most purposes prosecutors can no longer be regarded as members of the “judiciary”. Their status and functions are very different from those of judges.
法務部官員似乎不瞭解，台灣已改採「改良式當事人進行主義」，檢察官在大多數情形下不能再被視為「司法」的一員，他們的地位和功能與法官大相逕庭。
The proposals–not yet submitted to the legislature–have understandably aroused strong opposition from the legal profession. Although the MOJ has stressed that the proposals are not targeted at lawyers, they will have an adverse impact upon lawyers’ defense work. If they are enacted, Taiwan is sure to be further downgraded in the civil liberties ratings of major non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House, a strong American supporter that last week criticized recent setbacks in the island’s protection of criminal defendants’ rights.
不出所料，法務部的修正草案還沒有送到立法院，就引發律師界強烈的反對。雖然法務部強調草案非針對律師而來，但其事實上會對律師的辯護造成負面的影響。草案若是通過，台灣的公民自由度勢必再被重要的非政府組織降級，例如一直以來支持台灣民主進步的美國人權組織「自由之家」，上周的報告已經指出台灣去年在保障刑事被告權利上的退步。
It is far from clear that additional restrictions on defense lawyers are needed to guard against “obstructions of justice” in Taiwan. The MOJ has cited no empirical studies to show that existing laws and ethical rules are inadequate. Moreover, the vague language of each proposed criminal prohibition is an invitation to abuse and confusion that would inhibit the robust defense lawyering that a fair justice system requires.
目前完全不清楚的是，究竟有沒有必要對辯護律師設下更多限制來防止「妨害司法」行為，法務部未提出任何實證研究，證明目前法令和律師執業倫理均不足以規範相關行為。再者，修正草案中各條文所使用的模糊字眼，容易造成濫用、引起困惑，進而壓制公正刑事程序所需要的有力辯護工作。
Every country needs effective administration of justice. Yet, every country also needs vigorous lawyers to check abuses of the criminal process. If these MOJ proposals are enacted, the plight of Taiwan’s defense lawyers may begin to resemble that of their Chinese counterparts.
值得觀察的是日後自由之家與人權組織公佈排名時,台灣的整體的排名會不會有所影響(限制辯護會有傷害被告人權之疑).
以下中文翻譯部分取自中國時報(下面有連結).
==updated==
法務部針對此文竟還發布新聞稿,真有愈描愈黑的感覺...
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TAIWAN’S CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND CHINA’S Jan 20th, 2010 | By USAsialawNYU | Category: Jerome A. Cohen's Blog
An edited version of this text appeared in English in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) on January 20, 2010 under the title “Under Threat,” and appeared in Chinese on January 21, in the China Times (Taiwan) (繁體中文).
by Jerome A. Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen
The Chinese government’s continuing attacks on human rights lawyers rarely make foreign headlines these days. Monitoring, intimidating, disbarring and prosecuting activist lawyers have become routine in China. Even the tragic “disappearance” while in police custody of defense lawyer/political reformer Gao Zhisheng–now feared to be dead–hardly attracts attention.
It is also unremarkable for even non-political Chinese defense lawyers to suffer sanctions. The recent conviction of Beijing lawyer Li Zhuang for allegedly counseling his client to lie and bribe witnesses would not have been noted abroad if the case had not involved Chongqing’s extraordinary campaign to suppress organized crime.
By contrast, the Taiwan government’s new interest in curbing vigorous defense lawyers does constitute “news”. Although Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-Jeou recently took the occasion of the island’s Law Day to call for greater government efforts to promote judicial reform and human rights, his Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has been moving in the opposite direction.
相較之下，近來台灣政府開始對限制辯護律師感興趣，這倒是一則「新聞」。雖然馬英九總統上星期在台灣司法節慶祝大會表示，政府將更努力推動司法改革以落實人權保障，但其下法務部的作為卻與此背道而馳。
Last year, the Ministry, concerned about the conduct of ex-president Chen Shui-Bian’s defense lawyers in its ongoing corruption prosecutions against him, failed in its efforts to impose disciplinary sanctions against one of Chen’s lawyers for supposed ethical violations. Now it is trying to introduce legislation to punish “obstructions of justice” that will inevitably restrict defense lawyers’ activities.
The MOJ has proposed to amend the criminal code in several ways that threaten the modified adversarial legal system that Taiwan adopted a decade ago. Instead of supporting the equal contest between prosecutors and defense lawyers on which that system is based, the MOJ proposals, reflecting traditional Chinese distrust of defense lawyers, would subject Taiwan’s lawyers to some of the same dangers confronted by their counterparts in China, including significant prison time.
法務部提出的刑法修正草案，在幾個方面都將危及台灣十年前所採取的「改良式當事人進行主義」。法務部草案反映了中國傳統對辯護律師不信任的態度，草案不但未支持當事人進行主義的基礎｜檢察官與辯護律師的平等對抗，反而將使台灣律師面臨中國大陸律師所遭遇的一些危險，可能包括長期的牢獄生涯。
One amendment would punish anyone, including lawyers, for abetting defendants or others to “fabricate, alter, destroy or conceal” important evidence in criminal cases, even when their advice has been ignored and caused no harm! Further, it would punish anyone for abetting defendants to make false statements concerning important facts in trial or investigation. Thus, if a court rejects the defendant’s claim that his pre-trial confession was coerced by police, his lawyers might be prosecuted for having urged him to repudiate the confession. This “Sword of Damocles” hangs over Mainland lawyers, sometimes intimidating them from giving such advice, despite the prevalence of pre-trial torture.
修正草案其中一條擬處罰「使」被告或他人「偽造、變造、湮滅或隱匿」於刑事案件「有重要關係之證據」之行為，處罰對象包括一般人和律師。草案針對的是唆使行為，即使是被唆使的人沒有著手實施犯罪，也沒有任何實害發生，唆使行為也會成罪！此外，草案也懲罰「使被告」於審判或偵查時「就案情有重要關係之事項為虛偽陳述」之行為。如此一來，如果被告抗辯說審判前的自白是警方刑求而來，但法院不予採信的話，被告律師可能會因為建議被告推翻自白而被起訴。在中國大陸，這樣的風險像「達摩克里斯之劍（Sword of Damocles）」一樣，長期懸在律師的頭上，時刻威脅著律師，因此，即使刑訊逼供在中國相當普遍，律師有時也不敢建議當事人提出刑求抗辯。
Equally troublesome is the proposal to punish “illegitimate use” of important evidence outside of court. But what use is “illegitimate” and what evidence is “important”? The MOJ has stated that the provision is meant, among other things, to prevent documents from public trials being revealed at press conferences. Yet this would prevent freedom of speech and information essential to monitoring of the judicial process by the media and the people. Such restrictions, to the extent they exist in other democratic societies, are generally justified by the need to protect jury deliberations against media pressures, but Taiwan has no juries.
另一條草案條文同樣令人擔心，該條要懲罰將「相關證據資料之重要部分」於訴訟程序外為「不正當之使用」，但甚麼是「不正當之使用」？甚麼又是「相關證據資料之重要部分」？根據法務部的說明，此條文是為了避免例如召開記者會公布卷證資料等行為（即使是公開審判程序）。然而，這將會壓制人民和媒體監督司法程序所不可或缺的言論自由和資訊自由。這些限制，即使在其他民主社會有類似規定，其正當化理由通常是為了避免陪審團的決定受到媒體壓力，可是台灣並無陪審制度。
Even more problematic is the proposal to punish lawyers not only for contempt of court but also for contempt of prosecutors! Legal systems require effective and fair procedures for punishing refusal to heed reasonable court orders. But, in a system where lawyers and prosecutors are supposed to be equal competitors in their efforts to persuade a neutral judge, it is ludicrous to punish lawyers for failing to obey prosecutors.
更加有問題的是，法務部竟然在「藐視法庭罪」加上藐視檢察官罪的規定！誠然，法律制度需要有效、公正的程序來處罰拒絕遵守法院合理命令的人。但是在當事人進行主義下，律師和檢察官透過法庭攻防說服中立的法院採信其主張，雙方是處於平等的地位，如果律師因未能聽從檢察官的命令，便要被科以刑罰，十分荒唐。
MOJ officials do not seem to realize that, under Taiwan’s new adversarial system, for most purposes prosecutors can no longer be regarded as members of the “judiciary”. Their status and functions are very different from those of judges.
法務部官員似乎不瞭解，台灣已改採「改良式當事人進行主義」，檢察官在大多數情形下不能再被視為「司法」的一員，他們的地位和功能與法官大相逕庭。
The proposals–not yet submitted to the legislature–have understandably aroused strong opposition from the legal profession. Although the MOJ has stressed that the proposals are not targeted at lawyers, they will have an adverse impact upon lawyers’ defense work. If they are enacted, Taiwan is sure to be further downgraded in the civil liberties ratings of major non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House, a strong American supporter that last week criticized recent setbacks in the island’s protection of criminal defendants’ rights.
不出所料，法務部的修正草案還沒有送到立法院，就引發律師界強烈的反對。雖然法務部強調草案非針對律師而來，但其事實上會對律師的辯護造成負面的影響。草案若是通過，台灣的公民自由度勢必再被重要的非政府組織降級，例如一直以來支持台灣民主進步的美國人權組織「自由之家」，上周的報告已經指出台灣去年在保障刑事被告權利上的退步。
It is far from clear that additional restrictions on defense lawyers are needed to guard against “obstructions of justice” in Taiwan. The MOJ has cited no empirical studies to show that existing laws and ethical rules are inadequate. Moreover, the vague language of each proposed criminal prohibition is an invitation to abuse and confusion that would inhibit the robust defense lawyering that a fair justice system requires.
