Freedom House rates Taiwan free
Publication Date：01/13/2010
Source： Taiwan Today
The U.S.-based human rights organization Freedom House released its 2010 Freedom in the World report Jan. 12, listing Taiwan as one of the freest countries enjoying a high degree of political rights and civil liberties.
總部在美國的人權組織自由之家在一月十二日發佈2010年世界各國自由程度的報告,報告中指出台灣是世界上最自由的國家之一,享有高度的政治權利與公民自由. (按:關於台灣的排名請見第11頁)
According to the report, which rates 194 countries in political freedoms on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the freest and 7 the least freest, Taiwan is ranked on par with South Korea and Japan overall as the freest in Asia-Pacific where modest improvements were seen. This is the 14th running year that Taiwan qualifies as a free country in the annual study.
報告將194個國家在政治自由區分為一到七級,一代表最自由,七是最不自由. 台灣和南韓日本在整體排名上相同,而亞太區域是自由程度改善最多的區域. 這是台灣連續14年來在年度報告中被評為自由國家.
While Taiwan’s overall ranking remains unchanged from last year’s, it registers both gains and losses. In individual categories, its political rights rating improved from 2 in 2009 findings to 1 “due to enforcement of anticorruption laws that led to the prosecution of former high-ranking officials, the annulment of several legislators’ elections owing to vote-buying, and the investigation of over 200 candidates for alleged vote-buying in local elections.”
雖然台灣整體排名維持與去年一樣,兩個指標卻是各有進退. 在政治權利方面,"因為執行反貪污法律,台灣從去年的二級進步到一級, 有數位前朝高官被起訴,還有數位立委因賄選而當選無效,在地方選舉時,有超過兩百位候選人遭到買票的指控. "
On civil liberties, however, the report indicates Taiwan’s rating suffered a decline from 1 to 2 because of “flaws in the protection of criminal defendants’ rights that were exposed during anticorruption prosecutions and a high-profile murder case, as well as a law that infringes on academic freedom by barring staff and scholars at public educational facilities from participating in certain political activities.”
然而在公民自由方面,報導指出台灣的排名降級,從第一級降到第二級,因為"在貪污嫌疑犯的案件以及一個謀殺案裡被告的權力保障有瑕疵,同時,因為禁止公務員與學者參予特定政治活動,學術自由受到侵害"
Among the states being reviewed in the report this year, 89 countries were listed as “free,” 58 “partly free” while 47 were ranked “not free." The report concluded that some 2.3 billion people, or 24 percent of the world’s population, are currently living in societies disrespecting basic political rights and civil liberties, with more than half of the population residing in China.
A total of 10 countries and territories received ratings of 6 and 7—or 7 and 6—for political rights and civil liberties, respectively. They are Belarus, Chad, China, Cuba, Guinea, Laos, Saudi Arabia, South Ossetia, Syria and Western Sahara.
Arch Puddington, director of research at Freedom House, noted in the 2010 report that the world continues to see a continued erosion of freedom, with setbacks in Latin America, Africa, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East.
This is also the fourth consecutive year that the organization has seen more declines than gains, Puddington said, citing growing restrictions on freedom of expression and association in authoritarian settings, and a failure to continue democratic progress in previously improving countries due to “unchecked corruption and weakness in the rule of law.”
Under the Freedom House definitions, a “free” country is one where there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. A “partly free” state normally suffers from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the façade of limited pluralism.
A “not free” country is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied. (SY)
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Extended reading: Freedom House warns on rights in Taiwan「自由之家」對台灣人權狀況提出示警
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Official Google Blog: A new approach to China
延伸閱讀:
紐時對google新聞的報導
Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China
------
Official Google Blog: A new approach to China
1/12/2010 03:00:00 PM
Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident--albeit a significant one--was something quite different.
First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses--including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors--have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users' computers.
We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve's blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China's economic reform programs and its citizens' entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that "we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China."
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered--combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web--have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
紐時對google新聞的報導
Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China
------
Official Google Blog: A new approach to China
1/12/2010 03:00:00 PM
Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident--albeit a significant one--was something quite different.
First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses--including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors--have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users' computers.
We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve's blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China's economic reform programs and its citizens' entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that "we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China."
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered--combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web--have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
Monday, January 11, 2010
[轉載]GIO’s response misses the point (新聞局對第五號公開信的回函避重就輕) (updated,含更多翻譯)
這是在閱讀蘇俊賓的第五號回函後其中一個署名學者,Kagan,針對第五號回函的回應.文中明確指出馬政府避重就輕,或是誤用或是引用不相關資料來為自己辯駁(Su defends his government’s policies through misuse of documents and through the use of irrelevant documents.).
延伸閱讀:
國際學者給台灣政府的第五封公開信與新聞局的回函
------
GIO’s response misses the point
By Richard Kagan
Friday, Dec 25, 2009, Page 8
Last Friday I received an e-mail from Government Information Office (GIO) Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) responding to “Open letter to Taiwan’s president” (Nov. 13, page 8), which I signed with many other academics. This was one of a series of letters we have written concerning Taiwan’s eroding democratic freedoms, judicial systems and international relations. Su has responded in detail to the previous letters by defending the operations of the government with regard to the judicial system, and President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) democratic reforms and policies.
上週五,我收到一封由台灣新聞局長蘇俊賓發出,回覆我參予連署的第五號公開信的電子郵件(第五號公開信日期是2009年11月13日),那是封給台灣政府一系列的公開信的其中一封.這系列公開信事關我們對台灣民主自由倒退,司法體系傾斜,國際關係緊張的憂慮. 蘇先生詳細回覆第五號公開信裡,替馬政府辯駁並強調馬政府對司法與民主改革的決心.
But this time, Su wanted to justify and praise Taiwan’s system by referring to the “international community’s assessments” on these matters. His attempt to defend Taiwan by using international standards actually backfired in several ways.
然而,蘇引用國際評等來誇讚台灣體系的作法,就很多方面來講,會收到相反的成效.(按:詳見第五封公開信的回函.蘇企圖引用特定機構的數據來辯駁)
Let me explain in some detail why I question the minister’s research and the professionalism of the GIO.
以下讓我詳敘我為什麼對新聞局的研究與專業有所質疑.
First, Su uses faulty methodology to prove his point by not providing a context for his argument. He correctly points out that Freedom House ranks Taiwan among the “free” countries of Asia. In the combined ratings of Political and Civil Liberties, Taiwan scores 1.5. This puts it with Israel, Japan and South Korea. The rank of No. 1 is filled mainly by European countries as well as the US and Canada. What he fails to note is that China is scored 6.5 out of a 7-point ranking. China is paired with Zimbabwe and just below Myanmar and North Korea, who scored a 7.
首先,蘇先生沒有提供上下文或來龍去脈而以有瑕疵的方法來證明他的論點. 他正確指出根據自由之家的報告,台灣的確為亞洲的"自由"國家. 在政治與公民自由綜合評比裡,台灣的分數是1.5分,和以色列,日本與南韓並列.最自由的國家幾為歐洲國家與美加. 蘇先生忽略不提的是中國在7分的評比裡得分6.5. 中國與辛巴威並列,且只比緬甸與北韓好一點,後兩者同為七分. (按:最近的新聞提到台灣的政治權利升級,公民自由降等)
Why, then, is the Ma administration seeking rapprochement with China? How can a democratic country be so blind as to seek close relations with a government that is one of the most among authoritarian societies in the world? Who will benefit? Which is the likelier scenario — that China will force Taiwan to become less free, or that Taiwan will help China become more democratic?
那麼,馬政府為什麼要追求與中國和解呢?為什麼一個民主國家盲目地對一個集權國家急於示好?誰會從中獲利?最有可能的情況究竟是中國將迫使台灣變得更不自由?亦或是台灣將幫助中國變得更民主?
We can actually see the consequence of this relationship in the Corruption Perceptions for this year. Su claims that Taiwan’s ranking in the report on 180 countries issued by Transparency International rose to No. 37. This statement reveals political alchemy at its best. For instance, Taiwan’s score in 2007 was 34. Numerically it did rise to 37. But the higher a country gets, the greater the index of corruption. Somalia is rated at No. 180. In fact, Taiwan fell into greater corruption by three points.
事實上我們從今年的貪腐印象可以見得結果. 蘇宣稱根據國際透明組織,台灣在180個國家裏的排名37. 這充其量顯示出政治巫術.的確,就排名上台灣提升到37,但是台灣在2007年排名34.愈後面的排名顯示愈多貪污.索馬利亞排名180. (也就是說)事實上,台灣的排名退步了三名.
China, meanwhile, moved from 72 in 2007 to is worst score ever, at 79, this year. By Su’s admission, both “regions” (Taiwan and China) are slouching toward Somalia in the corruption index.
在此同時,中國的排名從2007年的72名退步到79,有史以來最差的一次. 根據蘇所承認,這兩個"地區"(指蘇是台灣與中國為兩個地區)的貪污排名正向索馬利亞靠攏.
Since we talked about Taiwan’s relations with China in our letter, it is important to place Taiwan in the context of Beijing’s power and influence to control cross-strait dialogue.
既然我們在信中提到兩岸關係,在討論事情時就必須把北京對兩岸對話的影響力納入考量.
One can see this most significantly when analyzing press freedoms. Freedom House reports that China has a system of control that “originated under classic totalitarian conditions” and is being modernized to serve the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. In 2005, China was ranked as No. 177 out of a total of 194 countries. Freedom House does not include in its analysis China’s policies in Tibet. If Tibet had been considered, China’s ranking would certainly have been even worse.
最明顯的是新聞自由.自由之家的報告指出中國有現代化的系統的在"有組織的在傳統一個中國的條件下"維護中國共產黨在中國的領導權. 在2005年,中國在194個國家中排名177,而這個評比甚至排除中國在西藏(圖博)的政策. 如果自由之家把中國的西藏政策納入考量,中國的評比只會更糟.
How can Chinese make a rational and educated decision about policies toward Taiwan when they live in an iron box of propaganda? When Beijing talks about the feelings of the Chinese people, how does the leadership know what the people think if it does not allow certain information to be circulated, or criticism of its policies? And why would Taipei believe that Chinese have any independent ideas about cross-strait relations when they are ruled by a state that is similar to Myanmar and North Korea in preventing its people from having freedom of the press, freedom to form political parties and freedom to live in a system ruled by law?
What Su needs is an international standard for judging how governments treat each other. For instance, when looking at some of the international organizations that the minister mentions, I could not find any place called “Chinese Taipei,” “Chinese Taiwan” or “One China.” Freedom House, unlike Beijing and Taipei, uses the appropriate name of “Taiwan” and not any substitute to evaluate the country’s rights and freedoms. Why can’t the leadership in Taipei conform to this international usage?
