其實在看完交響情人夢之後曾經想過要寫我對音樂教育的一些感想. 不過我一向懶惰,想想後就算了. 最近跟一些朋友或說是討論或說是聊天談到一些對某些曲子或是欣賞曲目的觀點,又激起我該把欠的文章寫一寫的想法而有此文.
想起來學校的音樂老師不算,我曾經有過三個鋼琴老師. 現在回想,我很多音樂欣賞的看法應該受到第一個鋼琴老師影響. 這篇來記載我對第一個鋼琴老師,也是我音樂啟蒙老師的一些點滴.
------------
如果沒記錯,我大概是四歲半的時候開始學鋼琴的. 而我只上了一年幼稚園,所以學鋼琴其實可以算是我最早的"學校"教育. 現在回想,我很多音樂欣賞的看法應該受到第一個鋼琴老師影響. 雖然對我影響這麼大, 當初倒不是特別去挑選過, 只因為第一個老師其實是媽媽以前的音樂老師,學琴地點又離家裡近,這麼自然地就成為我的音樂啟蒙老師了.
我的第一個鋼琴老師對指法,拍子,整首曲子,音感都有一定的要求. 我記得一開始剛學琴的時候老師並不急著教學. 先是介紹鋼琴本身架構,她曾打開蓋子,按著琴鍵,抱我站上椅子讓我觀看那黑盒子裡的變化,了解鋼琴是怎麼發音的. 接著老師教我讀譜,還有就是調整節拍器教我數拍子.
有了這些基本了解之後接著彈奏音階. 有兩件事情我印象很深刻. 第一:在學會看譜與最基本的音階之後(由中央C開始上下各一八度), 老師會要我背對鋼琴,由她彈奏然後要我說出音符(例如高音FA,低音DO…),然後相反地她講出音符由我到鍵盤上彈出正確的音來. 事後回想這應該是訓練音感吧?!
另一件跟彈奏音階有關的記憶是上課一開始一定要先彈奏音階十次. 至少一個月吧老師只訓練我彈音階. 當時我心浮氣躁只想趕快學曲目(炫耀?),但偏偏音階彈不好老師根本不教我任何曲目. 彈音階的時候老師的要求是速度,音量與指法都必須正確. 而且左右手的力道必須一致. 這種看似容易其實最難.有點像是蛋炒飯, 要每顆飯粒均勻沾上一樣多的蛋汁而且乾濕一致,火候一致, 雖然是簡單的菜卻最容易看出功力所在.
大部分的人都有慣用手,慣用手會影響施力大小. 今天在朋友部落格提到這點, 讓我想特別講一下左右手必須均衡這一項[1]. 這就是另一個與音階練習有關的記憶了. 我記得的是, 等到我終於可以彈好基礎音階之後, 就是花式的訓練. 所謂花式大抵有兩種: 其一是到某個音或多個音必須依老師臨時指定固定升(降)半音或是調整強弱; 其二是左手彈一個八度的時間右手就得彈完所有音階,然後是左手彈兩個八度音的時間右手彈完所有音階,如此重複到左右手速度一致彈完所有音階,.接著左右手互換.最後就是這兩者的綜合版.
終於通過這關後我想已經是半年了吧! 總之老師開始願意教我彈曲子了.
開始彈曲子之後,老師都會先講故事,一來介紹作曲者,二來介紹作曲的背景. 介紹完後其實並不急著彈奏. 老師通常會帶著我先讀譜. 並且要我譜放在腿上,手先在譜上虛擬彈奏全曲,老師會校正我錯誤的指法,然後等到正確後再讓我在鋼琴上彈奏. 因為已經經過修正, 通常在鋼琴上彈奏時已經不大會有錯誤,頂多就是一些細節的調整.
事後回想這個方法影響我很大. 因為即使後來換了鋼琴老師我還是習慣這種練琴的方式. 大部分的時間我花在讀譜與 “空中彈琴”,所以實際聽到琴音的時間其實不多. 我想鄰居應該很感謝這種方式吧? 不過這方式也曾經引起誤會. 後來換了鋼琴老師之後新的鋼琴老師曾經問過媽媽我每天每首曲子練習幾次? 媽媽回想 “聽到”的次數回答一度造成新老師誤認我是懶散的學生, 但在聽我彈奏後卻又挑不出太多毛病轉而認為我很有天賦,竟然只要練習幾次就可以有這種程度. 其實一切只是誤會.
總之讀譜的習慣影響我很大, 甚至後來我已經不彈琴而只欣賞音樂時,我還是很習慣的在接觸新曲目的時候要先讀譜. 我買的幾本作曲家的傳記也都有譜的片段,或是解釋曲目,或是介紹曲目歷史沿革.
讀譜其實還有許多有趣的回憶. 也許是年紀小, 老師會將各種音符賦予圖形或是影像來幫助我了解. 例如琶音代表爬階梯, 右手兩度和弦代表兩個小朋友牽手等等. 用這種方式下讀一首新曲子的譜時,老師會先讓我用do, rei, mi,的方式讀出, 接著會問我: 那你現在告訴我這首曲子在講什麼故事? 於是乎有: “兩個小朋牽手(右手兩度和弦)一起上了五層樓梯(五個琶音)之後,一個小朋友鬆開手(一指放開)跑下樓(琶音)去應門鈴(裝飾奏)” 之類. 這種讀譜方式非常有趣. 每首曲子也總在讀譜後“栩栩如生” 印在我腦海裡. 另外,聲音強弱則由圖案大小來表示. 等到弟弟也要開始學琴時我打開琴本,最早期的有幾本還有我當初畫的"故事,"自己看了不禁莞爾. 當然,這更有可能是那時我還不大會寫字,只好用圖形來記憶;也或著是因為我記憶的方式本來就以圖像來進行的.
圖像了解法還有另一面, 不過這就等待後話再說了.
(待續)
-----
[1]不確定是否因為很小就開始訓練,還是基因使然 (媽媽打桌球或羽球尤其是反拍只會用左手),其實我的慣用手是哪手一直不是很清楚. 有些事情似乎我一開始是用左手,雖然大部分是情是用右手做. 但是所有右手會做的事情,包含寫字左手一樣可以做.
Sunday, January 31, 2010
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
[轉載]Taiwan's loss of independence a threat to US: expert
Taiwan's loss of independence a threat to US: expert
By William Lowther
STAFF REPORTER , WASHINGTON
Wednesday, Jan 27, 2010, Page 1
A leading US academic warned that if Taiwan loses its independence and becomes part of China, its impact on US interests would be “complex and dangerous.”
Nancy Tucker, an expert on Taiwan at Georgetown University in Washington, said that the US' place in Asia would “never be the same again.”
Speaking at the “Power in East Asia” conference on Monday organized by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the professor said that a change in Taiwan's status could strengthen China and weaken the US.
“If things go badly across the [Taiwan] Strait, war could develop and the United States, regardless of its preferences, would be involved. But in the event that cross-strait dialogue breaks the current stalemate, resolves the current situation, it will have an enormous impact on the United States' mission in the region,” Tucker said.
The most important gain to such a development, Tucker said, would be peace and an end to threats of intentional or accidental war in the Taiwan Strait.
It would let the US scrap its policy of strategic ambiguity, the US and China could relax about possible military conflict, the US could minimize planning for a Taiwan contingency, and although Chinese nationalism would not disappear, “the emotional quotient would be significantly reduced,” she said.
Tucker told the conference that a general de-escalation of Chinese threats would mean better overall US-China relations and that the incorporation of Taiwan into some sort of association with China could have a “Trojan horse potential” to promote democracy in China.
But there would simultaneously be important losses.
For while there would be peace in the near term, over the longer term there would be a variety of security threats to the US’ position in the region.
China’s regional influence could be enhanced by being perceived as having solved the Taiwan issue and doing it through diplomacy rather than the use of force, she said.
US credibility with friends and allies across Southeast Asia would be diminished, as Washington would appear to have “walked away” from Taiwan, she said. Japan's sea lanes could also be jeopardized, Tucker said.
“Certainly that is one of the main things they worry about in such a situation. Tokyo might indeed give more serious thought to going nuclear. And the US presence in the region, in bases that are already controversial, could seem less necessary if there was peace in the Taiwan Strait,” she said.
Tucker said China would be free to develop more varied military capabilities, making it a less unpredictable and more flexible adversary.
There would be an end to US-Taiwan security cooperation, interoperability and arms sales.
“All of this would end despite Beijing’s assurances that Taiwan would be allowed to keep its own military — both because there would be a perception that arms sales would no longer be needed and also because the US would be less inclined to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan since military technology is already leaking across the Strait, and that would probably only escalate,” she said.
The result of all of this, Tucker said, would be that Taiwan would find itself at the mercy of Beijing if the relationship soured because Taipei could no longer effectively turn to the US once Washington had physically and psychologically removed itself from the mix.
In addition, she said, there would be an “unavoidable surrender” of US intelligence listening posts on Taiwan and that in turn would have broad implications for the US position in the region.
“China's arrogance would be stimulated with a Taiwan triumph, and an associated victory over the US,” Tucker said.
“There would be a potential blow to democracy in Taiwan. Anger and disillusionment of a large vocal minority opposed to any sort of association with China could damage the political system. As in Hong Kong today, there would likely be self-censorship and other kinds of adjustments to a non-democratic Chinese system,” she added.
China would be strengthened as the Chinese and Taiwanese economies became more integrated, and for the US this would be a problem not just because China would become a more aggressive competitor economically but also because there would be the potential for US commercial interests to be excluded, she said.
“In other words,” Tucker said, “shifting power relationships in East Asia would involve a difficult balancing act for the US even as Washington remains agnostic about the final choices made by Taiwan.”
By William Lowther
STAFF REPORTER , WASHINGTON
Wednesday, Jan 27, 2010, Page 1
A leading US academic warned that if Taiwan loses its independence and becomes part of China, its impact on US interests would be “complex and dangerous.”
Nancy Tucker, an expert on Taiwan at Georgetown University in Washington, said that the US' place in Asia would “never be the same again.”
Speaking at the “Power in East Asia” conference on Monday organized by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the professor said that a change in Taiwan's status could strengthen China and weaken the US.
“If things go badly across the [Taiwan] Strait, war could develop and the United States, regardless of its preferences, would be involved. But in the event that cross-strait dialogue breaks the current stalemate, resolves the current situation, it will have an enormous impact on the United States' mission in the region,” Tucker said.
The most important gain to such a development, Tucker said, would be peace and an end to threats of intentional or accidental war in the Taiwan Strait.
It would let the US scrap its policy of strategic ambiguity, the US and China could relax about possible military conflict, the US could minimize planning for a Taiwan contingency, and although Chinese nationalism would not disappear, “the emotional quotient would be significantly reduced,” she said.
Tucker told the conference that a general de-escalation of Chinese threats would mean better overall US-China relations and that the incorporation of Taiwan into some sort of association with China could have a “Trojan horse potential” to promote democracy in China.
But there would simultaneously be important losses.
For while there would be peace in the near term, over the longer term there would be a variety of security threats to the US’ position in the region.
China’s regional influence could be enhanced by being perceived as having solved the Taiwan issue and doing it through diplomacy rather than the use of force, she said.
US credibility with friends and allies across Southeast Asia would be diminished, as Washington would appear to have “walked away” from Taiwan, she said. Japan's sea lanes could also be jeopardized, Tucker said.
“Certainly that is one of the main things they worry about in such a situation. Tokyo might indeed give more serious thought to going nuclear. And the US presence in the region, in bases that are already controversial, could seem less necessary if there was peace in the Taiwan Strait,” she said.
Tucker said China would be free to develop more varied military capabilities, making it a less unpredictable and more flexible adversary.
There would be an end to US-Taiwan security cooperation, interoperability and arms sales.
“All of this would end despite Beijing’s assurances that Taiwan would be allowed to keep its own military — both because there would be a perception that arms sales would no longer be needed and also because the US would be less inclined to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan since military technology is already leaking across the Strait, and that would probably only escalate,” she said.
The result of all of this, Tucker said, would be that Taiwan would find itself at the mercy of Beijing if the relationship soured because Taipei could no longer effectively turn to the US once Washington had physically and psychologically removed itself from the mix.
In addition, she said, there would be an “unavoidable surrender” of US intelligence listening posts on Taiwan and that in turn would have broad implications for the US position in the region.
“China's arrogance would be stimulated with a Taiwan triumph, and an associated victory over the US,” Tucker said.
“There would be a potential blow to democracy in Taiwan. Anger and disillusionment of a large vocal minority opposed to any sort of association with China could damage the political system. As in Hong Kong today, there would likely be self-censorship and other kinds of adjustments to a non-democratic Chinese system,” she added.
China would be strengthened as the Chinese and Taiwanese economies became more integrated, and for the US this would be a problem not just because China would become a more aggressive competitor economically but also because there would be the potential for US commercial interests to be excluded, she said.
“In other words,” Tucker said, “shifting power relationships in East Asia would involve a difficult balancing act for the US even as Washington remains agnostic about the final choices made by Taiwan.”
Monday, January 25, 2010
[轉載]Taiwan’s political liberties not eroded (蘇:台灣政治自由未被侵蝕)
這是新聞局回應1/12Gerrit van der Wees單獨的公開信.新聞局什麼時候變這麼忙了?忙著跟國際友台人士打筆戰?
-------
Taiwan’s political liberties not eroded
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓 Tuesday, Jan 26, 2010, Page 8
In a recent opinion piece (“Democracy and human rights still regressing,” Jan. 12, page 8), Gerrit van der Wees said Taiwan’s freedom and democracy are being eroded. He also predicted that in the Freedom in the World 2010 survey conducted by Freedom House, Taiwan’s rankings would go down.
On the contrary, this year’s survey accords Taiwan the same near-perfect overall score of 1.5 it received in last year’s survey, sharing the same scores in the political rights and civil liberties categories as Japan, for example, and comparable to those of advanced Western democracies.
In Freedom House’s assessment, our average score of 1.5 is the result of an advance in political rights from a score of 2 to the highest score of 1, offset by a decrease in the civil liberties category from 1 to 2.
The administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is gratified at the survey’s affirmation of our progress. At the same time, we take seriously the criticisms and recommendations of Freedom House and other organizations and individuals concerning human rights. As we continue our fight against corruption, recognized by Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, we shall persevere in giving due attention to possible flaws in our judicial system that may violate human rights. (按:關於貪腐指數引用Transparency Int'l,先前Kagan也已經批評過了!沒想到蘇小賓還是不改其故啊)
Without elaborating, Van der Wees recommended that “if the Ma administration is really serious about human rights and democracy it will need to seriously rethink its approach and move toward much-needed judicial reform.”
In this regard, I would like to point out that reform of our judicial system — augmenting its ability to effectively deal with corruption and other crimes while respecting and protecting human rights — is an ongoing project that has been progressing steadily, and by all accounts quite successfully, over the past two decades thanks to cooperative efforts across the political spectrum.
(按:關於司改,請參考孔傑榮的文章)
Consequently, the independence and neutrality of the judiciary and the sanctity of human rights have become deeply rooted values in Taiwan — a reality evident to observers at home and abroad. Nonetheless, this administration is committed to keep pushing forward on these fronts.
Van der Wees said many observers believe that rapprochement with China has occurred at the expense of democracy and human rights. On this point, this administration’s pledge to put Taiwan first for the benefit of its people most certainly includes the preservation of Taiwan’s free and democratic way of life and rule of law.
As this applies to cross-strait relations, any new mainland policy involving the law must be approved by the legislature. At the same time, government policies and actions are constantly being scrutinized by Taiwan’s free and highly critical media.
Such processes in themselves are embodiments of freedom and democracy. Furthermore, they render it very difficult for any policy that is not supported by public opinion to be implemented. Hence, regardless of one’s views on this government’s policies, one should have faith that, ultimately, Taiwan’s system of government can and will reflect the popular will.
(按:我是有信心驅政府下台灣會很慘啦:P)
-------
Taiwan’s political liberties not eroded
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓 Tuesday, Jan 26, 2010, Page 8
In a recent opinion piece (“Democracy and human rights still regressing,” Jan. 12, page 8), Gerrit van der Wees said Taiwan’s freedom and democracy are being eroded. He also predicted that in the Freedom in the World 2010 survey conducted by Freedom House, Taiwan’s rankings would go down.
On the contrary, this year’s survey accords Taiwan the same near-perfect overall score of 1.5 it received in last year’s survey, sharing the same scores in the political rights and civil liberties categories as Japan, for example, and comparable to those of advanced Western democracies.
In Freedom House’s assessment, our average score of 1.5 is the result of an advance in political rights from a score of 2 to the highest score of 1, offset by a decrease in the civil liberties category from 1 to 2.
The administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is gratified at the survey’s affirmation of our progress. At the same time, we take seriously the criticisms and recommendations of Freedom House and other organizations and individuals concerning human rights. As we continue our fight against corruption, recognized by Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, we shall persevere in giving due attention to possible flaws in our judicial system that may violate human rights. (按:關於貪腐指數引用Transparency Int'l,先前Kagan也已經批評過了!沒想到蘇小賓還是不改其故啊)
Without elaborating, Van der Wees recommended that “if the Ma administration is really serious about human rights and democracy it will need to seriously rethink its approach and move toward much-needed judicial reform.”
In this regard, I would like to point out that reform of our judicial system — augmenting its ability to effectively deal with corruption and other crimes while respecting and protecting human rights — is an ongoing project that has been progressing steadily, and by all accounts quite successfully, over the past two decades thanks to cooperative efforts across the political spectrum.
(按:關於司改,請參考孔傑榮的文章)
Consequently, the independence and neutrality of the judiciary and the sanctity of human rights have become deeply rooted values in Taiwan — a reality evident to observers at home and abroad. Nonetheless, this administration is committed to keep pushing forward on these fronts.
Van der Wees said many observers believe that rapprochement with China has occurred at the expense of democracy and human rights. On this point, this administration’s pledge to put Taiwan first for the benefit of its people most certainly includes the preservation of Taiwan’s free and democratic way of life and rule of law.
As this applies to cross-strait relations, any new mainland policy involving the law must be approved by the legislature. At the same time, government policies and actions are constantly being scrutinized by Taiwan’s free and highly critical media.
Such processes in themselves are embodiments of freedom and democracy. Furthermore, they render it very difficult for any policy that is not supported by public opinion to be implemented. Hence, regardless of one’s views on this government’s policies, one should have faith that, ultimately, Taiwan’s system of government can and will reflect the popular will.
(按:我是有信心驅政府下台灣會很慘啦:P)
[轉載]Democracy and human rights still regressing(台灣民主與人權依然倒退中)
Many observers both inside and outside Taiwan are concluding that rapprochement with China has occurred at the expense of democracy and human rights.
Democracy and human rights still regressing
By Gerrit van der Wees
Tuesday, Jan 12, 2010, Page 8
As one of the signatories of the letter to president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) by a group of international academics and writers (“An open letter to Taiwan’s president,” Nov. 13, page 8), I was perplexed by the tone and content of the response from Government Information Office Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) (“GIO response to Nov. 13 open letter,” Dec. 18, page 8).(第五號公開信的回函見此)
Instead of welcoming the suggestions of such a distinguished group of international academics, Su went into a defensive mode, used quotes from organizations such as Freedom House out of context and tried to make us believe that all is well with judicial independence and the health of Taiwan’s democracy.
Taiwan still ranked among the world’s “free” countries in 2008 and last year because of the hard work of previous governments — the pioneering work of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and the sustained progress made under former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
The point that minister Su seems to fail to understand is that — in the view of many international observers — Taiwan’s democracy and human rights have regressed since Ma came to office.
The “right answer” would have been to say the government would assess any shortcomings and take steps toward judicial reform.
This has also been suggested by other international academics, such as Jerome Cohen, but the only response from Taipei has been to whitewash the obvious flaws in the system and to assert that “everything is all right.”
In the next few days, Freedom House will issue its report for this year and one can bet that Taiwan’s standing in the rankings will go down.
(按:自由之家的報告顯示台灣整體排名未變,但是公民權利下降,政治自由則提升)
So if the Ma administration is really serious about human rights and democracy it will need to seriously rethink its approach and move toward much-needed judicial reform.
On the issue of cross-strait relations, it is obvious that everyone is in favor of improvement. The question is: At what expense?
Many observers both inside and outside Taiwan are concluding that rapprochement with China has occurred at the expense of democracy and human rights.
It should be obvious to Su and his colleagues that this is not the right way to go about it.
In a separate response to another signatory, Richard Kagan, Su states: “The mantra that democracy in Taiwan is less robust than before utterly conflicts with reality.”
He then quotes the results of the recent local elections to prove his point.
What he fails to understand is the significant reduction in the KMT’s support has occurred because many people have doubts about the government’s adherence to basic principles of democracy and human rights.
If the Ma administration really intends to “significantly enhance the quality of our democracy” (Su’s words) it would be highly desirable if these basic principles were adhered too.
The recent beef problem with the US and the ongoing debate about an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China show that the Ma administration is still following a “top-down” approach, instead of listening to public opinion.
Gerrit van der Wees is the editor of Taiwan Communique in Washington.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
[轉載]TAIWAN’S CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND CHINA’S (孔傑榮:限制被告律師辯護,法務部勿走火入魔)==updated==
前陣子看到一些司法改革愈改愈回去的新聞我就一直在等,等孔傑榮會不會對此作文章. 針對制度面提出見解比針對個案重要且全面,不幸的是阿扁這個個案雖然凸顯問題所在,但此個案之特殊性往往模糊焦點. 由其司法系統幾次試圖追殺扁案的被告律師(見此),這問題實在很難讓人相信司法的公正性. 這在幾次國際學者給的公開信裡也都有所提及. 總之,現在終於等到這篇了!
值得觀察的是日後自由之家與人權組織公佈排名時,台灣的整體的排名會不會有所影響(限制辯護會有傷害被告人權之疑).
以下中文翻譯部分取自中國時報(下面有連結).
==updated==
法務部針對此文竟還發布新聞稿,真有愈描愈黑的感覺...
-------
TAIWAN’S CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND CHINA’S Jan 20th, 2010 | By USAsialawNYU | Category: Jerome A. Cohen's Blog
An edited version of this text appeared in English in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) on January 20, 2010 under the title “Under Threat,” and appeared in Chinese on January 21, in the China Times (Taiwan) (繁體中文).
by Jerome A. Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen
The Chinese government’s continuing attacks on human rights lawyers rarely make foreign headlines these days. Monitoring, intimidating, disbarring and prosecuting activist lawyers have become routine in China. Even the tragic “disappearance” while in police custody of defense lawyer/political reformer Gao Zhisheng–now feared to be dead–hardly attracts attention.
It is also unremarkable for even non-political Chinese defense lawyers to suffer sanctions. The recent conviction of Beijing lawyer Li Zhuang for allegedly counseling his client to lie and bribe witnesses would not have been noted abroad if the case had not involved Chongqing’s extraordinary campaign to suppress organized crime.
By contrast, the Taiwan government’s new interest in curbing vigorous defense lawyers does constitute “news”. Although Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-Jeou recently took the occasion of the island’s Law Day to call for greater government efforts to promote judicial reform and human rights, his Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has been moving in the opposite direction.
相較之下，近來台灣政府開始對限制辯護律師感興趣，這倒是一則「新聞」。雖然馬英九總統上星期在台灣司法節慶祝大會表示，政府將更努力推動司法改革以落實人權保障，但其下法務部的作為卻與此背道而馳。
Last year, the Ministry, concerned about the conduct of ex-president Chen Shui-Bian’s defense lawyers in its ongoing corruption prosecutions against him, failed in its efforts to impose disciplinary sanctions against one of Chen’s lawyers for supposed ethical violations. Now it is trying to introduce legislation to punish “obstructions of justice” that will inevitably restrict defense lawyers’ activities.
The MOJ has proposed to amend the criminal code in several ways that threaten the modified adversarial legal system that Taiwan adopted a decade ago. Instead of supporting the equal contest between prosecutors and defense lawyers on which that system is based, the MOJ proposals, reflecting traditional Chinese distrust of defense lawyers, would subject Taiwan’s lawyers to some of the same dangers confronted by their counterparts in China, including significant prison time.
法務部提出的刑法修正草案，在幾個方面都將危及台灣十年前所採取的「改良式當事人進行主義」。法務部草案反映了中國傳統對辯護律師不信任的態度，草案不但未支持當事人進行主義的基礎｜檢察官與辯護律師的平等對抗，反而將使台灣律師面臨中國大陸律師所遭遇的一些危險，可能包括長期的牢獄生涯。
One amendment would punish anyone, including lawyers, for abetting defendants or others to “fabricate, alter, destroy or conceal” important evidence in criminal cases, even when their advice has been ignored and caused no harm! Further, it would punish anyone for abetting defendants to make false statements concerning important facts in trial or investigation. Thus, if a court rejects the defendant’s claim that his pre-trial confession was coerced by police, his lawyers might be prosecuted for having urged him to repudiate the confession. This “Sword of Damocles” hangs over Mainland lawyers, sometimes intimidating them from giving such advice, despite the prevalence of pre-trial torture.
修正草案其中一條擬處罰「使」被告或他人「偽造、變造、湮滅或隱匿」於刑事案件「有重要關係之證據」之行為，處罰對象包括一般人和律師。草案針對的是唆使行為，即使是被唆使的人沒有著手實施犯罪，也沒有任何實害發生，唆使行為也會成罪！此外，草案也懲罰「使被告」於審判或偵查時「就案情有重要關係之事項為虛偽陳述」之行為。如此一來，如果被告抗辯說審判前的自白是警方刑求而來，但法院不予採信的話，被告律師可能會因為建議被告推翻自白而被起訴。在中國大陸，這樣的風險像「達摩克里斯之劍（Sword of Damocles）」一樣，長期懸在律師的頭上，時刻威脅著律師，因此，即使刑訊逼供在中國相當普遍，律師有時也不敢建議當事人提出刑求抗辯。
Equally troublesome is the proposal to punish “illegitimate use” of important evidence outside of court. But what use is “illegitimate” and what evidence is “important”? The MOJ has stated that the provision is meant, among other things, to prevent documents from public trials being revealed at press conferences. Yet this would prevent freedom of speech and information essential to monitoring of the judicial process by the media and the people. Such restrictions, to the extent they exist in other democratic societies, are generally justified by the need to protect jury deliberations against media pressures, but Taiwan has no juries.