目前完全不清楚的是，究竟有沒有必要對辯護律師設下更多限制來防止「妨害司法」行為，法務部未提出任何實證研究，證明目前法令和律師執業倫理均不足以規範相關行為。再者，修正草案中各條文所使用的模糊字眼，容易造成濫用、引起困惑，進而壓制公正刑事程序所需要的有力辯護工作。
Every country needs effective administration of justice. Yet, every country also needs vigorous lawyers to check abuses of the criminal process. If these MOJ proposals are enacted, the plight of Taiwan’s defense lawyers may begin to resemble that of their Chinese counterparts.
[轉載]在多元文化环境中创作音乐(updated)
轉載朋友接受的專訪. 真替他高興!
記得以前和他的一段對話聊到"中年轉業",那段對話可用一句做註解,是我從另一個轉業的朋友身上學到的,那就是: 找到喜歡的東西的時候,"死路"都很愉快的走!
==update==
video
---
BBC英伦网 玉川
来自台湾的音乐家庄承颖立志在英国传播中华文化。
旅居英国的华裔音乐家庄承颖来自台湾。他曾经在美国费城攻读景观建筑硕士学，但自幼对音乐的爱好使庄承颖走上音乐家之路。
2005年他来到英国伯明翰音乐学院攻读声乐表演，师从系主任男高音Julian Pike和次女高音Christine Cairns等，最后荣获声乐表演硕士学位，并成为一位难得的假声男高音。
近年来，庄承颖在英国举办和参加多次艺术演出，并与很多艺术家合作。最近，他又同艾米·麦克唐纳（Amy McDonnell）和谭颖两位年轻人携手，在伦敦组织了一场中国风实验演出，把中国传统音乐元素融入到多元文化的环境中。
这样一场以中国传统音乐为基调的音乐会，伦敦那些年轻的国际化的观众能接受吗？他在接受我的采访时有这样的解释：
选择其它媒体播放器
（庄承颖访谈摘录）
庄承颖：在组织和制作一台这类所谓“Fusion”音乐会（各种音乐融合在一起）时，我会对自己的西方古典音乐和中国传统音乐的背景比较注重。在跟其他文化背景的音乐家合作过程中，我认识到，在创作这种Fusion music时，保留不同的音乐风格和传统是很重要的。比如说，如果跟印度音乐家合作，我感到我们的音乐一定不仅要反映出中国音乐特征和西方古典音乐，也一定应该反映出印度音乐风格。我想，来欣赏这类音乐会的观众一定也期盼这样的音乐元素出现，听到不同音乐的冲突与和谐。所以在我们这场演出中，也会呈现出不同的音乐风格，例如爵士乐、中国音乐和西方前卫音乐等。
玉川：你跟这些不同文化背景的音乐家在合作当中有什么感想，愉快吗？
庄承颖：说实话，很多音乐家在考虑是否参加一场音乐会演出时都会考虑到经费问题。像这样一个由年轻人组织的经费很少的音乐会，我们这些参加演出的音乐家更多看重的是音乐会的实验和探索性质。大家可以说是志同道合，这么说吧，在合作过程中即使是争吵也是很开心的。
玉川：你觉得英国的音乐创作环境怎么样呢？
庄承颖：英国社会比较成熟，我们会开玩笑地说“没落的帝国”。但是“没落的帝国”有它文化沉稳的特点。在文化艺术方面有很健全的制度。另外一个不可忽视的因素是，当代伦敦是一个非常国际化、多元文化的都市，各种文化都能在伦敦并存和发展。虽然有时会使你产生没有依准的感觉，但同时你会感受到非常有趣和刺激的文化碰撞。所以我感到，在伦敦不仅可以保留自己的文化特征，而且还可以沉浸在多元文化之中，我是非常喜欢。
玉川：随着英国人对东方文化的了解日益增加，你觉得作为一个华人音乐家在这里创作音乐是不是大有天地呢？
庄承颖：我所追求的是音乐美的本身和沟通的感动。所以有时候我做事会比较固执或不计成本。我感到，不少西方人欣赏中国音乐不过是听听异国风情的音乐而已，但是我却想更向前推进一步，使中国音乐内涵同英国人的生活联系起来，以打动他们的内心。我感到的挫折是，很多中国音乐家都习惯于这种中国音乐的点缀功能，因此我感到有时跟中国音乐家合作比跟其他文化的音乐家合作更困难。我感到我的音乐努力虽然非常辛苦，但是很令人兴奋。
玉川：那你下一步打算是什么？
庄承颖：我已经有了演出和独奏会的基础。下一步我希望能使我的小小室内乐团能参加一些英国的音乐节，我们的这个室内乐团既有西方音乐本质，又包括声乐和中国器乐。我希望他们对我做出的既能打动中国人又能打动英国人的音乐努力感兴趣，引起一些回响，并邀请我们参加一些音乐节演出。
--------
行走在中西艺术之间 旅英华裔音乐家庄承颖的艺术人生
記得以前和他的一段對話聊到"中年轉業",那段對話可用一句做註解,是我從另一個轉業的朋友身上學到的,那就是: 找到喜歡的東西的時候,"死路"都很愉快的走!
==update==
video
---
BBC英伦网 玉川
来自台湾的音乐家庄承颖立志在英国传播中华文化。
旅居英国的华裔音乐家庄承颖来自台湾。他曾经在美国费城攻读景观建筑硕士学，但自幼对音乐的爱好使庄承颖走上音乐家之路。
2005年他来到英国伯明翰音乐学院攻读声乐表演，师从系主任男高音Julian Pike和次女高音Christine Cairns等，最后荣获声乐表演硕士学位，并成为一位难得的假声男高音。
近年来，庄承颖在英国举办和参加多次艺术演出，并与很多艺术家合作。最近，他又同艾米·麦克唐纳（Amy McDonnell）和谭颖两位年轻人携手，在伦敦组织了一场中国风实验演出，把中国传统音乐元素融入到多元文化的环境中。
这样一场以中国传统音乐为基调的音乐会，伦敦那些年轻的国际化的观众能接受吗？他在接受我的采访时有这样的解释：
选择其它媒体播放器
（庄承颖访谈摘录）
庄承颖：在组织和制作一台这类所谓“Fusion”音乐会（各种音乐融合在一起）时，我会对自己的西方古典音乐和中国传统音乐的背景比较注重。在跟其他文化背景的音乐家合作过程中，我认识到，在创作这种Fusion music时，保留不同的音乐风格和传统是很重要的。比如说，如果跟印度音乐家合作，我感到我们的音乐一定不仅要反映出中国音乐特征和西方古典音乐，也一定应该反映出印度音乐风格。我想，来欣赏这类音乐会的观众一定也期盼这样的音乐元素出现，听到不同音乐的冲突与和谐。所以在我们这场演出中，也会呈现出不同的音乐风格，例如爵士乐、中国音乐和西方前卫音乐等。
玉川：你跟这些不同文化背景的音乐家在合作当中有什么感想，愉快吗？
庄承颖：说实话，很多音乐家在考虑是否参加一场音乐会演出时都会考虑到经费问题。像这样一个由年轻人组织的经费很少的音乐会，我们这些参加演出的音乐家更多看重的是音乐会的实验和探索性质。大家可以说是志同道合，这么说吧，在合作过程中即使是争吵也是很开心的。
玉川：你觉得英国的音乐创作环境怎么样呢？
庄承颖：英国社会比较成熟，我们会开玩笑地说“没落的帝国”。但是“没落的帝国”有它文化沉稳的特点。在文化艺术方面有很健全的制度。另外一个不可忽视的因素是，当代伦敦是一个非常国际化、多元文化的都市，各种文化都能在伦敦并存和发展。虽然有时会使你产生没有依准的感觉，但同时你会感受到非常有趣和刺激的文化碰撞。所以我感到，在伦敦不仅可以保留自己的文化特征，而且还可以沉浸在多元文化之中，我是非常喜欢。
玉川：随着英国人对东方文化的了解日益增加，你觉得作为一个华人音乐家在这里创作音乐是不是大有天地呢？
庄承颖：我所追求的是音乐美的本身和沟通的感动。所以有时候我做事会比较固执或不计成本。我感到，不少西方人欣赏中国音乐不过是听听异国风情的音乐而已，但是我却想更向前推进一步，使中国音乐内涵同英国人的生活联系起来，以打动他们的内心。我感到的挫折是，很多中国音乐家都习惯于这种中国音乐的点缀功能，因此我感到有时跟中国音乐家合作比跟其他文化的音乐家合作更困难。我感到我的音乐努力虽然非常辛苦，但是很令人兴奋。
玉川：那你下一步打算是什么？
庄承颖：我已经有了演出和独奏会的基础。下一步我希望能使我的小小室内乐团能参加一些英国的音乐节，我们的这个室内乐团既有西方音乐本质，又包括声乐和中国器乐。我希望他们对我做出的既能打动中国人又能打动英国人的音乐努力感兴趣，引起一些回响，并邀请我们参加一些音乐节演出。
--------
行走在中西艺术之间 旅英华裔音乐家庄承颖的艺术人生
Monday, January 18, 2010
兩則新聞的雜感
我一直記得理則學老師說過,以辯論方式證明對方論點錯誤有三:其一,證明假設前提為非.其二證明推論過程錯誤.最後是另闢戰場. 當然第三者是非邏輯的論證.