蘇需要的是一套放諸國際皆準,國與國相互對待的標準. 例如,這些蘇所引用的國際組織提到台灣時使用台灣一辭,而不是中華台北,中華台灣,或是一個中國. 自由之家,不像北京或台北,使用適當的名稱稱呼台灣為台灣,而不是用一些替代的名稱,來對評估自由與人權.為什麼台北領導人不能夠採用國際一致的用法呢? (按:這個呼應到前幾段中,蘇俊賓以兩個"地區"而非兩個國家來稱呼台灣與中國的批評)
Su defends his government’s policies through misuse of documents and through the use of irrelevant documents. It does not matter how democratic Taiwan appears to be. What is important to ask is: What happens when a democracy seeks to join one of the authoritarian countries in the world? Actually, what should be compared are the statistics on the ruling parties of each country. The government of China is ruled by the CCP and not by the people. And the government of Taiwan is slowly reverting to a one-party state. In the Taiwan Strait, it is the leaders of the political parties, not government officials, who negotiate.
From a historical perspective, Su is engaging in the colonization of his country by an empire. No mater how pure the pearl is, when it lands in stomach of the predator, it no longer shines.
延伸閱讀:
國際學者給台灣政府的第五封公開信與新聞局的回函
------
GIO’s response misses the point
By Richard Kagan
Friday, Dec 25, 2009, Page 8
Last Friday I received an e-mail from Government Information Office (GIO) Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) responding to “Open letter to Taiwan’s president” (Nov. 13, page 8), which I signed with many other academics. This was one of a series of letters we have written concerning Taiwan’s eroding democratic freedoms, judicial systems and international relations. Su has responded in detail to the previous letters by defending the operations of the government with regard to the judicial system, and President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) democratic reforms and policies.
上週五,我收到一封由台灣新聞局長蘇俊賓發出,回覆我參予連署的第五號公開信的電子郵件(第五號公開信日期是2009年11月13日),那是封給台灣政府一系列的公開信的其中一封.這系列公開信事關我們對台灣民主自由倒退,司法體系傾斜,國際關係緊張的憂慮. 蘇先生詳細回覆第五號公開信裡,替馬政府辯駁並強調馬政府對司法與民主改革的決心.
But this time, Su wanted to justify and praise Taiwan’s system by referring to the “international community’s assessments” on these matters. His attempt to defend Taiwan by using international standards actually backfired in several ways.
然而,蘇引用國際評等來誇讚台灣體系的作法,就很多方面來講,會收到相反的成效.(按:詳見第五封公開信的回函.蘇企圖引用特定機構的數據來辯駁)
Let me explain in some detail why I question the minister’s research and the professionalism of the GIO.
以下讓我詳敘我為什麼對新聞局的研究與專業有所質疑.
First, Su uses faulty methodology to prove his point by not providing a context for his argument. He correctly points out that Freedom House ranks Taiwan among the “free” countries of Asia. In the combined ratings of Political and Civil Liberties, Taiwan scores 1.5. This puts it with Israel, Japan and South Korea. The rank of No. 1 is filled mainly by European countries as well as the US and Canada. What he fails to note is that China is scored 6.5 out of a 7-point ranking. China is paired with Zimbabwe and just below Myanmar and North Korea, who scored a 7.
首先,蘇先生沒有提供上下文或來龍去脈而以有瑕疵的方法來證明他的論點. 他正確指出根據自由之家的報告,台灣的確為亞洲的"自由"國家. 在政治與公民自由綜合評比裡,台灣的分數是1.5分,和以色列,日本與南韓並列.最自由的國家幾為歐洲國家與美加. 蘇先生忽略不提的是中國在7分的評比裡得分6.5. 中國與辛巴威並列,且只比緬甸與北韓好一點,後兩者同為七分. (按:最近的新聞提到台灣的政治權利升級,公民自由降等)
Why, then, is the Ma administration seeking rapprochement with China? How can a democratic country be so blind as to seek close relations with a government that is one of the most among authoritarian societies in the world? Who will benefit? Which is the likelier scenario — that China will force Taiwan to become less free, or that Taiwan will help China become more democratic?
那麼,馬政府為什麼要追求與中國和解呢?為什麼一個民主國家盲目地對一個集權國家急於示好?誰會從中獲利?最有可能的情況究竟是中國將迫使台灣變得更不自由?亦或是台灣將幫助中國變得更民主?
We can actually see the consequence of this relationship in the Corruption Perceptions for this year. Su claims that Taiwan’s ranking in the report on 180 countries issued by Transparency International rose to No. 37. This statement reveals political alchemy at its best. For instance, Taiwan’s score in 2007 was 34. Numerically it did rise to 37. But the higher a country gets, the greater the index of corruption. Somalia is rated at No. 180. In fact, Taiwan fell into greater corruption by three points.
事實上我們從今年的貪腐印象可以見得結果. 蘇宣稱根據國際透明組織,台灣在180個國家裏的排名37. 這充其量顯示出政治巫術.的確,就排名上台灣提升到37,但是台灣在2007年排名34.愈後面的排名顯示愈多貪污.索馬利亞排名180. (也就是說)事實上,台灣的排名退步了三名.
China, meanwhile, moved from 72 in 2007 to is worst score ever, at 79, this year. By Su’s admission, both “regions” (Taiwan and China) are slouching toward Somalia in the corruption index.
在此同時,中國的排名從2007年的72名退步到79,有史以來最差的一次. 根據蘇所承認,這兩個"地區"(指蘇是台灣與中國為兩個地區)的貪污排名正向索馬利亞靠攏.
Since we talked about Taiwan’s relations with China in our letter, it is important to place Taiwan in the context of Beijing’s power and influence to control cross-strait dialogue.
既然我們在信中提到兩岸關係,在討論事情時就必須把北京對兩岸對話的影響力納入考量.
One can see this most significantly when analyzing press freedoms. Freedom House reports that China has a system of control that “originated under classic totalitarian conditions” and is being modernized to serve the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. In 2005, China was ranked as No. 177 out of a total of 194 countries. Freedom House does not include in its analysis China’s policies in Tibet. If Tibet had been considered, China’s ranking would certainly have been even worse.
最明顯的是新聞自由.自由之家的報告指出中國有現代化的系統的在"有組織的在傳統一個中國的條件下"維護中國共產黨在中國的領導權. 在2005年,中國在194個國家中排名177,而這個評比甚至排除中國在西藏(圖博)的政策. 如果自由之家把中國的西藏政策納入考量,中國的評比只會更糟.
How can Chinese make a rational and educated decision about policies toward Taiwan when they live in an iron box of propaganda? When Beijing talks about the feelings of the Chinese people, how does the leadership know what the people think if it does not allow certain information to be circulated, or criticism of its policies? And why would Taipei believe that Chinese have any independent ideas about cross-strait relations when they are ruled by a state that is similar to Myanmar and North Korea in preventing its people from having freedom of the press, freedom to form political parties and freedom to live in a system ruled by law?
What Su needs is an international standard for judging how governments treat each other. For instance, when looking at some of the international organizations that the minister mentions, I could not find any place called “Chinese Taipei,” “Chinese Taiwan” or “One China.” Freedom House, unlike Beijing and Taipei, uses the appropriate name of “Taiwan” and not any substitute to evaluate the country’s rights and freedoms. Why can’t the leadership in Taipei conform to this international usage?
蘇需要的是一套放諸國際皆準,國與國相互對待的標準. 例如,這些蘇所引用的國際組織提到台灣時使用台灣一辭,而不是中華台北,中華台灣,或是一個中國. 自由之家,不像北京或台北,使用適當的名稱稱呼台灣為台灣,而不是用一些替代的名稱,來對評估自由與人權.為什麼台北領導人不能夠採用國際一致的用法呢? (按:這個呼應到前幾段中,蘇俊賓以兩個"地區"而非兩個國家來稱呼台灣與中國的批評)
Su defends his government’s policies through misuse of documents and through the use of irrelevant documents. It does not matter how democratic Taiwan appears to be. What is important to ask is: What happens when a democracy seeks to join one of the authoritarian countries in the world? Actually, what should be compared are the statistics on the ruling parties of each country. The government of China is ruled by the CCP and not by the people. And the government of Taiwan is slowly reverting to a one-party state. In the Taiwan Strait, it is the leaders of the political parties, not government officials, who negotiate.
From a historical perspective, Su is engaging in the colonization of his country by an empire. No mater how pure the pearl is, when it lands in stomach of the predator, it no longer shines.
[轉載] A GIO response to Richard Kagan
這是新聞局針對學者Richard Kagan提到政府的回函避重就輕特別撰文(反擊). 什麼時候起新聞局忙於與國際學者打筆戰了? 而且,政府回函沒有針對重點的問題在第五封公開信一開始也有所提及. 這種政府與民眾認知差異的情況,不但沒有改善,反而陷入各說各話的情況.真是令人擔憂.
延伸閱讀:
Richard Kagan的文章: GIO’s response misses the point
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A GIO response to Richard Kagan
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓
Friday, Jan 08, 2010, Page 8
In an op-ed published in the Taipei Times (“GIO’s response misses the point,” Dec. 25, page 8) Richard Kagan questions efforts by this government for closer ties between Taiwan and mainland China, based primarily on stated concerns about how this might affect democracy in Taiwan. Rather than rehash previous Government Information Office (GIO) responses to the misperceptions and specious claims therein, it would be more productive to focus on the central question he raises.
Professor Kagan expresses doubts about why a democratic country such as the Republic of China (Taiwan) would seek to develop closer relations with mainland China, which is not a democracy. As an historian, he surely must know that all members of the international community should and must develop relations with each other, regardless of differences in political systems or even bilateral disagreements over specific issues. The US engages in trade and security cooperation with non-democratic countries throughout the world, yet few question how this might affect US democracy.
Similarly, the Republic of China needs to develop relations with all members of the international community to ensure the best interests of the people of Taiwan. It is an internationally accepted fact that mainland China is growing in economic and strategic importance. When the international community wishes to solve major international problems, it increasingly finds that it must engage with Beijing to help find a solution. The US is working more closely than ever with the mainland to deal with managing the global financial crisis, handling the North Korean situation and countering global terrorism. As an integral member of the international community, Taiwan needs to engage with mainland China for many of the same reasons, regardless of any cross-strait differences.
However, this is absolutely not in any way at the expense of Taiwan’s hard-won democracy. This administration has consistently stressed since taking office that all its policies and interaction with Beijing shall be based on the principle of “putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people.” If improving ties had led to the appalling result Dr Kagan posits of Beijing controlling the dialogue and always getting what it wants, why was no double taxation avoidance agreement signed during the Chiang-Chen [Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林)] cross-strait talks in December, despite being on the agenda? The answer is simple: Disputed details in the wording of the agreement did not accord with the aforementioned principle, so we were not going to sign it, and did not.
The fact that these talks took place between the respectively authorized representative organizations of both sides — the SEF and ARATS — debunks the myth that the cross-strait dialogue is being conducted party-to-party, rather than government-to-government. The Legislative Yuan must approve any accord worked out with ARATS involving domestic laws. Only this administration, duly elected by the voters in Taiwan — and not any political party at either end of the political spectrum — sets cross-strait policy and speaks on behalf of the people of Taiwan.
Professor Kagan’s letter also dwelled on the disingenuous complaint that using “Chinese Taipei” as the name of our country in international events and organizations signals a deliberate diminution of national sovereignty. Taiwan’s participation in such events under the rubric “Chinese Taipei” during previous administrations did not diminish national sovereignty, nor can it do so now. This government has always sought and continues to vigorously seek the use of our official name, “Republic of China,” or at least “Taiwan,” in such situations. However, given Taiwan’s unique international status, use of our national title is beyond our control. We warmly welcome support from Dr Kagan and his colleagues for the correct use of our national title by international events and organizations hereafter.
