前陣子台灣的媒體講到台灣芬蘭化的問題,芬蘭化根據wiki的定義是:是一邊維持議會民主制度和資本主義經濟體制，同時卻處於共產主義國家勢力控制下的狀態，類似冷戰時芬蘭和蘇聯兩國之間的關係。此詞出現於1960年代後期的西德，為當時西德的保守派批評重視同共產主義諸國對話的時任西德總理勃蘭特時所新造的詞匯。
網路上有人貼出原文,我曾經試圖想翻譯全文後張貼在個人部落格,但實在太長,只翻了前面幾段還有中間偏後四段之後就放棄了. 現在把前面我自己翻的幾段連同原文對照貼出來如下.有空可能會慢慢再一段段翻,可能會從推銷芬蘭化(selling Finlandization)翻起(從我自己有興趣了解的翻起啦).
這裡有前1/3的翻譯,而這裡有關於芬蘭化的一些註解與後續評論.
1/13updated: 這裡有全文翻譯.(雖然我個人比較喜歡中英對照:P)
以下轉載.
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不再迫切的台海: 為什麼美國會從台灣芬蘭化中獲利
January/February 2010
Bruce Gilley
BRUCE GILLEY is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Portland State University's Mark O. Hatfield School of Government and the author of The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy.
Since 2005, Taiwan and China have been moving into a closer economic and political embrace -- a process that accelerated with the election of the pro-détente politician Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in 2008. This strengthening of relations presents the United States with its greatest challenge in the Taiwan Strait since 1979, when Washington severed ties with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
自從2005年以來,台灣與中國在經濟與政治上更加緊密結合,這個過程也因為馬英九當選後更為加速. 兩岸關係強化帶給美國自1979年台美斷交,美國(原文為"華盛頓")與中國建交以來最大的一次挑戰.
In many ways, the current thaw serves Taipei's interests, but it also allows Beijing to assert increasing influence over Taiwan. As a consensus emerges in Taiwan on establishing closer relations with China, the thaw is calling into question the United States' deeply ambiguous policy, which is supposed to serve both Taiwan's interests (by allowing it to retain its autonomy) and the United States' own (by guarding against an expansionist China). Washington now faces a stark choice: continue pursuing a militarized realist approach -- using Taiwan to balance the power of a rising China -- or follow an alternative liberal logic that seeks to promote long-term peace through closer economic, social, and political ties between Taiwan and China.
就很多方面來說,兩岸和解(thaw)符合台北的利益,但是和解的同時也讓北京對台灣有更大的影響力. 台灣內部的共識是強化與中國的關係,但此讓美國摩擬兩可的政策受到質疑:美國保衛台灣的自主性以對抗擴張主義的中國的政策使台美雙方都受益. 華府現在面對的是個嚴峻的選擇: 繼續強化軍事,利用台灣來與興起中的中國抗衡, 或是以更緊密的兩岸經濟,社會與政治連結來達到長遠之和平. (註:大抵就是鷹派與鴿派的選擇)
A TALE OF TWO DÉTENTES 雙合解記
After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities, led, respectively, by Chiang Kai-shek's defeated nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and Mao Zedong's victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For nearly three decades, Chiang and Mao harbored rival claims to the whole territory of China. Gradually, most of the international community came to accept Beijing's claims to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and a special role in its foreign relations. By 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China, 69 percent of the United Nations' member states had already severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of relations with China.
中國內戰止於1949年,那之後台灣與中國成為兩個政治實體,分別由戰敗的蔣介石率領國民黨與戰勝的毛澤東代表的中國共產黨統治兩岸. 近三十年來, 蔣介石與毛澤東都將對方之領土視為自己領土之一部份(儘管實際上只對台灣或只對中國得以行使主權.)漸漸的,大部分的國際社會接受北京視台灣為中國一部份的這種說法. 到了1972年,尼克森拜訪中國時, 百分之六十九的聯合國會員國都已經與台灣斷絕外交關係,紛紛與中國建交.