在之前討論"有偏見的媒體不好嗎?"一文我試圖以檢視假設前提的方式來探討該文的結論是否適用於台灣.在另一文裡我也討論到現代法律下,基本假設應該是"無罪推定原則",也就是說除非證明被告有罪,否則被告無罪. 這是法律應有之基本精神,雖然冤獄難免,此基本精神下卻可以使冤獄降到最少.
可惜台灣法治似乎愈走愈倒退. 司法改革裡的諸多草案若成立,台灣坐實野蠻社會下所假設的"原罪"假設:除非證明清白,否則被告有(原)罪. 詳見下文明確提到之:The draft law also seems to validate the presumption of guilt. For example, one provision states that not-guilty verdicts in long-running cases should be final if the defendant is found innocent at three separate High Court retrials. What critics rightly wonder is why a defendant should have to be found innocent three times to be acquitted.
這種人權之侵害也呼應自由之家日前剛公佈的結果,台灣總體排名雖然不變,公民自由卻下降.
另一則新聞是前一篇白樂崎反駁季禮芬蘭說裏所提及的.季禮至少犯了兩個假設錯誤:第一個錯誤是假設台灣芬蘭化將促使中國民主化(Gilley’s misplaced assumption is that this process will somehow lead to democratization in China.).第二個錯誤是假設芬蘭當初芬蘭化是志願的,但歷史上實為無可奈何之選擇.也就是說,季禮假設芬蘭化是種自由意志的選項而與魁儡政權不同,但其實芬蘭化卻是毫無選擇後成為一個附庸國 (To start with, the perception that “Finlandization” enjoyed “wide support in Finland at the time.” The question is: did the Finnish people have much of a choice, with the Russian gun pointed at their head?).
最後扯到ECFA. 政府雖已拒絕公投,何不在公佈ECFA架構後,來個正反論辯呢? 當然,一切要符合邏輯,如果僅是另闢戰場似的口水戰就免了.
以下是關於台灣司改愈改愈回去的原文.
------
The backsliding of judicial reform
By Celia Llopis-jepsen 游思麗
Tuesday, Jan 19, 2010, Page 8
You’ve probably heard of the Hsichih Trio. What you probably haven’t heard is that this case and others like it helped precipitate one of the most important judicial reforms in Taiwan’s history — amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002.
As a result, should you now find yourself to be a defendant in a criminal case, you have rights in presenting your side of the story that the three young men arrested in 1991 did not have.
But those rights are not enough.
A case in point: Even now, a defendant in a civil case that goes to the Supreme Court is entitled to a public defender, but a defendant facing more serious criminal charges — even leading to the death penalty — is not.
There is no justification for this, but there is an explanation. Historically, the courts have presumed defendants in criminal cases to be guilty until proven innocent. Their rights, and the risk of wrongful conviction, were not a concern.
Legal reforms in the past 10 years have tried to change that, but this mentality is reflected in parts of the law to this day.
Last week, Freedom House lowered Taiwan’s civil liberties rating in its annual Freedom in the World report, citing in part the inadequate protection of defendants’ rights in criminal cases, and naming as an example a “high-profile murder case” — perhaps a reference to the Chiou Ho-shun (邱和順) or Hsu Tzu-chiang (徐自強) cases, both of which saw fresh convictions in retrials last year.
Let’s flesh this out a little. What we should say, and the reason Freedom House was right to lower its rating, is that despite a momentous overhaul of the courts eight years ago that was designed to address this problem, the institutional capacity to abuse defendants’ rights remains.
Recent proposals to amend the law further indicate that legal reform may take a turn for the worse. If the proposals from the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Yuan proceed, we should no longer be concerned that reform has slowed; we should worry instead that it may be backsliding. The presumption of guilt seems to be gaining legitimacy again, despite years of efforts to root it out.
In 1999, disgust over cases like the Hsichih Trio came to a head. A landmark National Judicial Reform Congress that had been called to outline steps toward a fairer judiciary proposed divesting judges of their investigative powers and strengthening the position of the defendant in court.
Three years later, amendments to Articles 161 and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were passed, and with that, Taiwan’s courts adopted a modified adversarial system. Before then, they used an inquisitorial system — often associated with continental Europe — rather than the adversarial system of Britain, the US and other places where English law has left its mark. Taiwan’s system now is a version of the latter.
The difference is this: Judges today are expected to listen impartially and passively to two sides of a case — one presented by the defense, one by the prosecution. (Before 2002, judges played the role of prosecutor, investigating the case themselves. Prosecutors indicted suspects, but did not have to attend court hearings.) The defense, meanwhile, is allowed to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses and question interpretations of forensic evidence.
The spirit of the change was that the prosecution and the defense should enjoy the same status in court and have the same opportunities to make their case, while the judge should not be in direct conflict with the defendant.
The inquisitorial system may work well in some countries, but it was not working well in Taiwan 10 years ago, when the country began mulling these changes.
Taiwan was a young democracy, only recently emerged from the world’s longest period of martial law; a country where judges were not required to have law degrees, but were trained by an authoritarian regime.
The shockingly weak case against the Hsichih Trio, among others, said it all: The courts could not be trusted to dispense even-handed justice.
For this reason, the year 2002 was a victory for judicial reform advocates. But it wasn’t a miracle. Changing the law took Taiwan a few years — but what about changing court culture?
Eight years down the line, defense lawyers are not always on an equal footing with prosecutors, while judges at times may slip out of their redefined roles. And as for the presumption of innocence, there is cause to believe that the Hsichih Trio, Chiou and Hsu are still at trial so many years after their cases began not because they have been proven to be guilty, but because they have not been proven to be innocent.
These are some of the obstacles the judiciary is still struggling with — and now the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Yuan risk making the process even harder.
In October, the Judicial Yuan passed the Fair and Speedy Criminal Trials Act (刑事妥速審判法), which, if approved by the legislature, could prevent defendants who have been wrongfully detained for many years from receiving damages under the Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice Act (冤獄賠償法).
The draft law also seems to validate the presumption of guilt. For example, one provision states that not-guilty verdicts in long-running cases should be final if the defendant is found innocent at three separate High Court retrials. What critics rightly wonder is why a defendant should have to be found innocent three times to be acquitted.
The justice ministry, meanwhile, is mulling changes to the Criminal Code that are no better. These include, but are not limited to:
‧ Restrictions on “inappropriately” publicizing details of court cases (likely to have a chilling effect on journalists, civic groups and lawyers).
‧ Barring lawyers and defendants from “disobeying the orders of judges and prosecutors” or “speaking inappropriate words” to them.
‧ Extending the perjury law to encompass defendants, barring them from “concealing evidence” and threatening lawyers with up to seven years’ prison for abetting perjury.
‧ Barring lawyers from “harassing” witnesses.
(These changes are explained in the Taipei Times reports “MOJ proposal sparks concern among lawyers,” Dec. 18, page 1, and “Bar association attacks MOJ plans,” Jan. 5, page 3.)
The proposal has academics and lawyers crying foul, warning that the amendment would infringe on the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself, while intimidating lawyers out of putting together the best possible defense for their client.
Can the defense and prosecution enjoy equal footing if defendants and lawyers are bound under penalty of imprisonment to obey prosecutors’ “orders”?
The justice ministry and Judicial Yuan proposals may not threaten the distinct roles for judges and prosecutors set out under the adversarial system, but they could subvert the spirit of the system by validating the presumption of guilt and weakening defendants’ rights.
Articles 154 and 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure state that every defendant shall be presumed innocent until proven otherwise, that guilt can only be proven through evidence and that absent this evidence, the defendant shall be acquitted.
Ask judicial reform experts what it will take for these principles to be applied consistently in Taiwan’s courts and some of them just shake their heads.
“A new generation of judges” is a common answer.
In other words, progress is not just a matter of changing the law — it takes time, too.
But in the meantime, is it too much to ask that the justice ministry and the Judicial Yuan refrain from making things worse?
Celia Llopis-Jepsen is an editor at the Taipei Times.
在之前討論"有偏見的媒體不好嗎?"一文我試圖以檢視假設前提的方式來探討該文的結論是否適用於台灣.在另一文裡我也討論到現代法律下,基本假設應該是"無罪推定原則",也就是說除非證明被告有罪,否則被告無罪. 這是法律應有之基本精神,雖然冤獄難免,此基本精神下卻可以使冤獄降到最少.
可惜台灣法治似乎愈走愈倒退. 司法改革裡的諸多草案若成立,台灣坐實野蠻社會下所假設的"原罪"假設:除非證明清白,否則被告有(原)罪. 詳見下文明確提到之:The draft law also seems to validate the presumption of guilt. For example, one provision states that not-guilty verdicts in long-running cases should be final if the defendant is found innocent at three separate High Court retrials. What critics rightly wonder is why a defendant should have to be found innocent three times to be acquitted.
這種人權之侵害也呼應自由之家日前剛公佈的結果,台灣總體排名雖然不變,公民自由卻下降.
另一則新聞是前一篇白樂崎反駁季禮芬蘭說裏所提及的.季禮至少犯了兩個假設錯誤:第一個錯誤是假設台灣芬蘭化將促使中國民主化(Gilley’s misplaced assumption is that this process will somehow lead to democratization in China.).第二個錯誤是假設芬蘭當初芬蘭化是志願的,但歷史上實為無可奈何之選擇.也就是說,季禮假設芬蘭化是種自由意志的選項而與魁儡政權不同,但其實芬蘭化卻是毫無選擇後成為一個附庸國 (To start with, the perception that “Finlandization” enjoyed “wide support in Finland at the time.” The question is: did the Finnish people have much of a choice, with the Russian gun pointed at their head?).