另一條草案條文同樣令人擔心，該條要懲罰將「相關證據資料之重要部分」於訴訟程序外為「不正當之使用」，但甚麼是「不正當之使用」？甚麼又是「相關證據資料之重要部分」？根據法務部的說明，此條文是為了避免例如召開記者會公布卷證資料等行為（即使是公開審判程序）。然而，這將會壓制人民和媒體監督司法程序所不可或缺的言論自由和資訊自由。這些限制，即使在其他民主社會有類似規定，其正當化理由通常是為了避免陪審團的決定受到媒體壓力，可是台灣並無陪審制度。
Even more problematic is the proposal to punish lawyers not only for contempt of court but also for contempt of prosecutors! Legal systems require effective and fair procedures for punishing refusal to heed reasonable court orders. But, in a system where lawyers and prosecutors are supposed to be equal competitors in their efforts to persuade a neutral judge, it is ludicrous to punish lawyers for failing to obey prosecutors.
更加有問題的是，法務部竟然在「藐視法庭罪」加上藐視檢察官罪的規定！誠然，法律制度需要有效、公正的程序來處罰拒絕遵守法院合理命令的人。但是在當事人進行主義下，律師和檢察官透過法庭攻防說服中立的法院採信其主張，雙方是處於平等的地位，如果律師因未能聽從檢察官的命令，便要被科以刑罰，十分荒唐。
MOJ officials do not seem to realize that, under Taiwan’s new adversarial system, for most purposes prosecutors can no longer be regarded as members of the “judiciary”. Their status and functions are very different from those of judges.
法務部官員似乎不瞭解，台灣已改採「改良式當事人進行主義」，檢察官在大多數情形下不能再被視為「司法」的一員，他們的地位和功能與法官大相逕庭。
The proposals–not yet submitted to the legislature–have understandably aroused strong opposition from the legal profession. Although the MOJ has stressed that the proposals are not targeted at lawyers, they will have an adverse impact upon lawyers’ defense work. If they are enacted, Taiwan is sure to be further downgraded in the civil liberties ratings of major non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House, a strong American supporter that last week criticized recent setbacks in the island’s protection of criminal defendants’ rights.
不出所料，法務部的修正草案還沒有送到立法院，就引發律師界強烈的反對。雖然法務部強調草案非針對律師而來，但其事實上會對律師的辯護造成負面的影響。草案若是通過，台灣的公民自由度勢必再被重要的非政府組織降級，例如一直以來支持台灣民主進步的美國人權組織「自由之家」，上周的報告已經指出台灣去年在保障刑事被告權利上的退步。
It is far from clear that additional restrictions on defense lawyers are needed to guard against “obstructions of justice” in Taiwan. The MOJ has cited no empirical studies to show that existing laws and ethical rules are inadequate. Moreover, the vague language of each proposed criminal prohibition is an invitation to abuse and confusion that would inhibit the robust defense lawyering that a fair justice system requires.
目前完全不清楚的是，究竟有沒有必要對辯護律師設下更多限制來防止「妨害司法」行為，法務部未提出任何實證研究，證明目前法令和律師執業倫理均不足以規範相關行為。再者，修正草案中各條文所使用的模糊字眼，容易造成濫用、引起困惑，進而壓制公正刑事程序所需要的有力辯護工作。
Every country needs effective administration of justice. Yet, every country also needs vigorous lawyers to check abuses of the criminal process. If these MOJ proposals are enacted, the plight of Taiwan’s defense lawyers may begin to resemble that of their Chinese counterparts.
值得觀察的是日後自由之家與人權組織公佈排名時,台灣的整體的排名會不會有所影響(限制辯護會有傷害被告人權之疑).
以下中文翻譯部分取自中國時報(下面有連結).
==updated==
法務部針對此文竟還發布新聞稿,真有愈描愈黑的感覺...
-------
TAIWAN’S CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND CHINA’S Jan 20th, 2010 | By USAsialawNYU | Category: Jerome A. Cohen's Blog
An edited version of this text appeared in English in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) on January 20, 2010 under the title “Under Threat,” and appeared in Chinese on January 21, in the China Times (Taiwan) (繁體中文).
by Jerome A. Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen
The Chinese government’s continuing attacks on human rights lawyers rarely make foreign headlines these days. Monitoring, intimidating, disbarring and prosecuting activist lawyers have become routine in China. Even the tragic “disappearance” while in police custody of defense lawyer/political reformer Gao Zhisheng–now feared to be dead–hardly attracts attention.
It is also unremarkable for even non-political Chinese defense lawyers to suffer sanctions. The recent conviction of Beijing lawyer Li Zhuang for allegedly counseling his client to lie and bribe witnesses would not have been noted abroad if the case had not involved Chongqing’s extraordinary campaign to suppress organized crime.
By contrast, the Taiwan government’s new interest in curbing vigorous defense lawyers does constitute “news”. Although Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-Jeou recently took the occasion of the island’s Law Day to call for greater government efforts to promote judicial reform and human rights, his Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has been moving in the opposite direction.
相較之下，近來台灣政府開始對限制辯護律師感興趣，這倒是一則「新聞」。雖然馬英九總統上星期在台灣司法節慶祝大會表示，政府將更努力推動司法改革以落實人權保障，但其下法務部的作為卻與此背道而馳。
Last year, the Ministry, concerned about the conduct of ex-president Chen Shui-Bian’s defense lawyers in its ongoing corruption prosecutions against him, failed in its efforts to impose disciplinary sanctions against one of Chen’s lawyers for supposed ethical violations. Now it is trying to introduce legislation to punish “obstructions of justice” that will inevitably restrict defense lawyers’ activities.
The MOJ has proposed to amend the criminal code in several ways that threaten the modified adversarial legal system that Taiwan adopted a decade ago. Instead of supporting the equal contest between prosecutors and defense lawyers on which that system is based, the MOJ proposals, reflecting traditional Chinese distrust of defense lawyers, would subject Taiwan’s lawyers to some of the same dangers confronted by their counterparts in China, including significant prison time.
法務部提出的刑法修正草案，在幾個方面都將危及台灣十年前所採取的「改良式當事人進行主義」。法務部草案反映了中國傳統對辯護律師不信任的態度，草案不但未支持當事人進行主義的基礎｜檢察官與辯護律師的平等對抗，反而將使台灣律師面臨中國大陸律師所遭遇的一些危險，可能包括長期的牢獄生涯。
One amendment would punish anyone, including lawyers, for abetting defendants or others to “fabricate, alter, destroy or conceal” important evidence in criminal cases, even when their advice has been ignored and caused no harm! Further, it would punish anyone for abetting defendants to make false statements concerning important facts in trial or investigation. Thus, if a court rejects the defendant’s claim that his pre-trial confession was coerced by police, his lawyers might be prosecuted for having urged him to repudiate the confession. This “Sword of Damocles” hangs over Mainland lawyers, sometimes intimidating them from giving such advice, despite the prevalence of pre-trial torture.
修正草案其中一條擬處罰「使」被告或他人「偽造、變造、湮滅或隱匿」於刑事案件「有重要關係之證據」之行為，處罰對象包括一般人和律師。草案針對的是唆使行為，即使是被唆使的人沒有著手實施犯罪，也沒有任何實害發生，唆使行為也會成罪！此外，草案也懲罰「使被告」於審判或偵查時「就案情有重要關係之事項為虛偽陳述」之行為。如此一來，如果被告抗辯說審判前的自白是警方刑求而來，但法院不予採信的話，被告律師可能會因為建議被告推翻自白而被起訴。在中國大陸，這樣的風險像「達摩克里斯之劍（Sword of Damocles）」一樣，長期懸在律師的頭上，時刻威脅著律師，因此，即使刑訊逼供在中國相當普遍，律師有時也不敢建議當事人提出刑求抗辯。
Equally troublesome is the proposal to punish “illegitimate use” of important evidence outside of court. But what use is “illegitimate” and what evidence is “important”? The MOJ has stated that the provision is meant, among other things, to prevent documents from public trials being revealed at press conferences. Yet this would prevent freedom of speech and information essential to monitoring of the judicial process by the media and the people. Such restrictions, to the extent they exist in other democratic societies, are generally justified by the need to protect jury deliberations against media pressures, but Taiwan has no juries.
另一條草案條文同樣令人擔心，該條要懲罰將「相關證據資料之重要部分」於訴訟程序外為「不正當之使用」，但甚麼是「不正當之使用」？甚麼又是「相關證據資料之重要部分」？根據法務部的說明，此條文是為了避免例如召開記者會公布卷證資料等行為（即使是公開審判程序）。然而，這將會壓制人民和媒體監督司法程序所不可或缺的言論自由和資訊自由。這些限制，即使在其他民主社會有類似規定，其正當化理由通常是為了避免陪審團的決定受到媒體壓力，可是台灣並無陪審制度。
Even more problematic is the proposal to punish lawyers not only for contempt of court but also for contempt of prosecutors! Legal systems require effective and fair procedures for punishing refusal to heed reasonable court orders. But, in a system where lawyers and prosecutors are supposed to be equal competitors in their efforts to persuade a neutral judge, it is ludicrous to punish lawyers for failing to obey prosecutors.
更加有問題的是，法務部竟然在「藐視法庭罪」加上藐視檢察官罪的規定！誠然，法律制度需要有效、公正的程序來處罰拒絕遵守法院合理命令的人。但是在當事人進行主義下，律師和檢察官透過法庭攻防說服中立的法院採信其主張，雙方是處於平等的地位，如果律師因未能聽從檢察官的命令，便要被科以刑罰，十分荒唐。
MOJ officials do not seem to realize that, under Taiwan’s new adversarial system, for most purposes prosecutors can no longer be regarded as members of the “judiciary”. Their status and functions are very different from those of judges.
法務部官員似乎不瞭解，台灣已改採「改良式當事人進行主義」，檢察官在大多數情形下不能再被視為「司法」的一員，他們的地位和功能與法官大相逕庭。
The proposals–not yet submitted to the legislature–have understandably aroused strong opposition from the legal profession. Although the MOJ has stressed that the proposals are not targeted at lawyers, they will have an adverse impact upon lawyers’ defense work. If they are enacted, Taiwan is sure to be further downgraded in the civil liberties ratings of major non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House, a strong American supporter that last week criticized recent setbacks in the island’s protection of criminal defendants’ rights.
不出所料，法務部的修正草案還沒有送到立法院，就引發律師界強烈的反對。雖然法務部強調草案非針對律師而來，但其事實上會對律師的辯護造成負面的影響。草案若是通過，台灣的公民自由度勢必再被重要的非政府組織降級，例如一直以來支持台灣民主進步的美國人權組織「自由之家」，上周的報告已經指出台灣去年在保障刑事被告權利上的退步。
It is far from clear that additional restrictions on defense lawyers are needed to guard against “obstructions of justice” in Taiwan. The MOJ has cited no empirical studies to show that existing laws and ethical rules are inadequate. Moreover, the vague language of each proposed criminal prohibition is an invitation to abuse and confusion that would inhibit the robust defense lawyering that a fair justice system requires.
目前完全不清楚的是，究竟有沒有必要對辯護律師設下更多限制來防止「妨害司法」行為，法務部未提出任何實證研究，證明目前法令和律師執業倫理均不足以規範相關行為。再者，修正草案中各條文所使用的模糊字眼，容易造成濫用、引起困惑，進而壓制公正刑事程序所需要的有力辯護工作。
Every country needs effective administration of justice. Yet, every country also needs vigorous lawyers to check abuses of the criminal process. If these MOJ proposals are enacted, the plight of Taiwan’s defense lawyers may begin to resemble that of their Chinese counterparts.
[轉載]在多元文化环境中创作音乐(updated)
轉載朋友接受的專訪. 真替他高興!
記得以前和他的一段對話聊到"中年轉業",那段對話可用一句做註解,是我從另一個轉業的朋友身上學到的,那就是: 找到喜歡的東西的時候,"死路"都很愉快的走!
==update==
video
---
BBC英伦网 玉川
来自台湾的音乐家庄承颖立志在英国传播中华文化。
旅居英国的华裔音乐家庄承颖来自台湾。他曾经在美国费城攻读景观建筑硕士学，但自幼对音乐的爱好使庄承颖走上音乐家之路。
2005年他来到英国伯明翰音乐学院攻读声乐表演，师从系主任男高音Julian Pike和次女高音Christine Cairns等，最后荣获声乐表演硕士学位，并成为一位难得的假声男高音。
近年来，庄承颖在英国举办和参加多次艺术演出，并与很多艺术家合作。最近，他又同艾米·麦克唐纳（Amy McDonnell）和谭颖两位年轻人携手，在伦敦组织了一场中国风实验演出，把中国传统音乐元素融入到多元文化的环境中。
这样一场以中国传统音乐为基调的音乐会，伦敦那些年轻的国际化的观众能接受吗？他在接受我的采访时有这样的解释：
选择其它媒体播放器
（庄承颖访谈摘录）
庄承颖：在组织和制作一台这类所谓“Fusion”音乐会（各种音乐融合在一起）时，我会对自己的西方古典音乐和中国传统音乐的背景比较注重。在跟其他文化背景的音乐家合作过程中，我认识到，在创作这种Fusion music时，保留不同的音乐风格和传统是很重要的。比如说，如果跟印度音乐家合作，我感到我们的音乐一定不仅要反映出中国音乐特征和西方古典音乐，也一定应该反映出印度音乐风格。我想，来欣赏这类音乐会的观众一定也期盼这样的音乐元素出现，听到不同音乐的冲突与和谐。所以在我们这场演出中，也会呈现出不同的音乐风格，例如爵士乐、中国音乐和西方前卫音乐等。
玉川：你跟这些不同文化背景的音乐家在合作当中有什么感想，愉快吗？
庄承颖：说实话，很多音乐家在考虑是否参加一场音乐会演出时都会考虑到经费问题。像这样一个由年轻人组织的经费很少的音乐会，我们这些参加演出的音乐家更多看重的是音乐会的实验和探索性质。大家可以说是志同道合，这么说吧，在合作过程中即使是争吵也是很开心的。
玉川：你觉得英国的音乐创作环境怎么样呢？
庄承颖：英国社会比较成熟，我们会开玩笑地说“没落的帝国”。但是“没落的帝国”有它文化沉稳的特点。在文化艺术方面有很健全的制度。另外一个不可忽视的因素是，当代伦敦是一个非常国际化、多元文化的都市，各种文化都能在伦敦并存和发展。虽然有时会使你产生没有依准的感觉，但同时你会感受到非常有趣和刺激的文化碰撞。所以我感到，在伦敦不仅可以保留自己的文化特征，而且还可以沉浸在多元文化之中，我是非常喜欢。
玉川：随着英国人对东方文化的了解日益增加，你觉得作为一个华人音乐家在这里创作音乐是不是大有天地呢？
庄承颖：我所追求的是音乐美的本身和沟通的感动。所以有时候我做事会比较固执或不计成本。我感到，不少西方人欣赏中国音乐不过是听听异国风情的音乐而已，但是我却想更向前推进一步，使中国音乐内涵同英国人的生活联系起来，以打动他们的内心。我感到的挫折是，很多中国音乐家都习惯于这种中国音乐的点缀功能，因此我感到有时跟中国音乐家合作比跟其他文化的音乐家合作更困难。我感到我的音乐努力虽然非常辛苦，但是很令人兴奋。
玉川：那你下一步打算是什么？
庄承颖：我已经有了演出和独奏会的基础。下一步我希望能使我的小小室内乐团能参加一些英国的音乐节，我们的这个室内乐团既有西方音乐本质，又包括声乐和中国器乐。我希望他们对我做出的既能打动中国人又能打动英国人的音乐努力感兴趣，引起一些回响，并邀请我们参加一些音乐节演出。
--------
行走在中西艺术之间 旅英华裔音乐家庄承颖的艺术人生
記得以前和他的一段對話聊到"中年轉業",那段對話可用一句做註解,是我從另一個轉業的朋友身上學到的,那就是: 找到喜歡的東西的時候,"死路"都很愉快的走!
==update==
video
---
BBC英伦网 玉川
来自台湾的音乐家庄承颖立志在英国传播中华文化。
旅居英国的华裔音乐家庄承颖来自台湾。他曾经在美国费城攻读景观建筑硕士学，但自幼对音乐的爱好使庄承颖走上音乐家之路。
2005年他来到英国伯明翰音乐学院攻读声乐表演，师从系主任男高音Julian Pike和次女高音Christine Cairns等，最后荣获声乐表演硕士学位，并成为一位难得的假声男高音。
近年来，庄承颖在英国举办和参加多次艺术演出，并与很多艺术家合作。最近，他又同艾米·麦克唐纳（Amy McDonnell）和谭颖两位年轻人携手，在伦敦组织了一场中国风实验演出，把中国传统音乐元素融入到多元文化的环境中。
这样一场以中国传统音乐为基调的音乐会，伦敦那些年轻的国际化的观众能接受吗？他在接受我的采访时有这样的解释：
选择其它媒体播放器
（庄承颖访谈摘录）
庄承颖：在组织和制作一台这类所谓“Fusion”音乐会（各种音乐融合在一起）时，我会对自己的西方古典音乐和中国传统音乐的背景比较注重。在跟其他文化背景的音乐家合作过程中，我认识到，在创作这种Fusion music时，保留不同的音乐风格和传统是很重要的。比如说，如果跟印度音乐家合作，我感到我们的音乐一定不仅要反映出中国音乐特征和西方古典音乐，也一定应该反映出印度音乐风格。我想，来欣赏这类音乐会的观众一定也期盼这样的音乐元素出现，听到不同音乐的冲突与和谐。所以在我们这场演出中，也会呈现出不同的音乐风格，例如爵士乐、中国音乐和西方前卫音乐等。
玉川：你跟这些不同文化背景的音乐家在合作当中有什么感想，愉快吗？
庄承颖：说实话，很多音乐家在考虑是否参加一场音乐会演出时都会考虑到经费问题。像这样一个由年轻人组织的经费很少的音乐会，我们这些参加演出的音乐家更多看重的是音乐会的实验和探索性质。大家可以说是志同道合，这么说吧，在合作过程中即使是争吵也是很开心的。
玉川：你觉得英国的音乐创作环境怎么样呢？
庄承颖：英国社会比较成熟，我们会开玩笑地说“没落的帝国”。但是“没落的帝国”有它文化沉稳的特点。在文化艺术方面有很健全的制度。另外一个不可忽视的因素是，当代伦敦是一个非常国际化、多元文化的都市，各种文化都能在伦敦并存和发展。虽然有时会使你产生没有依准的感觉，但同时你会感受到非常有趣和刺激的文化碰撞。所以我感到，在伦敦不仅可以保留自己的文化特征，而且还可以沉浸在多元文化之中，我是非常喜欢。
玉川：随着英国人对东方文化的了解日益增加，你觉得作为一个华人音乐家在这里创作音乐是不是大有天地呢？
庄承颖：我所追求的是音乐美的本身和沟通的感动。所以有时候我做事会比较固执或不计成本。我感到，不少西方人欣赏中国音乐不过是听听异国风情的音乐而已，但是我却想更向前推进一步，使中国音乐内涵同英国人的生活联系起来，以打动他们的内心。我感到的挫折是，很多中国音乐家都习惯于这种中国音乐的点缀功能，因此我感到有时跟中国音乐家合作比跟其他文化的音乐家合作更困难。我感到我的音乐努力虽然非常辛苦，但是很令人兴奋。
玉川：那你下一步打算是什么？
庄承颖：我已经有了演出和独奏会的基础。下一步我希望能使我的小小室内乐团能参加一些英国的音乐节，我们的这个室内乐团既有西方音乐本质，又包括声乐和中国器乐。我希望他们对我做出的既能打动中国人又能打动英国人的音乐努力感兴趣，引起一些回响，并邀请我们参加一些音乐节演出。
--------
行走在中西艺术之间 旅英华裔音乐家庄承颖的艺术人生
Monday, January 18, 2010
兩則新聞的雜感
我一直記得理則學老師說過,以辯論方式證明對方論點錯誤有三:其一,證明假設前提為非.其二證明推論過程錯誤.最後是另闢戰場. 當然第三者是非邏輯的論證.
在之前討論"有偏見的媒體不好嗎?"一文我試圖以檢視假設前提的方式來探討該文的結論是否適用於台灣.在另一文裡我也討論到現代法律下,基本假設應該是"無罪推定原則",也就是說除非證明被告有罪,否則被告無罪. 這是法律應有之基本精神,雖然冤獄難免,此基本精神下卻可以使冤獄降到最少.
可惜台灣法治似乎愈走愈倒退. 司法改革裡的諸多草案若成立,台灣坐實野蠻社會下所假設的"原罪"假設:除非證明清白,否則被告有(原)罪. 詳見下文明確提到之:The draft law also seems to validate the presumption of guilt. For example, one provision states that not-guilty verdicts in long-running cases should be final if the defendant is found innocent at three separate High Court retrials. What critics rightly wonder is why a defendant should have to be found innocent three times to be acquitted.
這種人權之侵害也呼應自由之家日前剛公佈的結果,台灣總體排名雖然不變,公民自由卻下降.
另一則新聞是前一篇白樂崎反駁季禮芬蘭說裏所提及的.季禮至少犯了兩個假設錯誤:第一個錯誤是假設台灣芬蘭化將促使中國民主化(Gilley’s misplaced assumption is that this process will somehow lead to democratization in China.).第二個錯誤是假設芬蘭當初芬蘭化是志願的,但歷史上實為無可奈何之選擇.也就是說,季禮假設芬蘭化是種自由意志的選項而與魁儡政權不同,但其實芬蘭化卻是毫無選擇後成為一個附庸國 (To start with, the perception that “Finlandization” enjoyed “wide support in Finland at the time.” The question is: did the Finnish people have much of a choice, with the Russian gun pointed at their head?).
最後扯到ECFA. 政府雖已拒絕公投,何不在公佈ECFA架構後,來個正反論辯呢? 當然,一切要符合邏輯,如果僅是另闢戰場似的口水戰就免了.
以下是關於台灣司改愈改愈回去的原文.
------
The backsliding of judicial reform
By Celia Llopis-jepsen 游思麗
Tuesday, Jan 19, 2010, Page 8
You’ve probably heard of the Hsichih Trio. What you probably haven’t heard is that this case and others like it helped precipitate one of the most important judicial reforms in Taiwan’s history — amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002.
As a result, should you now find yourself to be a defendant in a criminal case, you have rights in presenting your side of the story that the three young men arrested in 1991 did not have.
But those rights are not enough.
A case in point: Even now, a defendant in a civil case that goes to the Supreme Court is entitled to a public defender, but a defendant facing more serious criminal charges — even leading to the death penalty — is not.
There is no justification for this, but there is an explanation. Historically, the courts have presumed defendants in criminal cases to be guilty until proven innocent. Their rights, and the risk of wrongful conviction, were not a concern.
Legal reforms in the past 10 years have tried to change that, but this mentality is reflected in parts of the law to this day.
Last week, Freedom House lowered Taiwan’s civil liberties rating in its annual Freedom in the World report, citing in part the inadequate protection of defendants’ rights in criminal cases, and naming as an example a “high-profile murder case” — perhaps a reference to the Chiou Ho-shun (邱和順) or Hsu Tzu-chiang (徐自強) cases, both of which saw fresh convictions in retrials last year.
Let’s flesh this out a little. What we should say, and the reason Freedom House was right to lower its rating, is that despite a momentous overhaul of the courts eight years ago that was designed to address this problem, the institutional capacity to abuse defendants’ rights remains.
Recent proposals to amend the law further indicate that legal reform may take a turn for the worse. If the proposals from the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Yuan proceed, we should no longer be concerned that reform has slowed; we should worry instead that it may be backsliding. The presumption of guilt seems to be gaining legitimacy again, despite years of efforts to root it out.
In 1999, disgust over cases like the Hsichih Trio came to a head. A landmark National Judicial Reform Congress that had been called to outline steps toward a fairer judiciary proposed divesting judges of their investigative powers and strengthening the position of the defendant in court.
Three years later, amendments to Articles 161 and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were passed, and with that, Taiwan’s courts adopted a modified adversarial system. Before then, they used an inquisitorial system — often associated with continental Europe — rather than the adversarial system of Britain, the US and other places where English law has left its mark. Taiwan’s system now is a version of the latter.
The difference is this: Judges today are expected to listen impartially and passively to two sides of a case — one presented by the defense, one by the prosecution. (Before 2002, judges played the role of prosecutor, investigating the case themselves. Prosecutors indicted suspects, but did not have to attend court hearings.) The defense, meanwhile, is allowed to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses and question interpretations of forensic evidence.
The spirit of the change was that the prosecution and the defense should enjoy the same status in court and have the same opportunities to make their case, while the judge should not be in direct conflict with the defendant.
The inquisitorial system may work well in some countries, but it was not working well in Taiwan 10 years ago, when the country began mulling these changes.
Taiwan was a young democracy, only recently emerged from the world’s longest period of martial law; a country where judges were not required to have law degrees, but were trained by an authoritarian regime.
The shockingly weak case against the Hsichih Trio, among others, said it all: The courts could not be trusted to dispense even-handed justice.
For this reason, the year 2002 was a victory for judicial reform advocates. But it wasn’t a miracle. Changing the law took Taiwan a few years — but what about changing court culture?