The mantra that democracy in Taiwan is less robust than before utterly conflicts with reality. Domestic political debate in Taiwan is as spirited and vigorous as ever. The local media scrutinize every action of this administration closely, and public demonstrations on political issues of every kind are commonplace. Any concerns that Taiwan is reverting to one-party rule were surely dispelled by the results of local elections held last month. KMT [Chinese Nationalist Party] candidates for mayor and county magistrate posts received 47.88 percent of the nationwide vote, while DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] candidates garnered 45.32 percent. There is no clearer proof that the people of Taiwan have the absolute power to choose their government.
The people of Taiwan have every reason to be proud of the democracy and freedom they have achieved. Taiwan continues to shape the debate on whether democracy is attainable in the Chinese-speaking world, even as cross-strait ties improve. We remain resolutely confident that the undeniable fact of democratic attainment in Taiwan will ultimately prove just as, or even more, powerful to spur positive developments on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait. That can only be to the benefit of the people of Taiwan and those of the mainland, as well as the world in general.
延伸閱讀:
Richard Kagan的文章: GIO’s response misses the point
-------
A GIO response to Richard Kagan
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓
Friday, Jan 08, 2010, Page 8
In an op-ed published in the Taipei Times (“GIO’s response misses the point,” Dec. 25, page 8) Richard Kagan questions efforts by this government for closer ties between Taiwan and mainland China, based primarily on stated concerns about how this might affect democracy in Taiwan. Rather than rehash previous Government Information Office (GIO) responses to the misperceptions and specious claims therein, it would be more productive to focus on the central question he raises.
Professor Kagan expresses doubts about why a democratic country such as the Republic of China (Taiwan) would seek to develop closer relations with mainland China, which is not a democracy. As an historian, he surely must know that all members of the international community should and must develop relations with each other, regardless of differences in political systems or even bilateral disagreements over specific issues. The US engages in trade and security cooperation with non-democratic countries throughout the world, yet few question how this might affect US democracy.
Similarly, the Republic of China needs to develop relations with all members of the international community to ensure the best interests of the people of Taiwan. It is an internationally accepted fact that mainland China is growing in economic and strategic importance. When the international community wishes to solve major international problems, it increasingly finds that it must engage with Beijing to help find a solution. The US is working more closely than ever with the mainland to deal with managing the global financial crisis, handling the North Korean situation and countering global terrorism. As an integral member of the international community, Taiwan needs to engage with mainland China for many of the same reasons, regardless of any cross-strait differences.
However, this is absolutely not in any way at the expense of Taiwan’s hard-won democracy. This administration has consistently stressed since taking office that all its policies and interaction with Beijing shall be based on the principle of “putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people.” If improving ties had led to the appalling result Dr Kagan posits of Beijing controlling the dialogue and always getting what it wants, why was no double taxation avoidance agreement signed during the Chiang-Chen [Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林)] cross-strait talks in December, despite being on the agenda? The answer is simple: Disputed details in the wording of the agreement did not accord with the aforementioned principle, so we were not going to sign it, and did not.
The fact that these talks took place between the respectively authorized representative organizations of both sides — the SEF and ARATS — debunks the myth that the cross-strait dialogue is being conducted party-to-party, rather than government-to-government. The Legislative Yuan must approve any accord worked out with ARATS involving domestic laws. Only this administration, duly elected by the voters in Taiwan — and not any political party at either end of the political spectrum — sets cross-strait policy and speaks on behalf of the people of Taiwan.
Professor Kagan’s letter also dwelled on the disingenuous complaint that using “Chinese Taipei” as the name of our country in international events and organizations signals a deliberate diminution of national sovereignty. Taiwan’s participation in such events under the rubric “Chinese Taipei” during previous administrations did not diminish national sovereignty, nor can it do so now. This government has always sought and continues to vigorously seek the use of our official name, “Republic of China,” or at least “Taiwan,” in such situations. However, given Taiwan’s unique international status, use of our national title is beyond our control. We warmly welcome support from Dr Kagan and his colleagues for the correct use of our national title by international events and organizations hereafter.
The mantra that democracy in Taiwan is less robust than before utterly conflicts with reality. Domestic political debate in Taiwan is as spirited and vigorous as ever. The local media scrutinize every action of this administration closely, and public demonstrations on political issues of every kind are commonplace. Any concerns that Taiwan is reverting to one-party rule were surely dispelled by the results of local elections held last month. KMT [Chinese Nationalist Party] candidates for mayor and county magistrate posts received 47.88 percent of the nationwide vote, while DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] candidates garnered 45.32 percent. There is no clearer proof that the people of Taiwan have the absolute power to choose their government.
The people of Taiwan have every reason to be proud of the democracy and freedom they have achieved. Taiwan continues to shape the debate on whether democracy is attainable in the Chinese-speaking world, even as cross-strait ties improve. We remain resolutely confident that the undeniable fact of democratic attainment in Taiwan will ultimately prove just as, or even more, powerful to spur positive developments on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait. That can only be to the benefit of the people of Taiwan and those of the mainland, as well as the world in general.
Friday, January 8, 2010
台灣芬蘭化的原文全文與部份翻譯(updated on 1/13)
前陣子台灣的媒體講到台灣芬蘭化的問題,芬蘭化根據wiki的定義是:是一邊維持議會民主制度和資本主義經濟體制，同時卻處於共產主義國家勢力控制下的狀態，類似冷戰時芬蘭和蘇聯兩國之間的關係。此詞出現於1960年代後期的西德，為當時西德的保守派批評重視同共產主義諸國對話的時任西德總理勃蘭特時所新造的詞匯。
網路上有人貼出原文,我曾經試圖想翻譯全文後張貼在個人部落格,但實在太長,只翻了前面幾段還有中間偏後四段之後就放棄了. 現在把前面我自己翻的幾段連同原文對照貼出來如下.有空可能會慢慢再一段段翻,可能會從推銷芬蘭化(selling Finlandization)翻起(從我自己有興趣了解的翻起啦).
這裡有前1/3的翻譯,而這裡有關於芬蘭化的一些註解與後續評論.
1/13updated: 這裡有全文翻譯.(雖然我個人比較喜歡中英對照:P)
以下轉載.
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不再迫切的台海: 為什麼美國會從台灣芬蘭化中獲利
January/February 2010
Bruce Gilley
BRUCE GILLEY is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Portland State University's Mark O. Hatfield School of Government and the author of The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy.
Since 2005, Taiwan and China have been moving into a closer economic and political embrace -- a process that accelerated with the election of the pro-détente politician Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in 2008. This strengthening of relations presents the United States with its greatest challenge in the Taiwan Strait since 1979, when Washington severed ties with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
自從2005年以來,台灣與中國在經濟與政治上更加緊密結合,這個過程也因為馬英九當選後更為加速. 兩岸關係強化帶給美國自1979年台美斷交,美國(原文為"華盛頓")與中國建交以來最大的一次挑戰.
In many ways, the current thaw serves Taipei's interests, but it also allows Beijing to assert increasing influence over Taiwan. As a consensus emerges in Taiwan on establishing closer relations with China, the thaw is calling into question the United States' deeply ambiguous policy, which is supposed to serve both Taiwan's interests (by allowing it to retain its autonomy) and the United States' own (by guarding against an expansionist China). Washington now faces a stark choice: continue pursuing a militarized realist approach -- using Taiwan to balance the power of a rising China -- or follow an alternative liberal logic that seeks to promote long-term peace through closer economic, social, and political ties between Taiwan and China.
就很多方面來說,兩岸和解(thaw)符合台北的利益,但是和解的同時也讓北京對台灣有更大的影響力. 台灣內部的共識是強化與中國的關係,但此讓美國摩擬兩可的政策受到質疑:美國保衛台灣的自主性以對抗擴張主義的中國的政策使台美雙方都受益. 華府現在面對的是個嚴峻的選擇: 繼續強化軍事,利用台灣來與興起中的中國抗衡, 或是以更緊密的兩岸經濟,社會與政治連結來達到長遠之和平. (註:大抵就是鷹派與鴿派的選擇)
A TALE OF TWO DÉTENTES 雙合解記
After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities, led, respectively, by Chiang Kai-shek's defeated nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and Mao Zedong's victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For nearly three decades, Chiang and Mao harbored rival claims to the whole territory of China. Gradually, most of the international community came to accept Beijing's claims to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and a special role in its foreign relations. By 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China, 69 percent of the United Nations' member states had already severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of relations with China.
中國內戰止於1949年,那之後台灣與中國成為兩個政治實體,分別由戰敗的蔣介石率領國民黨與戰勝的毛澤東代表的中國共產黨統治兩岸. 近三十年來, 蔣介石與毛澤東都將對方之領土視為自己領土之一部份(儘管實際上只對台灣或只對中國得以行使主權.)漸漸的,大部分的國際社會接受北京視台灣為中國一部份的這種說法. 到了1972年,尼克森拜訪中國時, 百分之六十九的聯合國會員國都已經與台灣斷絕外交關係,紛紛與中國建交.
The United States, which had merely "acknowledged" Beijing's claim to Taiwan, was slow to recognize the People's Republic of China due to Washington's historical ties with the KMT, dating back to World War II and its conflict with the PRC during the Korean War. The strategic position of Taiwan, astride western Pacific sea and air lanes, gave it added importance. But by 1979, even Washington had recognized Beijing. That same year, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in order to ensure continued legal, commercial, and de facto diplomatic relations with the island. At the last minute, Senate Republicans -- along with several Democrats who worried that President Jimmy Carter was disregarding Taiwan's security -- amended the legislation to include promises of arms sales to Taipei and a broader U.S. commitment to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" against the island.
基於華府與國民黨的歷史可追溯至二次大戰與韓戰期間中(共)美衝突的淵源，美國很晚才承認北京對台灣的宣示,也很晚才承認中華人民共和國。台灣的戰略地位，佔據西太平洋的海空航線要衝，使其更加重要。但是到了1979年，連華府也承認中國政權了。同年，美國實施了台灣關係法以確保維持法律、商業與實質外交關係。在最後一刻，參院共和黨員──加上幾個擔心卡特總統忽視台灣安全的民主黨員──修改法案，包括承諾對台軍售與美國擴大承諾「抵抗任何武力方式或其他形式的脅迫」。
The fading of the Chiang-Mao rivalry, which subsided after both leaders died in the mid-1970s, coupled with Beijing's new inward-looking focus on economic development, made these military commitments appear anachronistic during the 1980s. Beijing ended its shelling of the Taiwanese islands off the Chinese coast and welcomed Taiwanese "compatriots" to the mainland for tourism, investment, and family reunification. Taiwan's native-born president, Lee Teng-hui, who came to power in 1988, had no interest in "retaking the mainland" and approved the creation of such exchanges. In 1993, the heads of the two governments' cross-strait contact groups held their first direct talks, in Singapore.