最後扯到ECFA. 政府雖已拒絕公投,何不在公佈ECFA架構後,來個正反論辯呢? 當然,一切要符合邏輯,如果僅是另闢戰場似的口水戰就免了.
以下是關於台灣司改愈改愈回去的原文.
------
The backsliding of judicial reform
By Celia Llopis-jepsen 游思麗
Tuesday, Jan 19, 2010, Page 8
You’ve probably heard of the Hsichih Trio. What you probably haven’t heard is that this case and others like it helped precipitate one of the most important judicial reforms in Taiwan’s history — amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002.
As a result, should you now find yourself to be a defendant in a criminal case, you have rights in presenting your side of the story that the three young men arrested in 1991 did not have.
But those rights are not enough.
A case in point: Even now, a defendant in a civil case that goes to the Supreme Court is entitled to a public defender, but a defendant facing more serious criminal charges — even leading to the death penalty — is not.
There is no justification for this, but there is an explanation. Historically, the courts have presumed defendants in criminal cases to be guilty until proven innocent. Their rights, and the risk of wrongful conviction, were not a concern.
Legal reforms in the past 10 years have tried to change that, but this mentality is reflected in parts of the law to this day.
Last week, Freedom House lowered Taiwan’s civil liberties rating in its annual Freedom in the World report, citing in part the inadequate protection of defendants’ rights in criminal cases, and naming as an example a “high-profile murder case” — perhaps a reference to the Chiou Ho-shun (邱和順) or Hsu Tzu-chiang (徐自強) cases, both of which saw fresh convictions in retrials last year.
Let’s flesh this out a little. What we should say, and the reason Freedom House was right to lower its rating, is that despite a momentous overhaul of the courts eight years ago that was designed to address this problem, the institutional capacity to abuse defendants’ rights remains.
Recent proposals to amend the law further indicate that legal reform may take a turn for the worse. If the proposals from the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Yuan proceed, we should no longer be concerned that reform has slowed; we should worry instead that it may be backsliding. The presumption of guilt seems to be gaining legitimacy again, despite years of efforts to root it out.
In 1999, disgust over cases like the Hsichih Trio came to a head. A landmark National Judicial Reform Congress that had been called to outline steps toward a fairer judiciary proposed divesting judges of their investigative powers and strengthening the position of the defendant in court.
Three years later, amendments to Articles 161 and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were passed, and with that, Taiwan’s courts adopted a modified adversarial system. Before then, they used an inquisitorial system — often associated with continental Europe — rather than the adversarial system of Britain, the US and other places where English law has left its mark. Taiwan’s system now is a version of the latter.
The difference is this: Judges today are expected to listen impartially and passively to two sides of a case — one presented by the defense, one by the prosecution. (Before 2002, judges played the role of prosecutor, investigating the case themselves. Prosecutors indicted suspects, but did not have to attend court hearings.) The defense, meanwhile, is allowed to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses and question interpretations of forensic evidence.
The spirit of the change was that the prosecution and the defense should enjoy the same status in court and have the same opportunities to make their case, while the judge should not be in direct conflict with the defendant.
The inquisitorial system may work well in some countries, but it was not working well in Taiwan 10 years ago, when the country began mulling these changes.
Taiwan was a young democracy, only recently emerged from the world’s longest period of martial law; a country where judges were not required to have law degrees, but were trained by an authoritarian regime.
The shockingly weak case against the Hsichih Trio, among others, said it all: The courts could not be trusted to dispense even-handed justice.
For this reason, the year 2002 was a victory for judicial reform advocates. But it wasn’t a miracle. Changing the law took Taiwan a few years — but what about changing court culture?
Eight years down the line, defense lawyers are not always on an equal footing with prosecutors, while judges at times may slip out of their redefined roles. And as for the presumption of innocence, there is cause to believe that the Hsichih Trio, Chiou and Hsu are still at trial so many years after their cases began not because they have been proven to be guilty, but because they have not been proven to be innocent.
These are some of the obstacles the judiciary is still struggling with — and now the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Yuan risk making the process even harder.
In October, the Judicial Yuan passed the Fair and Speedy Criminal Trials Act (刑事妥速審判法), which, if approved by the legislature, could prevent defendants who have been wrongfully detained for many years from receiving damages under the Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice Act (冤獄賠償法).
The draft law also seems to validate the presumption of guilt. For example, one provision states that not-guilty verdicts in long-running cases should be final if the defendant is found innocent at three separate High Court retrials. What critics rightly wonder is why a defendant should have to be found innocent three times to be acquitted.
The justice ministry, meanwhile, is mulling changes to the Criminal Code that are no better. These include, but are not limited to:
‧ Restrictions on “inappropriately” publicizing details of court cases (likely to have a chilling effect on journalists, civic groups and lawyers).
‧ Barring lawyers and defendants from “disobeying the orders of judges and prosecutors” or “speaking inappropriate words” to them.
‧ Extending the perjury law to encompass defendants, barring them from “concealing evidence” and threatening lawyers with up to seven years’ prison for abetting perjury.
‧ Barring lawyers from “harassing” witnesses.
(These changes are explained in the Taipei Times reports “MOJ proposal sparks concern among lawyers,” Dec. 18, page 1, and “Bar association attacks MOJ plans,” Jan. 5, page 3.)
The proposal has academics and lawyers crying foul, warning that the amendment would infringe on the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself, while intimidating lawyers out of putting together the best possible defense for their client.
Can the defense and prosecution enjoy equal footing if defendants and lawyers are bound under penalty of imprisonment to obey prosecutors’ “orders”?
The justice ministry and Judicial Yuan proposals may not threaten the distinct roles for judges and prosecutors set out under the adversarial system, but they could subvert the spirit of the system by validating the presumption of guilt and weakening defendants’ rights.
Articles 154 and 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure state that every defendant shall be presumed innocent until proven otherwise, that guilt can only be proven through evidence and that absent this evidence, the defendant shall be acquitted.
Ask judicial reform experts what it will take for these principles to be applied consistently in Taiwan’s courts and some of them just shake their heads.
“A new generation of judges” is a common answer.
In other words, progress is not just a matter of changing the law — it takes time, too.
But in the meantime, is it too much to ask that the justice ministry and the Judicial Yuan refrain from making things worse?
Celia Llopis-Jepsen is an editor at the Taipei Times.
Sunday, January 17, 2010
轉載: Gilley’s ‘Finlandization’ is wrong (白樂崎:季禮的芬蘭化是錯誤的)(全文中英對照) (updated on 1/25)
前陣子季禮的芬蘭化引起討論.前AIT主席白樂崎對該文提出反駁. 我翻譯後對照中英文全文如下.
另:芬蘭化全文
=update on 1/25==
不是我要說嘴, 這篇文章竟然慢了一整個禮拜才刊出(《白樂崎專欄》 誰說「海峽不太危急」),真有爭取時效的事情的話,一個禮拜都不知道演變成怎樣了! 不過我猜遲到總比不到好? 媒體刊載總是比我這種沒人看自己寫爽的小格張貼有影響力多了!
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Gilley’s ‘Finlandization’ is wrong
白樂崎:季禮的芬蘭化是錯誤的
By Nat Bellocchi
Monday, Jan 18, 2010, Page 8
The relations between Taiwan, the US and China have given rise to many an academic analysis. This is understandable and even laudable: The network of relations is complex and is open to various interpretations and insights. Many past treatises have made valuable contributions to the understanding of developments between the three countries.
台灣,美國與中國之間的關係引發許多學術分析.這不但是可以了解甚至是值得嘉勉的:(國際)關係組成的網路複雜,容許各種解讀與見解. 過去已有許多論文幫助我們了解這三個國家之間關係的發展.
However, once every so often an academic publishes an analysis that is so far removed from reality that it would be dismissed out of hand for its lack of understanding and its outright naivite. Bruce Gilley’s article, titled “Not So Dire Straits” — published in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs (January/February 2010) — is such a work.
然而,偶爾會有或是缺乏對現實的了解,亦或是過於天真而有偏離現實的學術研究發表,我們大可以忽略此類不切實際的發表.季禮發表在國際事務(Foreign Affairs)一二月刊,標題為"不再迫切的台灣海峽"就屬此類.
Gilley’s basic thesis is that the present “rapprochement” between Taiwan and China opens the way for the “Finlandization” of Taiwan, and for the US to allow Taiwan to move from the present US strategic orbit towards China’s sphere of influence. Gilley’s misplaced assumption is that this process will somehow lead to democratization in China.
季禮的根本主張是台灣與中國間的和解打開台灣芬蘭化的這條通路,如此一來美國可允許台灣離開美國戰略軸心繼而往中國靠攏.季禮錯誤的假設台灣芬蘭化的過程將促使中國民主化.
Gilley’s misconceptions are multiple, so in a brief essay like this one can only touch on a few major points.
季禮的錯誤認知不僅於此,本文將簡短談論幾個重點.
To start with, the perception that “Finlandization” enjoyed “wide support in Finland at the time.” The question is: did the Finnish people have much of a choice, with the Russian gun pointed at their head?
首先是關於"芬蘭化"受到"當時多數芬蘭人的廣泛支持"的觀點,問題是:當俄羅斯以槍桿對準他們(芬蘭人)的頭,芬蘭人能有多少選擇?
A second general point is one of historical accuracy: Gilley writes that in 1949 “Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities.” The truth of the matter is that Taiwan — as a Japanese colony — had been a separate entity for some 50 years, while before that period the influence of the Chinese imperial governments on the island was minimal at best.