Eight years down the line, defense lawyers are not always on an equal footing with prosecutors, while judges at times may slip out of their redefined roles. And as for the presumption of innocence, there is cause to believe that the Hsichih Trio, Chiou and Hsu are still at trial so many years after their cases began not because they have been proven to be guilty, but because they have not been proven to be innocent.
These are some of the obstacles the judiciary is still struggling with — and now the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Yuan risk making the process even harder.
In October, the Judicial Yuan passed the Fair and Speedy Criminal Trials Act (刑事妥速審判法), which, if approved by the legislature, could prevent defendants who have been wrongfully detained for many years from receiving damages under the Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice Act (冤獄賠償法).
The draft law also seems to validate the presumption of guilt. For example, one provision states that not-guilty verdicts in long-running cases should be final if the defendant is found innocent at three separate High Court retrials. What critics rightly wonder is why a defendant should have to be found innocent three times to be acquitted.
The justice ministry, meanwhile, is mulling changes to the Criminal Code that are no better. These include, but are not limited to:
‧ Restrictions on “inappropriately” publicizing details of court cases (likely to have a chilling effect on journalists, civic groups and lawyers).
‧ Barring lawyers and defendants from “disobeying the orders of judges and prosecutors” or “speaking inappropriate words” to them.
‧ Extending the perjury law to encompass defendants, barring them from “concealing evidence” and threatening lawyers with up to seven years’ prison for abetting perjury.
‧ Barring lawyers from “harassing” witnesses.
(These changes are explained in the Taipei Times reports “MOJ proposal sparks concern among lawyers,” Dec. 18, page 1, and “Bar association attacks MOJ plans,” Jan. 5, page 3.)
The proposal has academics and lawyers crying foul, warning that the amendment would infringe on the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself, while intimidating lawyers out of putting together the best possible defense for their client.
Can the defense and prosecution enjoy equal footing if defendants and lawyers are bound under penalty of imprisonment to obey prosecutors’ “orders”?
The justice ministry and Judicial Yuan proposals may not threaten the distinct roles for judges and prosecutors set out under the adversarial system, but they could subvert the spirit of the system by validating the presumption of guilt and weakening defendants’ rights.
Articles 154 and 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure state that every defendant shall be presumed innocent until proven otherwise, that guilt can only be proven through evidence and that absent this evidence, the defendant shall be acquitted.
Ask judicial reform experts what it will take for these principles to be applied consistently in Taiwan’s courts and some of them just shake their heads.
“A new generation of judges” is a common answer.
In other words, progress is not just a matter of changing the law — it takes time, too.
But in the meantime, is it too much to ask that the justice ministry and the Judicial Yuan refrain from making things worse?
Celia Llopis-Jepsen is an editor at the Taipei Times.
在之前討論"有偏見的媒體不好嗎?"一文我試圖以檢視假設前提的方式來探討該文的結論是否適用於台灣.在另一文裡我也討論到現代法律下,基本假設應該是"無罪推定原則",也就是說除非證明被告有罪,否則被告無罪. 這是法律應有之基本精神,雖然冤獄難免,此基本精神下卻可以使冤獄降到最少.
可惜台灣法治似乎愈走愈倒退. 司法改革裡的諸多草案若成立,台灣坐實野蠻社會下所假設的"原罪"假設:除非證明清白,否則被告有(原)罪. 詳見下文明確提到之:The draft law also seems to validate the presumption of guilt. For example, one provision states that not-guilty verdicts in long-running cases should be final if the defendant is found innocent at three separate High Court retrials. What critics rightly wonder is why a defendant should have to be found innocent three times to be acquitted.
這種人權之侵害也呼應自由之家日前剛公佈的結果,台灣總體排名雖然不變,公民自由卻下降.
另一則新聞是前一篇白樂崎反駁季禮芬蘭說裏所提及的.季禮至少犯了兩個假設錯誤:第一個錯誤是假設台灣芬蘭化將促使中國民主化(Gilley’s misplaced assumption is that this process will somehow lead to democratization in China.).第二個錯誤是假設芬蘭當初芬蘭化是志願的,但歷史上實為無可奈何之選擇.也就是說,季禮假設芬蘭化是種自由意志的選項而與魁儡政權不同,但其實芬蘭化卻是毫無選擇後成為一個附庸國 (To start with, the perception that “Finlandization” enjoyed “wide support in Finland at the time.” The question is: did the Finnish people have much of a choice, with the Russian gun pointed at their head?).
最後扯到ECFA. 政府雖已拒絕公投,何不在公佈ECFA架構後,來個正反論辯呢? 當然,一切要符合邏輯,如果僅是另闢戰場似的口水戰就免了.
以下是關於台灣司改愈改愈回去的原文.
------
The backsliding of judicial reform
By Celia Llopis-jepsen 游思麗
Tuesday, Jan 19, 2010, Page 8
You’ve probably heard of the Hsichih Trio. What you probably haven’t heard is that this case and others like it helped precipitate one of the most important judicial reforms in Taiwan’s history — amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002.
As a result, should you now find yourself to be a defendant in a criminal case, you have rights in presenting your side of the story that the three young men arrested in 1991 did not have.
But those rights are not enough.
A case in point: Even now, a defendant in a civil case that goes to the Supreme Court is entitled to a public defender, but a defendant facing more serious criminal charges — even leading to the death penalty — is not.
There is no justification for this, but there is an explanation. Historically, the courts have presumed defendants in criminal cases to be guilty until proven innocent. Their rights, and the risk of wrongful conviction, were not a concern.
Legal reforms in the past 10 years have tried to change that, but this mentality is reflected in parts of the law to this day.
Last week, Freedom House lowered Taiwan’s civil liberties rating in its annual Freedom in the World report, citing in part the inadequate protection of defendants’ rights in criminal cases, and naming as an example a “high-profile murder case” — perhaps a reference to the Chiou Ho-shun (邱和順) or Hsu Tzu-chiang (徐自強) cases, both of which saw fresh convictions in retrials last year.
Let’s flesh this out a little. What we should say, and the reason Freedom House was right to lower its rating, is that despite a momentous overhaul of the courts eight years ago that was designed to address this problem, the institutional capacity to abuse defendants’ rights remains.
Recent proposals to amend the law further indicate that legal reform may take a turn for the worse. If the proposals from the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Yuan proceed, we should no longer be concerned that reform has slowed; we should worry instead that it may be backsliding. The presumption of guilt seems to be gaining legitimacy again, despite years of efforts to root it out.
In 1999, disgust over cases like the Hsichih Trio came to a head. A landmark National Judicial Reform Congress that had been called to outline steps toward a fairer judiciary proposed divesting judges of their investigative powers and strengthening the position of the defendant in court.
Three years later, amendments to Articles 161 and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were passed, and with that, Taiwan’s courts adopted a modified adversarial system. Before then, they used an inquisitorial system — often associated with continental Europe — rather than the adversarial system of Britain, the US and other places where English law has left its mark. Taiwan’s system now is a version of the latter.
The difference is this: Judges today are expected to listen impartially and passively to two sides of a case — one presented by the defense, one by the prosecution. (Before 2002, judges played the role of prosecutor, investigating the case themselves. Prosecutors indicted suspects, but did not have to attend court hearings.) The defense, meanwhile, is allowed to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses and question interpretations of forensic evidence.
The spirit of the change was that the prosecution and the defense should enjoy the same status in court and have the same opportunities to make their case, while the judge should not be in direct conflict with the defendant.
The inquisitorial system may work well in some countries, but it was not working well in Taiwan 10 years ago, when the country began mulling these changes.
Taiwan was a young democracy, only recently emerged from the world’s longest period of martial law; a country where judges were not required to have law degrees, but were trained by an authoritarian regime.
The shockingly weak case against the Hsichih Trio, among others, said it all: The courts could not be trusted to dispense even-handed justice.
For this reason, the year 2002 was a victory for judicial reform advocates. But it wasn’t a miracle. Changing the law took Taiwan a few years — but what about changing court culture?
Eight years down the line, defense lawyers are not always on an equal footing with prosecutors, while judges at times may slip out of their redefined roles. And as for the presumption of innocence, there is cause to believe that the Hsichih Trio, Chiou and Hsu are still at trial so many years after their cases began not because they have been proven to be guilty, but because they have not been proven to be innocent.
These are some of the obstacles the judiciary is still struggling with — and now the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Yuan risk making the process even harder.
In October, the Judicial Yuan passed the Fair and Speedy Criminal Trials Act (刑事妥速審判法), which, if approved by the legislature, could prevent defendants who have been wrongfully detained for many years from receiving damages under the Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice Act (冤獄賠償法).
The draft law also seems to validate the presumption of guilt. For example, one provision states that not-guilty verdicts in long-running cases should be final if the defendant is found innocent at three separate High Court retrials. What critics rightly wonder is why a defendant should have to be found innocent three times to be acquitted.
The justice ministry, meanwhile, is mulling changes to the Criminal Code that are no better. These include, but are not limited to:
‧ Restrictions on “inappropriately” publicizing details of court cases (likely to have a chilling effect on journalists, civic groups and lawyers).
‧ Barring lawyers and defendants from “disobeying the orders of judges and prosecutors” or “speaking inappropriate words” to them.
‧ Extending the perjury law to encompass defendants, barring them from “concealing evidence” and threatening lawyers with up to seven years’ prison for abetting perjury.
‧ Barring lawyers from “harassing” witnesses.
(These changes are explained in the Taipei Times reports “MOJ proposal sparks concern among lawyers,” Dec. 18, page 1, and “Bar association attacks MOJ plans,” Jan. 5, page 3.)
The proposal has academics and lawyers crying foul, warning that the amendment would infringe on the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself, while intimidating lawyers out of putting together the best possible defense for their client.
Can the defense and prosecution enjoy equal footing if defendants and lawyers are bound under penalty of imprisonment to obey prosecutors’ “orders”?
The justice ministry and Judicial Yuan proposals may not threaten the distinct roles for judges and prosecutors set out under the adversarial system, but they could subvert the spirit of the system by validating the presumption of guilt and weakening defendants’ rights.
Articles 154 and 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure state that every defendant shall be presumed innocent until proven otherwise, that guilt can only be proven through evidence and that absent this evidence, the defendant shall be acquitted.
Ask judicial reform experts what it will take for these principles to be applied consistently in Taiwan’s courts and some of them just shake their heads.
“A new generation of judges” is a common answer.
In other words, progress is not just a matter of changing the law — it takes time, too.
But in the meantime, is it too much to ask that the justice ministry and the Judicial Yuan refrain from making things worse?
Celia Llopis-Jepsen is an editor at the Taipei Times.
Sunday, January 17, 2010
轉載: Gilley’s ‘Finlandization’ is wrong (白樂崎:季禮的芬蘭化是錯誤的)(全文中英對照) (updated on 1/25)
前陣子季禮的芬蘭化引起討論.前AIT主席白樂崎對該文提出反駁. 我翻譯後對照中英文全文如下.
另:芬蘭化全文
=update on 1/25==
不是我要說嘴, 這篇文章竟然慢了一整個禮拜才刊出(《白樂崎專欄》 誰說「海峽不太危急」),真有爭取時效的事情的話,一個禮拜都不知道演變成怎樣了! 不過我猜遲到總比不到好? 媒體刊載總是比我這種沒人看自己寫爽的小格張貼有影響力多了!
------
Gilley’s ‘Finlandization’ is wrong
白樂崎:季禮的芬蘭化是錯誤的
By Nat Bellocchi
Monday, Jan 18, 2010, Page 8
The relations between Taiwan, the US and China have given rise to many an academic analysis. This is understandable and even laudable: The network of relations is complex and is open to various interpretations and insights. Many past treatises have made valuable contributions to the understanding of developments between the three countries.
台灣,美國與中國之間的關係引發許多學術分析.這不但是可以了解甚至是值得嘉勉的:(國際)關係組成的網路複雜,容許各種解讀與見解. 過去已有許多論文幫助我們了解這三個國家之間關係的發展.
However, once every so often an academic publishes an analysis that is so far removed from reality that it would be dismissed out of hand for its lack of understanding and its outright naivite. Bruce Gilley’s article, titled “Not So Dire Straits” — published in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs (January/February 2010) — is such a work.
然而,偶爾會有或是缺乏對現實的了解,亦或是過於天真而有偏離現實的學術研究發表,我們大可以忽略此類不切實際的發表.季禮發表在國際事務(Foreign Affairs)一二月刊,標題為"不再迫切的台灣海峽"就屬此類.
Gilley’s basic thesis is that the present “rapprochement” between Taiwan and China opens the way for the “Finlandization” of Taiwan, and for the US to allow Taiwan to move from the present US strategic orbit towards China’s sphere of influence. Gilley’s misplaced assumption is that this process will somehow lead to democratization in China.
季禮的根本主張是台灣與中國間的和解打開台灣芬蘭化的這條通路,如此一來美國可允許台灣離開美國戰略軸心繼而往中國靠攏.季禮錯誤的假設台灣芬蘭化的過程將促使中國民主化.
Gilley’s misconceptions are multiple, so in a brief essay like this one can only touch on a few major points.
季禮的錯誤認知不僅於此,本文將簡短談論幾個重點.
To start with, the perception that “Finlandization” enjoyed “wide support in Finland at the time.” The question is: did the Finnish people have much of a choice, with the Russian gun pointed at their head?
首先是關於"芬蘭化"受到"當時多數芬蘭人的廣泛支持"的觀點,問題是:當俄羅斯以槍桿對準他們(芬蘭人)的頭,芬蘭人能有多少選擇?
A second general point is one of historical accuracy: Gilley writes that in 1949 “Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities.” The truth of the matter is that Taiwan — as a Japanese colony — had been a separate entity for some 50 years, while before that period the influence of the Chinese imperial governments on the island was minimal at best.
第二(個錯誤)是關於歷史正確性:季禮寫到,在1949年"台灣和中國成為兩個獨立的政治實體". 事實是台灣,一個日本殖民地,中國清朝對台灣的影響即使在日本殖民那五十年前也非常小,如果真有任何影響可言.
The problem arose when the defeated Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was driven out of China and landed in Taiwan, treating it like occupied territory. It is also incorrect to say “most of the international community came to accept Beijing’s claim to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan.” This was only the case for pro-Beijing regimes of the likes of Zimbabwe and the Sudan. The US and other Western nations only “noted” or “acknowledged” Beijing’s claims, but took the position that it remained an unresolved issue, and that the island’s future needed to be determined in accordance with the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty.
問題在於戰敗的國民黨撤退到台灣,把台灣是為自己的土地進而佔領. (季禮)所謂的"國際社會大致上已接受北京政府宣稱對台擁有主權"的說法也不正確. 這僅對親中政權如辛巴威與蘇丹而言.美國與其他西方國家僅僅"注意"或是"承認"北京有此宣稱,但對此採取"有待解決"的立場,而且台灣的未來也必須以符合1952年舊金山合約的方式解決.
But the most serious fallacy of the article is that it posits that a Chamberlain-like appeasement of China on the Taiwan issue will somehow democratize and pacify a rising China rather than embolden it. That is a fundamental misconception: Repressive regimes are never mollified by concessions; it only increases their appetite.
但最嚴重的謬誤在於該文裡提議在台灣議題上對中國採取一種類似內務,姑息靖綏主義的方將或多或少促進民主,安撫興起中的中國而不會促使北京更加大膽妄為. 這是個根本的錯誤: 退讓從不會安撫高壓政權,相反的,(姑息)只會讓中國食髓知味(它胃口更大). (按:在季禮芬蘭化一文中提到:Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion."芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大").
It would be a fundamental error to sacrifice the hard-won achievements of a vibrant and democratic Taiwan and let it drift into an uncertain, fuzzy “principled neutrality.”
犧牲得來不易的民主台灣,讓它向不確定地,含糊的原則性中立靠攏將是個根本的錯誤.
Gilley wants us to believe that there is a distinction between this “Finland-style” status and “cowering acquiescence” as he calls it. An authoritarian power like China is hardly likely to be bothered by such finessing, and will remove any opposition to its rule; Tibet and East Turkestan are rather illustrative examples.
季禮要我們相信(志願性的)芬蘭化(Finland-style status)與(非志願性的)魁儡政權之間有所不同.極權國家如中國才懶得區分這種不同,並且會移除不利其政權的任何異議.圖博(西藏)與東土耳其斯坦(新疆)就是最好的例證.
(按:關於芬蘭化與魁儡政權之不同,見原文:Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make.Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.)
Gilley also argues that China’s claims to Taiwan may be less motivated “nationalism and … a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness,” and more by a geostrategic rationale: By virtue of its location, Taiwan has strategic importance, and by bringing it into its sphere of influence it could enhance its ability to project its naval power, and thereby exert its influence in the Western Pacific.
季禮還宣稱,中國宣稱擁有台灣並不是出自於民族主義的理由,而是基於地理位置鄰近使然: 就地理位置來看,台灣具戰略重要性,將台灣納入將強化中國在西太平洋的海軍與影響力.
On this point he is correct: Taiwan has tremendous strategic importance, not only for Japan and South Korea, but also for US interests in the East Asia and Pacific region. And this is precisely the reason why it was most wise for the US to stand by Taiwan in recently offering it anti-missile technology.
在這點上季禮是正確的:台灣在戰略上非常重要,不只是對日韓而言,對美國在東亞與太平洋利益而言亦然. 正因此,美國更應該固守立場,美國最近提供台灣飛彈防禦系統最為明智之舉.
From the perspective of the Taiwanese, a drift in China’s direction would mean a loss of the freedom and democracy they worked so hard to achieve. US credibility around the world — and particularly in East Asia — does depend on its adherence to the basic principles for which we stand. Allowing a free and democratic Taiwan to slide into the sphere of influence of an authoritarian China is not acceptable.
從台灣的角度還看,傾中意味著喪失得來不易的自由與民主.美國在世界,特別在東亞的信譽在於堅守基本立場.允許台灣向集權中國靠攏是不可接受的.
Thus, instead of “Finlandization” of Taiwan, the US should pursue a policy of stronger engagement with Taiwan by helping the country defend itself against a belligerent neighbor, and by signing a free-trade agreement to strengthen US economic and political ties with that democratic nation. Only by bringing Taiwan into the international family of nations, can real stability in East Asia be achieved.
因此,與其讓台灣芬蘭化,美國應該更積極介入,以幫助台灣防衛以對抗它的好戰的鄰近強國(指中國)的方式,以簽署自由貿易協定的方式來加強台灣與美國的政經關係.為有讓台灣參予國際社會才能讓東亞地區情勢穩固.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
==update on 1/20==
這裡有其他反駁芬蘭說意見的幾個連結.
Taking path of Finland could leave Taiwan cold By Chen Yi-nan 陳逸南
Forget Finland, think Hong Kong By Huang Chih-ta 黃致達 Wednesday, Jan 13, 2010, Page 8
THE LIBERTY TIMES EDITORIAL: Taiwan must uphold sovereignty Monday, Jan 04, 2010, Page 8
另:芬蘭化全文
=update on 1/25==
不是我要說嘴, 這篇文章竟然慢了一整個禮拜才刊出(《白樂崎專欄》 誰說「海峽不太危急」),真有爭取時效的事情的話,一個禮拜都不知道演變成怎樣了! 不過我猜遲到總比不到好? 媒體刊載總是比我這種沒人看自己寫爽的小格張貼有影響力多了!
------
Gilley’s ‘Finlandization’ is wrong
白樂崎:季禮的芬蘭化是錯誤的
By Nat Bellocchi
Monday, Jan 18, 2010, Page 8
The relations between Taiwan, the US and China have given rise to many an academic analysis. This is understandable and even laudable: The network of relations is complex and is open to various interpretations and insights. Many past treatises have made valuable contributions to the understanding of developments between the three countries.
台灣,美國與中國之間的關係引發許多學術分析.這不但是可以了解甚至是值得嘉勉的:(國際)關係組成的網路複雜,容許各種解讀與見解. 過去已有許多論文幫助我們了解這三個國家之間關係的發展.
However, once every so often an academic publishes an analysis that is so far removed from reality that it would be dismissed out of hand for its lack of understanding and its outright naivite. Bruce Gilley’s article, titled “Not So Dire Straits” — published in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs (January/February 2010) — is such a work.
然而,偶爾會有或是缺乏對現實的了解,亦或是過於天真而有偏離現實的學術研究發表,我們大可以忽略此類不切實際的發表.季禮發表在國際事務(Foreign Affairs)一二月刊,標題為"不再迫切的台灣海峽"就屬此類.
Gilley’s basic thesis is that the present “rapprochement” between Taiwan and China opens the way for the “Finlandization” of Taiwan, and for the US to allow Taiwan to move from the present US strategic orbit towards China’s sphere of influence. Gilley’s misplaced assumption is that this process will somehow lead to democratization in China.
季禮的根本主張是台灣與中國間的和解打開台灣芬蘭化的這條通路,如此一來美國可允許台灣離開美國戰略軸心繼而往中國靠攏.季禮錯誤的假設台灣芬蘭化的過程將促使中國民主化.
Gilley’s misconceptions are multiple, so in a brief essay like this one can only touch on a few major points.
季禮的錯誤認知不僅於此,本文將簡短談論幾個重點.
To start with, the perception that “Finlandization” enjoyed “wide support in Finland at the time.” The question is: did the Finnish people have much of a choice, with the Russian gun pointed at their head?
首先是關於"芬蘭化"受到"當時多數芬蘭人的廣泛支持"的觀點,問題是:當俄羅斯以槍桿對準他們(芬蘭人)的頭,芬蘭人能有多少選擇?
A second general point is one of historical accuracy: Gilley writes that in 1949 “Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities.” The truth of the matter is that Taiwan — as a Japanese colony — had been a separate entity for some 50 years, while before that period the influence of the Chinese imperial governments on the island was minimal at best.
第二(個錯誤)是關於歷史正確性:季禮寫到,在1949年"台灣和中國成為兩個獨立的政治實體". 事實是台灣,一個日本殖民地,中國清朝對台灣的影響即使在日本殖民那五十年前也非常小,如果真有任何影響可言.
The problem arose when the defeated Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was driven out of China and landed in Taiwan, treating it like occupied territory. It is also incorrect to say “most of the international community came to accept Beijing’s claim to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan.” This was only the case for pro-Beijing regimes of the likes of Zimbabwe and the Sudan. The US and other Western nations only “noted” or “acknowledged” Beijing’s claims, but took the position that it remained an unresolved issue, and that the island’s future needed to be determined in accordance with the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty.
問題在於戰敗的國民黨撤退到台灣,把台灣是為自己的土地進而佔領. (季禮)所謂的"國際社會大致上已接受北京政府宣稱對台擁有主權"的說法也不正確. 這僅對親中政權如辛巴威與蘇丹而言.美國與其他西方國家僅僅"注意"或是"承認"北京有此宣稱,但對此採取"有待解決"的立場,而且台灣的未來也必須以符合1952年舊金山合約的方式解決.
But the most serious fallacy of the article is that it posits that a Chamberlain-like appeasement of China on the Taiwan issue will somehow democratize and pacify a rising China rather than embolden it. That is a fundamental misconception: Repressive regimes are never mollified by concessions; it only increases their appetite.
但最嚴重的謬誤在於該文裡提議在台灣議題上對中國採取一種類似內務,姑息靖綏主義的方將或多或少促進民主,安撫興起中的中國而不會促使北京更加大膽妄為. 這是個根本的錯誤: 退讓從不會安撫高壓政權,相反的,(姑息)只會讓中國食髓知味(它胃口更大). (按:在季禮芬蘭化一文中提到:Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion."芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大").
It would be a fundamental error to sacrifice the hard-won achievements of a vibrant and democratic Taiwan and let it drift into an uncertain, fuzzy “principled neutrality.”
犧牲得來不易的民主台灣,讓它向不確定地,含糊的原則性中立靠攏將是個根本的錯誤.
Gilley wants us to believe that there is a distinction between this “Finland-style” status and “cowering acquiescence” as he calls it. An authoritarian power like China is hardly likely to be bothered by such finessing, and will remove any opposition to its rule; Tibet and East Turkestan are rather illustrative examples.
季禮要我們相信(志願性的)芬蘭化(Finland-style status)與(非志願性的)魁儡政權之間有所不同.極權國家如中國才懶得區分這種不同,並且會移除不利其政權的任何異議.圖博(西藏)與東土耳其斯坦(新疆)就是最好的例證.
(按:關於芬蘭化與魁儡政權之不同,見原文:Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make.Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.)
Gilley also argues that China’s claims to Taiwan may be less motivated “nationalism and … a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness,” and more by a geostrategic rationale: By virtue of its location, Taiwan has strategic importance, and by bringing it into its sphere of influence it could enhance its ability to project its naval power, and thereby exert its influence in the Western Pacific.
季禮還宣稱,中國宣稱擁有台灣並不是出自於民族主義的理由,而是基於地理位置鄰近使然: 就地理位置來看,台灣具戰略重要性,將台灣納入將強化中國在西太平洋的海軍與影響力.
On this point he is correct: Taiwan has tremendous strategic importance, not only for Japan and South Korea, but also for US interests in the East Asia and Pacific region. And this is precisely the reason why it was most wise for the US to stand by Taiwan in recently offering it anti-missile technology.
在這點上季禮是正確的:台灣在戰略上非常重要,不只是對日韓而言,對美國在東亞與太平洋利益而言亦然. 正因此,美國更應該固守立場,美國最近提供台灣飛彈防禦系統最為明智之舉.
From the perspective of the Taiwanese, a drift in China’s direction would mean a loss of the freedom and democracy they worked so hard to achieve. US credibility around the world — and particularly in East Asia — does depend on its adherence to the basic principles for which we stand. Allowing a free and democratic Taiwan to slide into the sphere of influence of an authoritarian China is not acceptable.
從台灣的角度還看,傾中意味著喪失得來不易的自由與民主.美國在世界,特別在東亞的信譽在於堅守基本立場.允許台灣向集權中國靠攏是不可接受的.