This "first détente" ended abruptly in 1995, when the United States issued a visa for Lee to visit Cornell University. China, in the midst of a domestic leadership transition, was already hardening its position on Taiwan, and armchair generals in all three places were publishing books on the predicted order of battle to come. Beijing saw the visa as a betrayal of earlier U.S. promises to refrain from any official relations with Taiwanese leaders. Taiwan's democratization was also leading to domestic popular pressures for a more assertive stance on independence. Beijing reacted by hurling missiles into the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. Washington dispatched aircraft carriers and radar ships to the area. Beijing's worst fears were then realized in 2000, when Taiwanese citizens elected Chen Shui-bian as their president. Chen, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), now the opposition, promised to seek formal recognition of Taiwan's de facto independence from China. As a consequence, cross-strait relations deteriorated dramatically between 1995 and 2005, leading to a renewed emphasis on militarization by all three sides.
The damage wrought by this "second freeze" led to serious rethinking in all three capitals. Beijing worried that its aggressive posture on Taiwan was threatening its broader influence in Asia, as other nations rallied behind the U.S. security shield; Taipei began to reevaluate the value of its symbolic assertions of nationhood; and Washington began to question its unlimited commitment to an increasingly troublesome Taiwan, which threatened to damage, if not destroy, its more important relationship with China. By the end of George W. Bush's first term, Washington had become the main check on Taipei's assertions of independence.
The "second détente" in cross-strait relations began with a 2005 speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao downplaying demands for reunification. Beijing was shifting its view as a result of an emerging grand strategy that stressed regional and global influence; accordingly, it came to see Taiwan less as an ideologically charged and urgent matter and more as a pragmatic and low-key management issue. Ma's election in 2008 signaled the resurgence of a similar vision in Taiwan. He promised "no unification, no independence, no use of force." Within months, in rapid and unprecedented fashion, the heads of the contact groups began holding semiannual meetings and signed more than two dozen previously unthinkable agreements. Although most of these involved economic matters, they had political implications, too. The number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan -- including Taiwan's long-militarized islands directly off the coast of China -- surged by a factor of ten, to 3,000 per day. China sent students to Taiwan, and the two sides authorized 270 flights per week across the strait. Important political fears that had previously restricted economic integration suddenly dissipated on both sides, and Taipei and Beijing began talking about the "total normalization" of their economic and financial ties. The supposedly fixed national interests on which foreign policy realists base their assessments were in total flux.
The second détente has also included explicitly political deals. China had previously permitted Taiwan to participate only in international organizations with an economic focus, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization. In 2009, it allowed Taiwan to participate as an observer at the annual board meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. Both sides began discussing a Taiwanese presence in the UN bodies responsible for civil aviation, commercial shipping, meteorology, and climate change.
Both sides also tacitly agreed to a "diplomatic truce": Beijing ceased courting the nations on Taiwan's dwindling list of 23 diplomatic allies, and in 2009 Taipei dropped its perpetual request for UN membership for the first time in 17 years. When Ma was reelected as KMT chair in July 2009, Hu declared that he would like to build "mutual trust between the two sides in political affairs." As political relations warmed, Taiwanese officials -- including leading DPP figures, such as the mayor of Kaohsiung -- became regular visitors in China.
There are indications that this second cross-straits détente will last. Although both leaders' terms will expire in 2012, Hu's designated successor, Xi Jinping, is a well-known advocate of cross-strait exchanges. Ma, meanwhile, has recovered from the political damage wrought by Typhoon Morakot, which struck the island in August 2009. So long as the DPP remains divided between extreme anti-détente and limited-détente factions, he seems likely to win reelection.
Taiwan and China are now approaching their relationship using completely different assumptions than those that governed cross-strait relations for decades. Whereas they previously saw the relationship as a military dispute, today both sides have embraced a view of security that is premised on high-level contact, trust, and reduced threats of force. Their views of economic issues, meanwhile, have placed global integration and competitiveness ahead of nationalist protectionism. This represents a fundamental shift in the political relationship between Taiwan and China.
FROM HELSINKI TO TAIPEI 從赫爾辛基到台北
To understand the evolution of the Taipei-Beijing relationship, it is useful to consider the theory and practice of what has become known as "Finlandization" in the field of political science. The term derives its name from Finland's 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join alliances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for any country challenging Soviet interests. In return, the Kremlin agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and respect Finland's democratic system. Therefore, from 1956 to 1981, under the leadership of President Urho Kekkonen, Finland pursued a policy of strategic appeasement and neutrality on U.S.-Soviet issues and limited domestic criticism of the Soviet Union. This policy enjoyed wide support in Finland at the time (despite the subsequent debate in Finland on its merits). Kekkonen also won praise across the political spectrum in the United States, especially from foreign policy realists such as George Kennan, who lauded the Finnish leader's "composure and firmness."
要了解兩岸關係的演變不妨參考日後政治學領域所謂 "芬蘭化"的理論與實務。這個名稱源自芬蘭在1948年與蘇聯的協議，據此赫爾辛基同意不加入挑戰莫斯科的聯盟或擔任任何挑戰蘇聯利益的國家的基地. 引以回報的是克里姆林宮同意維護芬蘭自治並尊重芬蘭的民主制度.因此，1956到1981年，在Urho Kekkonen總統領導下，芬蘭在美蘇議題上追求戰略綏靖與中立政策，限制國內對蘇聯的批評.當時這個政策在芬蘭廣受支持,雖然後續對成效的爭議也不斷.
Building on the work of others, the Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen in 1988proposed a general theory of Finlandization known as "adaptive politics." Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make. Unlike a puppet regime, a Finlandized state calculates that its long-term interests, and perhaps those of its neighbors, are best served by making strategic concessions to a superpower next door. These concessions are motivated chiefly by geographic proximity, psychological threats from the superpower, and cultural affinities between the two sides. Being so close, the superpower need only issue vague threats, rather than display actual military muscle, to change its weaker neighbor's policies. Meanwhile, the small power perceives itself as engaging in an "active and principled neutrality," rather than a cowering acquiescence, a distinction that is critical to rationalizing these policy changes domestically.
丹麥政治學者Mouritzen在1988年根據其他學者的研究提出芬蘭化的理論,指稱芬蘭化是種"適應性政治".Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.不像其他魁儡政權,經過精打細算後,一個芬蘭化的邦國的長期利益,甚至可能是強權鄰國的利益,最能夠從對強權讓步中獲得.這個讓步的主要動機在於對於鄰國強權的心裡恐懼與兩者文化上的緊密連結. 因為兩者如此緊密,超級強權僅需模糊的威脅,而不需實際的軍事展現,就已經足以改變鄰近小國的政治.同時,這個小國體認到"積極地,原則性的中立"明顯有異於畏縮的默認,因此得以在國內(domestically)合理化這種讓步強權的政策.
Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion. Even if one rejects the theory of Finlandization, it is difficult to deny that Kekkonen played a constructive role in ending the Cold War. In 1969, for instance, Finland offered itself as the venue for a conference between the two blocs that eventually produced a shared document with clear commitments to human rights and freedoms: the Helsinki accords.
芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大.即使有人拒絕芬蘭化的理論,也很難否定Kekkonen在結束冷戰中扮演一個建設性的角色. 例如在1969年,芬蘭讓自己成為兩方(按:指北約/美國與蘇聯)會談的管道(venue),進而讓雙方都承諾人權與自由--簽署赫爾辛基條約.
Cold War historians, such as John Lewis Gaddis, believe that the Helsinki process was central to undermining the moral authority of the Soviet Union, and others have argued that it prompted the ideological shift necessary to kickstart Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the mid-1980s. Moreover, Finland's unique status as interlocutor with Moscow made possible the first serious discussions of nuclear disarmament and of the shared development of Arctic resources, both of which served as templates for the warming of relations between NATO and the Soviet bloc. Although it usually has a negative connotation, "Finlandization" need not be a pejorative term.
冷戰歷史學家如John Lewis Gaddis相信芬蘭化(Helsinki process)對於崩解蘇聯權威居功厥偉,其他冷戰歷史學家則主張芬蘭化有助於1980年代中期Gorbachev對蘇聯的改革與意識形態的轉變.尤有甚者,芬蘭成為一個獨特的,與蘇聯對話者的狀態促成首次針對解除武裝的對談,也使得北約會員國之間得討論資源共享,並緩和北約會員國與蘇聯間的緊張關係. 雖然有負面意涵,"芬蘭化"不必是個輕蔑的詞彙. (註:作者也承認芬蘭化含有負面意涵,卻還鼓吹台灣芬蘭化,嗯,這交由讀者去判斷.)
Taiwan shares many of the key features that characterized Finland in the late 1940s. It is a small but internally sovereign state that is geographically close to a superpower with which it shares cultural and historical ties. Its fierce sense of independence is balanced by a pragmatic sense of the need to accommodate that superpower's vital interests. Most important, the evolving views of its leaders and its people today focus on seeking security through integration rather than confrontation. This approach could help defuse one of the most worrying trends in global politics: the emerging rivalry between China and the United States.
台灣和1940年代晚期的芬蘭在很多方面都類似. 它是個小但是主權獨立的邦國(按:英文上state,country,nation意義不甚相同,但是翻成中文幾乎都一樣翻成"國家".在此我姑且翻成邦國,若不恰當歡迎指教,謝謝!),地理上鄰近一個超級強權而又與此超級強權有文化上與歷史上的連結. 它強烈的獨立意識與務實的意識相互平衡以因應超級強權的利益.最重要的,隨著領導者與人民的觀念的遞嬗,今日的焦點著重於透過整合,而非衝撞,以追求安全.這種方式或可去除國際政治上對中美(兩個超級強權)對峙的疑慮. (註:這有一個很大的差異,台灣如果真正的真芬蘭化,台灣必須是主權獨立的邦國,不只是實際上更必須在法理上都是一個獨立的邦國.在上面所附的連結當中有一篇就提到台灣是獨立國家這個重點)
The analogy is not perfect. U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan today are more explicit than they were for Finland during the Cold War, although few doubt that NATO would have defended Finland against a Soviet invasion. And China's 1,000-plus missiles targeted at Taiwan are a more direct threat than anything the Soviet military ever mustered across the Vuoksi River. But in general the thinking that has motivated the second détente on both sides parallels that which led to the Finnish-Soviet détente of the Cold War. Although it is still early, Taipei is moving in the direction of eventual Finlandization.
這個類比當然並不完美.美國對台灣安全的保證遠比冷戰當時對芬蘭的保障來得明確,雖然少數質疑北約會保衛芬蘭以對抗蘇聯的入侵.而且,中國以超過一千枚飛彈對準台灣的威脅遠比蘇聯軍隊從未屯集於Vuoksi河畔來得更直接. 但整體而言,促使兩岸第二次和解的想法與芬蘭與蘇聯在冷戰時間的想法如出一轍.雖然為時尚早,台北已經逐步邁向芬蘭化.
Under such a scenario, Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power, rather than a U.S. strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing's fears about the island's becoming an obstacle to China's military and commercial ambitions in the region. It would also refrain from undermining the CCP's rule in China. In return, Beijing would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei expanded participation in international organizations, and extend the island favorable economic and social benefits.