第二(個錯誤)是關於歷史正確性:季禮寫到,在1949年"台灣和中國成為兩個獨立的政治實體". 事實是台灣,一個日本殖民地,中國清朝對台灣的影響即使在日本殖民那五十年前也非常小,如果真有任何影響可言.
The problem arose when the defeated Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was driven out of China and landed in Taiwan, treating it like occupied territory. It is also incorrect to say “most of the international community came to accept Beijing’s claim to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan.” This was only the case for pro-Beijing regimes of the likes of Zimbabwe and the Sudan. The US and other Western nations only “noted” or “acknowledged” Beijing’s claims, but took the position that it remained an unresolved issue, and that the island’s future needed to be determined in accordance with the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty.
問題在於戰敗的國民黨撤退到台灣,把台灣是為自己的土地進而佔領. (季禮)所謂的"國際社會大致上已接受北京政府宣稱對台擁有主權"的說法也不正確. 這僅對親中政權如辛巴威與蘇丹而言.美國與其他西方國家僅僅"注意"或是"承認"北京有此宣稱,但對此採取"有待解決"的立場,而且台灣的未來也必須以符合1952年舊金山合約的方式解決.
But the most serious fallacy of the article is that it posits that a Chamberlain-like appeasement of China on the Taiwan issue will somehow democratize and pacify a rising China rather than embolden it. That is a fundamental misconception: Repressive regimes are never mollified by concessions; it only increases their appetite.
但最嚴重的謬誤在於該文裡提議在台灣議題上對中國採取一種類似內務,姑息靖綏主義的方將或多或少促進民主,安撫興起中的中國而不會促使北京更加大膽妄為. 這是個根本的錯誤: 退讓從不會安撫高壓政權,相反的,(姑息)只會讓中國食髓知味(它胃口更大). (按:在季禮芬蘭化一文中提到:Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion."芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大").
It would be a fundamental error to sacrifice the hard-won achievements of a vibrant and democratic Taiwan and let it drift into an uncertain, fuzzy “principled neutrality.”
犧牲得來不易的民主台灣,讓它向不確定地,含糊的原則性中立靠攏將是個根本的錯誤.
Gilley wants us to believe that there is a distinction between this “Finland-style” status and “cowering acquiescence” as he calls it. An authoritarian power like China is hardly likely to be bothered by such finessing, and will remove any opposition to its rule; Tibet and East Turkestan are rather illustrative examples.
季禮要我們相信(志願性的)芬蘭化(Finland-style status)與(非志願性的)魁儡政權之間有所不同.極權國家如中國才懶得區分這種不同,並且會移除不利其政權的任何異議.圖博(西藏)與東土耳其斯坦(新疆)就是最好的例證.
(按:關於芬蘭化與魁儡政權之不同,見原文:Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make.Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.)
Gilley also argues that China’s claims to Taiwan may be less motivated “nationalism and … a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness,” and more by a geostrategic rationale: By virtue of its location, Taiwan has strategic importance, and by bringing it into its sphere of influence it could enhance its ability to project its naval power, and thereby exert its influence in the Western Pacific.
季禮還宣稱,中國宣稱擁有台灣並不是出自於民族主義的理由,而是基於地理位置鄰近使然: 就地理位置來看,台灣具戰略重要性,將台灣納入將強化中國在西太平洋的海軍與影響力.
On this point he is correct: Taiwan has tremendous strategic importance, not only for Japan and South Korea, but also for US interests in the East Asia and Pacific region. And this is precisely the reason why it was most wise for the US to stand by Taiwan in recently offering it anti-missile technology.
在這點上季禮是正確的:台灣在戰略上非常重要,不只是對日韓而言,對美國在東亞與太平洋利益而言亦然. 正因此,美國更應該固守立場,美國最近提供台灣飛彈防禦系統最為明智之舉.
From the perspective of the Taiwanese, a drift in China’s direction would mean a loss of the freedom and democracy they worked so hard to achieve. US credibility around the world — and particularly in East Asia — does depend on its adherence to the basic principles for which we stand. Allowing a free and democratic Taiwan to slide into the sphere of influence of an authoritarian China is not acceptable.
從台灣的角度還看,傾中意味著喪失得來不易的自由與民主.美國在世界,特別在東亞的信譽在於堅守基本立場.允許台灣向集權中國靠攏是不可接受的.
Thus, instead of “Finlandization” of Taiwan, the US should pursue a policy of stronger engagement with Taiwan by helping the country defend itself against a belligerent neighbor, and by signing a free-trade agreement to strengthen US economic and political ties with that democratic nation. Only by bringing Taiwan into the international family of nations, can real stability in East Asia be achieved.
因此,與其讓台灣芬蘭化,美國應該更積極介入,以幫助台灣防衛以對抗它的好戰的鄰近強國(指中國)的方式,以簽署自由貿易協定的方式來加強台灣與美國的政經關係.為有讓台灣參予國際社會才能讓東亞地區情勢穩固.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
==update on 1/20==
這裡有其他反駁芬蘭說意見的幾個連結.
Taking path of Finland could leave Taiwan cold By Chen Yi-nan 陳逸南
Forget Finland, think Hong Kong By Huang Chih-ta 黃致達 Wednesday, Jan 13, 2010, Page 8
THE LIBERTY TIMES EDITORIAL: Taiwan must uphold sovereignty Monday, Jan 04, 2010, Page 8
另:芬蘭化全文
=update on 1/25==
不是我要說嘴, 這篇文章竟然慢了一整個禮拜才刊出(《白樂崎專欄》 誰說「海峽不太危急」),真有爭取時效的事情的話,一個禮拜都不知道演變成怎樣了! 不過我猜遲到總比不到好? 媒體刊載總是比我這種沒人看自己寫爽的小格張貼有影響力多了!
------
Gilley’s ‘Finlandization’ is wrong
白樂崎:季禮的芬蘭化是錯誤的
By Nat Bellocchi
Monday, Jan 18, 2010, Page 8
The relations between Taiwan, the US and China have given rise to many an academic analysis. This is understandable and even laudable: The network of relations is complex and is open to various interpretations and insights. Many past treatises have made valuable contributions to the understanding of developments between the three countries.
台灣,美國與中國之間的關係引發許多學術分析.這不但是可以了解甚至是值得嘉勉的:(國際)關係組成的網路複雜,容許各種解讀與見解. 過去已有許多論文幫助我們了解這三個國家之間關係的發展.
However, once every so often an academic publishes an analysis that is so far removed from reality that it would be dismissed out of hand for its lack of understanding and its outright naivite. Bruce Gilley’s article, titled “Not So Dire Straits” — published in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs (January/February 2010) — is such a work.
然而,偶爾會有或是缺乏對現實的了解,亦或是過於天真而有偏離現實的學術研究發表,我們大可以忽略此類不切實際的發表.季禮發表在國際事務(Foreign Affairs)一二月刊,標題為"不再迫切的台灣海峽"就屬此類.
Gilley’s basic thesis is that the present “rapprochement” between Taiwan and China opens the way for the “Finlandization” of Taiwan, and for the US to allow Taiwan to move from the present US strategic orbit towards China’s sphere of influence. Gilley’s misplaced assumption is that this process will somehow lead to democratization in China.
季禮的根本主張是台灣與中國間的和解打開台灣芬蘭化的這條通路,如此一來美國可允許台灣離開美國戰略軸心繼而往中國靠攏.季禮錯誤的假設台灣芬蘭化的過程將促使中國民主化.
Gilley’s misconceptions are multiple, so in a brief essay like this one can only touch on a few major points.
季禮的錯誤認知不僅於此,本文將簡短談論幾個重點.
To start with, the perception that “Finlandization” enjoyed “wide support in Finland at the time.” The question is: did the Finnish people have much of a choice, with the Russian gun pointed at their head?
首先是關於"芬蘭化"受到"當時多數芬蘭人的廣泛支持"的觀點,問題是:當俄羅斯以槍桿對準他們(芬蘭人)的頭,芬蘭人能有多少選擇?
A second general point is one of historical accuracy: Gilley writes that in 1949 “Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities.” The truth of the matter is that Taiwan — as a Japanese colony — had been a separate entity for some 50 years, while before that period the influence of the Chinese imperial governments on the island was minimal at best.
第二(個錯誤)是關於歷史正確性:季禮寫到,在1949年"台灣和中國成為兩個獨立的政治實體". 事實是台灣,一個日本殖民地,中國清朝對台灣的影響即使在日本殖民那五十年前也非常小,如果真有任何影響可言.
The problem arose when the defeated Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was driven out of China and landed in Taiwan, treating it like occupied territory. It is also incorrect to say “most of the international community came to accept Beijing’s claim to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan.” This was only the case for pro-Beijing regimes of the likes of Zimbabwe and the Sudan. The US and other Western nations only “noted” or “acknowledged” Beijing’s claims, but took the position that it remained an unresolved issue, and that the island’s future needed to be determined in accordance with the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty.
問題在於戰敗的國民黨撤退到台灣,把台灣是為自己的土地進而佔領. (季禮)所謂的"國際社會大致上已接受北京政府宣稱對台擁有主權"的說法也不正確. 這僅對親中政權如辛巴威與蘇丹而言.美國與其他西方國家僅僅"注意"或是"承認"北京有此宣稱,但對此採取"有待解決"的立場,而且台灣的未來也必須以符合1952年舊金山合約的方式解決.
But the most serious fallacy of the article is that it posits that a Chamberlain-like appeasement of China on the Taiwan issue will somehow democratize and pacify a rising China rather than embolden it. That is a fundamental misconception: Repressive regimes are never mollified by concessions; it only increases their appetite.