Thus, instead of “Finlandization” of Taiwan, the US should pursue a policy of stronger engagement with Taiwan by helping the country defend itself against a belligerent neighbor, and by signing a free-trade agreement to strengthen US economic and political ties with that democratic nation. Only by bringing Taiwan into the international family of nations, can real stability in East Asia be achieved.
因此,與其讓台灣芬蘭化,美國應該更積極介入,以幫助台灣防衛以對抗它的好戰的鄰近強國(指中國)的方式,以簽署自由貿易協定的方式來加強台灣與美國的政經關係.為有讓台灣參予國際社會才能讓東亞地區情勢穩固.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
==update on 1/20==
這裡有其他反駁芬蘭說意見的幾個連結.
Taking path of Finland could leave Taiwan cold By Chen Yi-nan 陳逸南
Forget Finland, think Hong Kong By Huang Chih-ta 黃致達 Wednesday, Jan 13, 2010, Page 8
THE LIBERTY TIMES EDITORIAL: Taiwan must uphold sovereignty Monday, Jan 04, 2010, Page 8
Saturday, January 16, 2010
拋磚引玉(1): 關於德布西的前奏曲
這其實是前一陣子的對話了. 話說咖啡館裡有人問我有沒有德布西前奏曲的推荐版本. 事實上德布西並不在我喜歡的作曲家之列, 雖然對他的音樂有接觸, 談不上喜歡, 所以有了以下的文字. 過了幾天,突然想到可以去問問瓦哈哈的觀點, 結果就引來一長串的討論.
在此我只貼出我原先的文字, 穿插其他人對該版本的一些看法. 文後則提供瓦哈拉原文的連結. 我很喜歡這種對話. 基本上,我的觀點完全是從樂曲結構與樂派切入, 這大概和我算是半個學院派出身有關. 瓦哈拉則是從他鋼琴美學欣賞的角度出發,因此原文一開始(在第二段)他先提供他個人欣賞的偏好. 有興趣的人可以看看在特定鋼琴欣賞美學下對我就結構出發提到的各版本有什麼看法.
附帶一提, 被追問兩個版本,分別是Francois（富蘭索瓦）與 Haas的版本. 我把相關對話也編輯進去。
以下.
----
我: 先說,德布西不算是我喜歡的作曲家(我是LKK派的),所以我對他的音樂沒有特別研究,當然就遑論版本比較了!
瓦: 先說明我欣賞鋼琴獨奏錄音的美學觀點。對傳統的曲目（像貝多芬蕭邦）我對錄音音質很不挑剔，所以我會聽Schnabel的貝多芬奏鳴曲或是Lipatti甚至更古早的鋼琴家彈蕭邦。當然我會有點介意演奏技巧，但是我更在乎的是感情與整體感覺。但是對於像Debussy或Ravel，我會非常在乎音色明暗的微妙變化與動態對比，所以我幾乎無法接受音質太差的錄音。聽Debussy時我比較唯物，其他傳統音樂則較唯心。
我: 所以我不付責任的想法是,先說前奏曲這種玩意兒好了.蕭邦和德布西都曾經用24種大小調來寫前奏曲. 好了,我很落俗套的,就是喜歡浪漫的蕭邦寫的前奏曲,相對下實在對於德布西的前奏曲有點,ㄟ,不那嚜喜歡. 所以就曲式上,我個人非常喜歡玻里尼彈奏的蕭邦曲目,所以如果玻里尼也有彈奏德布希的前奏曲,也許可以一試.
瓦: Pollini的Book 1我不怎麼喜歡。我覺得那好像也是有點缺乏想像力的演奏，而且錄音的音質有點怪，鋼琴的音色有點悶暗，也有點缺乏動態，像是在音樂廳頂樓後段最低價的座位聽到的鋼琴。
我: 其次,如果就德布希屬於的樂派來講,我個人偏見是德布希的音樂比較適合很有個性的處理方法.也就是說那種中規中舉的鋼琴演奏家,或是小心翼翼的,我大概就不會推薦去嚐試.我心目中想到兩者:齊瑪曼或是李希特的版本,如果他們有錄音的話.我相信前者應該有.後者我不是那嚜有把握(可能得問他的粉絲RICHTER大),我只知道李希特錄過德布希的其他曲目.
順便一提,我非常喜歡齊瑪曼,去年吧曾經在自己的部落格講過他一二事.
瓦: 我也不是一開始就喜歡Ravel和Debussy，不過他們的管弦樂很容易被接受，我花了些時間才開始喜歡他們的鋼琴，因為和我原先聽得多的浪漫派鋼琴曲完全不同。
如果硬要區分的話，我想我比較喜歡Ravel的管弦樂，Debussy的鋼琴。前奏曲是非常有趣的東西，幾乎每個能成一家之言的鋼琴家演奏都有很大的差異。我覺得彈Debussy大概需要很有想像力和創意，以及精確的執行能力。
Richter其實幾乎彈全了前奏曲，但是他從不彈任何全集。最玩整的錄音應該是這個版本：Debussy: Preludes; L'Isle joyeuse; Chopin: Ballade No. 3; Scherzo No. 4; Etc.，算了算缺的只有Book 1 #8 (no surprise at all) 以及#12 Minstrel。歷史錄音，音效相當不好，但我願意接受。Richter的演奏向來極有個性，沒什麼中庸路線。Book 1我聽得比較熟，他的#9有點諧謔的開頭節奏，以及#10中間”鐘聲”的神奇效果，都讓我印象很深刻。我在台灣買到另一個罕見的版本是Richter在60年代巴黎的音樂會，包括了一首海頓的sonata和四首前奏曲（Book 1 #6, #7, #9, #10）。那張Vanguard出的CD錄音比較好，也是我所知唯二的Richter Sunken Cathedral錄音。
Zimerman的錄音是非常難得的演奏超一流而且錄音又正確無比，很難想像DG也能錄出這樣的水準。看過一篇焦元浦的訪問，這錄音花了很長的時間不說，Zimerman還參與錄音後製技術工作，並且親自確認製作出的錄音在音響上重播的音效音質與現場無異。這套CD的動態極大，是觀眾席前排的音色。Zimerman不但演奏技巧超級而且很有想像力，Book 1 #5以鋼琴竟能做出類似撥弦的音效，#6表現出如萬徑人蹤滅般孤寂的無聲之聲，#10的莊嚴肅穆雍容，是我在任何其他錄音中沒聽到過的。
R：這裡有Ｒｉｃｔｈｅｒ的大全。我比較能接受的法國作曲家是拉威爾。這是野田妹彈過的拉威爾, Richter 50年代的錄音更猛 .
D: Debussy 跟 Ravel 的感覺，我心中一直認為 Debussy的音樂比較圓滑平順些，而Ravel 比較angular一點。在Ravel的許多鋼琴曲中，可以很明顯得感覺出 曲子所需要的技巧部份。
我記得我大一的台灣室友的 Debussy Preludes也是 Zimerman的，我也很喜歡。
粽: 我是被德布西的棕髮少女給迷住了，耳熟能詳的旋律，應該不算太脫離浪漫樂派。
我: 德布西不是我喜歡的作曲家, 他的作品,我比較歡貝加瑪斯克組曲裡一些曲目.
瓦: 我不那麼喜歡Debussy旋律太明白的曲子，像棕髮少女，月光。這些改編成其他樂器演奏（像小提琴或管弦樂）效果也很好，但是旋律太動聽像沙龍音樂。
我: 再來就是我個人怪癖.我ㄧ向偏愛(這是試過多次之後的歸納)演奏者與作曲家是同一個國家,如果是這樣的話,那我會推薦Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的版本. 先前才去現場聽過Thibaudet演奏同屬法國,印象樂派的拉威爾曲目(同樣的,拉威爾也不是我那麼喜歡的作曲家),印象非常深刻.如果他以相同功力演奏德布希作品,應該也會很出色. 印象中迪卡有他的錄音.
K: 同國藉的話，好像應該推一下最常被推的 Francois（富蘭索瓦）吧 ?
我: Francois我沒聽過,我沒辦法推薦我沒聽過的人. 我是說,我沒聽過任何他的錄音,也沒聽過他的現場(廢話,他走的時候我還沒出生啊). 完全沒接觸還推薦的話才真的是不付責任喔. 另,他被我歸在半個法國人 因為他不是法國出身滴,最先接受音樂教育也不是在法國.
我之所以推薦Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的版本,就是因為在此(現場)聽了他彈奏的拉威爾鏡子組曲,印象深刻才推薦的。拉威爾...我也不是很喜歡, 只有少數作品我能接受.會去聽那場Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的演奏會,的確是受到交響情人夢的影響.當天另外的曲目是布拉姆斯的鋼琴.兩種不同樂派放在一起彈奏真是很有趣的組合。離題了！
瓦：Francois的Chopin, Debussy, Ravel就算不能算絕品，至少也絕對是逸品。他有種特別的韻律感，有人用”醺然”來形容，雖然醺然聽起來像是喝醉酒或磕了藥。我覺得他的前奏曲”好像”有一點瑕疵，但是從頭聽來有種渾然天成的流暢感覺。
粽：那Haas的版本呢？
我：Ｈaas, 我也沒聽過, 不過他是Gieseking 的學生, 也許直接聽Gieseking的?
瓦：我發現我很喜歡Gieseking的Mozart，但是不喜歡他的Debussy。這是我最早買的Debussy Preludes CD，當初好像是因為日本樂評把它當經典。除了音質太差之外，我還覺得他彈得有點悶。我想”中庸”應該算是客氣又不失公平的評語。我想我也許該去找出當年看的樂評，看是不是我聽漏了什麼或是有什麼誤解。我最近剛買到LP，聲音比CD自然得太多了，但仍無助於讓我改變看法。
D: 我手邊也有 Gieseking 的學生 Werner Haas彈的一套，也是很中庸的彈法。因為自己也有 Val 的那一套 Francois 版，所以比較過，還是欣賞 Francois 的多一些。
這讓我剛好可以回應你所提到的，希望由同國家的音樂家演奏那個國家的作曲家的曲子。我記得很久前跟美國同學討論過這個問題，最後答案還是無解。他的觀點是，好的音樂應該是universal無國界。就像貝多芬的交響曲跟奏鳴曲，是偉大到任何人都應該可以欣賞跟表演。不過反過來說，民族樂派很強的曲子，不了解那文化的人，放進去的感情畢竟是不同的。我記得當初shaham 來台灣拉 梁祝的時候，去聽的同學都覺得缺少了什麼東西，可能就是那個對中國文化的體會。(自己沒去) ~~~~ 扯那麼多，要說的是，其實某些地方，我可以了解妳的出發點。
粽: 題外話，我有一個朋友，她主修鋼琴的，她研究所的老師就是俄國人，是一位嚴格的老先生，每次聽她彈蕭邦(波蘭算泛俄羅斯?)就搖頭，叫她要放感情，要放感情!!! 幾次以後，還是沒辦法到達老師的標準，老師失望地講了一句：You never know what we suffered...然後就叫她改彈 Bartok…
我: 我想那老師解釋了這種巧合(解釋了我的癖好)! ...不過我不確定我會把蕭邦算進去...
有些曲目的確是事隔多年後才會欣賞(或是就不欣賞了)我想這跟人生經歷還有當時心境有關吧? 像布拉姆斯的,我ㄧ開始還把他的某作品批評的一無事處, 真的是年輕時候不知天高地厚才會做的事啊 ...[1]
遠: 我對德布西的音樂不熟, 但是最近看東京奏鳴曲這部電影, 最後小男孩彈德布西的月光時, 眼淚不爭氣的掉下來了! 推薦大家看。
Tokyo Sonata - Claire de Lune (Debussy), 香川照之 (坂上之雲中的正岡子規), 小泉今日子主演, 坎城影展「一種注目」評審團大獎。
我: 這樣聽來那鍋東京奏鳴曲好像太催淚了...謝謝推薦(OR分享),我從來沒注意到這片.
我蠻好奇為什麼選月光這首來當結尾? 片名用奏鳴曲也很有趣.是因為奏鳴曲的曲式(各自獨立,但卻又是同一首曲子-->各自生活,但是同一家人)象徵的意義嗎? 無論如何,待看電影又增加一片了...
K: 小男孩的演出的確很感人。不過以年紀來說好像太過火了一些。雖然不知道東京奏鳴曲是什麼內容，不過這個小孩的情緒委實在太多...月光再怎麼亮也不會有「暴烈」的感覺吧...（月亮在月蝕的時候跑出來強烈抗議嗎）茲附大衛王演奏改編曲，以為柔和月光的參考。
我: 大衛王那版本有趣. 我之前才剛注意到四季有鋼琴版,這大衛王的小提琴版有異曲同工之妙. 不過月光可以很激烈啊!貝多芬的月光奏鳴曲是也. 這是巴倫玻音的版本(杜普雷的老公) (前面瓦哈拉曾經提到改編曲目)
遠: 東京奏鳴曲不算「催淚」片, 過程到結尾都不煽情。為什麼用月光呢? 應該劇組討論過的, 我一時間還想不到更適合的曲目, 看完片子後可以再來討論。
(拉回前奏曲)
瓦: 前奏曲如果只想聽一個版本的話，我會推薦Zimerman，因為錄音與演奏俱佳。
我: 粽, 看來齊瑪曼有兩票, 我和瓦哈拉各一票.
---------
延伸閱讀:
瓦哈拉的 德布西前奏曲與一些音樂討論
[1] 關於年輕時對布拉姆斯批評 的一段往事
==updated==
德布西前奏曲《阿納卡普里的丘陵》：風格?美學?詮釋
在此我只貼出我原先的文字, 穿插其他人對該版本的一些看法. 文後則提供瓦哈拉原文的連結. 我很喜歡這種對話. 基本上,我的觀點完全是從樂曲結構與樂派切入, 這大概和我算是半個學院派出身有關. 瓦哈拉則是從他鋼琴美學欣賞的角度出發,因此原文一開始(在第二段)他先提供他個人欣賞的偏好. 有興趣的人可以看看在特定鋼琴欣賞美學下對我就結構出發提到的各版本有什麼看法.
附帶一提, 被追問兩個版本,分別是Francois（富蘭索瓦）與 Haas的版本. 我把相關對話也編輯進去。
以下.
----
我: 先說,德布西不算是我喜歡的作曲家(我是LKK派的),所以我對他的音樂沒有特別研究,當然就遑論版本比較了!
瓦: 先說明我欣賞鋼琴獨奏錄音的美學觀點。對傳統的曲目（像貝多芬蕭邦）我對錄音音質很不挑剔，所以我會聽Schnabel的貝多芬奏鳴曲或是Lipatti甚至更古早的鋼琴家彈蕭邦。當然我會有點介意演奏技巧，但是我更在乎的是感情與整體感覺。但是對於像Debussy或Ravel，我會非常在乎音色明暗的微妙變化與動態對比，所以我幾乎無法接受音質太差的錄音。聽Debussy時我比較唯物，其他傳統音樂則較唯心。
我: 所以我不付責任的想法是,先說前奏曲這種玩意兒好了.蕭邦和德布西都曾經用24種大小調來寫前奏曲. 好了,我很落俗套的,就是喜歡浪漫的蕭邦寫的前奏曲,相對下實在對於德布西的前奏曲有點,ㄟ,不那嚜喜歡. 所以就曲式上,我個人非常喜歡玻里尼彈奏的蕭邦曲目,所以如果玻里尼也有彈奏德布希的前奏曲,也許可以一試.
瓦: Pollini的Book 1我不怎麼喜歡。我覺得那好像也是有點缺乏想像力的演奏，而且錄音的音質有點怪，鋼琴的音色有點悶暗，也有點缺乏動態，像是在音樂廳頂樓後段最低價的座位聽到的鋼琴。
我: 其次,如果就德布希屬於的樂派來講,我個人偏見是德布希的音樂比較適合很有個性的處理方法.也就是說那種中規中舉的鋼琴演奏家,或是小心翼翼的,我大概就不會推薦去嚐試.我心目中想到兩者:齊瑪曼或是李希特的版本,如果他們有錄音的話.我相信前者應該有.後者我不是那嚜有把握(可能得問他的粉絲RICHTER大),我只知道李希特錄過德布希的其他曲目.
順便一提,我非常喜歡齊瑪曼,去年吧曾經在自己的部落格講過他一二事.
瓦: 我也不是一開始就喜歡Ravel和Debussy，不過他們的管弦樂很容易被接受，我花了些時間才開始喜歡他們的鋼琴，因為和我原先聽得多的浪漫派鋼琴曲完全不同。
如果硬要區分的話，我想我比較喜歡Ravel的管弦樂，Debussy的鋼琴。前奏曲是非常有趣的東西，幾乎每個能成一家之言的鋼琴家演奏都有很大的差異。我覺得彈Debussy大概需要很有想像力和創意，以及精確的執行能力。
Richter其實幾乎彈全了前奏曲，但是他從不彈任何全集。最玩整的錄音應該是這個版本：Debussy: Preludes; L'Isle joyeuse; Chopin: Ballade No. 3; Scherzo No. 4; Etc.，算了算缺的只有Book 1 #8 (no surprise at all) 以及#12 Minstrel。歷史錄音，音效相當不好，但我願意接受。Richter的演奏向來極有個性，沒什麼中庸路線。Book 1我聽得比較熟，他的#9有點諧謔的開頭節奏，以及#10中間”鐘聲”的神奇效果，都讓我印象很深刻。我在台灣買到另一個罕見的版本是Richter在60年代巴黎的音樂會，包括了一首海頓的sonata和四首前奏曲（Book 1 #6, #7, #9, #10）。那張Vanguard出的CD錄音比較好，也是我所知唯二的Richter Sunken Cathedral錄音。
Zimerman的錄音是非常難得的演奏超一流而且錄音又正確無比，很難想像DG也能錄出這樣的水準。看過一篇焦元浦的訪問，這錄音花了很長的時間不說，Zimerman還參與錄音後製技術工作，並且親自確認製作出的錄音在音響上重播的音效音質與現場無異。這套CD的動態極大，是觀眾席前排的音色。Zimerman不但演奏技巧超級而且很有想像力，Book 1 #5以鋼琴竟能做出類似撥弦的音效，#6表現出如萬徑人蹤滅般孤寂的無聲之聲，#10的莊嚴肅穆雍容，是我在任何其他錄音中沒聽到過的。
R：這裡有Ｒｉｃｔｈｅｒ的大全。我比較能接受的法國作曲家是拉威爾。這是野田妹彈過的拉威爾, Richter 50年代的錄音更猛 .
D: Debussy 跟 Ravel 的感覺，我心中一直認為 Debussy的音樂比較圓滑平順些，而Ravel 比較angular一點。在Ravel的許多鋼琴曲中，可以很明顯得感覺出 曲子所需要的技巧部份。
我記得我大一的台灣室友的 Debussy Preludes也是 Zimerman的，我也很喜歡。
粽: 我是被德布西的棕髮少女給迷住了，耳熟能詳的旋律，應該不算太脫離浪漫樂派。
我: 德布西不是我喜歡的作曲家, 他的作品,我比較歡貝加瑪斯克組曲裡一些曲目.
瓦: 我不那麼喜歡Debussy旋律太明白的曲子，像棕髮少女，月光。這些改編成其他樂器演奏（像小提琴或管弦樂）效果也很好，但是旋律太動聽像沙龍音樂。
我: 再來就是我個人怪癖.我ㄧ向偏愛(這是試過多次之後的歸納)演奏者與作曲家是同一個國家,如果是這樣的話,那我會推薦Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的版本. 先前才去現場聽過Thibaudet演奏同屬法國,印象樂派的拉威爾曲目(同樣的,拉威爾也不是我那麼喜歡的作曲家),印象非常深刻.如果他以相同功力演奏德布希作品,應該也會很出色. 印象中迪卡有他的錄音.
K: 同國藉的話，好像應該推一下最常被推的 Francois（富蘭索瓦）吧 ?
我: Francois我沒聽過,我沒辦法推薦我沒聽過的人. 我是說,我沒聽過任何他的錄音,也沒聽過他的現場(廢話,他走的時候我還沒出生啊). 完全沒接觸還推薦的話才真的是不付責任喔. 另,他被我歸在半個法國人 因為他不是法國出身滴,最先接受音樂教育也不是在法國.
我之所以推薦Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的版本,就是因為在此(現場)聽了他彈奏的拉威爾鏡子組曲,印象深刻才推薦的。拉威爾...我也不是很喜歡, 只有少數作品我能接受.會去聽那場Jean-Yves Thibaudet 的演奏會,的確是受到交響情人夢的影響.當天另外的曲目是布拉姆斯的鋼琴.兩種不同樂派放在一起彈奏真是很有趣的組合。離題了！
瓦：Francois的Chopin, Debussy, Ravel就算不能算絕品，至少也絕對是逸品。他有種特別的韻律感，有人用”醺然”來形容，雖然醺然聽起來像是喝醉酒或磕了藥。我覺得他的前奏曲”好像”有一點瑕疵，但是從頭聽來有種渾然天成的流暢感覺。
粽：那Haas的版本呢？
我：Ｈaas, 我也沒聽過, 不過他是Gieseking 的學生, 也許直接聽Gieseking的?
瓦：我發現我很喜歡Gieseking的Mozart，但是不喜歡他的Debussy。這是我最早買的Debussy Preludes CD，當初好像是因為日本樂評把它當經典。除了音質太差之外，我還覺得他彈得有點悶。我想”中庸”應該算是客氣又不失公平的評語。我想我也許該去找出當年看的樂評，看是不是我聽漏了什麼或是有什麼誤解。我最近剛買到LP，聲音比CD自然得太多了，但仍無助於讓我改變看法。
D: 我手邊也有 Gieseking 的學生 Werner Haas彈的一套，也是很中庸的彈法。因為自己也有 Val 的那一套 Francois 版，所以比較過，還是欣賞 Francois 的多一些。
這讓我剛好可以回應你所提到的，希望由同國家的音樂家演奏那個國家的作曲家的曲子。我記得很久前跟美國同學討論過這個問題，最後答案還是無解。他的觀點是，好的音樂應該是universal無國界。就像貝多芬的交響曲跟奏鳴曲，是偉大到任何人都應該可以欣賞跟表演。不過反過來說，民族樂派很強的曲子，不了解那文化的人，放進去的感情畢竟是不同的。我記得當初shaham 來台灣拉 梁祝的時候，去聽的同學都覺得缺少了什麼東西，可能就是那個對中國文化的體會。(自己沒去) ~~~~ 扯那麼多，要說的是，其實某些地方，我可以了解妳的出發點。
粽: 題外話，我有一個朋友，她主修鋼琴的，她研究所的老師就是俄國人，是一位嚴格的老先生，每次聽她彈蕭邦(波蘭算泛俄羅斯?)就搖頭，叫她要放感情，要放感情!!! 幾次以後，還是沒辦法到達老師的標準，老師失望地講了一句：You never know what we suffered...然後就叫她改彈 Bartok…
我: 我想那老師解釋了這種巧合(解釋了我的癖好)! ...不過我不確定我會把蕭邦算進去...
有些曲目的確是事隔多年後才會欣賞(或是就不欣賞了)我想這跟人生經歷還有當時心境有關吧? 像布拉姆斯的,我ㄧ開始還把他的某作品批評的一無事處, 真的是年輕時候不知天高地厚才會做的事啊 ...[1]
遠: 我對德布西的音樂不熟, 但是最近看東京奏鳴曲這部電影, 最後小男孩彈德布西的月光時, 眼淚不爭氣的掉下來了! 推薦大家看。
Tokyo Sonata - Claire de Lune (Debussy), 香川照之 (坂上之雲中的正岡子規), 小泉今日子主演, 坎城影展「一種注目」評審團大獎。
我: 這樣聽來那鍋東京奏鳴曲好像太催淚了...謝謝推薦(OR分享),我從來沒注意到這片.
我蠻好奇為什麼選月光這首來當結尾? 片名用奏鳴曲也很有趣.是因為奏鳴曲的曲式(各自獨立,但卻又是同一首曲子-->各自生活,但是同一家人)象徵的意義嗎? 無論如何,待看電影又增加一片了...
K: 小男孩的演出的確很感人。不過以年紀來說好像太過火了一些。雖然不知道東京奏鳴曲是什麼內容，不過這個小孩的情緒委實在太多...月光再怎麼亮也不會有「暴烈」的感覺吧...（月亮在月蝕的時候跑出來強烈抗議嗎）茲附大衛王演奏改編曲，以為柔和月光的參考。
我: 大衛王那版本有趣. 我之前才剛注意到四季有鋼琴版,這大衛王的小提琴版有異曲同工之妙. 不過月光可以很激烈啊!貝多芬的月光奏鳴曲是也. 這是巴倫玻音的版本(杜普雷的老公) (前面瓦哈拉曾經提到改編曲目)
遠: 東京奏鳴曲不算「催淚」片, 過程到結尾都不煽情。為什麼用月光呢? 應該劇組討論過的, 我一時間還想不到更適合的曲目, 看完片子後可以再來討論。
(拉回前奏曲)
瓦: 前奏曲如果只想聽一個版本的話，我會推薦Zimerman，因為錄音與演奏俱佳。
我: 粽, 看來齊瑪曼有兩票, 我和瓦哈拉各一票.
---------
延伸閱讀:
瓦哈拉的 德布西前奏曲與一些音樂討論
[1] 關於年輕時對布拉姆斯批評 的一段往事
==updated==
德布西前奏曲《阿納卡普里的丘陵》：風格?美學?詮釋
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
[轉載]Move to Replace Taiwan Editor Spurs Talk(中時撤換總編引發討論) (updated)
前一陣子中國C咖與台灣A咖說相關的報導,影響所及是旺旺報的總編夏珍被撤換. 本來我對這新聞沒什麼太大興趣的,不過另外兩則新聞讓(Google威脅退出中國市場,與自由之家公佈世界年度報告)我決定把WSJ這篇文章貼出來.本來台灣一個小報(以市佔率來看)換總編沒什麼大不了的,但因為和中國這個強權國家關聯下,這種新聞還引起WSJ專文報導.