在這種情況下,台灣會重新定位自己為中立國,而不是美國的戰略伙伴,以化解北京視台灣為中國在亞洲軍事與商業崛起的障礙. 它也必須節制不能妨礙中國共產黨在中國的執政.(相對的,)北京必須以解除軍事威脅,給予台北參予國際組織,擴展台灣經濟與社會利益做為回報.
The DPP's director of international affairs, Hsiao Bi-khim, has written that the changes in Taiwan's China policy "are leading to a new strategic outlook, which aligns Taiwan with China's sphere of influence instead of maintaining the traditional presumed informal alliance with the United States." Although Hsiao, like many in the DPP, fears this sort of shift, such reservations are unwarranted.
民進黨的國際事務部主任蕭美琴曾經撰文指出台灣的中國政策"正帶領一個新的策略觀點,那是個台灣與中國影響力結盟,而非傳統與美國非正式聯盟的觀點."雖然蕭美琴,和許多民進黨員一樣,對此轉換感到恐懼而有所保留,但這種保留毫無根據.
A MEANS OR AN END? 是手段還是目的?
There are two ways to view the shift in Chinese policy toward Taiwan. The dominant interpretation has long been that Beijing is motivated by nationalism and that the PRC's irredentist claims to Taiwan stem from a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness. According to this view, the CCP is striving to reincorporate Taiwan into China in order to avert a domestic nationalist backlash and a crisis of legitimacy. Seen in this light, Taiwan is an end unto itself and the second détente is merely a tactical shift intended to force Taiwan into reunification through indirect means: beneath Beijing's silk glove of détente is the iron fist of nationalism.
In recent years, many Western analysts have rejected this nationalist interpretation of Beijing's Taiwan policy and opted instead for a geostrategic one. Unrecovered territories are legion in the history of the PRC, and the CCP has found it easy to let go of others (including disputed regions bordering Russia, India, and the Spratly Islands, as well as control over Mongolia and Korea). Taiwan, however, by virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential strategic threat to China. It could serve as a base for foreign military operations against China and even in peacetime could constrain Beijing's ability to develop and project naval power and ensure maritime security in East Asia.
Beijing's core goal from this perspective is the preservation of its dominance in its immediate offshore region, as became clear in 2009 when five Chinese vessels trailed a U.S. Navy ship sailing near a Chinese submarine base. Taiwan represents an obstacle to this goal if it remains a U.S. strategic ally armed with advanced U.S. weaponry, but not if it becomes a self-defending and neutral state with close economic and political ties to China. Beijing's constantly changing position on Taiwan -- which has incrementally moderated from "liberation" to "peaceful unification" to "one China" to "anti-independence" since Mao's era -- in fact reflects a concern with Taiwan's geostrategic status, not with the precise nature of its political ties to China. According to this interpretation, Beijing has no interest in occupying or ruling Taiwan; it simply wants a sphere of influence that increases its global clout and in which Taiwan is a neutral state, not a client state. Seen through this lens, Taiwan is a means to an end and the second détente is a tactic intended to achieve this strategic objective through Taiwan's Finlandization.
China's recent behavior confirms this view; Beijing's decision to allow Taiwan to participate in the WHO represents a cool-headed understanding that giving Taiwan a greater international voice could enhance its independence from the United States, which would, in turn, serve China's own interests. It also gives Beijing an opportunity to show that a China-dominated Asia need not be less peaceful, less prosperous, or even less democratic. As the Chinese scholar Jianwei Wang of the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point puts it, "Beijing views the Taiwan issue and cross-straits relations as an integral part of China's comprehensive 'rise' in world affairs rather than as an isolated issue purely affecting national pride alone."
Recent survey data lends credence to this argument. The mainland citizens polled by Horizon Research in 2004 were not particularly nationalist about retaking Taiwan -- only 15 percent wanted immediate military action, whereas 58 percent believed that the government should rule out the use of force in favor of economic integration. In a 2008 speech, Hu identified "political antagonism," rather than political separation, as the problem in cross-straits relations, breaking with previous pronouncements from Beijing. Subsequent policy statements by the CCP have revealed a calm confidence in the shifting geostrategic relationship with Taiwan, not a bombastic nationalist urgency for reunification.
THE PACIFIER 安撫
In 1995, at the end of the first détente, Chen-shen Yen, a Taiwanese scholar and KMT adviser, wrote a paper in the Taiwanese political journalWenti yu Yanjiu explicitly extolling the logic of Finlandization (or fenlanhua in Chinese) for Taiwan. By seeking Beijing's approval for an expanded international voice, maintaining a foreign policy that did not threaten China, and choosing leaders who enjoyed Beijing's trust, Yen argued, Taiwan could do more to protect its internal autonomy and economic prosperity than it could by challenging the rising superpower on its doorstep. Moreover, Taiwan's long-term interests in gaining true independence could only be achieved by democratization in China, which would be more likely if Taiwan avoided stoking a military or ideological confrontation. His conclusion echoed that of the Athenians in Thucydides' Melian dialogue: "Given the responsibility to protect its future existence," wrote Yen, "a civilized country should adjust itself to external realities." It has taken over a decade for Yen's prescient views to gain currency, but they now have widespread support.
Ma's pursuit of "total normalization" has enjoyed steady and rising popularity in Taiwan since he came to office. It reflects a view that the militarized approach to the cross-strait conflict that has dominated both Taiwanese (and U.S.) strategic thinking since the days of Chiang and Mao has not resolved the dispute and does not serve Taiwan's present needs. Just as Finland, a small country, was able to pioneer a nonmilitarized alternative to the Cold War, so, too, could Taiwan play that role in the brewing U.S.-Chinese cold war in Asia.
At present, a rising China threatens the world primarily because there has been little in the way of domestic political liberalization to keep Beijing's increasing economic and military power in check. Taiwan could play a far greater role in China's liberalization if it were to become a Finlandized part of the region and its officials were able to move across the strait even more freely than they do now. Already, prominent Chinese liberals, such as Zhang Boshu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are arguing that the mainland should draw lessons about political development from Taiwan. As Sheng Lijun of the National University of Singapore writes, "With the Taiwan political challenge, Beijing will sooner or later have to improve its governance (including democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption)." Taipei's experience with democratic reform offers many lessons for Beijing -- especially because the formerly authoritarian KMT's return to power in 2008 showed that the CCP could one day hope to rule again even if the advent of democracy initially brought another party to power.
Democratic reform in China will be encouraged both by popular pressure to emulate Taiwan (PRC citizens have already enthusiastically adopted Taiwanese pop culture and business practices) and by the brute necessity of managing the relationship in a way that meets the Taiwanese electorate's high expectations of transparency and accountability. Some may call it appeasement, but if Taiwan uses appeasement to democratize and pacify a rising China, it will be a worthy appeasement indeed.
SELLING FINLANDIZATION 推銷芬蘭化
Taiwan's continued progress toward Finlandization will depend on whether Ma can demonstrate the tangible benefits of this strategy to the Taiwanese population. He will have to secure an even greater international voice for Taiwan (for example, making its WHO observer status permanent), the ability to negotiate its own free-trade agreements, and the verified removal of some of the more than 1,000 Chinese missiles currently aimed at the island. Best of all would be a peace accord under which China renounced the use of force unless the island were invaded or achieved de jure independence. Such an accord, which both sides are seeking, would be the functional equivalent of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty, allaying the large power's security concerns while assuring the small power of its autonomy. Another potential benefit is a promised economic cooperation framework agreement within which Taiwan could pursue a free-trade agreement with Beijing; Taiwan currently risks becoming uncompetitive in the Chinese market and China-based supply chains as a result of the free-trade agreements between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.
Ma will also have to reassure Taiwanese voters, who fear losing their political freedoms. In Taiwan, there is a justified concern about being lured into a trap of integration with China that would imperil Taiwan's democracy and internal sovereignty (meanwhile, Beijing fears that Taiwan's external sovereignty will grow as its participation in international organizations expands). The University of Wisconsin's Wang, whose analysis reflects the CCP's strategic views, writes ominously that Ma will eventually have to show his goodwill by scaling back Taiwan's arms purchases and acknowledging that reunification is an option in the long term. Wang is correct that Finlandization will not be free of costs for Taiwan. In particular, as was the case in Finland, Taipei will have to restrain anticommunist activism on the island and distance itself from the United States militarily.
Under much domestic pressure and possibly with the tacit consent of Beijing, Ma allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan in September 2009 to pray for the victims of the typhoon. But the same month he denied entry to the Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, citing national security concerns and the public interest. His official statement on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre -- with its delicate reference to a "painful chapter in history" that "must be faced," as similar dark moments in Taiwan's history had to be -- was classic Finlandized diplomacy. For Ma, the Tiananmen anniversary was a reminder to "both sides to spur each other to make further improvements in the area of human rights." A similarly tendentious, if ultimately fruitful, moral equivalence on the part of Finnish leaders is what brought the Soviets to Helsinki to talk about human rights.
For now, domestic opposition to Ma's policy is muted. Most controversies on the island concern how to pursue integration with China, not whether to do so. The risks of political dependence on China seem worth it to most Taiwanese, especially given the island's current political dependence on the United States. And Taiwan's youth, in particular, see China as an opportunity rather than a threat. For the DPP to regain power, it will have to embrace this pragmatic consensus on China. The days of the DPP's "just say no" platform on China are over.
Just as Ma must consider the views of the electorate, he must also take into account the reactions of other Asian states. Taiwan could still alienate other Asian nations if it shifted to a more China-centered, Finlandized approach, but this is unlikely because it is exactly what ASEAN has been promoting among its members for ten years or more through its "ASEAN + 3" and ASEAN Regional Forum initiatives. The theory of Finlandization may highlight the uniqueness of Taiwan's situation, but a similar logic already informs policymaking in other Asian capitals. South Korea has been taking a similar tack, and many neighboring nations believe that China can be pacified, as Vietnam was, through inclusion and cooperation. Even Japan, which feels itself to be more vulnerable than other Asian countries to China's rise as a naval power, has an interest in encouraging internal reforms in China and might learn from Taiwan's example. After all, West Germany's successful Ostpolitik, which led to a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970, built on the lessons of Finland's accommodation with the Soviet Union.
Far from seeking to alienate other Asian governments, then, the KMT government believes that Taiwan's international status will be enhanced if Taipei falls in step with its neighbors' preferred methods of dealing with a rising China -- through accommodation, socialization, and communication.
OUT OF ORBIT 脫軌
The Finlandization of Taiwan will, of course, pose major challenges to current U.S. policy. An April 2009 Congressional Research Service report recognized this dilemma by asking how Washington ought to react "if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRC." Opinions in Washington are divided between two realist camps. The first wants to allow the changes to proceed so that, in the words of Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Taiwan does not become a "strategic liability" to the United States. The second wants to rearm Taiwan so that, in the words of Dennis Blair, the U.S. national intelligence director, Taiwan is not "so defenseless that it feels that it has to do everything that China says." Neither camp seems to accept, much less endorse, the liberal logic of Finlandization as an alternative security strategy for Taiwan.