但最嚴重的謬誤在於該文裡提議在台灣議題上對中國採取一種類似內務,姑息靖綏主義的方將或多或少促進民主,安撫興起中的中國而不會促使北京更加大膽妄為. 這是個根本的錯誤: 退讓從不會安撫高壓政權,相反的,(姑息)只會讓中國食髓知味(它胃口更大). (按:在季禮芬蘭化一文中提到:Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion."芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大").
It would be a fundamental error to sacrifice the hard-won achievements of a vibrant and democratic Taiwan and let it drift into an uncertain, fuzzy “principled neutrality.”
犧牲得來不易的民主台灣,讓它向不確定地,含糊的原則性中立靠攏將是個根本的錯誤.
Gilley wants us to believe that there is a distinction between this “Finland-style” status and “cowering acquiescence” as he calls it. An authoritarian power like China is hardly likely to be bothered by such finessing, and will remove any opposition to its rule; Tibet and East Turkestan are rather illustrative examples.
季禮要我們相信(志願性的)芬蘭化(Finland-style status)與(非志願性的)魁儡政權之間有所不同.極權國家如中國才懶得區分這種不同,並且會移除不利其政權的任何異議.圖博(西藏)與東土耳其斯坦(新疆)就是最好的例證.
(按:關於芬蘭化與魁儡政權之不同,見原文:Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make.Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.)
Gilley also argues that China’s claims to Taiwan may be less motivated “nationalism and … a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness,” and more by a geostrategic rationale: By virtue of its location, Taiwan has strategic importance, and by bringing it into its sphere of influence it could enhance its ability to project its naval power, and thereby exert its influence in the Western Pacific.
季禮還宣稱,中國宣稱擁有台灣並不是出自於民族主義的理由,而是基於地理位置鄰近使然: 就地理位置來看,台灣具戰略重要性,將台灣納入將強化中國在西太平洋的海軍與影響力.
On this point he is correct: Taiwan has tremendous strategic importance, not only for Japan and South Korea, but also for US interests in the East Asia and Pacific region. And this is precisely the reason why it was most wise for the US to stand by Taiwan in recently offering it anti-missile technology.
在這點上季禮是正確的:台灣在戰略上非常重要,不只是對日韓而言,對美國在東亞與太平洋利益而言亦然. 正因此,美國更應該固守立場,美國最近提供台灣飛彈防禦系統最為明智之舉.
From the perspective of the Taiwanese, a drift in China’s direction would mean a loss of the freedom and democracy they worked so hard to achieve. US credibility around the world — and particularly in East Asia — does depend on its adherence to the basic principles for which we stand. Allowing a free and democratic Taiwan to slide into the sphere of influence of an authoritarian China is not acceptable.
從台灣的角度還看,傾中意味著喪失得來不易的自由與民主.美國在世界,特別在東亞的信譽在於堅守基本立場.允許台灣向集權中國靠攏是不可接受的.
Thus, instead of “Finlandization” of Taiwan, the US should pursue a policy of stronger engagement with Taiwan by helping the country defend itself against a belligerent neighbor, and by signing a free-trade agreement to strengthen US economic and political ties with that democratic nation. Only by bringing Taiwan into the international family of nations, can real stability in East Asia be achieved.
因此,與其讓台灣芬蘭化,美國應該更積極介入,以幫助台灣防衛以對抗它的好戰的鄰近強國(指中國)的方式,以簽署自由貿易協定的方式來加強台灣與美國的政經關係.為有讓台灣參予國際社會才能讓東亞地區情勢穩固.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
==update on 1/20==
這裡有其他反駁芬蘭說意見的幾個連結.
Taking path of Finland could leave Taiwan cold By Chen Yi-nan 陳逸南
Forget Finland, think Hong Kong By Huang Chih-ta 黃致達 Wednesday, Jan 13, 2010, Page 8
THE LIBERTY TIMES EDITORIAL: Taiwan must uphold sovereignty Monday, Jan 04, 2010, Page 8
Saturday, January 16, 2010
拋磚引玉(1): 關於德布西的前奏曲
這其實是前一陣子的對話了. 話說咖啡館裡有人問我有沒有德布西前奏曲的推荐版本. 事實上德布西並不在我喜歡的作曲家之列, 雖然對他的音樂有接觸, 談不上喜歡, 所以有了以下的文字. 過了幾天,突然想到可以去問問瓦哈哈的觀點, 結果就引來一長串的討論.
在此我只貼出我原先的文字, 穿插其他人對該版本的一些看法. 文後則提供瓦哈拉原文的連結. 我很喜歡這種對話. 基本上,我的觀點完全是從樂曲結構與樂派切入, 這大概和我算是半個學院派出身有關. 瓦哈拉則是從他鋼琴美學欣賞的角度出發,因此原文一開始(在第二段)他先提供他個人欣賞的偏好. 有興趣的人可以看看在特定鋼琴欣賞美學下對我就結構出發提到的各版本有什麼看法.
附帶一提, 被追問兩個版本,分別是Francois（富蘭索瓦）與 Haas的版本. 我把相關對話也編輯進去。
以下.
----
我: 先說,德布西不算是我喜歡的作曲家(我是LKK派的),所以我對他的音樂沒有特別研究,當然就遑論版本比較了!
瓦: 先說明我欣賞鋼琴獨奏錄音的美學觀點。對傳統的曲目（像貝多芬蕭邦）我對錄音音質很不挑剔，所以我會聽Schnabel的貝多芬奏鳴曲或是Lipatti甚至更古早的鋼琴家彈蕭邦。當然我會有點介意演奏技巧，但是我更在乎的是感情與整體感覺。但是對於像Debussy或Ravel，我會非常在乎音色明暗的微妙變化與動態對比，所以我幾乎無法接受音質太差的錄音。聽Debussy時我比較唯物，其他傳統音樂則較唯心。
我: 所以我不付責任的想法是,先說前奏曲這種玩意兒好了.蕭邦和德布西都曾經用24種大小調來寫前奏曲. 好了,我很落俗套的,就是喜歡浪漫的蕭邦寫的前奏曲,相對下實在對於德布西的前奏曲有點,ㄟ,不那嚜喜歡. 所以就曲式上,我個人非常喜歡玻里尼彈奏的蕭邦曲目,所以如果玻里尼也有彈奏德布希的前奏曲,也許可以一試.
瓦: Pollini的Book 1我不怎麼喜歡。我覺得那好像也是有點缺乏想像力的演奏，而且錄音的音質有點怪，鋼琴的音色有點悶暗，也有點缺乏動態，像是在音樂廳頂樓後段最低價的座位聽到的鋼琴。
我: 其次,如果就德布希屬於的樂派來講,我個人偏見是德布希的音樂比較適合很有個性的處理方法.也就是說那種中規中舉的鋼琴演奏家,或是小心翼翼的,我大概就不會推薦去嚐試.我心目中想到兩者:齊瑪曼或是李希特的版本,如果他們有錄音的話.我相信前者應該有.後者我不是那嚜有把握(可能得問他的粉絲RICHTER大),我只知道李希特錄過德布希的其他曲目.
順便一提,我非常喜歡齊瑪曼,去年吧曾經在自己的部落格講過他一二事.
瓦: 我也不是一開始就喜歡Ravel和Debussy，不過他們的管弦樂很容易被接受，我花了些時間才開始喜歡他們的鋼琴，因為和我原先聽得多的浪漫派鋼琴曲完全不同。
如果硬要區分的話，我想我比較喜歡Ravel的管弦樂，Debussy的鋼琴。前奏曲是非常有趣的東西，幾乎每個能成一家之言的鋼琴家演奏都有很大的差異。我覺得彈Debussy大概需要很有想像力和創意，以及精確的執行能力。
Richter其實幾乎彈全了前奏曲，但是他從不彈任何全集。最玩整的錄音應該是這個版本：Debussy: Preludes; L'Isle joyeuse; Chopin: Ballade No. 3; Scherzo No. 4; Etc.，算了算缺的只有Book 1 #8 (no surprise at all) 以及#12 Minstrel。歷史錄音，音效相當不好，但我願意接受。Richter的演奏向來極有個性，沒什麼中庸路線。Book 1我聽得比較熟，他的#9有點諧謔的開頭節奏，以及#10中間”鐘聲”的神奇效果，都讓我印象很深刻。我在台灣買到另一個罕見的版本是Richter在60年代巴黎的音樂會，包括了一首海頓的sonata和四首前奏曲（Book 1 #6, #7, #9, #10）。那張Vanguard出的CD錄音比較好，也是我所知唯二的Richter Sunken Cathedral錄音。
Zimerman的錄音是非常難得的演奏超一流而且錄音又正確無比，很難想像DG也能錄出這樣的水準。看過一篇焦元浦的訪問，這錄音花了很長的時間不說，Zimerman還參與錄音後製技術工作，並且親自確認製作出的錄音在音響上重播的音效音質與現場無異。這套CD的動態極大，是觀眾席前排的音色。Zimerman不但演奏技巧超級而且很有想像力，Book 1 #5以鋼琴竟能做出類似撥弦的音效，#6表現出如萬徑人蹤滅般孤寂的無聲之聲，#10的莊嚴肅穆雍容，是我在任何其他錄音中沒聽到過的。
R：這裡有Ｒｉｃｔｈｅｒ的大全。我比較能接受的法國作曲家是拉威爾。這是野田妹彈過的拉威爾, Richter 50年代的錄音更猛 .