更進一步講,姑且不論真相為何,Google因為厭倦於中國政府審查或其他要求,或其他壓力,揚言退出中國市場.這其他壓力,據悉是中國政府要求Google提供維權人士的帳號等,Google表示這與他們堅持的理念不和,表示不惜退出. 同樣是言論自由,旺旺報和Google的作法有天壤之別.
其次,前一天自由之家才剛公佈年度報告.台灣的縱和評比不變,依然是自由國家.中國也還是不自由國家. 不過一月份公佈的只是全世界的排名,接下來五月份要公佈的是媒體自由的部份,值得關注.去年的報告在此. 另一個值得觀察的是最近公視的變化. 這裡有一些最近事件演化的文章.
再則,在Richard Kagan的公開信裡也提到,台灣急於和中國和解,但卻忽略了中國這個是個最不自由的國家會帶給台灣怎樣的影響,而只是片面地引用有利數據來辯白而已. 詳見第四段.
其實旺旺報引起的關注早在去年易手之際就開始,IFJ也曾報導關切. 因此,除了五月份自由之家即將公佈的媒體自由外,七月份各國的報告也值得關切.
以下.
------
Move to Replace Taiwan Editor Spurs Talk, January 11, 2010
About two weeks after one of Taiwan’s leading newspapers, the China Times, published a front-page story that called China’s envoy to Taiwan a “C-list politician,” the paper’s editor-in-chief was replaced.
The newspaper said the replacement was a routine rotation. However, it fueled talk at the paper and at the island’s other publications that the move was spurred by anger in China over the story and that it was another sign of China’s increasing clout in Taiwan.
Hsia Chen, former editor in chief of the China Times, had been running the newspaper since early 2008. Later that year, a Hong Kong-listed rice-cracker manufacturer, Want Want China Holding Ltd., acquired it. Tsai Eng-meng, chairman of Want Want, decided to replace Ms. Hsia late last week, according to the paper’s staff.
Tsai, a Taiwanese businessman who has been running business in China for two decades, is well-known for his pro-China position. Since he took the China Times reins, he has publicly reiterated that his newspapers are not supposed to criticize Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou, his administration and the Chinese government. Last August, he further founded a tabloid, the Want Daily, in Taiwan to promote China to the island’s readers.
Since the summer of 2009, Tsai has been complaining that the paper’s news pages are not supportive enough of the governments of Taiwan and China, according to some employees at the paper. In September, the paper’s front-page coverage of the visit of Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama, whom China considers an enemy, specifically sparked Tsai’s anger, according to some of the paper’s reporters, who declined to be identified. The paper eventually decreased the quantity of reports about the spiritual leader’s visit and moved such coverage to inside pages.
“Our main guideline is about promoting the cross-Strait [Taiwan-China] peaceful development,” said Wang Chuo-chong, editor of the China’s Times China page.
Rumors about Hsia’s replacement had been circulating internally for months, the paper’s reporters and editors said. On Dec 26, a report on the paper’s front page quoted an anonymous official of Taiwan’s semiofficial negotiation organization, Strait Exchange Foundation, as saying that the scenario of three Taiwan political heavyweights trying to meet with China’s visiting negotiation envoy, Chen Yunlin, was like “the A-list politician versus the C-list,” with Chen representing the “C-list.” Beijing’s anger over the news story led to Tsai’s decision to replace Hsia, other local publications reported.
The newspaper denied the speculation. Hsia said in an email to staff last week, “There have been lots of speculation about this replacement. It is difficult for me to comment on why this happened.”
Hsia is exchanging her position with Wang Mei-yu, chief editor of China Times’ subsidiary weekly magazine, the China Times Weekly. After the shift , some of the daily newspaper’s reporters said they would censor themselves when they write about China.
“From now on, I believe everyone would be extra careful about China coverage,” said a staff reporter of the paper, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
–Ting-I Tsai
更進一步講,姑且不論真相為何,Google因為厭倦於中國政府審查或其他要求,或其他壓力,揚言退出中國市場.這其他壓力,據悉是中國政府要求Google提供維權人士的帳號等,Google表示這與他們堅持的理念不和,表示不惜退出. 同樣是言論自由,旺旺報和Google的作法有天壤之別.
其次,前一天自由之家才剛公佈年度報告.台灣的縱和評比不變,依然是自由國家.中國也還是不自由國家. 不過一月份公佈的只是全世界的排名,接下來五月份要公佈的是媒體自由的部份,值得關注.去年的報告在此. 另一個值得觀察的是最近公視的變化. 這裡有一些最近事件演化的文章.
再則,在Richard Kagan的公開信裡也提到,台灣急於和中國和解,但卻忽略了中國這個是個最不自由的國家會帶給台灣怎樣的影響,而只是片面地引用有利數據來辯白而已. 詳見第四段.
其實旺旺報引起的關注早在去年易手之際就開始,IFJ也曾報導關切. 因此,除了五月份自由之家即將公佈的媒體自由外,七月份各國的報告也值得關切.
以下.
------
Move to Replace Taiwan Editor Spurs Talk, January 11, 2010
About two weeks after one of Taiwan’s leading newspapers, the China Times, published a front-page story that called China’s envoy to Taiwan a “C-list politician,” the paper’s editor-in-chief was replaced.
The newspaper said the replacement was a routine rotation. However, it fueled talk at the paper and at the island’s other publications that the move was spurred by anger in China over the story and that it was another sign of China’s increasing clout in Taiwan.
Hsia Chen, former editor in chief of the China Times, had been running the newspaper since early 2008. Later that year, a Hong Kong-listed rice-cracker manufacturer, Want Want China Holding Ltd., acquired it. Tsai Eng-meng, chairman of Want Want, decided to replace Ms. Hsia late last week, according to the paper’s staff.
Tsai, a Taiwanese businessman who has been running business in China for two decades, is well-known for his pro-China position. Since he took the China Times reins, he has publicly reiterated that his newspapers are not supposed to criticize Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou, his administration and the Chinese government. Last August, he further founded a tabloid, the Want Daily, in Taiwan to promote China to the island’s readers.
Since the summer of 2009, Tsai has been complaining that the paper’s news pages are not supportive enough of the governments of Taiwan and China, according to some employees at the paper. In September, the paper’s front-page coverage of the visit of Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama, whom China considers an enemy, specifically sparked Tsai’s anger, according to some of the paper’s reporters, who declined to be identified. The paper eventually decreased the quantity of reports about the spiritual leader’s visit and moved such coverage to inside pages.
“Our main guideline is about promoting the cross-Strait [Taiwan-China] peaceful development,” said Wang Chuo-chong, editor of the China’s Times China page.
Rumors about Hsia’s replacement had been circulating internally for months, the paper’s reporters and editors said. On Dec 26, a report on the paper’s front page quoted an anonymous official of Taiwan’s semiofficial negotiation organization, Strait Exchange Foundation, as saying that the scenario of three Taiwan political heavyweights trying to meet with China’s visiting negotiation envoy, Chen Yunlin, was like “the A-list politician versus the C-list,” with Chen representing the “C-list.” Beijing’s anger over the news story led to Tsai’s decision to replace Hsia, other local publications reported.
The newspaper denied the speculation. Hsia said in an email to staff last week, “There have been lots of speculation about this replacement. It is difficult for me to comment on why this happened.”
Hsia is exchanging her position with Wang Mei-yu, chief editor of China Times’ subsidiary weekly magazine, the China Times Weekly. After the shift , some of the daily newspaper’s reporters said they would censor themselves when they write about China.
“From now on, I believe everyone would be extra careful about China coverage,” said a staff reporter of the paper, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
–Ting-I Tsai
[轉載] Freedom House rates Taiwan free (自由之家:台灣名列自由國家) (含重點翻譯)
Freedom House rates Taiwan free
Publication Date：01/13/2010
Source： Taiwan Today
The U.S.-based human rights organization Freedom House released its 2010 Freedom in the World report Jan. 12, listing Taiwan as one of the freest countries enjoying a high degree of political rights and civil liberties.
總部在美國的人權組織自由之家在一月十二日發佈2010年世界各國自由程度的報告,報告中指出台灣是世界上最自由的國家之一,享有高度的政治權利與公民自由. (按:關於台灣的排名請見第11頁)
According to the report, which rates 194 countries in political freedoms on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the freest and 7 the least freest, Taiwan is ranked on par with South Korea and Japan overall as the freest in Asia-Pacific where modest improvements were seen. This is the 14th running year that Taiwan qualifies as a free country in the annual study.
報告將194個國家在政治自由區分為一到七級,一代表最自由,七是最不自由. 台灣和南韓日本在整體排名上相同,而亞太區域是自由程度改善最多的區域. 這是台灣連續14年來在年度報告中被評為自由國家.
While Taiwan’s overall ranking remains unchanged from last year’s, it registers both gains and losses. In individual categories, its political rights rating improved from 2 in 2009 findings to 1 “due to enforcement of anticorruption laws that led to the prosecution of former high-ranking officials, the annulment of several legislators’ elections owing to vote-buying, and the investigation of over 200 candidates for alleged vote-buying in local elections.”
雖然台灣整體排名維持與去年一樣,兩個指標卻是各有進退. 在政治權利方面,"因為執行反貪污法律,台灣從去年的二級進步到一級, 有數位前朝高官被起訴,還有數位立委因賄選而當選無效,在地方選舉時,有超過兩百位候選人遭到買票的指控. "
On civil liberties, however, the report indicates Taiwan’s rating suffered a decline from 1 to 2 because of “flaws in the protection of criminal defendants’ rights that were exposed during anticorruption prosecutions and a high-profile murder case, as well as a law that infringes on academic freedom by barring staff and scholars at public educational facilities from participating in certain political activities.”
然而在公民自由方面,報導指出台灣的排名降級,從第一級降到第二級,因為"在貪污嫌疑犯的案件以及一個謀殺案裡被告的權力保障有瑕疵,同時,因為禁止公務員與學者參予特定政治活動,學術自由受到侵害"
Among the states being reviewed in the report this year, 89 countries were listed as “free,” 58 “partly free” while 47 were ranked “not free." The report concluded that some 2.3 billion people, or 24 percent of the world’s population, are currently living in societies disrespecting basic political rights and civil liberties, with more than half of the population residing in China.
A total of 10 countries and territories received ratings of 6 and 7—or 7 and 6—for political rights and civil liberties, respectively. They are Belarus, Chad, China, Cuba, Guinea, Laos, Saudi Arabia, South Ossetia, Syria and Western Sahara.
Arch Puddington, director of research at Freedom House, noted in the 2010 report that the world continues to see a continued erosion of freedom, with setbacks in Latin America, Africa, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East.
This is also the fourth consecutive year that the organization has seen more declines than gains, Puddington said, citing growing restrictions on freedom of expression and association in authoritarian settings, and a failure to continue democratic progress in previously improving countries due to “unchecked corruption and weakness in the rule of law.”
Under the Freedom House definitions, a “free” country is one where there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. A “partly free” state normally suffers from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the façade of limited pluralism.
A “not free” country is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied. (SY)
--------
Extended reading: Freedom House warns on rights in Taiwan「自由之家」對台灣人權狀況提出示警
Publication Date：01/13/2010
Source： Taiwan Today
The U.S.-based human rights organization Freedom House released its 2010 Freedom in the World report Jan. 12, listing Taiwan as one of the freest countries enjoying a high degree of political rights and civil liberties.
總部在美國的人權組織自由之家在一月十二日發佈2010年世界各國自由程度的報告,報告中指出台灣是世界上最自由的國家之一,享有高度的政治權利與公民自由. (按:關於台灣的排名請見第11頁)
According to the report, which rates 194 countries in political freedoms on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the freest and 7 the least freest, Taiwan is ranked on par with South Korea and Japan overall as the freest in Asia-Pacific where modest improvements were seen. This is the 14th running year that Taiwan qualifies as a free country in the annual study.
報告將194個國家在政治自由區分為一到七級,一代表最自由,七是最不自由. 台灣和南韓日本在整體排名上相同,而亞太區域是自由程度改善最多的區域. 這是台灣連續14年來在年度報告中被評為自由國家.
While Taiwan’s overall ranking remains unchanged from last year’s, it registers both gains and losses. In individual categories, its political rights rating improved from 2 in 2009 findings to 1 “due to enforcement of anticorruption laws that led to the prosecution of former high-ranking officials, the annulment of several legislators’ elections owing to vote-buying, and the investigation of over 200 candidates for alleged vote-buying in local elections.”
雖然台灣整體排名維持與去年一樣,兩個指標卻是各有進退. 在政治權利方面,"因為執行反貪污法律,台灣從去年的二級進步到一級, 有數位前朝高官被起訴,還有數位立委因賄選而當選無效,在地方選舉時,有超過兩百位候選人遭到買票的指控. "
On civil liberties, however, the report indicates Taiwan’s rating suffered a decline from 1 to 2 because of “flaws in the protection of criminal defendants’ rights that were exposed during anticorruption prosecutions and a high-profile murder case, as well as a law that infringes on academic freedom by barring staff and scholars at public educational facilities from participating in certain political activities.”
然而在公民自由方面,報導指出台灣的排名降級,從第一級降到第二級,因為"在貪污嫌疑犯的案件以及一個謀殺案裡被告的權力保障有瑕疵,同時,因為禁止公務員與學者參予特定政治活動,學術自由受到侵害"
Among the states being reviewed in the report this year, 89 countries were listed as “free,” 58 “partly free” while 47 were ranked “not free." The report concluded that some 2.3 billion people, or 24 percent of the world’s population, are currently living in societies disrespecting basic political rights and civil liberties, with more than half of the population residing in China.
A total of 10 countries and territories received ratings of 6 and 7—or 7 and 6—for political rights and civil liberties, respectively. They are Belarus, Chad, China, Cuba, Guinea, Laos, Saudi Arabia, South Ossetia, Syria and Western Sahara.
Arch Puddington, director of research at Freedom House, noted in the 2010 report that the world continues to see a continued erosion of freedom, with setbacks in Latin America, Africa, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East.
This is also the fourth consecutive year that the organization has seen more declines than gains, Puddington said, citing growing restrictions on freedom of expression and association in authoritarian settings, and a failure to continue democratic progress in previously improving countries due to “unchecked corruption and weakness in the rule of law.”
Under the Freedom House definitions, a “free” country is one where there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. A “partly free” state normally suffers from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the façade of limited pluralism.
A “not free” country is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied. (SY)
--------
Extended reading: Freedom House warns on rights in Taiwan「自由之家」對台灣人權狀況提出示警
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Official Google Blog: A new approach to China
延伸閱讀:
紐時對google新聞的報導
Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China
------
Official Google Blog: A new approach to China
1/12/2010 03:00:00 PM
Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident--albeit a significant one--was something quite different.
First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses--including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors--have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users' computers.
We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve's blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China's economic reform programs and its citizens' entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that "we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China."
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered--combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web--have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
紐時對google新聞的報導
Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China
------
Official Google Blog: A new approach to China
1/12/2010 03:00:00 PM
Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident--albeit a significant one--was something quite different.
First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses--including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors--have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users' computers.
We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve's blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China's economic reform programs and its citizens' entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that "we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China."
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered--combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web--have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
Monday, January 11, 2010
[轉載]GIO’s response misses the point (新聞局對第五號公開信的回函避重就輕) (updated,含更多翻譯)
這是在閱讀蘇俊賓的第五號回函後其中一個署名學者,Kagan,針對第五號回函的回應.文中明確指出馬政府避重就輕,或是誤用或是引用不相關資料來為自己辯駁(Su defends his government’s policies through misuse of documents and through the use of irrelevant documents.).
延伸閱讀:
國際學者給台灣政府的第五封公開信與新聞局的回函
------
GIO’s response misses the point
By Richard Kagan
Friday, Dec 25, 2009, Page 8
Last Friday I received an e-mail from Government Information Office (GIO) Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) responding to “Open letter to Taiwan’s president” (Nov. 13, page 8), which I signed with many other academics. This was one of a series of letters we have written concerning Taiwan’s eroding democratic freedoms, judicial systems and international relations. Su has responded in detail to the previous letters by defending the operations of the government with regard to the judicial system, and President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) democratic reforms and policies.
上週五,我收到一封由台灣新聞局長蘇俊賓發出,回覆我參予連署的第五號公開信的電子郵件(第五號公開信日期是2009年11月13日),那是封給台灣政府一系列的公開信的其中一封.這系列公開信事關我們對台灣民主自由倒退,司法體系傾斜,國際關係緊張的憂慮. 蘇先生詳細回覆第五號公開信裡,替馬政府辯駁並強調馬政府對司法與民主改革的決心.
But this time, Su wanted to justify and praise Taiwan’s system by referring to the “international community’s assessments” on these matters. His attempt to defend Taiwan by using international standards actually backfired in several ways.
然而,蘇引用國際評等來誇讚台灣體系的作法,就很多方面來講,會收到相反的成效.(按:詳見第五封公開信的回函.蘇企圖引用特定機構的數據來辯駁)
Let me explain in some detail why I question the minister’s research and the professionalism of the GIO.
以下讓我詳敘我為什麼對新聞局的研究與專業有所質疑.
First, Su uses faulty methodology to prove his point by not providing a context for his argument. He correctly points out that Freedom House ranks Taiwan among the “free” countries of Asia. In the combined ratings of Political and Civil Liberties, Taiwan scores 1.5. This puts it with Israel, Japan and South Korea. The rank of No. 1 is filled mainly by European countries as well as the US and Canada. What he fails to note is that China is scored 6.5 out of a 7-point ranking. China is paired with Zimbabwe and just below Myanmar and North Korea, who scored a 7.
首先,蘇先生沒有提供上下文或來龍去脈而以有瑕疵的方法來證明他的論點. 他正確指出根據自由之家的報告,台灣的確為亞洲的"自由"國家. 在政治與公民自由綜合評比裡,台灣的分數是1.5分,和以色列,日本與南韓並列.最自由的國家幾為歐洲國家與美加. 蘇先生忽略不提的是中國在7分的評比裡得分6.5. 中國與辛巴威並列,且只比緬甸與北韓好一點,後兩者同為七分. (按:最近的新聞提到台灣的政治權利升級,公民自由降等)
Why, then, is the Ma administration seeking rapprochement with China? How can a democratic country be so blind as to seek close relations with a government that is one of the most among authoritarian societies in the world? Who will benefit? Which is the likelier scenario — that China will force Taiwan to become less free, or that Taiwan will help China become more democratic?
那麼,馬政府為什麼要追求與中國和解呢?為什麼一個民主國家盲目地對一個集權國家急於示好?誰會從中獲利?最有可能的情況究竟是中國將迫使台灣變得更不自由?亦或是台灣將幫助中國變得更民主?
We can actually see the consequence of this relationship in the Corruption Perceptions for this year. Su claims that Taiwan’s ranking in the report on 180 countries issued by Transparency International rose to No. 37. This statement reveals political alchemy at its best. For instance, Taiwan’s score in 2007 was 34. Numerically it did rise to 37. But the higher a country gets, the greater the index of corruption. Somalia is rated at No. 180. In fact, Taiwan fell into greater corruption by three points.
事實上我們從今年的貪腐印象可以見得結果. 蘇宣稱根據國際透明組織,台灣在180個國家裏的排名37. 這充其量顯示出政治巫術.的確,就排名上台灣提升到37,但是台灣在2007年排名34.愈後面的排名顯示愈多貪污.索馬利亞排名180. (也就是說)事實上,台灣的排名退步了三名.
China, meanwhile, moved from 72 in 2007 to is worst score ever, at 79, this year. By Su’s admission, both “regions” (Taiwan and China) are slouching toward Somalia in the corruption index.
在此同時,中國的排名從2007年的72名退步到79,有史以來最差的一次. 根據蘇所承認,這兩個"地區"(指蘇是台灣與中國為兩個地區)的貪污排名正向索馬利亞靠攏.
Since we talked about Taiwan’s relations with China in our letter, it is important to place Taiwan in the context of Beijing’s power and influence to control cross-strait dialogue.
既然我們在信中提到兩岸關係,在討論事情時就必須把北京對兩岸對話的影響力納入考量.
One can see this most significantly when analyzing press freedoms. Freedom House reports that China has a system of control that “originated under classic totalitarian conditions” and is being modernized to serve the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. In 2005, China was ranked as No. 177 out of a total of 194 countries. Freedom House does not include in its analysis China’s policies in Tibet. If Tibet had been considered, China’s ranking would certainly have been even worse.
最明顯的是新聞自由.自由之家的報告指出中國有現代化的系統的在"有組織的在傳統一個中國的條件下"維護中國共產黨在中國的領導權. 在2005年,中國在194個國家中排名177,而這個評比甚至排除中國在西藏(圖博)的政策. 如果自由之家把中國的西藏政策納入考量,中國的評比只會更糟.
How can Chinese make a rational and educated decision about policies toward Taiwan when they live in an iron box of propaganda? When Beijing talks about the feelings of the Chinese people, how does the leadership know what the people think if it does not allow certain information to be circulated, or criticism of its policies? And why would Taipei believe that Chinese have any independent ideas about cross-strait relations when they are ruled by a state that is similar to Myanmar and North Korea in preventing its people from having freedom of the press, freedom to form political parties and freedom to live in a system ruled by law?
What Su needs is an international standard for judging how governments treat each other. For instance, when looking at some of the international organizations that the minister mentions, I could not find any place called “Chinese Taipei,” “Chinese Taiwan” or “One China.” Freedom House, unlike Beijing and Taipei, uses the appropriate name of “Taiwan” and not any substitute to evaluate the country’s rights and freedoms. Why can’t the leadership in Taipei conform to this international usage?
蘇需要的是一套放諸國際皆準,國與國相互對待的標準. 例如,這些蘇所引用的國際組織提到台灣時使用台灣一辭,而不是中華台北,中華台灣,或是一個中國. 自由之家,不像北京或台北,使用適當的名稱稱呼台灣為台灣,而不是用一些替代的名稱,來對評估自由與人權.為什麼台北領導人不能夠採用國際一致的用法呢? (按:這個呼應到前幾段中,蘇俊賓以兩個"地區"而非兩個國家來稱呼台灣與中國的批評)
Su defends his government’s policies through misuse of documents and through the use of irrelevant documents. It does not matter how democratic Taiwan appears to be. What is important to ask is: What happens when a democracy seeks to join one of the authoritarian countries in the world? Actually, what should be compared are the statistics on the ruling parties of each country. The government of China is ruled by the CCP and not by the people. And the government of Taiwan is slowly reverting to a one-party state. In the Taiwan Strait, it is the leaders of the political parties, not government officials, who negotiate.
From a historical perspective, Su is engaging in the colonization of his country by an empire. No mater how pure the pearl is, when it lands in stomach of the predator, it no longer shines.
延伸閱讀:
國際學者給台灣政府的第五封公開信與新聞局的回函
------
GIO’s response misses the point
By Richard Kagan
Friday, Dec 25, 2009, Page 8
Last Friday I received an e-mail from Government Information Office (GIO) Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) responding to “Open letter to Taiwan’s president” (Nov. 13, page 8), which I signed with many other academics. This was one of a series of letters we have written concerning Taiwan’s eroding democratic freedoms, judicial systems and international relations. Su has responded in detail to the previous letters by defending the operations of the government with regard to the judicial system, and President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) democratic reforms and policies.
上週五,我收到一封由台灣新聞局長蘇俊賓發出,回覆我參予連署的第五號公開信的電子郵件(第五號公開信日期是2009年11月13日),那是封給台灣政府一系列的公開信的其中一封.這系列公開信事關我們對台灣民主自由倒退,司法體系傾斜,國際關係緊張的憂慮. 蘇先生詳細回覆第五號公開信裡,替馬政府辯駁並強調馬政府對司法與民主改革的決心.
But this time, Su wanted to justify and praise Taiwan’s system by referring to the “international community’s assessments” on these matters. His attempt to defend Taiwan by using international standards actually backfired in several ways.
然而,蘇引用國際評等來誇讚台灣體系的作法,就很多方面來講,會收到相反的成效.(按:詳見第五封公開信的回函.蘇企圖引用特定機構的數據來辯駁)
Let me explain in some detail why I question the minister’s research and the professionalism of the GIO.
以下讓我詳敘我為什麼對新聞局的研究與專業有所質疑.
First, Su uses faulty methodology to prove his point by not providing a context for his argument. He correctly points out that Freedom House ranks Taiwan among the “free” countries of Asia. In the combined ratings of Political and Civil Liberties, Taiwan scores 1.5. This puts it with Israel, Japan and South Korea. The rank of No. 1 is filled mainly by European countries as well as the US and Canada. What he fails to note is that China is scored 6.5 out of a 7-point ranking. China is paired with Zimbabwe and just below Myanmar and North Korea, who scored a 7.
首先,蘇先生沒有提供上下文或來龍去脈而以有瑕疵的方法來證明他的論點. 他正確指出根據自由之家的報告,台灣的確為亞洲的"自由"國家. 在政治與公民自由綜合評比裡,台灣的分數是1.5分,和以色列,日本與南韓並列.最自由的國家幾為歐洲國家與美加. 蘇先生忽略不提的是中國在7分的評比裡得分6.5. 中國與辛巴威並列,且只比緬甸與北韓好一點,後兩者同為七分. (按:最近的新聞提到台灣的政治權利升級,公民自由降等)
Why, then, is the Ma administration seeking rapprochement with China? How can a democratic country be so blind as to seek close relations with a government that is one of the most among authoritarian societies in the world? Who will benefit? Which is the likelier scenario — that China will force Taiwan to become less free, or that Taiwan will help China become more democratic?
那麼,馬政府為什麼要追求與中國和解呢?為什麼一個民主國家盲目地對一個集權國家急於示好?誰會從中獲利?最有可能的情況究竟是中國將迫使台灣變得更不自由?亦或是台灣將幫助中國變得更民主?