The United States, which had merely "acknowledged" Beijing's claim to Taiwan, was slow to recognize the People's Republic of China due to Washington's historical ties with the KMT, dating back to World War II and its conflict with the PRC during the Korean War. The strategic position of Taiwan, astride western Pacific sea and air lanes, gave it added importance. But by 1979, even Washington had recognized Beijing. That same year, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in order to ensure continued legal, commercial, and de facto diplomatic relations with the island. At the last minute, Senate Republicans -- along with several Democrats who worried that President Jimmy Carter was disregarding Taiwan's security -- amended the legislation to include promises of arms sales to Taipei and a broader U.S. commitment to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" against the island.
基於華府與國民黨的歷史可追溯至二次大戰與韓戰期間中(共)美衝突的淵源，美國很晚才承認北京對台灣的宣示,也很晚才承認中華人民共和國。台灣的戰略地位，佔據西太平洋的海空航線要衝，使其更加重要。但是到了1979年，連華府也承認中國政權了。同年，美國實施了台灣關係法以確保維持法律、商業與實質外交關係。在最後一刻，參院共和黨員──加上幾個擔心卡特總統忽視台灣安全的民主黨員──修改法案，包括承諾對台軍售與美國擴大承諾「抵抗任何武力方式或其他形式的脅迫」。
The fading of the Chiang-Mao rivalry, which subsided after both leaders died in the mid-1970s, coupled with Beijing's new inward-looking focus on economic development, made these military commitments appear anachronistic during the 1980s. Beijing ended its shelling of the Taiwanese islands off the Chinese coast and welcomed Taiwanese "compatriots" to the mainland for tourism, investment, and family reunification. Taiwan's native-born president, Lee Teng-hui, who came to power in 1988, had no interest in "retaking the mainland" and approved the creation of such exchanges. In 1993, the heads of the two governments' cross-strait contact groups held their first direct talks, in Singapore.
This "first détente" ended abruptly in 1995, when the United States issued a visa for Lee to visit Cornell University. China, in the midst of a domestic leadership transition, was already hardening its position on Taiwan, and armchair generals in all three places were publishing books on the predicted order of battle to come. Beijing saw the visa as a betrayal of earlier U.S. promises to refrain from any official relations with Taiwanese leaders. Taiwan's democratization was also leading to domestic popular pressures for a more assertive stance on independence. Beijing reacted by hurling missiles into the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. Washington dispatched aircraft carriers and radar ships to the area. Beijing's worst fears were then realized in 2000, when Taiwanese citizens elected Chen Shui-bian as their president. Chen, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), now the opposition, promised to seek formal recognition of Taiwan's de facto independence from China. As a consequence, cross-strait relations deteriorated dramatically between 1995 and 2005, leading to a renewed emphasis on militarization by all three sides.
The damage wrought by this "second freeze" led to serious rethinking in all three capitals. Beijing worried that its aggressive posture on Taiwan was threatening its broader influence in Asia, as other nations rallied behind the U.S. security shield; Taipei began to reevaluate the value of its symbolic assertions of nationhood; and Washington began to question its unlimited commitment to an increasingly troublesome Taiwan, which threatened to damage, if not destroy, its more important relationship with China. By the end of George W. Bush's first term, Washington had become the main check on Taipei's assertions of independence.
The "second détente" in cross-strait relations began with a 2005 speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao downplaying demands for reunification. Beijing was shifting its view as a result of an emerging grand strategy that stressed regional and global influence; accordingly, it came to see Taiwan less as an ideologically charged and urgent matter and more as a pragmatic and low-key management issue. Ma's election in 2008 signaled the resurgence of a similar vision in Taiwan. He promised "no unification, no independence, no use of force." Within months, in rapid and unprecedented fashion, the heads of the contact groups began holding semiannual meetings and signed more than two dozen previously unthinkable agreements. Although most of these involved economic matters, they had political implications, too. The number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan -- including Taiwan's long-militarized islands directly off the coast of China -- surged by a factor of ten, to 3,000 per day. China sent students to Taiwan, and the two sides authorized 270 flights per week across the strait. Important political fears that had previously restricted economic integration suddenly dissipated on both sides, and Taipei and Beijing began talking about the "total normalization" of their economic and financial ties. The supposedly fixed national interests on which foreign policy realists base their assessments were in total flux.
The second détente has also included explicitly political deals. China had previously permitted Taiwan to participate only in international organizations with an economic focus, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization. In 2009, it allowed Taiwan to participate as an observer at the annual board meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. Both sides began discussing a Taiwanese presence in the UN bodies responsible for civil aviation, commercial shipping, meteorology, and climate change.