D: Debussy 跟 Ravel 的感覺，我心中一直認為 Debussy的音樂比較圓滑平順些，而Ravel 比較angular一點。在Ravel的許多鋼琴曲中，可以很明顯得感覺出 曲子所需要的技巧部份。
我記得我大一的台灣室友的 Debussy Preludes也是 Zimerman的，我也很喜歡。
粽: 我是被德布西的棕髮少女給迷住了，耳熟能詳的旋律，應該不算太脫離浪漫樂派。
我: 德布西不是我喜歡的作曲家, 他的作品,我比較歡貝加瑪斯克組曲裡一些曲目.
瓦: 我不那麼喜歡Debussy旋律太明白的曲子，像棕髮少女，月光。這些改編成其他樂器演奏（像小提琴或管弦樂）效果也很好，但是旋律太動聽像沙龍音樂。
我: 再來就是我個人怪癖.我ㄧ向偏愛(這是試過多次之後的歸納)演奏者與作曲家是同一個國家,如果是這樣的話,那我會推薦Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的版本. 先前才去現場聽過Thibaudet演奏同屬法國,印象樂派的拉威爾曲目(同樣的,拉威爾也不是我那麼喜歡的作曲家),印象非常深刻.如果他以相同功力演奏德布希作品,應該也會很出色. 印象中迪卡有他的錄音.
K: 同國藉的話，好像應該推一下最常被推的 Francois（富蘭索瓦）吧 ?
我: Francois我沒聽過,我沒辦法推薦我沒聽過的人. 我是說,我沒聽過任何他的錄音,也沒聽過他的現場(廢話,他走的時候我還沒出生啊). 完全沒接觸還推薦的話才真的是不付責任喔. 另,他被我歸在半個法國人 因為他不是法國出身滴,最先接受音樂教育也不是在法國.
我之所以推薦Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的版本,就是因為在此(現場)聽了他彈奏的拉威爾鏡子組曲,印象深刻才推薦的。拉威爾...我也不是很喜歡, 只有少數作品我能接受.會去聽那場Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的演奏會,的確是受到交響情人夢的影響.當天另外的曲目是布拉姆斯的鋼琴.兩種不同樂派放在一起彈奏真是很有趣的組合。離題了！
瓦：Francois的Chopin, Debussy, Ravel就算不能算絕品，至少也絕對是逸品。他有種特別的韻律感，有人用”醺然”來形容，雖然醺然聽起來像是喝醉酒或磕了藥。我覺得他的前奏曲”好像”有一點瑕疵，但是從頭聽來有種渾然天成的流暢感覺。
粽：那Haas的版本呢？
我：Ｈaas, 我也沒聽過, 不過他是Gieseking 的學生, 也許直接聽Gieseking的?
瓦：我發現我很喜歡Gieseking的Mozart，但是不喜歡他的Debussy。這是我最早買的Debussy Preludes CD，當初好像是因為日本樂評把它當經典。除了音質太差之外，我還覺得他彈得有點悶。我想”中庸”應該算是客氣又不失公平的評語。我想我也許該去找出當年看的樂評，看是不是我聽漏了什麼或是有什麼誤解。我最近剛買到LP，聲音比CD自然得太多了，但仍無助於讓我改變看法。
D: 我手邊也有 Gieseking 的學生 Werner Haas彈的一套，也是很中庸的彈法。因為自己也有 Val 的那一套 Francois 版，所以比較過，還是欣賞 Francois 的多一些。
這讓我剛好可以回應你所提到的，希望由同國家的音樂家演奏那個國家的作曲家的曲子。我記得很久前跟美國同學討論過這個問題，最後答案還是無解。他的觀點是，好的音樂應該是universal無國界。就像貝多芬的交響曲跟奏鳴曲，是偉大到任何人都應該可以欣賞跟表演。不過反過來說，民族樂派很強的曲子，不了解那文化的人，放進去的感情畢竟是不同的。我記得當初shaham 來台灣拉 梁祝的時候，去聽的同學都覺得缺少了什麼東西，可能就是那個對中國文化的體會。(自己沒去) ~~~~ 扯那麼多，要說的是，其實某些地方，我可以了解妳的出發點。
粽: 題外話，我有一個朋友，她主修鋼琴的，她研究所的老師就是俄國人，是一位嚴格的老先生，每次聽她彈蕭邦(波蘭算泛俄羅斯?)就搖頭，叫她要放感情，要放感情!!! 幾次以後，還是沒辦法到達老師的標準，老師失望地講了一句：You never know what we suffered...然後就叫她改彈 Bartok…
我: 我想那老師解釋了這種巧合(解釋了我的癖好)! ...不過我不確定我會把蕭邦算進去...
有些曲目的確是事隔多年後才會欣賞(或是就不欣賞了)我想這跟人生經歷還有當時心境有關吧? 像布拉姆斯的,我ㄧ開始還把他的某作品批評的一無事處, 真的是年輕時候不知天高地厚才會做的事啊 ...[1]
遠: 我對德布西的音樂不熟, 但是最近看東京奏鳴曲這部電影, 最後小男孩彈德布西的月光時, 眼淚不爭氣的掉下來了! 推薦大家看。
Tokyo Sonata - Claire de Lune (Debussy), 香川照之 (坂上之雲中的正岡子規), 小泉今日子主演, 坎城影展「一種注目」評審團大獎。
我: 這樣聽來那鍋東京奏鳴曲好像太催淚了...謝謝推薦(OR分享),我從來沒注意到這片.
我蠻好奇為什麼選月光這首來當結尾? 片名用奏鳴曲也很有趣.是因為奏鳴曲的曲式(各自獨立,但卻又是同一首曲子-->各自生活,但是同一家人)象徵的意義嗎? 無論如何,待看電影又增加一片了...
K: 小男孩的演出的確很感人。不過以年紀來說好像太過火了一些。雖然不知道東京奏鳴曲是什麼內容，不過這個小孩的情緒委實在太多...月光再怎麼亮也不會有「暴烈」的感覺吧...（月亮在月蝕的時候跑出來強烈抗議嗎）茲附大衛王演奏改編曲，以為柔和月光的參考。
我: 大衛王那版本有趣. 我之前才剛注意到四季有鋼琴版,這大衛王的小提琴版有異曲同工之妙. 不過月光可以很激烈啊!貝多芬的月光奏鳴曲是也. 這是巴倫玻音的版本(杜普雷的老公) (前面瓦哈拉曾經提到改編曲目)
遠: 東京奏鳴曲不算「催淚」片, 過程到結尾都不煽情。為什麼用月光呢? 應該劇組討論過的, 我一時間還想不到更適合的曲目, 看完片子後可以再來討論。
(拉回前奏曲)
瓦: 前奏曲如果只想聽一個版本的話，我會推薦Zimerman，因為錄音與演奏俱佳。
我: 粽, 看來齊瑪曼有兩票, 我和瓦哈拉各一票.
---------
延伸閱讀:
瓦哈拉的 德布西前奏曲與一些音樂討論
[1] 關於年輕時對布拉姆斯批評 的一段往事
==updated==
德布西前奏曲《阿納卡普里的丘陵》：風格?美學?詮釋
在此我只貼出我原先的文字, 穿插其他人對該版本的一些看法. 文後則提供瓦哈拉原文的連結. 我很喜歡這種對話. 基本上,我的觀點完全是從樂曲結構與樂派切入, 這大概和我算是半個學院派出身有關. 瓦哈拉則是從他鋼琴美學欣賞的角度出發,因此原文一開始(在第二段)他先提供他個人欣賞的偏好. 有興趣的人可以看看在特定鋼琴欣賞美學下對我就結構出發提到的各版本有什麼看法.
附帶一提, 被追問兩個版本,分別是Francois（富蘭索瓦）與 Haas的版本. 我把相關對話也編輯進去。
以下.
----
我: 先說,德布西不算是我喜歡的作曲家(我是LKK派的),所以我對他的音樂沒有特別研究,當然就遑論版本比較了!
瓦: 先說明我欣賞鋼琴獨奏錄音的美學觀點。對傳統的曲目（像貝多芬蕭邦）我對錄音音質很不挑剔，所以我會聽Schnabel的貝多芬奏鳴曲或是Lipatti甚至更古早的鋼琴家彈蕭邦。當然我會有點介意演奏技巧，但是我更在乎的是感情與整體感覺。但是對於像Debussy或Ravel，我會非常在乎音色明暗的微妙變化與動態對比，所以我幾乎無法接受音質太差的錄音。聽Debussy時我比較唯物，其他傳統音樂則較唯心。
我: 所以我不付責任的想法是,先說前奏曲這種玩意兒好了.蕭邦和德布西都曾經用24種大小調來寫前奏曲. 好了,我很落俗套的,就是喜歡浪漫的蕭邦寫的前奏曲,相對下實在對於德布西的前奏曲有點,ㄟ,不那嚜喜歡. 所以就曲式上,我個人非常喜歡玻里尼彈奏的蕭邦曲目,所以如果玻里尼也有彈奏德布希的前奏曲,也許可以一試.
瓦: Pollini的Book 1我不怎麼喜歡。我覺得那好像也是有點缺乏想像力的演奏，而且錄音的音質有點怪，鋼琴的音色有點悶暗，也有點缺乏動態，像是在音樂廳頂樓後段最低價的座位聽到的鋼琴。
我: 其次,如果就德布希屬於的樂派來講,我個人偏見是德布希的音樂比較適合很有個性的處理方法.也就是說那種中規中舉的鋼琴演奏家,或是小心翼翼的,我大概就不會推薦去嚐試.我心目中想到兩者:齊瑪曼或是李希特的版本,如果他們有錄音的話.我相信前者應該有.後者我不是那嚜有把握(可能得問他的粉絲RICHTER大),我只知道李希特錄過德布希的其他曲目.