Taiwan has played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s -- first it served as a buffer against communist expansion out of North Korea, and more recently it has been a bulwark against a rising China. It is strategically located along East Asian shipping lanes and could provide another naval resupply site if China continues to limit U.S. naval visits to Hong Kong. Keeping Taiwan within the U.S. orbit has served Washington's interests by demonstrating that the United States will continue to engage in Asia, despite talk of a declining U.S. role in the region. The tragic result of this policy, however, has been that it has played into Beijing's fears of encirclement and naval inferiority, which in turn has prompted China's own military buildup.
Finlandization will allow Taiwan to break this cycle by taking itself out of the game and moderating the security dilemma that haunts the Washington-Beijing relationship. The cross-strait freeze of 1995-2005 raised fears in Washington that Taiwan was becoming a strategic liability for the United States. Ma's policies have momentarily resolved that concern. And if the United States uses the current opportunity to adjust its own policies and support the détente, that concern could be rendered moot. This would make future provocations by either side less likely.
Taipei's decision to chart a new course is a godsend for a U.S. administration that increasingly needs China's cooperation in achieving its highest priority: maintaining the peaceful international liberal order. The United States requires Beijing's support on a host of pressing world issues -- from climate change to financial stability and nuclear nonproliferation. William Stanton, Washington's de facto ambassador to Taiwan, admitted as much in October 2009, declaring that "it's in everybody's interests, including Taiwan's as well, that the U.S. try to have a cooperative relationship with China."
In recent years, the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship has been increasingly dictated by the interests of narrow lobbies rather than grand strategy. The U.S. arms industry, the Taiwanese military, and Taiwanese independence activists together make a formidable force. Before the current détente, Taiwan's staunch anticommunism and adversarial policy toward China aligned well with Washington's own ideology and militarized approach to the Taiwan Strait. But the recent evolution of tactical and strategic thinking in Taipei and Beijing has created a disjuncture. The adversarial status quo that the United States has protected is no longer the status quo that the Taiwanese want protected.
進年來,台美關係逐漸由少數利益團體遊說取代整體策略. 美國的國防工業,台灣的軍隊,以及獨派活動人士共同形成一股可觀的力量. 在現在的和解出現之前,台灣反共以及仇中的立場與華府的意識形態以及應派一致. 但是近來台北與北京關係改善形成台美間(立場)的分裂. 台灣已經不是當初依賴美國保護的以維現狀的台灣了!
Obviously, if Ma were to compromise Taiwan's democratic institutions in pursuit of détente with China, Washington would have reason to complain. But if a democratic Taiwan continues to move into China's orbit, Washington should follow the lead of the Taiwanese people in redefining their future. In the past, U.S. "noninterference" meant maintaining the balance of power across the strait and challenging Beijing's provocations. Today, it means reducing the militarization of the conflict and not interfering with Taiwan's Finlandization.
很明顯的,如果馬政府犧牲台灣民主體制作為與中國和解的交換,美國政府大有立場抱怨.但是,如果一個民主的台灣繼續在往中國的軌道上邁進,華府則應該順從台灣人民重新定義台灣自己的將來. 在過去,美國的不干預政策指的是兩岸抗衡. 在今天,不干預政策代表減少軍事衝突,並且減少干預台灣的芬蘭化.
Even from a strictly realist perspective, there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit, given that U.S. military security can be attained through other Asian bases and operations. Taiwan's Finlandization should be seen not as a necessary sacrifice to a rising China but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China. Washington should drop its zero-sum view of the Taipei-Beijing relationship and embrace the strategic logic underlying the rapprochement -- in effect "losing China" a second time by allowing Taiwan to drift into the PRC's sphere of influence.
即使是從最務實的角度來看,美國實在沒有必要把台灣放在它的戰略部局裡,美國大可以藉由它在亞洲的其他軍事基地達到美國的安全. 台灣芬蘭化實在不是用來對抗興起中國所必須付出的犧牲,相反的,台灣的芬蘭化反而可以藉此安撫中國. 華府已經放棄它過去的"零和"看法,轉而取代的是與中國共存的想法--美國不想再次在對台影響上輸給中國.
Ma told a visiting congressional delegation in August 2009 that his détente would be "beneficial to all parties concerned." He is right. As was the case with Finland and the Soviet Union, Taiwan has an inherent interest in a peaceful and democratic China. Washington needs to embrace this shift not only because it serves its own long-term strategic aims in Asia and globally but also because what the Taiwanese people choose to do with their sovereign democratic power is up to them.The overburdened giant should happily watch from a distance and focus on other pressing regional and global issues.
在2009年八月,馬英九告訴訪台的國會代表"和解讓所有相關人均受益".此話不差(他是對的).就如同芬蘭與俄羅斯的例子,台灣可以從一個和平與民主的中國中獲益. 華府必須擁抱這個位移不但是因為這符合美國本身在亞洲與在全球的長期戰略目標,更因為台灣人民有權對自己的主權依民主方式做出選擇. 這個已經負荷過度的巨人(按:指美國)應該樂於從距離之外見到這種發展,(這將有利美國)以便將焦點放在其他區域與全球議題上.
SIDELINING UNCLE SAM 與美國分道揚鑣
The United States has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted both strategically and diplomatically. Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the PRC's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei.
In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan -- a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit.
By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture.
The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations -- specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power.
Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift.
網路上有人貼出原文,我曾經試圖想翻譯全文後張貼在個人部落格,但實在太長,只翻了前面幾段還有中間偏後四段之後就放棄了. 現在把前面我自己翻的幾段連同原文對照貼出來如下.有空可能會慢慢再一段段翻,可能會從推銷芬蘭化(selling Finlandization)翻起(從我自己有興趣了解的翻起啦).
這裡有前1/3的翻譯,而這裡有關於芬蘭化的一些註解與後續評論.
1/13updated: 這裡有全文翻譯.(雖然我個人比較喜歡中英對照:P)
以下轉載.
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不再迫切的台海: 為什麼美國會從台灣芬蘭化中獲利
January/February 2010
Bruce Gilley
BRUCE GILLEY is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Portland State University's Mark O. Hatfield School of Government and the author of The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy.
Since 2005, Taiwan and China have been moving into a closer economic and political embrace -- a process that accelerated with the election of the pro-détente politician Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in 2008. This strengthening of relations presents the United States with its greatest challenge in the Taiwan Strait since 1979, when Washington severed ties with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
自從2005年以來,台灣與中國在經濟與政治上更加緊密結合,這個過程也因為馬英九當選後更為加速. 兩岸關係強化帶給美國自1979年台美斷交,美國(原文為"華盛頓")與中國建交以來最大的一次挑戰.
In many ways, the current thaw serves Taipei's interests, but it also allows Beijing to assert increasing influence over Taiwan. As a consensus emerges in Taiwan on establishing closer relations with China, the thaw is calling into question the United States' deeply ambiguous policy, which is supposed to serve both Taiwan's interests (by allowing it to retain its autonomy) and the United States' own (by guarding against an expansionist China). Washington now faces a stark choice: continue pursuing a militarized realist approach -- using Taiwan to balance the power of a rising China -- or follow an alternative liberal logic that seeks to promote long-term peace through closer economic, social, and political ties between Taiwan and China.
就很多方面來說,兩岸和解(thaw)符合台北的利益,但是和解的同時也讓北京對台灣有更大的影響力. 台灣內部的共識是強化與中國的關係,但此讓美國摩擬兩可的政策受到質疑:美國保衛台灣的自主性以對抗擴張主義的中國的政策使台美雙方都受益. 華府現在面對的是個嚴峻的選擇: 繼續強化軍事,利用台灣來與興起中的中國抗衡, 或是以更緊密的兩岸經濟,社會與政治連結來達到長遠之和平. (註:大抵就是鷹派與鴿派的選擇)
A TALE OF TWO DÉTENTES 雙合解記
After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities, led, respectively, by Chiang Kai-shek's defeated nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and Mao Zedong's victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For nearly three decades, Chiang and Mao harbored rival claims to the whole territory of China. Gradually, most of the international community came to accept Beijing's claims to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and a special role in its foreign relations. By 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China, 69 percent of the United Nations' member states had already severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of relations with China.
中國內戰止於1949年,那之後台灣與中國成為兩個政治實體,分別由戰敗的蔣介石率領國民黨與戰勝的毛澤東代表的中國共產黨統治兩岸. 近三十年來, 蔣介石與毛澤東都將對方之領土視為自己領土之一部份(儘管實際上只對台灣或只對中國得以行使主權.)漸漸的,大部分的國際社會接受北京視台灣為中國一部份的這種說法. 到了1972年,尼克森拜訪中國時, 百分之六十九的聯合國會員國都已經與台灣斷絕外交關係,紛紛與中國建交.
The United States, which had merely "acknowledged" Beijing's claim to Taiwan, was slow to recognize the People's Republic of China due to Washington's historical ties with the KMT, dating back to World War II and its conflict with the PRC during the Korean War. The strategic position of Taiwan, astride western Pacific sea and air lanes, gave it added importance. But by 1979, even Washington had recognized Beijing. That same year, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in order to ensure continued legal, commercial, and de facto diplomatic relations with the island. At the last minute, Senate Republicans -- along with several Democrats who worried that President Jimmy Carter was disregarding Taiwan's security -- amended the legislation to include promises of arms sales to Taipei and a broader U.S. commitment to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" against the island.
基於華府與國民黨的歷史可追溯至二次大戰與韓戰期間中(共)美衝突的淵源，美國很晚才承認北京對台灣的宣示,也很晚才承認中華人民共和國。台灣的戰略地位，佔據西太平洋的海空航線要衝，使其更加重要。但是到了1979年，連華府也承認中國政權了。同年，美國實施了台灣關係法以確保維持法律、商業與實質外交關係。在最後一刻，參院共和黨員──加上幾個擔心卡特總統忽視台灣安全的民主黨員──修改法案，包括承諾對台軍售與美國擴大承諾「抵抗任何武力方式或其他形式的脅迫」。
The fading of the Chiang-Mao rivalry, which subsided after both leaders died in the mid-1970s, coupled with Beijing's new inward-looking focus on economic development, made these military commitments appear anachronistic during the 1980s. Beijing ended its shelling of the Taiwanese islands off the Chinese coast and welcomed Taiwanese "compatriots" to the mainland for tourism, investment, and family reunification. Taiwan's native-born president, Lee Teng-hui, who came to power in 1988, had no interest in "retaking the mainland" and approved the creation of such exchanges. In 1993, the heads of the two governments' cross-strait contact groups held their first direct talks, in Singapore.
This "first détente" ended abruptly in 1995, when the United States issued a visa for Lee to visit Cornell University. China, in the midst of a domestic leadership transition, was already hardening its position on Taiwan, and armchair generals in all three places were publishing books on the predicted order of battle to come. Beijing saw the visa as a betrayal of earlier U.S. promises to refrain from any official relations with Taiwanese leaders. Taiwan's democratization was also leading to domestic popular pressures for a more assertive stance on independence. Beijing reacted by hurling missiles into the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. Washington dispatched aircraft carriers and radar ships to the area. Beijing's worst fears were then realized in 2000, when Taiwanese citizens elected Chen Shui-bian as their president. Chen, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), now the opposition, promised to seek formal recognition of Taiwan's de facto independence from China. As a consequence, cross-strait relations deteriorated dramatically between 1995 and 2005, leading to a renewed emphasis on militarization by all three sides.