Both sides also tacitly agreed to a "diplomatic truce": Beijing ceased courting the nations on Taiwan's dwindling list of 23 diplomatic allies, and in 2009 Taipei dropped its perpetual request for UN membership for the first time in 17 years. When Ma was reelected as KMT chair in July 2009, Hu declared that he would like to build "mutual trust between the two sides in political affairs." As political relations warmed, Taiwanese officials -- including leading DPP figures, such as the mayor of Kaohsiung -- became regular visitors in China.
There are indications that this second cross-straits détente will last. Although both leaders' terms will expire in 2012, Hu's designated successor, Xi Jinping, is a well-known advocate of cross-strait exchanges. Ma, meanwhile, has recovered from the political damage wrought by Typhoon Morakot, which struck the island in August 2009. So long as the DPP remains divided between extreme anti-détente and limited-détente factions, he seems likely to win reelection.
Taiwan and China are now approaching their relationship using completely different assumptions than those that governed cross-strait relations for decades. Whereas they previously saw the relationship as a military dispute, today both sides have embraced a view of security that is premised on high-level contact, trust, and reduced threats of force. Their views of economic issues, meanwhile, have placed global integration and competitiveness ahead of nationalist protectionism. This represents a fundamental shift in the political relationship between Taiwan and China.
FROM HELSINKI TO TAIPEI 從赫爾辛基到台北
To understand the evolution of the Taipei-Beijing relationship, it is useful to consider the theory and practice of what has become known as "Finlandization" in the field of political science. The term derives its name from Finland's 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join alliances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for any country challenging Soviet interests. In return, the Kremlin agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and respect Finland's democratic system. Therefore, from 1956 to 1981, under the leadership of President Urho Kekkonen, Finland pursued a policy of strategic appeasement and neutrality on U.S.-Soviet issues and limited domestic criticism of the Soviet Union. This policy enjoyed wide support in Finland at the time (despite the subsequent debate in Finland on its merits). Kekkonen also won praise across the political spectrum in the United States, especially from foreign policy realists such as George Kennan, who lauded the Finnish leader's "composure and firmness."
要了解兩岸關係的演變不妨參考日後政治學領域所謂 "芬蘭化"的理論與實務。這個名稱源自芬蘭在1948年與蘇聯的協議，據此赫爾辛基同意不加入挑戰莫斯科的聯盟或擔任任何挑戰蘇聯利益的國家的基地. 引以回報的是克里姆林宮同意維護芬蘭自治並尊重芬蘭的民主制度.因此，1956到1981年，在Urho Kekkonen總統領導下，芬蘭在美蘇議題上追求戰略綏靖與中立政策，限制國內對蘇聯的批評.當時這個政策在芬蘭廣受支持,雖然後續對成效的爭議也不斷.
Building on the work of others, the Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen in 1988proposed a general theory of Finlandization known as "adaptive politics." Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make. Unlike a puppet regime, a Finlandized state calculates that its long-term interests, and perhaps those of its neighbors, are best served by making strategic concessions to a superpower next door. These concessions are motivated chiefly by geographic proximity, psychological threats from the superpower, and cultural affinities between the two sides. Being so close, the superpower need only issue vague threats, rather than display actual military muscle, to change its weaker neighbor's policies. Meanwhile, the small power perceives itself as engaging in an "active and principled neutrality," rather than a cowering acquiescence, a distinction that is critical to rationalizing these policy changes domestically.
丹麥政治學者Mouritzen在1988年根據其他學者的研究提出芬蘭化的理論,指稱芬蘭化是種"適應性政治".Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.不像其他魁儡政權,經過精打細算後,一個芬蘭化的邦國的長期利益,甚至可能是強權鄰國的利益,最能夠從對強權讓步中獲得.這個讓步的主要動機在於對於鄰國強權的心裡恐懼與兩者文化上的緊密連結. 因為兩者如此緊密,超級強權僅需模糊的威脅,而不需實際的軍事展現,就已經足以改變鄰近小國的政治.同時,這個小國體認到"積極地,原則性的中立"明顯有異於畏縮的默認,因此得以在國內(domestically)合理化這種讓步強權的政策.
Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion. Even if one rejects the theory of Finlandization, it is difficult to deny that Kekkonen played a constructive role in ending the Cold War. In 1969, for instance, Finland offered itself as the venue for a conference between the two blocs that eventually produced a shared document with clear commitments to human rights and freedoms: the Helsinki accords.
芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大.即使有人拒絕芬蘭化的理論,也很難否定Kekkonen在結束冷戰中扮演一個建設性的角色. 例如在1969年,芬蘭讓自己成為兩方(按:指北約/美國與蘇聯)會談的管道(venue),進而讓雙方都承諾人權與自由--簽署赫爾辛基條約.
Cold War historians, such as John Lewis Gaddis, believe that the Helsinki process was central to undermining the moral authority of the Soviet Union, and others have argued that it prompted the ideological shift necessary to kickstart Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the mid-1980s. Moreover, Finland's unique status as interlocutor with Moscow made possible the first serious discussions of nuclear disarmament and of the shared development of Arctic resources, both of which served as templates for the warming of relations between NATO and the Soviet bloc. Although it usually has a negative connotation, "Finlandization" need not be a pejorative term.
冷戰歷史學家如John Lewis Gaddis相信芬蘭化(Helsinki process)對於崩解蘇聯權威居功厥偉,其他冷戰歷史學家則主張芬蘭化有助於1980年代中期Gorbachev對蘇聯的改革與意識形態的轉變.尤有甚者,芬蘭成為一個獨特的,與蘇聯對話者的狀態促成首次針對解除武裝的對談,也使得北約會員國之間得討論資源共享,並緩和北約會員國與蘇聯間的緊張關係. 雖然有負面意涵,"芬蘭化"不必是個輕蔑的詞彙. (註:作者也承認芬蘭化含有負面意涵,卻還鼓吹台灣芬蘭化,嗯,這交由讀者去判斷.)
Taiwan shares many of the key features that characterized Finland in the late 1940s. It is a small but internally sovereign state that is geographically close to a superpower with which it shares cultural and historical ties. Its fierce sense of independence is balanced by a pragmatic sense of the need to accommodate that superpower's vital interests. Most important, the evolving views of its leaders and its people today focus on seeking security through integration rather than confrontation. This approach could help defuse one of the most worrying trends in global politics: the emerging rivalry between China and the United States.
台灣和1940年代晚期的芬蘭在很多方面都類似. 它是個小但是主權獨立的邦國(按:英文上state,country,nation意義不甚相同,但是翻成中文幾乎都一樣翻成"國家".在此我姑且翻成邦國,若不恰當歡迎指教,謝謝!),地理上鄰近一個超級強權而又與此超級強權有文化上與歷史上的連結. 它強烈的獨立意識與務實的意識相互平衡以因應超級強權的利益.最重要的,隨著領導者與人民的觀念的遞嬗,今日的焦點著重於透過整合,而非衝撞,以追求安全.這種方式或可去除國際政治上對中美(兩個超級強權)對峙的疑慮. (註:這有一個很大的差異,台灣如果真正的真芬蘭化,台灣必須是主權獨立的邦國,不只是實際上更必須在法理上都是一個獨立的邦國.在上面所附的連結當中有一篇就提到台灣是獨立國家這個重點)
The analogy is not perfect. U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan today are more explicit than they were for Finland during the Cold War, although few doubt that NATO would have defended Finland against a Soviet invasion. And China's 1,000-plus missiles targeted at Taiwan are a more direct threat than anything the Soviet military ever mustered across the Vuoksi River. But in general the thinking that has motivated the second détente on both sides parallels that which led to the Finnish-Soviet détente of the Cold War. Although it is still early, Taipei is moving in the direction of eventual Finlandization.
這個類比當然並不完美.美國對台灣安全的保證遠比冷戰當時對芬蘭的保障來得明確,雖然少數質疑北約會保衛芬蘭以對抗蘇聯的入侵.而且,中國以超過一千枚飛彈對準台灣的威脅遠比蘇聯軍隊從未屯集於Vuoksi河畔來得更直接. 但整體而言,促使兩岸第二次和解的想法與芬蘭與蘇聯在冷戰時間的想法如出一轍.雖然為時尚早,台北已經逐步邁向芬蘭化.