順便一提,我非常喜歡齊瑪曼,去年吧曾經在自己的部落格講過他一二事.
瓦: 我也不是一開始就喜歡Ravel和Debussy，不過他們的管弦樂很容易被接受，我花了些時間才開始喜歡他們的鋼琴，因為和我原先聽得多的浪漫派鋼琴曲完全不同。
如果硬要區分的話，我想我比較喜歡Ravel的管弦樂，Debussy的鋼琴。前奏曲是非常有趣的東西，幾乎每個能成一家之言的鋼琴家演奏都有很大的差異。我覺得彈Debussy大概需要很有想像力和創意，以及精確的執行能力。
Richter其實幾乎彈全了前奏曲，但是他從不彈任何全集。最玩整的錄音應該是這個版本：Debussy: Preludes; L'Isle joyeuse; Chopin: Ballade No. 3; Scherzo No. 4; Etc.，算了算缺的只有Book 1 #8 (no surprise at all) 以及#12 Minstrel。歷史錄音，音效相當不好，但我願意接受。Richter的演奏向來極有個性，沒什麼中庸路線。Book 1我聽得比較熟，他的#9有點諧謔的開頭節奏，以及#10中間”鐘聲”的神奇效果，都讓我印象很深刻。我在台灣買到另一個罕見的版本是Richter在60年代巴黎的音樂會，包括了一首海頓的sonata和四首前奏曲（Book 1 #6, #7, #9, #10）。那張Vanguard出的CD錄音比較好，也是我所知唯二的Richter Sunken Cathedral錄音。
Zimerman的錄音是非常難得的演奏超一流而且錄音又正確無比，很難想像DG也能錄出這樣的水準。看過一篇焦元浦的訪問，這錄音花了很長的時間不說，Zimerman還參與錄音後製技術工作，並且親自確認製作出的錄音在音響上重播的音效音質與現場無異。這套CD的動態極大，是觀眾席前排的音色。Zimerman不但演奏技巧超級而且很有想像力，Book 1 #5以鋼琴竟能做出類似撥弦的音效，#6表現出如萬徑人蹤滅般孤寂的無聲之聲，#10的莊嚴肅穆雍容，是我在任何其他錄音中沒聽到過的。
R：這裡有Ｒｉｃｔｈｅｒ的大全。我比較能接受的法國作曲家是拉威爾。這是野田妹彈過的拉威爾, Richter 50年代的錄音更猛 .
D: Debussy 跟 Ravel 的感覺，我心中一直認為 Debussy的音樂比較圓滑平順些，而Ravel 比較angular一點。在Ravel的許多鋼琴曲中，可以很明顯得感覺出 曲子所需要的技巧部份。
我記得我大一的台灣室友的 Debussy Preludes也是 Zimerman的，我也很喜歡。
粽: 我是被德布西的棕髮少女給迷住了，耳熟能詳的旋律，應該不算太脫離浪漫樂派。
我: 德布西不是我喜歡的作曲家, 他的作品,我比較歡貝加瑪斯克組曲裡一些曲目.
瓦: 我不那麼喜歡Debussy旋律太明白的曲子，像棕髮少女，月光。這些改編成其他樂器演奏（像小提琴或管弦樂）效果也很好，但是旋律太動聽像沙龍音樂。
我: 再來就是我個人怪癖.我ㄧ向偏愛(這是試過多次之後的歸納)演奏者與作曲家是同一個國家,如果是這樣的話,那我會推薦Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的版本. 先前才去現場聽過Thibaudet演奏同屬法國,印象樂派的拉威爾曲目(同樣的,拉威爾也不是我那麼喜歡的作曲家),印象非常深刻.如果他以相同功力演奏德布希作品,應該也會很出色. 印象中迪卡有他的錄音.
K: 同國藉的話，好像應該推一下最常被推的 Francois（富蘭索瓦）吧 ?
我: Francois我沒聽過,我沒辦法推薦我沒聽過的人. 我是說,我沒聽過任何他的錄音,也沒聽過他的現場(廢話,他走的時候我還沒出生啊). 完全沒接觸還推薦的話才真的是不付責任喔. 另,他被我歸在半個法國人 因為他不是法國出身滴,最先接受音樂教育也不是在法國.
我之所以推薦Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的版本,就是因為在此(現場)聽了他彈奏的拉威爾鏡子組曲,印象深刻才推薦的。拉威爾...我也不是很喜歡, 只有少數作品我能接受.會去聽那場Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的演奏會,的確是受到交響情人夢的影響.當天另外的曲目是布拉姆斯的鋼琴.兩種不同樂派放在一起彈奏真是很有趣的組合。離題了！
瓦：Francois的Chopin, Debussy, Ravel就算不能算絕品，至少也絕對是逸品。他有種特別的韻律感，有人用”醺然”來形容，雖然醺然聽起來像是喝醉酒或磕了藥。我覺得他的前奏曲”好像”有一點瑕疵，但是從頭聽來有種渾然天成的流暢感覺。
粽：那Haas的版本呢？
我：Ｈaas, 我也沒聽過, 不過他是Gieseking 的學生, 也許直接聽Gieseking的?
瓦：我發現我很喜歡Gieseking的Mozart，但是不喜歡他的Debussy。這是我最早買的Debussy Preludes CD，當初好像是因為日本樂評把它當經典。除了音質太差之外，我還覺得他彈得有點悶。我想”中庸”應該算是客氣又不失公平的評語。我想我也許該去找出當年看的樂評，看是不是我聽漏了什麼或是有什麼誤解。我最近剛買到LP，聲音比CD自然得太多了，但仍無助於讓我改變看法。
D: 我手邊也有 Gieseking 的學生 Werner Haas彈的一套，也是很中庸的彈法。因為自己也有 Val 的那一套 Francois 版，所以比較過，還是欣賞 Francois 的多一些。
這讓我剛好可以回應你所提到的，希望由同國家的音樂家演奏那個國家的作曲家的曲子。我記得很久前跟美國同學討論過這個問題，最後答案還是無解。他的觀點是，好的音樂應該是universal無國界。就像貝多芬的交響曲跟奏鳴曲，是偉大到任何人都應該可以欣賞跟表演。不過反過來說，民族樂派很強的曲子，不了解那文化的人，放進去的感情畢竟是不同的。我記得當初shaham 來台灣拉 梁祝的時候，去聽的同學都覺得缺少了什麼東西，可能就是那個對中國文化的體會。(自己沒去) ~~~~ 扯那麼多，要說的是，其實某些地方，我可以了解妳的出發點。
粽: 題外話，我有一個朋友，她主修鋼琴的，她研究所的老師就是俄國人，是一位嚴格的老先生，每次聽她彈蕭邦(波蘭算泛俄羅斯?)就搖頭，叫她要放感情，要放感情!!! 幾次以後，還是沒辦法到達老師的標準，老師失望地講了一句：You never know what we suffered...然後就叫她改彈 Bartok…
我: 我想那老師解釋了這種巧合(解釋了我的癖好)! ...不過我不確定我會把蕭邦算進去...
有些曲目的確是事隔多年後才會欣賞(或是就不欣賞了)我想這跟人生經歷還有當時心境有關吧? 像布拉姆斯的,我ㄧ開始還把他的某作品批評的一無事處, 真的是年輕時候不知天高地厚才會做的事啊 ...[1]
遠: 我對德布西的音樂不熟, 但是最近看東京奏鳴曲這部電影, 最後小男孩彈德布西的月光時, 眼淚不爭氣的掉下來了! 推薦大家看。
Tokyo Sonata - Claire de Lune (Debussy), 香川照之 (坂上之雲中的正岡子規), 小泉今日子主演, 坎城影展「一種注目」評審團大獎。
我: 這樣聽來那鍋東京奏鳴曲好像太催淚了...謝謝推薦(OR分享),我從來沒注意到這片.
我蠻好奇為什麼選月光這首來當結尾? 片名用奏鳴曲也很有趣.是因為奏鳴曲的曲式(各自獨立,但卻又是同一首曲子-->各自生活,但是同一家人)象徵的意義嗎? 無論如何,待看電影又增加一片了...
K: 小男孩的演出的確很感人。不過以年紀來說好像太過火了一些。雖然不知道東京奏鳴曲是什麼內容，不過這個小孩的情緒委實在太多...月光再怎麼亮也不會有「暴烈」的感覺吧...（月亮在月蝕的時候跑出來強烈抗議嗎）茲附大衛王演奏改編曲，以為柔和月光的參考。
我: 大衛王那版本有趣. 我之前才剛注意到四季有鋼琴版,這大衛王的小提琴版有異曲同工之妙. 不過月光可以很激烈啊!貝多芬的月光奏鳴曲是也. 這是巴倫玻音的版本(杜普雷的老公) (前面瓦哈拉曾經提到改編曲目)
遠: 東京奏鳴曲不算「催淚」片, 過程到結尾都不煽情。為什麼用月光呢? 應該劇組討論過的, 我一時間還想不到更適合的曲目, 看完片子後可以再來討論。
(拉回前奏曲)
瓦: 前奏曲如果只想聽一個版本的話，我會推薦Zimerman，因為錄音與演奏俱佳。
我: 粽, 看來齊瑪曼有兩票, 我和瓦哈拉各一票.
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延伸閱讀:
瓦哈拉的 德布西前奏曲與一些音樂討論
[1] 關於年輕時對布拉姆斯批評 的一段往事
==updated==
德布西前奏曲《阿納卡普里的丘陵》：風格?美學?詮釋
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