The damage wrought by this "second freeze" led to serious rethinking in all three capitals. Beijing worried that its aggressive posture on Taiwan was threatening its broader influence in Asia, as other nations rallied behind the U.S. security shield; Taipei began to reevaluate the value of its symbolic assertions of nationhood; and Washington began to question its unlimited commitment to an increasingly troublesome Taiwan, which threatened to damage, if not destroy, its more important relationship with China. By the end of George W. Bush's first term, Washington had become the main check on Taipei's assertions of independence.
The "second détente" in cross-strait relations began with a 2005 speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao downplaying demands for reunification. Beijing was shifting its view as a result of an emerging grand strategy that stressed regional and global influence; accordingly, it came to see Taiwan less as an ideologically charged and urgent matter and more as a pragmatic and low-key management issue. Ma's election in 2008 signaled the resurgence of a similar vision in Taiwan. He promised "no unification, no independence, no use of force." Within months, in rapid and unprecedented fashion, the heads of the contact groups began holding semiannual meetings and signed more than two dozen previously unthinkable agreements. Although most of these involved economic matters, they had political implications, too. The number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan -- including Taiwan's long-militarized islands directly off the coast of China -- surged by a factor of ten, to 3,000 per day. China sent students to Taiwan, and the two sides authorized 270 flights per week across the strait. Important political fears that had previously restricted economic integration suddenly dissipated on both sides, and Taipei and Beijing began talking about the "total normalization" of their economic and financial ties. The supposedly fixed national interests on which foreign policy realists base their assessments were in total flux.
The second détente has also included explicitly political deals. China had previously permitted Taiwan to participate only in international organizations with an economic focus, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization. In 2009, it allowed Taiwan to participate as an observer at the annual board meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. Both sides began discussing a Taiwanese presence in the UN bodies responsible for civil aviation, commercial shipping, meteorology, and climate change.
Both sides also tacitly agreed to a "diplomatic truce": Beijing ceased courting the nations on Taiwan's dwindling list of 23 diplomatic allies, and in 2009 Taipei dropped its perpetual request for UN membership for the first time in 17 years. When Ma was reelected as KMT chair in July 2009, Hu declared that he would like to build "mutual trust between the two sides in political affairs." As political relations warmed, Taiwanese officials -- including leading DPP figures, such as the mayor of Kaohsiung -- became regular visitors in China.
There are indications that this second cross-straits détente will last. Although both leaders' terms will expire in 2012, Hu's designated successor, Xi Jinping, is a well-known advocate of cross-strait exchanges. Ma, meanwhile, has recovered from the political damage wrought by Typhoon Morakot, which struck the island in August 2009. So long as the DPP remains divided between extreme anti-détente and limited-détente factions, he seems likely to win reelection.
Taiwan and China are now approaching their relationship using completely different assumptions than those that governed cross-strait relations for decades. Whereas they previously saw the relationship as a military dispute, today both sides have embraced a view of security that is premised on high-level contact, trust, and reduced threats of force. Their views of economic issues, meanwhile, have placed global integration and competitiveness ahead of nationalist protectionism. This represents a fundamental shift in the political relationship between Taiwan and China.
FROM HELSINKI TO TAIPEI 從赫爾辛基到台北
To understand the evolution of the Taipei-Beijing relationship, it is useful to consider the theory and practice of what has become known as "Finlandization" in the field of political science. The term derives its name from Finland's 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join alliances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for any country challenging Soviet interests. In return, the Kremlin agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and respect Finland's democratic system. Therefore, from 1956 to 1981, under the leadership of President Urho Kekkonen, Finland pursued a policy of strategic appeasement and neutrality on U.S.-Soviet issues and limited domestic criticism of the Soviet Union. This policy enjoyed wide support in Finland at the time (despite the subsequent debate in Finland on its merits). Kekkonen also won praise across the political spectrum in the United States, especially from foreign policy realists such as George Kennan, who lauded the Finnish leader's "composure and firmness."
要了解兩岸關係的演變不妨參考日後政治學領域所謂 "芬蘭化"的理論與實務。這個名稱源自芬蘭在1948年與蘇聯的協議，據此赫爾辛基同意不加入挑戰莫斯科的聯盟或擔任任何挑戰蘇聯利益的國家的基地. 引以回報的是克里姆林宮同意維護芬蘭自治並尊重芬蘭的民主制度.因此，1956到1981年，在Urho Kekkonen總統領導下，芬蘭在美蘇議題上追求戰略綏靖與中立政策，限制國內對蘇聯的批評.當時這個政策在芬蘭廣受支持,雖然後續對成效的爭議也不斷.
Building on the work of others, the Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen in 1988proposed a general theory of Finlandization known as "adaptive politics." Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or "puppet," state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence -- voluntary choices that the latter could never make. Unlike a puppet regime, a Finlandized state calculates that its long-term interests, and perhaps those of its neighbors, are best served by making strategic concessions to a superpower next door. These concessions are motivated chiefly by geographic proximity, psychological threats from the superpower, and cultural affinities between the two sides. Being so close, the superpower need only issue vague threats, rather than display actual military muscle, to change its weaker neighbor's policies. Meanwhile, the small power perceives itself as engaging in an "active and principled neutrality," rather than a cowering acquiescence, a distinction that is critical to rationalizing these policy changes domestically.
丹麥政治學者Mouritzen在1988年根據其他學者的研究提出芬蘭化的理論,指稱芬蘭化是種"適應性政治".Mouritzen強調芬蘭化(Finalized)的政權與魁儡政權之間根本的差異在於:前者志願性的選擇對一個強大的鄰國讓步以換取獨立,後者則是毫無自主選擇權.不像其他魁儡政權,經過精打細算後,一個芬蘭化的邦國的長期利益,甚至可能是強權鄰國的利益,最能夠從對強權讓步中獲得.這個讓步的主要動機在於對於鄰國強權的心裡恐懼與兩者文化上的緊密連結. 因為兩者如此緊密,超級強權僅需模糊的威脅,而不需實際的軍事展現,就已經足以改變鄰近小國的政治.同時,這個小國體認到"積極地,原則性的中立"明顯有異於畏縮的默認,因此得以在國內(domestically)合理化這種讓步強權的政策.
Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion. Even if one rejects the theory of Finlandization, it is difficult to deny that Kekkonen played a constructive role in ending the Cold War. In 1969, for instance, Finland offered itself as the venue for a conference between the two blocs that eventually produced a shared document with clear commitments to human rights and freedoms: the Helsinki accords.
芬蘭化對冷戰實務派提出一種直接的挑戰:該派認為對蘇聯的妥協只會讓莫斯科的胃口更大.即使有人拒絕芬蘭化的理論,也很難否定Kekkonen在結束冷戰中扮演一個建設性的角色. 例如在1969年,芬蘭讓自己成為兩方(按:指北約/美國與蘇聯)會談的管道(venue),進而讓雙方都承諾人權與自由--簽署赫爾辛基條約.
Cold War historians, such as John Lewis Gaddis, believe that the Helsinki process was central to undermining the moral authority of the Soviet Union, and others have argued that it prompted the ideological shift necessary to kickstart Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the mid-1980s. Moreover, Finland's unique status as interlocutor with Moscow made possible the first serious discussions of nuclear disarmament and of the shared development of Arctic resources, both of which served as templates for the warming of relations between NATO and the Soviet bloc. Although it usually has a negative connotation, "Finlandization" need not be a pejorative term.
冷戰歷史學家如John Lewis Gaddis相信芬蘭化(Helsinki process)對於崩解蘇聯權威居功厥偉,其他冷戰歷史學家則主張芬蘭化有助於1980年代中期Gorbachev對蘇聯的改革與意識形態的轉變.尤有甚者,芬蘭成為一個獨特的,與蘇聯對話者的狀態促成首次針對解除武裝的對談,也使得北約會員國之間得討論資源共享,並緩和北約會員國與蘇聯間的緊張關係. 雖然有負面意涵,"芬蘭化"不必是個輕蔑的詞彙. (註:作者也承認芬蘭化含有負面意涵,卻還鼓吹台灣芬蘭化,嗯,這交由讀者去判斷.)
Taiwan shares many of the key features that characterized Finland in the late 1940s. It is a small but internally sovereign state that is geographically close to a superpower with which it shares cultural and historical ties. Its fierce sense of independence is balanced by a pragmatic sense of the need to accommodate that superpower's vital interests. Most important, the evolving views of its leaders and its people today focus on seeking security through integration rather than confrontation. This approach could help defuse one of the most worrying trends in global politics: the emerging rivalry between China and the United States.
台灣和1940年代晚期的芬蘭在很多方面都類似. 它是個小但是主權獨立的邦國(按:英文上state,country,nation意義不甚相同,但是翻成中文幾乎都一樣翻成"國家".在此我姑且翻成邦國,若不恰當歡迎指教,謝謝!),地理上鄰近一個超級強權而又與此超級強權有文化上與歷史上的連結. 它強烈的獨立意識與務實的意識相互平衡以因應超級強權的利益.最重要的,隨著領導者與人民的觀念的遞嬗,今日的焦點著重於透過整合,而非衝撞,以追求安全.這種方式或可去除國際政治上對中美(兩個超級強權)對峙的疑慮. (註:這有一個很大的差異,台灣如果真正的真芬蘭化,台灣必須是主權獨立的邦國,不只是實際上更必須在法理上都是一個獨立的邦國.在上面所附的連結當中有一篇就提到台灣是獨立國家這個重點)
The analogy is not perfect. U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan today are more explicit than they were for Finland during the Cold War, although few doubt that NATO would have defended Finland against a Soviet invasion. And China's 1,000-plus missiles targeted at Taiwan are a more direct threat than anything the Soviet military ever mustered across the Vuoksi River. But in general the thinking that has motivated the second détente on both sides parallels that which led to the Finnish-Soviet détente of the Cold War. Although it is still early, Taipei is moving in the direction of eventual Finlandization.
這個類比當然並不完美.美國對台灣安全的保證遠比冷戰當時對芬蘭的保障來得明確,雖然少數質疑北約會保衛芬蘭以對抗蘇聯的入侵.而且,中國以超過一千枚飛彈對準台灣的威脅遠比蘇聯軍隊從未屯集於Vuoksi河畔來得更直接. 但整體而言,促使兩岸第二次和解的想法與芬蘭與蘇聯在冷戰時間的想法如出一轍.雖然為時尚早,台北已經逐步邁向芬蘭化.
Under such a scenario, Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power, rather than a U.S. strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing's fears about the island's becoming an obstacle to China's military and commercial ambitions in the region. It would also refrain from undermining the CCP's rule in China. In return, Beijing would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei expanded participation in international organizations, and extend the island favorable economic and social benefits.
在這種情況下,台灣會重新定位自己為中立國,而不是美國的戰略伙伴,以化解北京視台灣為中國在亞洲軍事與商業崛起的障礙. 它也必須節制不能妨礙中國共產黨在中國的執政.(相對的,)北京必須以解除軍事威脅,給予台北參予國際組織,擴展台灣經濟與社會利益做為回報.