We can actually see the consequence of this relationship in the Corruption Perceptions for this year. Su claims that Taiwan’s ranking in the report on 180 countries issued by Transparency International rose to No. 37. This statement reveals political alchemy at its best. For instance, Taiwan’s score in 2007 was 34. Numerically it did rise to 37. But the higher a country gets, the greater the index of corruption. Somalia is rated at No. 180. In fact, Taiwan fell into greater corruption by three points.
事實上我們從今年的貪腐印象可以見得結果. 蘇宣稱根據國際透明組織,台灣在180個國家裏的排名37. 這充其量顯示出政治巫術.的確,就排名上台灣提升到37,但是台灣在2007年排名34.愈後面的排名顯示愈多貪污.索馬利亞排名180. (也就是說)事實上,台灣的排名退步了三名.
China, meanwhile, moved from 72 in 2007 to is worst score ever, at 79, this year. By Su’s admission, both “regions” (Taiwan and China) are slouching toward Somalia in the corruption index.
在此同時,中國的排名從2007年的72名退步到79,有史以來最差的一次. 根據蘇所承認,這兩個"地區"(指蘇是台灣與中國為兩個地區)的貪污排名正向索馬利亞靠攏.
Since we talked about Taiwan’s relations with China in our letter, it is important to place Taiwan in the context of Beijing’s power and influence to control cross-strait dialogue.
既然我們在信中提到兩岸關係,在討論事情時就必須把北京對兩岸對話的影響力納入考量.
One can see this most significantly when analyzing press freedoms. Freedom House reports that China has a system of control that “originated under classic totalitarian conditions” and is being modernized to serve the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. In 2005, China was ranked as No. 177 out of a total of 194 countries. Freedom House does not include in its analysis China’s policies in Tibet. If Tibet had been considered, China’s ranking would certainly have been even worse.
最明顯的是新聞自由.自由之家的報告指出中國有現代化的系統的在"有組織的在傳統一個中國的條件下"維護中國共產黨在中國的領導權. 在2005年,中國在194個國家中排名177,而這個評比甚至排除中國在西藏(圖博)的政策. 如果自由之家把中國的西藏政策納入考量,中國的評比只會更糟.
How can Chinese make a rational and educated decision about policies toward Taiwan when they live in an iron box of propaganda? When Beijing talks about the feelings of the Chinese people, how does the leadership know what the people think if it does not allow certain information to be circulated, or criticism of its policies? And why would Taipei believe that Chinese have any independent ideas about cross-strait relations when they are ruled by a state that is similar to Myanmar and North Korea in preventing its people from having freedom of the press, freedom to form political parties and freedom to live in a system ruled by law?
What Su needs is an international standard for judging how governments treat each other. For instance, when looking at some of the international organizations that the minister mentions, I could not find any place called “Chinese Taipei,” “Chinese Taiwan” or “One China.” Freedom House, unlike Beijing and Taipei, uses the appropriate name of “Taiwan” and not any substitute to evaluate the country’s rights and freedoms. Why can’t the leadership in Taipei conform to this international usage?
蘇需要的是一套放諸國際皆準,國與國相互對待的標準. 例如,這些蘇所引用的國際組織提到台灣時使用台灣一辭,而不是中華台北,中華台灣,或是一個中國. 自由之家,不像北京或台北,使用適當的名稱稱呼台灣為台灣,而不是用一些替代的名稱,來對評估自由與人權.為什麼台北領導人不能夠採用國際一致的用法呢? (按:這個呼應到前幾段中,蘇俊賓以兩個"地區"而非兩個國家來稱呼台灣與中國的批評)
Su defends his government’s policies through misuse of documents and through the use of irrelevant documents. It does not matter how democratic Taiwan appears to be. What is important to ask is: What happens when a democracy seeks to join one of the authoritarian countries in the world? Actually, what should be compared are the statistics on the ruling parties of each country. The government of China is ruled by the CCP and not by the people. And the government of Taiwan is slowly reverting to a one-party state. In the Taiwan Strait, it is the leaders of the political parties, not government officials, who negotiate.
From a historical perspective, Su is engaging in the colonization of his country by an empire. No mater how pure the pearl is, when it lands in stomach of the predator, it no longer shines.
[轉載] A GIO response to Richard Kagan
這是新聞局針對學者Richard Kagan提到政府的回函避重就輕特別撰文(反擊). 什麼時候起新聞局忙於與國際學者打筆戰了? 而且,政府回函沒有針對重點的問題在第五封公開信一開始也有所提及. 這種政府與民眾認知差異的情況,不但沒有改善,反而陷入各說各話的情況.真是令人擔憂.
延伸閱讀:
Richard Kagan的文章: GIO’s response misses the point
-------
A GIO response to Richard Kagan
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓
Friday, Jan 08, 2010, Page 8
In an op-ed published in the Taipei Times (“GIO’s response misses the point,” Dec. 25, page 8) Richard Kagan questions efforts by this government for closer ties between Taiwan and mainland China, based primarily on stated concerns about how this might affect democracy in Taiwan. Rather than rehash previous Government Information Office (GIO) responses to the misperceptions and specious claims therein, it would be more productive to focus on the central question he raises.
Professor Kagan expresses doubts about why a democratic country such as the Republic of China (Taiwan) would seek to develop closer relations with mainland China, which is not a democracy. As an historian, he surely must know that all members of the international community should and must develop relations with each other, regardless of differences in political systems or even bilateral disagreements over specific issues. The US engages in trade and security cooperation with non-democratic countries throughout the world, yet few question how this might affect US democracy.
Similarly, the Republic of China needs to develop relations with all members of the international community to ensure the best interests of the people of Taiwan. It is an internationally accepted fact that mainland China is growing in economic and strategic importance. When the international community wishes to solve major international problems, it increasingly finds that it must engage with Beijing to help find a solution. The US is working more closely than ever with the mainland to deal with managing the global financial crisis, handling the North Korean situation and countering global terrorism. As an integral member of the international community, Taiwan needs to engage with mainland China for many of the same reasons, regardless of any cross-strait differences.
However, this is absolutely not in any way at the expense of Taiwan’s hard-won democracy. This administration has consistently stressed since taking office that all its policies and interaction with Beijing shall be based on the principle of “putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people.” If improving ties had led to the appalling result Dr Kagan posits of Beijing controlling the dialogue and always getting what it wants, why was no double taxation avoidance agreement signed during the Chiang-Chen [Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林)] cross-strait talks in December, despite being on the agenda? The answer is simple: Disputed details in the wording of the agreement did not accord with the aforementioned principle, so we were not going to sign it, and did not.
The fact that these talks took place between the respectively authorized representative organizations of both sides — the SEF and ARATS — debunks the myth that the cross-strait dialogue is being conducted party-to-party, rather than government-to-government. The Legislative Yuan must approve any accord worked out with ARATS involving domestic laws. Only this administration, duly elected by the voters in Taiwan — and not any political party at either end of the political spectrum — sets cross-strait policy and speaks on behalf of the people of Taiwan.
Professor Kagan’s letter also dwelled on the disingenuous complaint that using “Chinese Taipei” as the name of our country in international events and organizations signals a deliberate diminution of national sovereignty. Taiwan’s participation in such events under the rubric “Chinese Taipei” during previous administrations did not diminish national sovereignty, nor can it do so now. This government has always sought and continues to vigorously seek the use of our official name, “Republic of China,” or at least “Taiwan,” in such situations. However, given Taiwan’s unique international status, use of our national title is beyond our control. We warmly welcome support from Dr Kagan and his colleagues for the correct use of our national title by international events and organizations hereafter.
The mantra that democracy in Taiwan is less robust than before utterly conflicts with reality. Domestic political debate in Taiwan is as spirited and vigorous as ever. The local media scrutinize every action of this administration closely, and public demonstrations on political issues of every kind are commonplace. Any concerns that Taiwan is reverting to one-party rule were surely dispelled by the results of local elections held last month. KMT [Chinese Nationalist Party] candidates for mayor and county magistrate posts received 47.88 percent of the nationwide vote, while DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] candidates garnered 45.32 percent. There is no clearer proof that the people of Taiwan have the absolute power to choose their government.
The people of Taiwan have every reason to be proud of the democracy and freedom they have achieved. Taiwan continues to shape the debate on whether democracy is attainable in the Chinese-speaking world, even as cross-strait ties improve. We remain resolutely confident that the undeniable fact of democratic attainment in Taiwan will ultimately prove just as, or even more, powerful to spur positive developments on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait. That can only be to the benefit of the people of Taiwan and those of the mainland, as well as the world in general.
延伸閱讀:
Richard Kagan的文章: GIO’s response misses the point
-------
A GIO response to Richard Kagan
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓
Friday, Jan 08, 2010, Page 8
In an op-ed published in the Taipei Times (“GIO’s response misses the point,” Dec. 25, page 8) Richard Kagan questions efforts by this government for closer ties between Taiwan and mainland China, based primarily on stated concerns about how this might affect democracy in Taiwan. Rather than rehash previous Government Information Office (GIO) responses to the misperceptions and specious claims therein, it would be more productive to focus on the central question he raises.
Professor Kagan expresses doubts about why a democratic country such as the Republic of China (Taiwan) would seek to develop closer relations with mainland China, which is not a democracy. As an historian, he surely must know that all members of the international community should and must develop relations with each other, regardless of differences in political systems or even bilateral disagreements over specific issues. The US engages in trade and security cooperation with non-democratic countries throughout the world, yet few question how this might affect US democracy.
Similarly, the Republic of China needs to develop relations with all members of the international community to ensure the best interests of the people of Taiwan. It is an internationally accepted fact that mainland China is growing in economic and strategic importance. When the international community wishes to solve major international problems, it increasingly finds that it must engage with Beijing to help find a solution. The US is working more closely than ever with the mainland to deal with managing the global financial crisis, handling the North Korean situation and countering global terrorism. As an integral member of the international community, Taiwan needs to engage with mainland China for many of the same reasons, regardless of any cross-strait differences.
However, this is absolutely not in any way at the expense of Taiwan’s hard-won democracy. This administration has consistently stressed since taking office that all its policies and interaction with Beijing shall be based on the principle of “putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people.” If improving ties had led to the appalling result Dr Kagan posits of Beijing controlling the dialogue and always getting what it wants, why was no double taxation avoidance agreement signed during the Chiang-Chen [Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林)] cross-strait talks in December, despite being on the agenda? The answer is simple: Disputed details in the wording of the agreement did not accord with the aforementioned principle, so we were not going to sign it, and did not.
The fact that these talks took place between the respectively authorized representative organizations of both sides — the SEF and ARATS — debunks the myth that the cross-strait dialogue is being conducted party-to-party, rather than government-to-government. The Legislative Yuan must approve any accord worked out with ARATS involving domestic laws. Only this administration, duly elected by the voters in Taiwan — and not any political party at either end of the political spectrum — sets cross-strait policy and speaks on behalf of the people of Taiwan.
Professor Kagan’s letter also dwelled on the disingenuous complaint that using “Chinese Taipei” as the name of our country in international events and organizations signals a deliberate diminution of national sovereignty. Taiwan’s participation in such events under the rubric “Chinese Taipei” during previous administrations did not diminish national sovereignty, nor can it do so now. This government has always sought and continues to vigorously seek the use of our official name, “Republic of China,” or at least “Taiwan,” in such situations. However, given Taiwan’s unique international status, use of our national title is beyond our control. We warmly welcome support from Dr Kagan and his colleagues for the correct use of our national title by international events and organizations hereafter.
The mantra that democracy in Taiwan is less robust than before utterly conflicts with reality. Domestic political debate in Taiwan is as spirited and vigorous as ever. The local media scrutinize every action of this administration closely, and public demonstrations on political issues of every kind are commonplace. Any concerns that Taiwan is reverting to one-party rule were surely dispelled by the results of local elections held last month. KMT [Chinese Nationalist Party] candidates for mayor and county magistrate posts received 47.88 percent of the nationwide vote, while DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] candidates garnered 45.32 percent. There is no clearer proof that the people of Taiwan have the absolute power to choose their government.
The people of Taiwan have every reason to be proud of the democracy and freedom they have achieved. Taiwan continues to shape the debate on whether democracy is attainable in the Chinese-speaking world, even as cross-strait ties improve. We remain resolutely confident that the undeniable fact of democratic attainment in Taiwan will ultimately prove just as, or even more, powerful to spur positive developments on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait. That can only be to the benefit of the people of Taiwan and those of the mainland, as well as the world in general.
Friday, January 8, 2010
台灣芬蘭化的原文全文與部份翻譯(updated on 1/13)
前陣子台灣的媒體講到台灣芬蘭化的問題,芬蘭化根據wiki的定義是:是一邊維持議會民主制度和資本主義經濟體制，同時卻處於共產主義國家勢力控制下的狀態，類似冷戰時芬蘭和蘇聯兩國之間的關係。此詞出現於1960年代後期的西德，為當時西德的保守派批評重視同共產主義諸國對話的時任西德總理勃蘭特時所新造的詞匯。
網路上有人貼出原文,我曾經試圖想翻譯全文後張貼在個人部落格,但實在太長,只翻了前面幾段還有中間偏後四段之後就放棄了. 現在把前面我自己翻的幾段連同原文對照貼出來如下.有空可能會慢慢再一段段翻,可能會從推銷芬蘭化(selling Finlandization)翻起(從我自己有興趣了解的翻起啦).
這裡有前1/3的翻譯,而這裡有關於芬蘭化的一些註解與後續評論.
1/13updated: 這裡有全文翻譯.(雖然我個人比較喜歡中英對照:P)
以下轉載.
-------
不再迫切的台海: 為什麼美國會從台灣芬蘭化中獲利
January/February 2010
Bruce Gilley
BRUCE GILLEY is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Portland State University's Mark O. Hatfield School of Government and the author of The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy.
Since 2005, Taiwan and China have been moving into a closer economic and political embrace -- a process that accelerated with the election of the pro-détente politician Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in 2008. This strengthening of relations presents the United States with its greatest challenge in the Taiwan Strait since 1979, when Washington severed ties with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
自從2005年以來,台灣與中國在經濟與政治上更加緊密結合,這個過程也因為馬英九當選後更為加速. 兩岸關係強化帶給美國自1979年台美斷交,美國(原文為"華盛頓")與中國建交以來最大的一次挑戰.
In many ways, the current thaw serves Taipei's interests, but it also allows Beijing to assert increasing influence over Taiwan. As a consensus emerges in Taiwan on establishing closer relations with China, the thaw is calling into question the United States' deeply ambiguous policy, which is supposed to serve both Taiwan's interests (by allowing it to retain its autonomy) and the United States' own (by guarding against an expansionist China). Washington now faces a stark choice: continue pursuing a militarized realist approach -- using Taiwan to balance the power of a rising China -- or follow an alternative liberal logic that seeks to promote long-term peace through closer economic, social, and political ties between Taiwan and China.
就很多方面來說,兩岸和解(thaw)符合台北的利益,但是和解的同時也讓北京對台灣有更大的影響力. 台灣內部的共識是強化與中國的關係,但此讓美國摩擬兩可的政策受到質疑:美國保衛台灣的自主性以對抗擴張主義的中國的政策使台美雙方都受益. 華府現在面對的是個嚴峻的選擇: 繼續強化軍事,利用台灣來與興起中的中國抗衡, 或是以更緊密的兩岸經濟,社會與政治連結來達到長遠之和平. (註:大抵就是鷹派與鴿派的選擇)
A TALE OF TWO DÉTENTES 雙合解記
After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities, led, respectively, by Chiang Kai-shek's defeated nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and Mao Zedong's victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For nearly three decades, Chiang and Mao harbored rival claims to the whole territory of China. Gradually, most of the international community came to accept Beijing's claims to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and a special role in its foreign relations. By 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China, 69 percent of the United Nations' member states had already severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of relations with China.
中國內戰止於1949年,那之後台灣與中國成為兩個政治實體,分別由戰敗的蔣介石率領國民黨與戰勝的毛澤東代表的中國共產黨統治兩岸. 近三十年來, 蔣介石與毛澤東都將對方之領土視為自己領土之一部份(儘管實際上只對台灣或只對中國得以行使主權.)漸漸的,大部分的國際社會接受北京視台灣為中國一部份的這種說法. 到了1972年,尼克森拜訪中國時, 百分之六十九的聯合國會員國都已經與台灣斷絕外交關係,紛紛與中國建交.
The United States, which had merely "acknowledged" Beijing's claim to Taiwan, was slow to recognize the People's Republic of China due to Washington's historical ties with the KMT, dating back to World War II and its conflict with the PRC during the Korean War. The strategic position of Taiwan, astride western Pacific sea and air lanes, gave it added importance. But by 1979, even Washington had recognized Beijing. That same year, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in order to ensure continued legal, commercial, and de facto diplomatic relations with the island. At the last minute, Senate Republicans -- along with several Democrats who worried that President Jimmy Carter was disregarding Taiwan's security -- amended the legislation to include promises of arms sales to Taipei and a broader U.S. commitment to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" against the island.
基於華府與國民黨的歷史可追溯至二次大戰與韓戰期間中(共)美衝突的淵源，美國很晚才承認北京對台灣的宣示,也很晚才承認中華人民共和國。台灣的戰略地位，佔據西太平洋的海空航線要衝，使其更加重要。但是到了1979年，連華府也承認中國政權了。同年，美國實施了台灣關係法以確保維持法律、商業與實質外交關係。在最後一刻，參院共和黨員──加上幾個擔心卡特總統忽視台灣安全的民主黨員──修改法案，包括承諾對台軍售與美國擴大承諾「抵抗任何武力方式或其他形式的脅迫」。
The fading of the Chiang-Mao rivalry, which subsided after both leaders died in the mid-1970s, coupled with Beijing's new inward-looking focus on economic development, made these military commitments appear anachronistic during the 1980s. Beijing ended its shelling of the Taiwanese islands off the Chinese coast and welcomed Taiwanese "compatriots" to the mainland for tourism, investment, and family reunification. Taiwan's native-born president, Lee Teng-hui, who came to power in 1988, had no interest in "retaking the mainland" and approved the creation of such exchanges. In 1993, the heads of the two governments' cross-strait contact groups held their first direct talks, in Singapore.
This "first détente" ended abruptly in 1995, when the United States issued a visa for Lee to visit Cornell University. China, in the midst of a domestic leadership transition, was already hardening its position on Taiwan, and armchair generals in all three places were publishing books on the predicted order of battle to come. Beijing saw the visa as a betrayal of earlier U.S. promises to refrain from any official relations with Taiwanese leaders. Taiwan's democratization was also leading to domestic popular pressures for a more assertive stance on independence. Beijing reacted by hurling missiles into the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. Washington dispatched aircraft carriers and radar ships to the area. Beijing's worst fears were then realized in 2000, when Taiwanese citizens elected Chen Shui-bian as their president. Chen, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), now the opposition, promised to seek formal recognition of Taiwan's de facto independence from China. As a consequence, cross-strait relations deteriorated dramatically between 1995 and 2005, leading to a renewed emphasis on militarization by all three sides.
The damage wrought by this "second freeze" led to serious rethinking in all three capitals. Beijing worried that its aggressive posture on Taiwan was threatening its broader influence in Asia, as other nations rallied behind the U.S. security shield; Taipei began to reevaluate the value of its symbolic assertions of nationhood; and Washington began to question its unlimited commitment to an increasingly troublesome Taiwan, which threatened to damage, if not destroy, its more important relationship with China. By the end of George W. Bush's first term, Washington had become the main check on Taipei's assertions of independence.
The "second détente" in cross-strait relations began with a 2005 speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao downplaying demands for reunification. Beijing was shifting its view as a result of an emerging grand strategy that stressed regional and global influence; accordingly, it came to see Taiwan less as an ideologically charged and urgent matter and more as a pragmatic and low-key management issue. Ma's election in 2008 signaled the resurgence of a similar vision in Taiwan. He promised "no unification, no independence, no use of force." Within months, in rapid and unprecedented fashion, the heads of the contact groups began holding semiannual meetings and signed more than two dozen previously unthinkable agreements. Although most of these involved economic matters, they had political implications, too. The number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan -- including Taiwan's long-militarized islands directly off the coast of China -- surged by a factor of ten, to 3,000 per day. China sent students to Taiwan, and the two sides authorized 270 flights per week across the strait. Important political fears that had previously restricted economic integration suddenly dissipated on both sides, and Taipei and Beijing began talking about the "total normalization" of their economic and financial ties. The supposedly fixed national interests on which foreign policy realists base their assessments were in total flux.
The second détente has also included explicitly political deals. China had previously permitted Taiwan to participate only in international organizations with an economic focus, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization. In 2009, it allowed Taiwan to participate as an observer at the annual board meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. Both sides began discussing a Taiwanese presence in the UN bodies responsible for civil aviation, commercial shipping, meteorology, and climate change.
Both sides also tacitly agreed to a "diplomatic truce": Beijing ceased courting the nations on Taiwan's dwindling list of 23 diplomatic allies, and in 2009 Taipei dropped its perpetual request for UN membership for the first time in 17 years. When Ma was reelected as KMT chair in July 2009, Hu declared that he would like to build "mutual trust between the two sides in political affairs." As political relations warmed, Taiwanese officials -- including leading DPP figures, such as the mayor of Kaohsiung -- became regular visitors in China.
There are indications that this second cross-straits détente will last. Although both leaders' terms will expire in 2012, Hu's designated successor, Xi Jinping, is a well-known advocate of cross-strait exchanges. Ma, meanwhile, has recovered from the political damage wrought by Typhoon Morakot, which struck the island in August 2009. So long as the DPP remains divided between extreme anti-détente and limited-détente factions, he seems likely to win reelection.
Taiwan and China are now approaching their relationship using completely different assumptions than those that governed cross-strait relations for decades. Whereas they previously saw the relationship as a military dispute, today both sides have embraced a view of security that is premised on high-level contact, trust, and reduced threats of force. Their views of economic issues, meanwhile, have placed global integration and competitiveness ahead of nationalist protectionism. This represents a fundamental shift in the political relationship between Taiwan and China.
FROM HELSINKI TO TAIPEI 從赫爾辛基到台北
To understand the evolution of the Taipei-Beijing relationship, it is useful to consider the theory and practice of what has become known as "Finlandization" in the field of political science. The term derives its name from Finland's 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join alliances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for any country challenging Soviet interests. In return, the Kremlin agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and respect Finland's democratic system. Therefore, from 1956 to 1981, under the leadership of President Urho Kekkonen, Finland pursued a policy of strategic appeasement and neutrality on U.S.-Soviet issues and limited domestic criticism of the Soviet Union. This policy enjoyed wide support in Finland at the time (despite the subsequent debate in Finland on its merits). Kekkonen also won praise across the political spectrum in the United States, especially from foreign policy realists such as George Kennan, who lauded the Finnish leader's "composure and firmness."
要了解兩岸關係的演變不妨參考日後政治學領域所謂 "芬蘭化"的理論與實務。這個名稱源自芬蘭在1948年與蘇聯的協議，據此赫爾辛基同意不加入挑戰莫斯科的聯盟或擔任任何挑戰蘇聯利益的國家的基地. 引以回報的是克里姆林宮同意維護芬蘭自治並尊重芬蘭的民主制度.因此，1956到1981年，在Urho Kekkonen總統領導下，芬蘭在美蘇議題上追求戰略綏靖與中立政策，限制國內對蘇聯的批評.當時這個政策在芬蘭廣受支持,雖然後續對成效的爭議也不斷.
Building on the work of others, the Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen in 1988proposed a general theory of Finlandization known as "adaptive politics." Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make. Unlike a puppet regime, a Finlandized state calculates that its long-term interests, and perhaps those of its neighbors, are best served by making strategic concessions to a superpower next door. These concessions are motivated chiefly by geographic proximity, psychological threats from the superpower, and cultural affinities between the two sides. Being so close, the superpower need only issue vague threats, rather than display actual military muscle, to change its weaker neighbor's policies. Meanwhile, the small power perceives itself as engaging in an "active and principled neutrality," rather than a cowering acquiescence, a distinction that is critical to rationalizing these policy changes domestically.
丹麥政治學者Mouritzen在1988年根據其他學者的研究提出芬蘭化的理論,指稱芬蘭化是種"適應性政治".Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.不像其他魁儡政權,經過精打細算後,一個芬蘭化的邦國的長期利益,甚至可能是強權鄰國的利益,最能夠從對強權讓步中獲得.這個讓步的主要動機在於對於鄰國強權的心裡恐懼與兩者文化上的緊密連結. 因為兩者如此緊密,超級強權僅需模糊的威脅,而不需實際的軍事展現,就已經足以改變鄰近小國的政治.同時,這個小國體認到"積極地,原則性的中立"明顯有異於畏縮的默認,因此得以在國內(domestically)合理化這種讓步強權的政策.
Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion. Even if one rejects the theory of Finlandization, it is difficult to deny that Kekkonen played a constructive role in ending the Cold War. In 1969, for instance, Finland offered itself as the venue for a conference between the two blocs that eventually produced a shared document with clear commitments to human rights and freedoms: the Helsinki accords.
芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大.即使有人拒絕芬蘭化的理論,也很難否定Kekkonen在結束冷戰中扮演一個建設性的角色. 例如在1969年,芬蘭讓自己成為兩方(按:指北約/美國與蘇聯)會談的管道(venue),進而讓雙方都承諾人權與自由--簽署赫爾辛基條約.
Cold War historians, such as John Lewis Gaddis, believe that the Helsinki process was central to undermining the moral authority of the Soviet Union, and others have argued that it prompted the ideological shift necessary to kickstart Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the mid-1980s. Moreover, Finland's unique status as interlocutor with Moscow made possible the first serious discussions of nuclear disarmament and of the shared development of Arctic resources, both of which served as templates for the warming of relations between NATO and the Soviet bloc. Although it usually has a negative connotation, "Finlandization" need not be a pejorative term.