Under such a scenario, Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power, rather than a U.S. strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing's fears about the island's becoming an obstacle to China's military and commercial ambitions in the region. It would also refrain from undermining the CCP's rule in China. In return, Beijing would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei expanded participation in international organizations, and extend the island favorable economic and social benefits.
在這種情況下,台灣會重新定位自己為中立國,而不是美國的戰略伙伴,以化解北京視台灣為中國在亞洲軍事與商業崛起的障礙. 它也必須節制不能妨礙中國共產黨在中國的執政.(相對的,)北京必須以解除軍事威脅,給予台北參予國際組織,擴展台灣經濟與社會利益做為回報.
The DPP's director of international affairs, Hsiao Bi-khim, has written that the changes in Taiwan's China policy "are leading to a new strategic outlook, which aligns Taiwan with China's sphere of influence instead of maintaining the traditional presumed informal alliance with the United States." Although Hsiao, like many in the DPP, fears this sort of shift, such reservations are unwarranted.
民進黨的國際事務部主任蕭美琴曾經撰文指出台灣的中國政策"正帶領一個新的策略觀點,那是個台灣與中國影響力結盟,而非傳統與美國非正式聯盟的觀點."雖然蕭美琴,和許多民進黨員一樣,對此轉換感到恐懼而有所保留,但這種保留毫無根據.
A MEANS OR AN END? 是手段還是目的?
There are two ways to view the shift in Chinese policy toward Taiwan. The dominant interpretation has long been that Beijing is motivated by nationalism and that the PRC's irredentist claims to Taiwan stem from a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness. According to this view, the CCP is striving to reincorporate Taiwan into China in order to avert a domestic nationalist backlash and a crisis of legitimacy. Seen in this light, Taiwan is an end unto itself and the second détente is merely a tactical shift intended to force Taiwan into reunification through indirect means: beneath Beijing's silk glove of détente is the iron fist of nationalism.
In recent years, many Western analysts have rejected this nationalist interpretation of Beijing's Taiwan policy and opted instead for a geostrategic one. Unrecovered territories are legion in the history of the PRC, and the CCP has found it easy to let go of others (including disputed regions bordering Russia, India, and the Spratly Islands, as well as control over Mongolia and Korea). Taiwan, however, by virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential strategic threat to China. It could serve as a base for foreign military operations against China and even in peacetime could constrain Beijing's ability to develop and project naval power and ensure maritime security in East Asia.
Beijing's core goal from this perspective is the preservation of its dominance in its immediate offshore region, as became clear in 2009 when five Chinese vessels trailed a U.S. Navy ship sailing near a Chinese submarine base. Taiwan represents an obstacle to this goal if it remains a U.S. strategic ally armed with advanced U.S. weaponry, but not if it becomes a self-defending and neutral state with close economic and political ties to China. Beijing's constantly changing position on Taiwan -- which has incrementally moderated from "liberation" to "peaceful unification" to "one China" to "anti-independence" since Mao's era -- in fact reflects a concern with Taiwan's geostrategic status, not with the precise nature of its political ties to China. According to this interpretation, Beijing has no interest in occupying or ruling Taiwan; it simply wants a sphere of influence that increases its global clout and in which Taiwan is a neutral state, not a client state. Seen through this lens, Taiwan is a means to an end and the second détente is a tactic intended to achieve this strategic objective through Taiwan's Finlandization.
China's recent behavior confirms this view; Beijing's decision to allow Taiwan to participate in the WHO represents a cool-headed understanding that giving Taiwan a greater international voice could enhance its independence from the United States, which would, in turn, serve China's own interests. It also gives Beijing an opportunity to show that a China-dominated Asia need not be less peaceful, less prosperous, or even less democratic. As the Chinese scholar Jianwei Wang of the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point puts it, "Beijing views the Taiwan issue and cross-straits relations as an integral part of China's comprehensive 'rise' in world affairs rather than as an isolated issue purely affecting national pride alone."