冷戰歷史學家如John Lewis Gaddis相信芬蘭化(Helsinki process)對於崩解蘇聯權威居功厥偉,其他冷戰歷史學家則主張芬蘭化有助於1980年代中期Gorbachev對蘇聯的改革與意識形態的轉變.尤有甚者,芬蘭成為一個獨特的,與蘇聯對話者的狀態促成首次針對解除武裝的對談,也使得北約會員國之間得討論資源共享,並緩和北約會員國與蘇聯間的緊張關係. 雖然有負面意涵,"芬蘭化"不必是個輕蔑的詞彙. (註:作者也承認芬蘭化含有負面意涵,卻還鼓吹台灣芬蘭化,嗯,這交由讀者去判斷.)
Taiwan shares many of the key features that characterized Finland in the late 1940s. It is a small but internally sovereign state that is geographically close to a superpower with which it shares cultural and historical ties. Its fierce sense of independence is balanced by a pragmatic sense of the need to accommodate that superpower's vital interests. Most important, the evolving views of its leaders and its people today focus on seeking security through integration rather than confrontation. This approach could help defuse one of the most worrying trends in global politics: the emerging rivalry between China and the United States.
台灣和1940年代晚期的芬蘭在很多方面都類似. 它是個小但是主權獨立的邦國(按:英文上state,country,nation意義不甚相同,但是翻成中文幾乎都一樣翻成"國家".在此我姑且翻成邦國,若不恰當歡迎指教,謝謝!),地理上鄰近一個超級強權而又與此超級強權有文化上與歷史上的連結. 它強烈的獨立意識與務實的意識相互平衡以因應超級強權的利益.最重要的,隨著領導者與人民的觀念的遞嬗,今日的焦點著重於透過整合,而非衝撞,以追求安全.這種方式或可去除國際政治上對中美(兩個超級強權)對峙的疑慮. (註:這有一個很大的差異,台灣如果真正的真芬蘭化,台灣必須是主權獨立的邦國,不只是實際上更必須在法理上都是一個獨立的邦國.在上面所附的連結當中有一篇就提到台灣是獨立國家這個重點)
The analogy is not perfect. U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan today are more explicit than they were for Finland during the Cold War, although few doubt that NATO would have defended Finland against a Soviet invasion. And China's 1,000-plus missiles targeted at Taiwan are a more direct threat than anything the Soviet military ever mustered across the Vuoksi River. But in general the thinking that has motivated the second détente on both sides parallels that which led to the Finnish-Soviet détente of the Cold War. Although it is still early, Taipei is moving in the direction of eventual Finlandization.
這個類比當然並不完美.美國對台灣安全的保證遠比冷戰當時對芬蘭的保障來得明確,雖然少數質疑北約會保衛芬蘭以對抗蘇聯的入侵.而且,中國以超過一千枚飛彈對準台灣的威脅遠比蘇聯軍隊從未屯集於Vuoksi河畔來得更直接. 但整體而言,促使兩岸第二次和解的想法與芬蘭與蘇聯在冷戰時間的想法如出一轍.雖然為時尚早,台北已經逐步邁向芬蘭化.
Under such a scenario, Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power, rather than a U.S. strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing's fears about the island's becoming an obstacle to China's military and commercial ambitions in the region. It would also refrain from undermining the CCP's rule in China. In return, Beijing would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei expanded participation in international organizations, and extend the island favorable economic and social benefits.
在這種情況下,台灣會重新定位自己為中立國,而不是美國的戰略伙伴,以化解北京視台灣為中國在亞洲軍事與商業崛起的障礙. 它也必須節制不能妨礙中國共產黨在中國的執政.(相對的,)北京必須以解除軍事威脅,給予台北參予國際組織,擴展台灣經濟與社會利益做為回報.
The DPP's director of international affairs, Hsiao Bi-khim, has written that the changes in Taiwan's China policy "are leading to a new strategic outlook, which aligns Taiwan with China's sphere of influence instead of maintaining the traditional presumed informal alliance with the United States." Although Hsiao, like many in the DPP, fears this sort of shift, such reservations are unwarranted.
民進黨的國際事務部主任蕭美琴曾經撰文指出台灣的中國政策"正帶領一個新的策略觀點,那是個台灣與中國影響力結盟,而非傳統與美國非正式聯盟的觀點."雖然蕭美琴,和許多民進黨員一樣,對此轉換感到恐懼而有所保留,但這種保留毫無根據.
A MEANS OR AN END? 是手段還是目的?
There are two ways to view the shift in Chinese policy toward Taiwan. The dominant interpretation has long been that Beijing is motivated by nationalism and that the PRC's irredentist claims to Taiwan stem from a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness. According to this view, the CCP is striving to reincorporate Taiwan into China in order to avert a domestic nationalist backlash and a crisis of legitimacy. Seen in this light, Taiwan is an end unto itself and the second détente is merely a tactical shift intended to force Taiwan into reunification through indirect means: beneath Beijing's silk glove of détente is the iron fist of nationalism.
In recent years, many Western analysts have rejected this nationalist interpretation of Beijing's Taiwan policy and opted instead for a geostrategic one. Unrecovered territories are legion in the history of the PRC, and the CCP has found it easy to let go of others (including disputed regions bordering Russia, India, and the Spratly Islands, as well as control over Mongolia and Korea). Taiwan, however, by virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential strategic threat to China. It could serve as a base for foreign military operations against China and even in peacetime could constrain Beijing's ability to develop and project naval power and ensure maritime security in East Asia.
Beijing's core goal from this perspective is the preservation of its dominance in its immediate offshore region, as became clear in 2009 when five Chinese vessels trailed a U.S. Navy ship sailing near a Chinese submarine base. Taiwan represents an obstacle to this goal if it remains a U.S. strategic ally armed with advanced U.S. weaponry, but not if it becomes a self-defending and neutral state with close economic and political ties to China. Beijing's constantly changing position on Taiwan -- which has incrementally moderated from "liberation" to "peaceful unification" to "one China" to "anti-independence" since Mao's era -- in fact reflects a concern with Taiwan's geostrategic status, not with the precise nature of its political ties to China. According to this interpretation, Beijing has no interest in occupying or ruling Taiwan; it simply wants a sphere of influence that increases its global clout and in which Taiwan is a neutral state, not a client state. Seen through this lens, Taiwan is a means to an end and the second détente is a tactic intended to achieve this strategic objective through Taiwan's Finlandization.
China's recent behavior confirms this view; Beijing's decision to allow Taiwan to participate in the WHO represents a cool-headed understanding that giving Taiwan a greater international voice could enhance its independence from the United States, which would, in turn, serve China's own interests. It also gives Beijing an opportunity to show that a China-dominated Asia need not be less peaceful, less prosperous, or even less democratic. As the Chinese scholar Jianwei Wang of the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point puts it, "Beijing views the Taiwan issue and cross-straits relations as an integral part of China's comprehensive 'rise' in world affairs rather than as an isolated issue purely affecting national pride alone."
Recent survey data lends credence to this argument. The mainland citizens polled by Horizon Research in 2004 were not particularly nationalist about retaking Taiwan -- only 15 percent wanted immediate military action, whereas 58 percent believed that the government should rule out the use of force in favor of economic integration. In a 2008 speech, Hu identified "political antagonism," rather than political separation, as the problem in cross-straits relations, breaking with previous pronouncements from Beijing. Subsequent policy statements by the CCP have revealed a calm confidence in the shifting geostrategic relationship with Taiwan, not a bombastic nationalist urgency for reunification.
THE PACIFIER 安撫
In 1995, at the end of the first détente, Chen-shen Yen, a Taiwanese scholar and KMT adviser, wrote a paper in the Taiwanese political journalWenti yu Yanjiu explicitly extolling the logic of Finlandization (or fenlanhua in Chinese) for Taiwan. By seeking Beijing's approval for an expanded international voice, maintaining a foreign policy that did not threaten China, and choosing leaders who enjoyed Beijing's trust, Yen argued, Taiwan could do more to protect its internal autonomy and economic prosperity than it could by challenging the rising superpower on its doorstep. Moreover, Taiwan's long-term interests in gaining true independence could only be achieved by democratization in China, which would be more likely if Taiwan avoided stoking a military or ideological confrontation. His conclusion echoed that of the Athenians in Thucydides' Melian dialogue: "Given the responsibility to protect its future existence," wrote Yen, "a civilized country should adjust itself to external realities." It has taken over a decade for Yen's prescient views to gain currency, but they now have widespread support.
Ma's pursuit of "total normalization" has enjoyed steady and rising popularity in Taiwan since he came to office. It reflects a view that the militarized approach to the cross-strait conflict that has dominated both Taiwanese (and U.S.) strategic thinking since the days of Chiang and Mao has not resolved the dispute and does not serve Taiwan's present needs. Just as Finland, a small country, was able to pioneer a nonmilitarized alternative to the Cold War, so, too, could Taiwan play that role in the brewing U.S.-Chinese cold war in Asia.
At present, a rising China threatens the world primarily because there has been little in the way of domestic political liberalization to keep Beijing's increasing economic and military power in check. Taiwan could play a far greater role in China's liberalization if it were to become a Finlandized part of the region and its officials were able to move across the strait even more freely than they do now. Already, prominent Chinese liberals, such as Zhang Boshu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are arguing that the mainland should draw lessons about political development from Taiwan. As Sheng Lijun of the National University of Singapore writes, "With the Taiwan political challenge, Beijing will sooner or later have to improve its governance (including democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption)." Taipei's experience with democratic reform offers many lessons for Beijing -- especially because the formerly authoritarian KMT's return to power in 2008 showed that the CCP could one day hope to rule again even if the advent of democracy initially brought another party to power.
Democratic reform in China will be encouraged both by popular pressure to emulate Taiwan (PRC citizens have already enthusiastically adopted Taiwanese pop culture and business practices) and by the brute necessity of managing the relationship in a way that meets the Taiwanese electorate's high expectations of transparency and accountability. Some may call it appeasement, but if Taiwan uses appeasement to democratize and pacify a rising China, it will be a worthy appeasement indeed.
SELLING FINLANDIZATION 推銷芬蘭化
Taiwan's continued progress toward Finlandization will depend on whether Ma can demonstrate the tangible benefits of this strategy to the Taiwanese population. He will have to secure an even greater international voice for Taiwan (for example, making its WHO observer status permanent), the ability to negotiate its own free-trade agreements, and the verified removal of some of the more than 1,000 Chinese missiles currently aimed at the island. Best of all would be a peace accord under which China renounced the use of force unless the island were invaded or achieved de jure independence. Such an accord, which both sides are seeking, would be the functional equivalent of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty, allaying the large power's security concerns while assuring the small power of its autonomy. Another potential benefit is a promised economic cooperation framework agreement within which Taiwan could pursue a free-trade agreement with Beijing; Taiwan currently risks becoming uncompetitive in the Chinese market and China-based supply chains as a result of the free-trade agreements between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.
Ma will also have to reassure Taiwanese voters, who fear losing their political freedoms. In Taiwan, there is a justified concern about being lured into a trap of integration with China that would imperil Taiwan's democracy and internal sovereignty (meanwhile, Beijing fears that Taiwan's external sovereignty will grow as its participation in international organizations expands). The University of Wisconsin's Wang, whose analysis reflects the CCP's strategic views, writes ominously that Ma will eventually have to show his goodwill by scaling back Taiwan's arms purchases and acknowledging that reunification is an option in the long term. Wang is correct that Finlandization will not be free of costs for Taiwan. In particular, as was the case in Finland, Taipei will have to restrain anticommunist activism on the island and distance itself from the United States militarily.
Under much domestic pressure and possibly with the tacit consent of Beijing, Ma allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan in September 2009 to pray for the victims of the typhoon. But the same month he denied entry to the Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, citing national security concerns and the public interest. His official statement on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre -- with its delicate reference to a "painful chapter in history" that "must be faced," as similar dark moments in Taiwan's history had to be -- was classic Finlandized diplomacy. For Ma, the Tiananmen anniversary was a reminder to "both sides to spur each other to make further improvements in the area of human rights." A similarly tendentious, if ultimately fruitful, moral equivalence on the part of Finnish leaders is what brought the Soviets to Helsinki to talk about human rights.
For now, domestic opposition to Ma's policy is muted. Most controversies on the island concern how to pursue integration with China, not whether to do so. The risks of political dependence on China seem worth it to most Taiwanese, especially given the island's current political dependence on the United States. And Taiwan's youth, in particular, see China as an opportunity rather than a threat. For the DPP to regain power, it will have to embrace this pragmatic consensus on China. The days of the DPP's "just say no" platform on China are over.
Just as Ma must consider the views of the electorate, he must also take into account the reactions of other Asian states. Taiwan could still alienate other Asian nations if it shifted to a more China-centered, Finlandized approach, but this is unlikely because it is exactly what ASEAN has been promoting among its members for ten years or more through its "ASEAN + 3" and ASEAN Regional Forum initiatives. The theory of Finlandization may highlight the uniqueness of Taiwan's situation, but a similar logic already informs policymaking in other Asian capitals. South Korea has been taking a similar tack, and many neighboring nations believe that China can be pacified, as Vietnam was, through inclusion and cooperation. Even Japan, which feels itself to be more vulnerable than other Asian countries to China's rise as a naval power, has an interest in encouraging internal reforms in China and might learn from Taiwan's example. After all, West Germany's successful Ostpolitik, which led to a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970, built on the lessons of Finland's accommodation with the Soviet Union.
Far from seeking to alienate other Asian governments, then, the KMT government believes that Taiwan's international status will be enhanced if Taipei falls in step with its neighbors' preferred methods of dealing with a rising China -- through accommodation, socialization, and communication.
OUT OF ORBIT 脫軌
The Finlandization of Taiwan will, of course, pose major challenges to current U.S. policy. An April 2009 Congressional Research Service report recognized this dilemma by asking how Washington ought to react "if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRC." Opinions in Washington are divided between two realist camps. The first wants to allow the changes to proceed so that, in the words of Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Taiwan does not become a "strategic liability" to the United States. The second wants to rearm Taiwan so that, in the words of Dennis Blair, the U.S. national intelligence director, Taiwan is not "so defenseless that it feels that it has to do everything that China says." Neither camp seems to accept, much less endorse, the liberal logic of Finlandization as an alternative security strategy for Taiwan.
Taiwan has played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s -- first it served as a buffer against communist expansion out of North Korea, and more recently it has been a bulwark against a rising China. It is strategically located along East Asian shipping lanes and could provide another naval resupply site if China continues to limit U.S. naval visits to Hong Kong. Keeping Taiwan within the U.S. orbit has served Washington's interests by demonstrating that the United States will continue to engage in Asia, despite talk of a declining U.S. role in the region. The tragic result of this policy, however, has been that it has played into Beijing's fears of encirclement and naval inferiority, which in turn has prompted China's own military buildup.
Finlandization will allow Taiwan to break this cycle by taking itself out of the game and moderating the security dilemma that haunts the Washington-Beijing relationship. The cross-strait freeze of 1995-2005 raised fears in Washington that Taiwan was becoming a strategic liability for the United States. Ma's policies have momentarily resolved that concern. And if the United States uses the current opportunity to adjust its own policies and support the détente, that concern could be rendered moot. This would make future provocations by either side less likely.
Taipei's decision to chart a new course is a godsend for a U.S. administration that increasingly needs China's cooperation in achieving its highest priority: maintaining the peaceful international liberal order. The United States requires Beijing's support on a host of pressing world issues -- from climate change to financial stability and nuclear nonproliferation. William Stanton, Washington's de facto ambassador to Taiwan, admitted as much in October 2009, declaring that "it's in everybody's interests, including Taiwan's as well, that the U.S. try to have a cooperative relationship with China."
In recent years, the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship has been increasingly dictated by the interests of narrow lobbies rather than grand strategy. The U.S. arms industry, the Taiwanese military, and Taiwanese independence activists together make a formidable force. Before the current détente, Taiwan's staunch anticommunism and adversarial policy toward China aligned well with Washington's own ideology and militarized approach to the Taiwan Strait. But the recent evolution of tactical and strategic thinking in Taipei and Beijing has created a disjuncture. The adversarial status quo that the United States has protected is no longer the status quo that the Taiwanese want protected.
進年來,台美關係逐漸由少數利益團體遊說取代整體策略. 美國的國防工業,台灣的軍隊,以及獨派活動人士共同形成一股可觀的力量. 在現在的和解出現之前,台灣反共以及仇中的立場與華府的意識形態以及應派一致. 但是近來台北與北京關係改善形成台美間(立場)的分裂. 台灣已經不是當初依賴美國保護的以維現狀的台灣了!
Obviously, if Ma were to compromise Taiwan's democratic institutions in pursuit of détente with China, Washington would have reason to complain. But if a democratic Taiwan continues to move into China's orbit, Washington should follow the lead of the Taiwanese people in redefining their future. In the past, U.S. "noninterference" meant maintaining the balance of power across the strait and challenging Beijing's provocations. Today, it means reducing the militarization of the conflict and not interfering with Taiwan's Finlandization.
很明顯的,如果馬政府犧牲台灣民主體制作為與中國和解的交換,美國政府大有立場抱怨.但是,如果一個民主的台灣繼續在往中國的軌道上邁進,華府則應該順從台灣人民重新定義台灣自己的將來. 在過去,美國的不干預政策指的是兩岸抗衡. 在今天,不干預政策代表減少軍事衝突,並且減少干預台灣的芬蘭化.
Even from a strictly realist perspective, there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit, given that U.S. military security can be attained through other Asian bases and operations. Taiwan's Finlandization should be seen not as a necessary sacrifice to a rising China but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China. Washington should drop its zero-sum view of the Taipei-Beijing relationship and embrace the strategic logic underlying the rapprochement -- in effect "losing China" a second time by allowing Taiwan to drift into the PRC's sphere of influence.
即使是從最務實的角度來看,美國實在沒有必要把台灣放在它的戰略部局裡,美國大可以藉由它在亞洲的其他軍事基地達到美國的安全. 台灣芬蘭化實在不是用來對抗興起中國所必須付出的犧牲,相反的,台灣的芬蘭化反而可以藉此安撫中國. 華府已經放棄它過去的"零和"看法,轉而取代的是與中國共存的想法--美國不想再次在對台影響上輸給中國.
Ma told a visiting congressional delegation in August 2009 that his détente would be "beneficial to all parties concerned." He is right. As was the case with Finland and the Soviet Union, Taiwan has an inherent interest in a peaceful and democratic China. Washington needs to embrace this shift not only because it serves its own long-term strategic aims in Asia and globally but also because what the Taiwanese people choose to do with their sovereign democratic power is up to them.The overburdened giant should happily watch from a distance and focus on other pressing regional and global issues.
在2009年八月,馬英九告訴訪台的國會代表"和解讓所有相關人均受益".此話不差(他是對的).就如同芬蘭與俄羅斯的例子,台灣可以從一個和平與民主的中國中獲益. 華府必須擁抱這個位移不但是因為這符合美國本身在亞洲與在全球的長期戰略目標,更因為台灣人民有權對自己的主權依民主方式做出選擇. 這個已經負荷過度的巨人(按:指美國)應該樂於從距離之外見到這種發展,(這將有利美國)以便將焦點放在其他區域與全球議題上.
SIDELINING UNCLE SAM 與美國分道揚鑣
The United States has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted both strategically and diplomatically. Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the PRC's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei.
In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan -- a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit.
By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture.
The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations -- specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power.
Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift.
網路上有人貼出原文,我曾經試圖想翻譯全文後張貼在個人部落格,但實在太長,只翻了前面幾段還有中間偏後四段之後就放棄了. 現在把前面我自己翻的幾段連同原文對照貼出來如下.有空可能會慢慢再一段段翻,可能會從推銷芬蘭化(selling Finlandization)翻起(從我自己有興趣了解的翻起啦).
這裡有前1/3的翻譯,而這裡有關於芬蘭化的一些註解與後續評論.
1/13updated: 這裡有全文翻譯.(雖然我個人比較喜歡中英對照:P)
以下轉載.
-------
不再迫切的台海: 為什麼美國會從台灣芬蘭化中獲利
January/February 2010
Bruce Gilley
BRUCE GILLEY is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Portland State University's Mark O. Hatfield School of Government and the author of The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy.
Since 2005, Taiwan and China have been moving into a closer economic and political embrace -- a process that accelerated with the election of the pro-détente politician Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in 2008. This strengthening of relations presents the United States with its greatest challenge in the Taiwan Strait since 1979, when Washington severed ties with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
自從2005年以來,台灣與中國在經濟與政治上更加緊密結合,這個過程也因為馬英九當選後更為加速. 兩岸關係強化帶給美國自1979年台美斷交,美國(原文為"華盛頓")與中國建交以來最大的一次挑戰.
In many ways, the current thaw serves Taipei's interests, but it also allows Beijing to assert increasing influence over Taiwan. As a consensus emerges in Taiwan on establishing closer relations with China, the thaw is calling into question the United States' deeply ambiguous policy, which is supposed to serve both Taiwan's interests (by allowing it to retain its autonomy) and the United States' own (by guarding against an expansionist China). Washington now faces a stark choice: continue pursuing a militarized realist approach -- using Taiwan to balance the power of a rising China -- or follow an alternative liberal logic that seeks to promote long-term peace through closer economic, social, and political ties between Taiwan and China.
就很多方面來說,兩岸和解(thaw)符合台北的利益,但是和解的同時也讓北京對台灣有更大的影響力. 台灣內部的共識是強化與中國的關係,但此讓美國摩擬兩可的政策受到質疑:美國保衛台灣的自主性以對抗擴張主義的中國的政策使台美雙方都受益. 華府現在面對的是個嚴峻的選擇: 繼續強化軍事,利用台灣來與興起中的中國抗衡, 或是以更緊密的兩岸經濟,社會與政治連結來達到長遠之和平. (註:大抵就是鷹派與鴿派的選擇)
A TALE OF TWO DÉTENTES 雙合解記
After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities, led, respectively, by Chiang Kai-shek's defeated nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and Mao Zedong's victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For nearly three decades, Chiang and Mao harbored rival claims to the whole territory of China. Gradually, most of the international community came to accept Beijing's claims to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and a special role in its foreign relations. By 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China, 69 percent of the United Nations' member states had already severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of relations with China.
中國內戰止於1949年,那之後台灣與中國成為兩個政治實體,分別由戰敗的蔣介石率領國民黨與戰勝的毛澤東代表的中國共產黨統治兩岸. 近三十年來, 蔣介石與毛澤東都將對方之領土視為自己領土之一部份(儘管實際上只對台灣或只對中國得以行使主權.)漸漸的,大部分的國際社會接受北京視台灣為中國一部份的這種說法. 到了1972年,尼克森拜訪中國時, 百分之六十九的聯合國會員國都已經與台灣斷絕外交關係,紛紛與中國建交.
The United States, which had merely "acknowledged" Beijing's claim to Taiwan, was slow to recognize the People's Republic of China due to Washington's historical ties with the KMT, dating back to World War II and its conflict with the PRC during the Korean War. The strategic position of Taiwan, astride western Pacific sea and air lanes, gave it added importance. But by 1979, even Washington had recognized Beijing. That same year, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in order to ensure continued legal, commercial, and de facto diplomatic relations with the island. At the last minute, Senate Republicans -- along with several Democrats who worried that President Jimmy Carter was disregarding Taiwan's security -- amended the legislation to include promises of arms sales to Taipei and a broader U.S. commitment to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" against the island.
基於華府與國民黨的歷史可追溯至二次大戰與韓戰期間中(共)美衝突的淵源，美國很晚才承認北京對台灣的宣示,也很晚才承認中華人民共和國。台灣的戰略地位，佔據西太平洋的海空航線要衝，使其更加重要。但是到了1979年，連華府也承認中國政權了。同年，美國實施了台灣關係法以確保維持法律、商業與實質外交關係。在最後一刻，參院共和黨員──加上幾個擔心卡特總統忽視台灣安全的民主黨員──修改法案，包括承諾對台軍售與美國擴大承諾「抵抗任何武力方式或其他形式的脅迫」。
The fading of the Chiang-Mao rivalry, which subsided after both leaders died in the mid-1970s, coupled with Beijing's new inward-looking focus on economic development, made these military commitments appear anachronistic during the 1980s. Beijing ended its shelling of the Taiwanese islands off the Chinese coast and welcomed Taiwanese "compatriots" to the mainland for tourism, investment, and family reunification. Taiwan's native-born president, Lee Teng-hui, who came to power in 1988, had no interest in "retaking the mainland" and approved the creation of such exchanges. In 1993, the heads of the two governments' cross-strait contact groups held their first direct talks, in Singapore.
This "first détente" ended abruptly in 1995, when the United States issued a visa for Lee to visit Cornell University. China, in the midst of a domestic leadership transition, was already hardening its position on Taiwan, and armchair generals in all three places were publishing books on the predicted order of battle to come. Beijing saw the visa as a betrayal of earlier U.S. promises to refrain from any official relations with Taiwanese leaders. Taiwan's democratization was also leading to domestic popular pressures for a more assertive stance on independence. Beijing reacted by hurling missiles into the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. Washington dispatched aircraft carriers and radar ships to the area. Beijing's worst fears were then realized in 2000, when Taiwanese citizens elected Chen Shui-bian as their president. Chen, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), now the opposition, promised to seek formal recognition of Taiwan's de facto independence from China. As a consequence, cross-strait relations deteriorated dramatically between 1995 and 2005, leading to a renewed emphasis on militarization by all three sides.
The damage wrought by this "second freeze" led to serious rethinking in all three capitals. Beijing worried that its aggressive posture on Taiwan was threatening its broader influence in Asia, as other nations rallied behind the U.S. security shield; Taipei began to reevaluate the value of its symbolic assertions of nationhood; and Washington began to question its unlimited commitment to an increasingly troublesome Taiwan, which threatened to damage, if not destroy, its more important relationship with China. By the end of George W. Bush's first term, Washington had become the main check on Taipei's assertions of independence.