Recent survey data lends credence to this argument. The mainland citizens polled by Horizon Research in 2004 were not particularly nationalist about retaking Taiwan -- only 15 percent wanted immediate military action, whereas 58 percent believed that the government should rule out the use of force in favor of economic integration. In a 2008 speech, Hu identified "political antagonism," rather than political separation, as the problem in cross-straits relations, breaking with previous pronouncements from Beijing. Subsequent policy statements by the CCP have revealed a calm confidence in the shifting geostrategic relationship with Taiwan, not a bombastic nationalist urgency for reunification.
THE PACIFIER 安撫
In 1995, at the end of the first détente, Chen-shen Yen, a Taiwanese scholar and KMT adviser, wrote a paper in the Taiwanese political journalWenti yu Yanjiu explicitly extolling the logic of Finlandization (or fenlanhua in Chinese) for Taiwan. By seeking Beijing's approval for an expanded international voice, maintaining a foreign policy that did not threaten China, and choosing leaders who enjoyed Beijing's trust, Yen argued, Taiwan could do more to protect its internal autonomy and economic prosperity than it could by challenging the rising superpower on its doorstep. Moreover, Taiwan's long-term interests in gaining true independence could only be achieved by democratization in China, which would be more likely if Taiwan avoided stoking a military or ideological confrontation. His conclusion echoed that of the Athenians in Thucydides' Melian dialogue: "Given the responsibility to protect its future existence," wrote Yen, "a civilized country should adjust itself to external realities." It has taken over a decade for Yen's prescient views to gain currency, but they now have widespread support.
Ma's pursuit of "total normalization" has enjoyed steady and rising popularity in Taiwan since he came to office. It reflects a view that the militarized approach to the cross-strait conflict that has dominated both Taiwanese (and U.S.) strategic thinking since the days of Chiang and Mao has not resolved the dispute and does not serve Taiwan's present needs. Just as Finland, a small country, was able to pioneer a nonmilitarized alternative to the Cold War, so, too, could Taiwan play that role in the brewing U.S.-Chinese cold war in Asia.
At present, a rising China threatens the world primarily because there has been little in the way of domestic political liberalization to keep Beijing's increasing economic and military power in check. Taiwan could play a far greater role in China's liberalization if it were to become a Finlandized part of the region and its officials were able to move across the strait even more freely than they do now. Already, prominent Chinese liberals, such as Zhang Boshu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are arguing that the mainland should draw lessons about political development from Taiwan. As Sheng Lijun of the National University of Singapore writes, "With the Taiwan political challenge, Beijing will sooner or later have to improve its governance (including democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption)." Taipei's experience with democratic reform offers many lessons for Beijing -- especially because the formerly authoritarian KMT's return to power in 2008 showed that the CCP could one day hope to rule again even if the advent of democracy initially brought another party to power.
Democratic reform in China will be encouraged both by popular pressure to emulate Taiwan (PRC citizens have already enthusiastically adopted Taiwanese pop culture and business practices) and by the brute necessity of managing the relationship in a way that meets the Taiwanese electorate's high expectations of transparency and accountability. Some may call it appeasement, but if Taiwan uses appeasement to democratize and pacify a rising China, it will be a worthy appeasement indeed.
SELLING FINLANDIZATION 推銷芬蘭化
Taiwan's continued progress toward Finlandization will depend on whether Ma can demonstrate the tangible benefits of this strategy to the Taiwanese population. He will have to secure an even greater international voice for Taiwan (for example, making its WHO observer status permanent), the ability to negotiate its own free-trade agreements, and the verified removal of some of the more than 1,000 Chinese missiles currently aimed at the island. Best of all would be a peace accord under which China renounced the use of force unless the island were invaded or achieved de jure independence. Such an accord, which both sides are seeking, would be the functional equivalent of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty, allaying the large power's security concerns while assuring the small power of its autonomy. Another potential benefit is a promised economic cooperation framework agreement within which Taiwan could pursue a free-trade agreement with Beijing; Taiwan currently risks becoming uncompetitive in the Chinese market and China-based supply chains as a result of the free-trade agreements between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.
Ma will also have to reassure Taiwanese voters, who fear losing their political freedoms. In Taiwan, there is a justified concern about being lured into a trap of integration with China that would imperil Taiwan's democracy and internal sovereignty (meanwhile, Beijing fears that Taiwan's external sovereignty will grow as its participation in international organizations expands). The University of Wisconsin's Wang, whose analysis reflects the CCP's strategic views, writes ominously that Ma will eventually have to show his goodwill by scaling back Taiwan's arms purchases and acknowledging that reunification is an option in the long term. Wang is correct that Finlandization will not be free of costs for Taiwan. In particular, as was the case in Finland, Taipei will have to restrain anticommunist activism on the island and distance itself from the United States militarily.
Under much domestic pressure and possibly with the tacit consent of Beijing, Ma allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan in September 2009 to pray for the victims of the typhoon. But the same month he denied entry to the Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, citing national security concerns and the public interest. His official statement on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre -- with its delicate reference to a "painful chapter in history" that "must be faced," as similar dark moments in Taiwan's history had to be -- was classic Finlandized diplomacy. For Ma, the Tiananmen anniversary was a reminder to "both sides to spur each other to make further improvements in the area of human rights." A similarly tendentious, if ultimately fruitful, moral equivalence on the part of Finnish leaders is what brought the Soviets to Helsinki to talk about human rights.
For now, domestic opposition to Ma's policy is muted. Most controversies on the island concern how to pursue integration with China, not whether to do so. The risks of political dependence on China seem worth it to most Taiwanese, especially given the island's current political dependence on the United States. And Taiwan's youth, in particular, see China as an opportunity rather than a threat. For the DPP to regain power, it will have to embrace this pragmatic consensus on China. The days of the DPP's "just say no" platform on China are over.
Just as Ma must consider the views of the electorate, he must also take into account the reactions of other Asian states. Taiwan could still alienate other Asian nations if it shifted to a more China-centered, Finlandized approach, but this is unlikely because it is exactly what ASEAN has been promoting among its members for ten years or more through its "ASEAN + 3" and ASEAN Regional Forum initiatives. The theory of Finlandization may highlight the uniqueness of Taiwan's situation, but a similar logic already informs policymaking in other Asian capitals. South Korea has been taking a similar tack, and many neighboring nations believe that China can be pacified, as Vietnam was, through inclusion and cooperation. Even Japan, which feels itself to be more vulnerable than other Asian countries to China's rise as a naval power, has an interest in encouraging internal reforms in China and might learn from Taiwan's example. After all, West Germany's successful Ostpolitik, which led to a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970, built on the lessons of Finland's accommodation with the Soviet Union.
Far from seeking to alienate other Asian governments, then, the KMT government believes that Taiwan's international status will be enhanced if Taipei falls in step with its neighbors' preferred methods of dealing with a rising China -- through accommodation, socialization, and communication.
OUT OF ORBIT 脫軌
The Finlandization of Taiwan will, of course, pose major challenges to current U.S. policy. An April 2009 Congressional Research Service report recognized this dilemma by asking how Washington ought to react "if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRC." Opinions in Washington are divided between two realist camps. The first wants to allow the changes to proceed so that, in the words of Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Taiwan does not become a "strategic liability" to the United States. The second wants to rearm Taiwan so that, in the words of Dennis Blair, the U.S. national intelligence director, Taiwan is not "so defenseless that it feels that it has to do everything that China says." Neither camp seems to accept, much less endorse, the liberal logic of Finlandization as an alternative security strategy for Taiwan.
Taiwan has played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s -- first it served as a buffer against communist expansion out of North Korea, and more recently it has been a bulwark against a rising China. It is strategically located along East Asian shipping lanes and could provide another naval resupply site if China continues to limit U.S. naval visits to Hong Kong. Keeping Taiwan within the U.S. orbit has served Washington's interests by demonstrating that the United States will continue to engage in Asia, despite talk of a declining U.S. role in the region. The tragic result of this policy, however, has been that it has played into Beijing's fears of encirclement and naval inferiority, which in turn has prompted China's own military buildup.
Finlandization will allow Taiwan to break this cycle by taking itself out of the game and moderating the security dilemma that haunts the Washington-Beijing relationship. The cross-strait freeze of 1995-2005 raised fears in Washington that Taiwan was becoming a strategic liability for the United States. Ma's policies have momentarily resolved that concern. And if the United States uses the current opportunity to adjust its own policies and support the détente, that concern could be rendered moot. This would make future provocations by either side less likely.