The "second détente" in cross-strait relations began with a 2005 speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao downplaying demands for reunification. Beijing was shifting its view as a result of an emerging grand strategy that stressed regional and global influence; accordingly, it came to see Taiwan less as an ideologically charged and urgent matter and more as a pragmatic and low-key management issue. Ma's election in 2008 signaled the resurgence of a similar vision in Taiwan. He promised "no unification, no independence, no use of force." Within months, in rapid and unprecedented fashion, the heads of the contact groups began holding semiannual meetings and signed more than two dozen previously unthinkable agreements. Although most of these involved economic matters, they had political implications, too. The number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan -- including Taiwan's long-militarized islands directly off the coast of China -- surged by a factor of ten, to 3,000 per day. China sent students to Taiwan, and the two sides authorized 270 flights per week across the strait. Important political fears that had previously restricted economic integration suddenly dissipated on both sides, and Taipei and Beijing began talking about the "total normalization" of their economic and financial ties. The supposedly fixed national interests on which foreign policy realists base their assessments were in total flux.
The second détente has also included explicitly political deals. China had previously permitted Taiwan to participate only in international organizations with an economic focus, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization. In 2009, it allowed Taiwan to participate as an observer at the annual board meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. Both sides began discussing a Taiwanese presence in the UN bodies responsible for civil aviation, commercial shipping, meteorology, and climate change.
Both sides also tacitly agreed to a "diplomatic truce": Beijing ceased courting the nations on Taiwan's dwindling list of 23 diplomatic allies, and in 2009 Taipei dropped its perpetual request for UN membership for the first time in 17 years. When Ma was reelected as KMT chair in July 2009, Hu declared that he would like to build "mutual trust between the two sides in political affairs." As political relations warmed, Taiwanese officials -- including leading DPP figures, such as the mayor of Kaohsiung -- became regular visitors in China.
There are indications that this second cross-straits détente will last. Although both leaders' terms will expire in 2012, Hu's designated successor, Xi Jinping, is a well-known advocate of cross-strait exchanges. Ma, meanwhile, has recovered from the political damage wrought by Typhoon Morakot, which struck the island in August 2009. So long as the DPP remains divided between extreme anti-détente and limited-détente factions, he seems likely to win reelection.
Taiwan and China are now approaching their relationship using completely different assumptions than those that governed cross-strait relations for decades. Whereas they previously saw the relationship as a military dispute, today both sides have embraced a view of security that is premised on high-level contact, trust, and reduced threats of force. Their views of economic issues, meanwhile, have placed global integration and competitiveness ahead of nationalist protectionism. This represents a fundamental shift in the political relationship between Taiwan and China.
FROM HELSINKI TO TAIPEI 從赫爾辛基到台北
To understand the evolution of the Taipei-Beijing relationship, it is useful to consider the theory and practice of what has become known as "Finlandization" in the field of political science. The term derives its name from Finland's 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join alliances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for any country challenging Soviet interests. In return, the Kremlin agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and respect Finland's democratic system. Therefore, from 1956 to 1981, under the leadership of President Urho Kekkonen, Finland pursued a policy of strategic appeasement and neutrality on U.S.-Soviet issues and limited domestic criticism of the Soviet Union. This policy enjoyed wide support in Finland at the time (despite the subsequent debate in Finland on its merits). Kekkonen also won praise across the political spectrum in the United States, especially from foreign policy realists such as George Kennan, who lauded the Finnish leader's "composure and firmness."
要了解兩岸關係的演變不妨參考日後政治學領域所謂 "芬蘭化"的理論與實務。這個名稱源自芬蘭在1948年與蘇聯的協議，據此赫爾辛基同意不加入挑戰莫斯科的聯盟或擔任任何挑戰蘇聯利益的國家的基地. 引以回報的是克里姆林宮同意維護芬蘭自治並尊重芬蘭的民主制度.因此，1956到1981年，在Urho Kekkonen總統領導下，芬蘭在美蘇議題上追求戰略綏靖與中立政策，限制國內對蘇聯的批評.當時這個政策在芬蘭廣受支持,雖然後續對成效的爭議也不斷.
Building on the work of others, the Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen in 1988proposed a general theory of Finlandization known as "adaptive politics." Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make. Unlike a puppet regime, a Finlandized state calculates that its long-term interests, and perhaps those of its neighbors, are best served by making strategic concessions to a superpower next door. These concessions are motivated chiefly by geographic proximity, psychological threats from the superpower, and cultural affinities between the two sides. Being so close, the superpower need only issue vague threats, rather than display actual military muscle, to change its weaker neighbor's policies. Meanwhile, the small power perceives itself as engaging in an "active and principled neutrality," rather than a cowering acquiescence, a distinction that is critical to rationalizing these policy changes domestically.
丹麥政治學者Mouritzen在1988年根據其他學者的研究提出芬蘭化的理論,指稱芬蘭化是種"適應性政治".Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.不像其他魁儡政權,經過精打細算後,一個芬蘭化的邦國的長期利益,甚至可能是強權鄰國的利益,最能夠從對強權讓步中獲得.這個讓步的主要動機在於對於鄰國強權的心裡恐懼與兩者文化上的緊密連結. 因為兩者如此緊密,超級強權僅需模糊的威脅,而不需實際的軍事展現,就已經足以改變鄰近小國的政治.同時,這個小國體認到"積極地,原則性的中立"明顯有異於畏縮的默認,因此得以在國內(domestically)合理化這種讓步強權的政策.
Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion. Even if one rejects the theory of Finlandization, it is difficult to deny that Kekkonen played a constructive role in ending the Cold War. In 1969, for instance, Finland offered itself as the venue for a conference between the two blocs that eventually produced a shared document with clear commitments to human rights and freedoms: the Helsinki accords.
芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大.即使有人拒絕芬蘭化的理論,也很難否定Kekkonen在結束冷戰中扮演一個建設性的角色. 例如在1969年,芬蘭讓自己成為兩方(按:指北約/美國與蘇聯)會談的管道(venue),進而讓雙方都承諾人權與自由--簽署赫爾辛基條約.
Cold War historians, such as John Lewis Gaddis, believe that the Helsinki process was central to undermining the moral authority of the Soviet Union, and others have argued that it prompted the ideological shift necessary to kickstart Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the mid-1980s. Moreover, Finland's unique status as interlocutor with Moscow made possible the first serious discussions of nuclear disarmament and of the shared development of Arctic resources, both of which served as templates for the warming of relations between NATO and the Soviet bloc. Although it usually has a negative connotation, "Finlandization" need not be a pejorative term.
冷戰歷史學家如John Lewis Gaddis相信芬蘭化(Helsinki process)對於崩解蘇聯權威居功厥偉,其他冷戰歷史學家則主張芬蘭化有助於1980年代中期Gorbachev對蘇聯的改革與意識形態的轉變.尤有甚者,芬蘭成為一個獨特的,與蘇聯對話者的狀態促成首次針對解除武裝的對談,也使得北約會員國之間得討論資源共享,並緩和北約會員國與蘇聯間的緊張關係. 雖然有負面意涵,"芬蘭化"不必是個輕蔑的詞彙. (註:作者也承認芬蘭化含有負面意涵,卻還鼓吹台灣芬蘭化,嗯,這交由讀者去判斷.)
Taiwan shares many of the key features that characterized Finland in the late 1940s. It is a small but internally sovereign state that is geographically close to a superpower with which it shares cultural and historical ties. Its fierce sense of independence is balanced by a pragmatic sense of the need to accommodate that superpower's vital interests. Most important, the evolving views of its leaders and its people today focus on seeking security through integration rather than confrontation. This approach could help defuse one of the most worrying trends in global politics: the emerging rivalry between China and the United States.
台灣和1940年代晚期的芬蘭在很多方面都類似. 它是個小但是主權獨立的邦國(按:英文上state,country,nation意義不甚相同,但是翻成中文幾乎都一樣翻成"國家".在此我姑且翻成邦國,若不恰當歡迎指教,謝謝!),地理上鄰近一個超級強權而又與此超級強權有文化上與歷史上的連結. 它強烈的獨立意識與務實的意識相互平衡以因應超級強權的利益.最重要的,隨著領導者與人民的觀念的遞嬗,今日的焦點著重於透過整合,而非衝撞,以追求安全.這種方式或可去除國際政治上對中美(兩個超級強權)對峙的疑慮. (註:這有一個很大的差異,台灣如果真正的真芬蘭化,台灣必須是主權獨立的邦國,不只是實際上更必須在法理上都是一個獨立的邦國.在上面所附的連結當中有一篇就提到台灣是獨立國家這個重點)
The analogy is not perfect. U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan today are more explicit than they were for Finland during the Cold War, although few doubt that NATO would have defended Finland against a Soviet invasion. And China's 1,000-plus missiles targeted at Taiwan are a more direct threat than anything the Soviet military ever mustered across the Vuoksi River. But in general the thinking that has motivated the second détente on both sides parallels that which led to the Finnish-Soviet détente of the Cold War. Although it is still early, Taipei is moving in the direction of eventual Finlandization.
這個類比當然並不完美.美國對台灣安全的保證遠比冷戰當時對芬蘭的保障來得明確,雖然少數質疑北約會保衛芬蘭以對抗蘇聯的入侵.而且,中國以超過一千枚飛彈對準台灣的威脅遠比蘇聯軍隊從未屯集於Vuoksi河畔來得更直接. 但整體而言,促使兩岸第二次和解的想法與芬蘭與蘇聯在冷戰時間的想法如出一轍.雖然為時尚早,台北已經逐步邁向芬蘭化.
Under such a scenario, Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power, rather than a U.S. strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing's fears about the island's becoming an obstacle to China's military and commercial ambitions in the region. It would also refrain from undermining the CCP's rule in China. In return, Beijing would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei expanded participation in international organizations, and extend the island favorable economic and social benefits.
在這種情況下,台灣會重新定位自己為中立國,而不是美國的戰略伙伴,以化解北京視台灣為中國在亞洲軍事與商業崛起的障礙. 它也必須節制不能妨礙中國共產黨在中國的執政.(相對的,)北京必須以解除軍事威脅,給予台北參予國際組織,擴展台灣經濟與社會利益做為回報.
The DPP's director of international affairs, Hsiao Bi-khim, has written that the changes in Taiwan's China policy "are leading to a new strategic outlook, which aligns Taiwan with China's sphere of influence instead of maintaining the traditional presumed informal alliance with the United States." Although Hsiao, like many in the DPP, fears this sort of shift, such reservations are unwarranted.
民進黨的國際事務部主任蕭美琴曾經撰文指出台灣的中國政策"正帶領一個新的策略觀點,那是個台灣與中國影響力結盟,而非傳統與美國非正式聯盟的觀點."雖然蕭美琴,和許多民進黨員一樣,對此轉換感到恐懼而有所保留,但這種保留毫無根據.
A MEANS OR AN END? 是手段還是目的?
There are two ways to view the shift in Chinese policy toward Taiwan. The dominant interpretation has long been that Beijing is motivated by nationalism and that the PRC's irredentist claims to Taiwan stem from a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness. According to this view, the CCP is striving to reincorporate Taiwan into China in order to avert a domestic nationalist backlash and a crisis of legitimacy. Seen in this light, Taiwan is an end unto itself and the second détente is merely a tactical shift intended to force Taiwan into reunification through indirect means: beneath Beijing's silk glove of détente is the iron fist of nationalism.
In recent years, many Western analysts have rejected this nationalist interpretation of Beijing's Taiwan policy and opted instead for a geostrategic one. Unrecovered territories are legion in the history of the PRC, and the CCP has found it easy to let go of others (including disputed regions bordering Russia, India, and the Spratly Islands, as well as control over Mongolia and Korea). Taiwan, however, by virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential strategic threat to China. It could serve as a base for foreign military operations against China and even in peacetime could constrain Beijing's ability to develop and project naval power and ensure maritime security in East Asia.
Beijing's core goal from this perspective is the preservation of its dominance in its immediate offshore region, as became clear in 2009 when five Chinese vessels trailed a U.S. Navy ship sailing near a Chinese submarine base. Taiwan represents an obstacle to this goal if it remains a U.S. strategic ally armed with advanced U.S. weaponry, but not if it becomes a self-defending and neutral state with close economic and political ties to China. Beijing's constantly changing position on Taiwan -- which has incrementally moderated from "liberation" to "peaceful unification" to "one China" to "anti-independence" since Mao's era -- in fact reflects a concern with Taiwan's geostrategic status, not with the precise nature of its political ties to China. According to this interpretation, Beijing has no interest in occupying or ruling Taiwan; it simply wants a sphere of influence that increases its global clout and in which Taiwan is a neutral state, not a client state. Seen through this lens, Taiwan is a means to an end and the second détente is a tactic intended to achieve this strategic objective through Taiwan's Finlandization.
China's recent behavior confirms this view; Beijing's decision to allow Taiwan to participate in the WHO represents a cool-headed understanding that giving Taiwan a greater international voice could enhance its independence from the United States, which would, in turn, serve China's own interests. It also gives Beijing an opportunity to show that a China-dominated Asia need not be less peaceful, less prosperous, or even less democratic. As the Chinese scholar Jianwei Wang of the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point puts it, "Beijing views the Taiwan issue and cross-straits relations as an integral part of China's comprehensive 'rise' in world affairs rather than as an isolated issue purely affecting national pride alone."
Recent survey data lends credence to this argument. The mainland citizens polled by Horizon Research in 2004 were not particularly nationalist about retaking Taiwan -- only 15 percent wanted immediate military action, whereas 58 percent believed that the government should rule out the use of force in favor of economic integration. In a 2008 speech, Hu identified "political antagonism," rather than political separation, as the problem in cross-straits relations, breaking with previous pronouncements from Beijing. Subsequent policy statements by the CCP have revealed a calm confidence in the shifting geostrategic relationship with Taiwan, not a bombastic nationalist urgency for reunification.
THE PACIFIER 安撫
In 1995, at the end of the first détente, Chen-shen Yen, a Taiwanese scholar and KMT adviser, wrote a paper in the Taiwanese political journalWenti yu Yanjiu explicitly extolling the logic of Finlandization (or fenlanhua in Chinese) for Taiwan. By seeking Beijing's approval for an expanded international voice, maintaining a foreign policy that did not threaten China, and choosing leaders who enjoyed Beijing's trust, Yen argued, Taiwan could do more to protect its internal autonomy and economic prosperity than it could by challenging the rising superpower on its doorstep. Moreover, Taiwan's long-term interests in gaining true independence could only be achieved by democratization in China, which would be more likely if Taiwan avoided stoking a military or ideological confrontation. His conclusion echoed that of the Athenians in Thucydides' Melian dialogue: "Given the responsibility to protect its future existence," wrote Yen, "a civilized country should adjust itself to external realities." It has taken over a decade for Yen's prescient views to gain currency, but they now have widespread support.
Ma's pursuit of "total normalization" has enjoyed steady and rising popularity in Taiwan since he came to office. It reflects a view that the militarized approach to the cross-strait conflict that has dominated both Taiwanese (and U.S.) strategic thinking since the days of Chiang and Mao has not resolved the dispute and does not serve Taiwan's present needs. Just as Finland, a small country, was able to pioneer a nonmilitarized alternative to the Cold War, so, too, could Taiwan play that role in the brewing U.S.-Chinese cold war in Asia.
At present, a rising China threatens the world primarily because there has been little in the way of domestic political liberalization to keep Beijing's increasing economic and military power in check. Taiwan could play a far greater role in China's liberalization if it were to become a Finlandized part of the region and its officials were able to move across the strait even more freely than they do now. Already, prominent Chinese liberals, such as Zhang Boshu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are arguing that the mainland should draw lessons about political development from Taiwan. As Sheng Lijun of the National University of Singapore writes, "With the Taiwan political challenge, Beijing will sooner or later have to improve its governance (including democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption)." Taipei's experience with democratic reform offers many lessons for Beijing -- especially because the formerly authoritarian KMT's return to power in 2008 showed that the CCP could one day hope to rule again even if the advent of democracy initially brought another party to power.
Democratic reform in China will be encouraged both by popular pressure to emulate Taiwan (PRC citizens have already enthusiastically adopted Taiwanese pop culture and business practices) and by the brute necessity of managing the relationship in a way that meets the Taiwanese electorate's high expectations of transparency and accountability. Some may call it appeasement, but if Taiwan uses appeasement to democratize and pacify a rising China, it will be a worthy appeasement indeed.
SELLING FINLANDIZATION 推銷芬蘭化
Taiwan's continued progress toward Finlandization will depend on whether Ma can demonstrate the tangible benefits of this strategy to the Taiwanese population. He will have to secure an even greater international voice for Taiwan (for example, making its WHO observer status permanent), the ability to negotiate its own free-trade agreements, and the verified removal of some of the more than 1,000 Chinese missiles currently aimed at the island. Best of all would be a peace accord under which China renounced the use of force unless the island were invaded or achieved de jure independence. Such an accord, which both sides are seeking, would be the functional equivalent of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty, allaying the large power's security concerns while assuring the small power of its autonomy. Another potential benefit is a promised economic cooperation framework agreement within which Taiwan could pursue a free-trade agreement with Beijing; Taiwan currently risks becoming uncompetitive in the Chinese market and China-based supply chains as a result of the free-trade agreements between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.
Ma will also have to reassure Taiwanese voters, who fear losing their political freedoms. In Taiwan, there is a justified concern about being lured into a trap of integration with China that would imperil Taiwan's democracy and internal sovereignty (meanwhile, Beijing fears that Taiwan's external sovereignty will grow as its participation in international organizations expands). The University of Wisconsin's Wang, whose analysis reflects the CCP's strategic views, writes ominously that Ma will eventually have to show his goodwill by scaling back Taiwan's arms purchases and acknowledging that reunification is an option in the long term. Wang is correct that Finlandization will not be free of costs for Taiwan. In particular, as was the case in Finland, Taipei will have to restrain anticommunist activism on the island and distance itself from the United States militarily.
Under much domestic pressure and possibly with the tacit consent of Beijing, Ma allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan in September 2009 to pray for the victims of the typhoon. But the same month he denied entry to the Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, citing national security concerns and the public interest. His official statement on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre -- with its delicate reference to a "painful chapter in history" that "must be faced," as similar dark moments in Taiwan's history had to be -- was classic Finlandized diplomacy. For Ma, the Tiananmen anniversary was a reminder to "both sides to spur each other to make further improvements in the area of human rights." A similarly tendentious, if ultimately fruitful, moral equivalence on the part of Finnish leaders is what brought the Soviets to Helsinki to talk about human rights.
For now, domestic opposition to Ma's policy is muted. Most controversies on the island concern how to pursue integration with China, not whether to do so. The risks of political dependence on China seem worth it to most Taiwanese, especially given the island's current political dependence on the United States. And Taiwan's youth, in particular, see China as an opportunity rather than a threat. For the DPP to regain power, it will have to embrace this pragmatic consensus on China. The days of the DPP's "just say no" platform on China are over.
Just as Ma must consider the views of the electorate, he must also take into account the reactions of other Asian states. Taiwan could still alienate other Asian nations if it shifted to a more China-centered, Finlandized approach, but this is unlikely because it is exactly what ASEAN has been promoting among its members for ten years or more through its "ASEAN + 3" and ASEAN Regional Forum initiatives. The theory of Finlandization may highlight the uniqueness of Taiwan's situation, but a similar logic already informs policymaking in other Asian capitals. South Korea has been taking a similar tack, and many neighboring nations believe that China can be pacified, as Vietnam was, through inclusion and cooperation. Even Japan, which feels itself to be more vulnerable than other Asian countries to China's rise as a naval power, has an interest in encouraging internal reforms in China and might learn from Taiwan's example. After all, West Germany's successful Ostpolitik, which led to a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970, built on the lessons of Finland's accommodation with the Soviet Union.
Far from seeking to alienate other Asian governments, then, the KMT government believes that Taiwan's international status will be enhanced if Taipei falls in step with its neighbors' preferred methods of dealing with a rising China -- through accommodation, socialization, and communication.
OUT OF ORBIT 脫軌
The Finlandization of Taiwan will, of course, pose major challenges to current U.S. policy. An April 2009 Congressional Research Service report recognized this dilemma by asking how Washington ought to react "if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRC." Opinions in Washington are divided between two realist camps. The first wants to allow the changes to proceed so that, in the words of Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Taiwan does not become a "strategic liability" to the United States. The second wants to rearm Taiwan so that, in the words of Dennis Blair, the U.S. national intelligence director, Taiwan is not "so defenseless that it feels that it has to do everything that China says." Neither camp seems to accept, much less endorse, the liberal logic of Finlandization as an alternative security strategy for Taiwan.
Taiwan has played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s -- first it served as a buffer against communist expansion out of North Korea, and more recently it has been a bulwark against a rising China. It is strategically located along East Asian shipping lanes and could provide another naval resupply site if China continues to limit U.S. naval visits to Hong Kong. Keeping Taiwan within the U.S. orbit has served Washington's interests by demonstrating that the United States will continue to engage in Asia, despite talk of a declining U.S. role in the region. The tragic result of this policy, however, has been that it has played into Beijing's fears of encirclement and naval inferiority, which in turn has prompted China's own military buildup.
Finlandization will allow Taiwan to break this cycle by taking itself out of the game and moderating the security dilemma that haunts the Washington-Beijing relationship. The cross-strait freeze of 1995-2005 raised fears in Washington that Taiwan was becoming a strategic liability for the United States. Ma's policies have momentarily resolved that concern. And if the United States uses the current opportunity to adjust its own policies and support the détente, that concern could be rendered moot. This would make future provocations by either side less likely.
Taipei's decision to chart a new course is a godsend for a U.S. administration that increasingly needs China's cooperation in achieving its highest priority: maintaining the peaceful international liberal order. The United States requires Beijing's support on a host of pressing world issues -- from climate change to financial stability and nuclear nonproliferation. William Stanton, Washington's de facto ambassador to Taiwan, admitted as much in October 2009, declaring that "it's in everybody's interests, including Taiwan's as well, that the U.S. try to have a cooperative relationship with China."
In recent years, the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship has been increasingly dictated by the interests of narrow lobbies rather than grand strategy. The U.S. arms industry, the Taiwanese military, and Taiwanese independence activists together make a formidable force. Before the current détente, Taiwan's staunch anticommunism and adversarial policy toward China aligned well with Washington's own ideology and militarized approach to the Taiwan Strait. But the recent evolution of tactical and strategic thinking in Taipei and Beijing has created a disjuncture. The adversarial status quo that the United States has protected is no longer the status quo that the Taiwanese want protected.
進年來,台美關係逐漸由少數利益團體遊說取代整體策略. 美國的國防工業,台灣的軍隊,以及獨派活動人士共同形成一股可觀的力量. 在現在的和解出現之前,台灣反共以及仇中的立場與華府的意識形態以及應派一致. 但是近來台北與北京關係改善形成台美間(立場)的分裂. 台灣已經不是當初依賴美國保護的以維現狀的台灣了!
Obviously, if Ma were to compromise Taiwan's democratic institutions in pursuit of détente with China, Washington would have reason to complain. But if a democratic Taiwan continues to move into China's orbit, Washington should follow the lead of the Taiwanese people in redefining their future. In the past, U.S. "noninterference" meant maintaining the balance of power across the strait and challenging Beijing's provocations. Today, it means reducing the militarization of the conflict and not interfering with Taiwan's Finlandization.
很明顯的,如果馬政府犧牲台灣民主體制作為與中國和解的交換,美國政府大有立場抱怨.但是,如果一個民主的台灣繼續在往中國的軌道上邁進,華府則應該順從台灣人民重新定義台灣自己的將來. 在過去,美國的不干預政策指的是兩岸抗衡. 在今天,不干預政策代表減少軍事衝突,並且減少干預台灣的芬蘭化.
Even from a strictly realist perspective, there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit, given that U.S. military security can be attained through other Asian bases and operations. Taiwan's Finlandization should be seen not as a necessary sacrifice to a rising China but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China. Washington should drop its zero-sum view of the Taipei-Beijing relationship and embrace the strategic logic underlying the rapprochement -- in effect "losing China" a second time by allowing Taiwan to drift into the PRC's sphere of influence.
即使是從最務實的角度來看,美國實在沒有必要把台灣放在它的戰略部局裡,美國大可以藉由它在亞洲的其他軍事基地達到美國的安全. 台灣芬蘭化實在不是用來對抗興起中國所必須付出的犧牲,相反的,台灣的芬蘭化反而可以藉此安撫中國. 華府已經放棄它過去的"零和"看法,轉而取代的是與中國共存的想法--美國不想再次在對台影響上輸給中國.
Ma told a visiting congressional delegation in August 2009 that his détente would be "beneficial to all parties concerned." He is right. As was the case with Finland and the Soviet Union, Taiwan has an inherent interest in a peaceful and democratic China. Washington needs to embrace this shift not only because it serves its own long-term strategic aims in Asia and globally but also because what the Taiwanese people choose to do with their sovereign democratic power is up to them.The overburdened giant should happily watch from a distance and focus on other pressing regional and global issues.
在2009年八月,馬英九告訴訪台的國會代表"和解讓所有相關人均受益".此話不差(他是對的).就如同芬蘭與俄羅斯的例子,台灣可以從一個和平與民主的中國中獲益. 華府必須擁抱這個位移不但是因為這符合美國本身在亞洲與在全球的長期戰略目標,更因為台灣人民有權對自己的主權依民主方式做出選擇. 這個已經負荷過度的巨人(按:指美國)應該樂於從距離之外見到這種發展,(這將有利美國)以便將焦點放在其他區域與全球議題上.
SIDELINING UNCLE SAM 與美國分道揚鑣
The United States has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted both strategically and diplomatically. Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the PRC's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei.
In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan -- a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit.
By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture.
The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations -- specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power.
Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)