Taipei's decision to chart a new course is a godsend for a U.S. administration that increasingly needs China's cooperation in achieving its highest priority: maintaining the peaceful international liberal order. The United States requires Beijing's support on a host of pressing world issues -- from climate change to financial stability and nuclear nonproliferation. William Stanton, Washington's de facto ambassador to Taiwan, admitted as much in October 2009, declaring that "it's in everybody's interests, including Taiwan's as well, that the U.S. try to have a cooperative relationship with China."
In recent years, the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship has been increasingly dictated by the interests of narrow lobbies rather than grand strategy. The U.S. arms industry, the Taiwanese military, and Taiwanese independence activists together make a formidable force. Before the current détente, Taiwan's staunch anticommunism and adversarial policy toward China aligned well with Washington's own ideology and militarized approach to the Taiwan Strait. But the recent evolution of tactical and strategic thinking in Taipei and Beijing has created a disjuncture. The adversarial status quo that the United States has protected is no longer the status quo that the Taiwanese want protected.
進年來,台美關係逐漸由少數利益團體遊說取代整體策略. 美國的國防工業,台灣的軍隊,以及獨派活動人士共同形成一股可觀的力量. 在現在的和解出現之前,台灣反共以及仇中的立場與華府的意識形態以及應派一致. 但是近來台北與北京關係改善形成台美間(立場)的分裂. 台灣已經不是當初依賴美國保護的以維現狀的台灣了!
Obviously, if Ma were to compromise Taiwan's democratic institutions in pursuit of détente with China, Washington would have reason to complain. But if a democratic Taiwan continues to move into China's orbit, Washington should follow the lead of the Taiwanese people in redefining their future. In the past, U.S. "noninterference" meant maintaining the balance of power across the strait and challenging Beijing's provocations. Today, it means reducing the militarization of the conflict and not interfering with Taiwan's Finlandization.
很明顯的,如果馬政府犧牲台灣民主體制作為與中國和解的交換,美國政府大有立場抱怨.但是,如果一個民主的台灣繼續在往中國的軌道上邁進,華府則應該順從台灣人民重新定義台灣自己的將來. 在過去,美國的不干預政策指的是兩岸抗衡. 在今天,不干預政策代表減少軍事衝突,並且減少干預台灣的芬蘭化.
Even from a strictly realist perspective, there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit, given that U.S. military security can be attained through other Asian bases and operations. Taiwan's Finlandization should be seen not as a necessary sacrifice to a rising China but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China. Washington should drop its zero-sum view of the Taipei-Beijing relationship and embrace the strategic logic underlying the rapprochement -- in effect "losing China" a second time by allowing Taiwan to drift into the PRC's sphere of influence.
即使是從最務實的角度來看,美國實在沒有必要把台灣放在它的戰略部局裡,美國大可以藉由它在亞洲的其他軍事基地達到美國的安全. 台灣芬蘭化實在不是用來對抗興起中國所必須付出的犧牲,相反的,台灣的芬蘭化反而可以藉此安撫中國. 華府已經放棄它過去的"零和"看法,轉而取代的是與中國共存的想法--美國不想再次在對台影響上輸給中國.
Ma told a visiting congressional delegation in August 2009 that his détente would be "beneficial to all parties concerned." He is right. As was the case with Finland and the Soviet Union, Taiwan has an inherent interest in a peaceful and democratic China. Washington needs to embrace this shift not only because it serves its own long-term strategic aims in Asia and globally but also because what the Taiwanese people choose to do with their sovereign democratic power is up to them.The overburdened giant should happily watch from a distance and focus on other pressing regional and global issues.
在2009年八月,馬英九告訴訪台的國會代表"和解讓所有相關人均受益".此話不差(他是對的).就如同芬蘭與俄羅斯的例子,台灣可以從一個和平與民主的中國中獲益. 華府必須擁抱這個位移不但是因為這符合美國本身在亞洲與在全球的長期戰略目標,更因為台灣人民有權對自己的主權依民主方式做出選擇. 這個已經負荷過度的巨人(按:指美國)應該樂於從距離之外見到這種發展,(這將有利美國)以便將焦點放在其他區域與全球議題上.
SIDELINING UNCLE SAM 與美國分道揚鑣
The United States has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted both strategically and diplomatically. Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the PRC's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei.
In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan -- a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit.
By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture.
The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations -- specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power.
Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift.
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