The DPP's director of international affairs, Hsiao Bi-khim, has written that the changes in Taiwan's China policy "are leading to a new strategic outlook, which aligns Taiwan with China's sphere of influence instead of maintaining the traditional presumed informal alliance with the United States." Although Hsiao, like many in the DPP, fears this sort of shift, such reservations are unwarranted.
民進黨的國際事務部主任蕭美琴曾經撰文指出台灣的中國政策"正帶領一個新的策略觀點,那是個台灣與中國影響力結盟,而非傳統與美國非正式聯盟的觀點."雖然蕭美琴,和許多民進黨員一樣,對此轉換感到恐懼而有所保留,但這種保留毫無根據.
A MEANS OR AN END? 是手段還是目的?
There are two ways to view the shift in Chinese policy toward Taiwan. The dominant interpretation has long been that Beijing is motivated by nationalism and that the PRC's irredentist claims to Taiwan stem from a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness. According to this view, the CCP is striving to reincorporate Taiwan into China in order to avert a domestic nationalist backlash and a crisis of legitimacy. Seen in this light, Taiwan is an end unto itself and the second détente is merely a tactical shift intended to force Taiwan into reunification through indirect means: beneath Beijing's silk glove of détente is the iron fist of nationalism.
In recent years, many Western analysts have rejected this nationalist interpretation of Beijing's Taiwan policy and opted instead for a geostrategic one. Unrecovered territories are legion in the history of the PRC, and the CCP has found it easy to let go of others (including disputed regions bordering Russia, India, and the Spratly Islands, as well as control over Mongolia and Korea). Taiwan, however, by virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential strategic threat to China. It could serve as a base for foreign military operations against China and even in peacetime could constrain Beijing's ability to develop and project naval power and ensure maritime security in East Asia.
Beijing's core goal from this perspective is the preservation of its dominance in its immediate offshore region, as became clear in 2009 when five Chinese vessels trailed a U.S. Navy ship sailing near a Chinese submarine base. Taiwan represents an obstacle to this goal if it remains a U.S. strategic ally armed with advanced U.S. weaponry, but not if it becomes a self-defending and neutral state with close economic and political ties to China. Beijing's constantly changing position on Taiwan -- which has incrementally moderated from "liberation" to "peaceful unification" to "one China" to "anti-independence" since Mao's era -- in fact reflects a concern with Taiwan's geostrategic status, not with the precise nature of its political ties to China. According to this interpretation, Beijing has no interest in occupying or ruling Taiwan; it simply wants a sphere of influence that increases its global clout and in which Taiwan is a neutral state, not a client state. Seen through this lens, Taiwan is a means to an end and the second détente is a tactic intended to achieve this strategic objective through Taiwan's Finlandization.
China's recent behavior confirms this view; Beijing's decision to allow Taiwan to participate in the WHO represents a cool-headed understanding that giving Taiwan a greater international voice could enhance its independence from the United States, which would, in turn, serve China's own interests. It also gives Beijing an opportunity to show that a China-dominated Asia need not be less peaceful, less prosperous, or even less democratic. As the Chinese scholar Jianwei Wang of the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point puts it, "Beijing views the Taiwan issue and cross-straits relations as an integral part of China's comprehensive 'rise' in world affairs rather than as an isolated issue purely affecting national pride alone."
Recent survey data lends credence to this argument. The mainland citizens polled by Horizon Research in 2004 were not particularly nationalist about retaking Taiwan -- only 15 percent wanted immediate military action, whereas 58 percent believed that the government should rule out the use of force in favor of economic integration. In a 2008 speech, Hu identified "political antagonism," rather than political separation, as the problem in cross-straits relations, breaking with previous pronouncements from Beijing. Subsequent policy statements by the CCP have revealed a calm confidence in the shifting geostrategic relationship with Taiwan, not a bombastic nationalist urgency for reunification.
THE PACIFIER 安撫
In 1995, at the end of the first détente, Chen-shen Yen, a Taiwanese scholar and KMT adviser, wrote a paper in the Taiwanese political journalWenti yu Yanjiu explicitly extolling the logic of Finlandization (or fenlanhua in Chinese) for Taiwan. By seeking Beijing's approval for an expanded international voice, maintaining a foreign policy that did not threaten China, and choosing leaders who enjoyed Beijing's trust, Yen argued, Taiwan could do more to protect its internal autonomy and economic prosperity than it could by challenging the rising superpower on its doorstep. Moreover, Taiwan's long-term interests in gaining true independence could only be achieved by democratization in China, which would be more likely if Taiwan avoided stoking a military or ideological confrontation. His conclusion echoed that of the Athenians in Thucydides' Melian dialogue: "Given the responsibility to protect its future existence," wrote Yen, "a civilized country should adjust itself to external realities." It has taken over a decade for Yen's prescient views to gain currency, but they now have widespread support.
Ma's pursuit of "total normalization" has enjoyed steady and rising popularity in Taiwan since he came to office. It reflects a view that the militarized approach to the cross-strait conflict that has dominated both Taiwanese (and U.S.) strategic thinking since the days of Chiang and Mao has not resolved the dispute and does not serve Taiwan's present needs. Just as Finland, a small country, was able to pioneer a nonmilitarized alternative to the Cold War, so, too, could Taiwan play that role in the brewing U.S.-Chinese cold war in Asia.
At present, a rising China threatens the world primarily because there has been little in the way of domestic political liberalization to keep Beijing's increasing economic and military power in check. Taiwan could play a far greater role in China's liberalization if it were to become a Finlandized part of the region and its officials were able to move across the strait even more freely than they do now. Already, prominent Chinese liberals, such as Zhang Boshu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are arguing that the mainland should draw lessons about political development from Taiwan. As Sheng Lijun of the National University of Singapore writes, "With the Taiwan political challenge, Beijing will sooner or later have to improve its governance (including democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption)." Taipei's experience with democratic reform offers many lessons for Beijing -- especially because the formerly authoritarian KMT's return to power in 2008 showed that the CCP could one day hope to rule again even if the advent of democracy initially brought another party to power.
Democratic reform in China will be encouraged both by popular pressure to emulate Taiwan (PRC citizens have already enthusiastically adopted Taiwanese pop culture and business practices) and by the brute necessity of managing the relationship in a way that meets the Taiwanese electorate's high expectations of transparency and accountability. Some may call it appeasement, but if Taiwan uses appeasement to democratize and pacify a rising China, it will be a worthy appeasement indeed.
SELLING FINLANDIZATION 推銷芬蘭化
Taiwan's continued progress toward Finlandization will depend on whether Ma can demonstrate the tangible benefits of this strategy to the Taiwanese population. He will have to secure an even greater international voice for Taiwan (for example, making its WHO observer status permanent), the ability to negotiate its own free-trade agreements, and the verified removal of some of the more than 1,000 Chinese missiles currently aimed at the island. Best of all would be a peace accord under which China renounced the use of force unless the island were invaded or achieved de jure independence. Such an accord, which both sides are seeking, would be the functional equivalent of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty, allaying the large power's security concerns while assuring the small power of its autonomy. Another potential benefit is a promised economic cooperation framework agreement within which Taiwan could pursue a free-trade agreement with Beijing; Taiwan currently risks becoming uncompetitive in the Chinese market and China-based supply chains as a result of the free-trade agreements between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.
Ma will also have to reassure Taiwanese voters, who fear losing their political freedoms. In Taiwan, there is a justified concern about being lured into a trap of integration with China that would imperil Taiwan's democracy and internal sovereignty (meanwhile, Beijing fears that Taiwan's external sovereignty will grow as its participation in international organizations expands). The University of Wisconsin's Wang, whose analysis reflects the CCP's strategic views, writes ominously that Ma will eventually have to show his goodwill by scaling back Taiwan's arms purchases and acknowledging that reunification is an option in the long term. Wang is correct that Finlandization will not be free of costs for Taiwan. In particular, as was the case in Finland, Taipei will have to restrain anticommunist activism on the island and distance itself from the United States militarily.
Under much domestic pressure and possibly with the tacit consent of Beijing, Ma allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan in September 2009 to pray for the victims of the typhoon. But the same month he denied entry to the Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, citing national security concerns and the public interest. His official statement on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre -- with its delicate reference to a "painful chapter in history" that "must be faced," as similar dark moments in Taiwan's history had to be -- was classic Finlandized diplomacy. For Ma, the Tiananmen anniversary was a reminder to "both sides to spur each other to make further improvements in the area of human rights." A similarly tendentious, if ultimately fruitful, moral equivalence on the part of Finnish leaders is what brought the Soviets to Helsinki to talk about human rights.
For now, domestic opposition to Ma's policy is muted. Most controversies on the island concern how to pursue integration with China, not whether to do so. The risks of political dependence on China seem worth it to most Taiwanese, especially given the island's current political dependence on the United States. And Taiwan's youth, in particular, see China as an opportunity rather than a threat. For the DPP to regain power, it will have to embrace this pragmatic consensus on China. The days of the DPP's "just say no" platform on China are over.
Just as Ma must consider the views of the electorate, he must also take into account the reactions of other Asian states. Taiwan could still alienate other Asian nations if it shifted to a more China-centered, Finlandized approach, but this is unlikely because it is exactly what ASEAN has been promoting among its members for ten years or more through its "ASEAN + 3" and ASEAN Regional Forum initiatives. The theory of Finlandization may highlight the uniqueness of Taiwan's situation, but a similar logic already informs policymaking in other Asian capitals. South Korea has been taking a similar tack, and many neighboring nations believe that China can be pacified, as Vietnam was, through inclusion and cooperation. Even Japan, which feels itself to be more vulnerable than other Asian countries to China's rise as a naval power, has an interest in encouraging internal reforms in China and might learn from Taiwan's example. After all, West Germany's successful Ostpolitik, which led to a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970, built on the lessons of Finland's accommodation with the Soviet Union.
Far from seeking to alienate other Asian governments, then, the KMT government believes that Taiwan's international status will be enhanced if Taipei falls in step with its neighbors' preferred methods of dealing with a rising China -- through accommodation, socialization, and communication.
OUT OF ORBIT 脫軌
The Finlandization of Taiwan will, of course, pose major challenges to current U.S. policy. An April 2009 Congressional Research Service report recognized this dilemma by asking how Washington ought to react "if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRC." Opinions in Washington are divided between two realist camps. The first wants to allow the changes to proceed so that, in the words of Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Taiwan does not become a "strategic liability" to the United States. The second wants to rearm Taiwan so that, in the words of Dennis Blair, the U.S. national intelligence director, Taiwan is not "so defenseless that it feels that it has to do everything that China says." Neither camp seems to accept, much less endorse, the liberal logic of Finlandization as an alternative security strategy for Taiwan.
Taiwan has played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s -- first it served as a buffer against communist expansion out of North Korea, and more recently it has been a bulwark against a rising China. It is strategically located along East Asian shipping lanes and could provide another naval resupply site if China continues to limit U.S. naval visits to Hong Kong. Keeping Taiwan within the U.S. orbit has served Washington's interests by demonstrating that the United States will continue to engage in Asia, despite talk of a declining U.S. role in the region. The tragic result of this policy, however, has been that it has played into Beijing's fears of encirclement and naval inferiority, which in turn has prompted China's own military buildup.
Finlandization will allow Taiwan to break this cycle by taking itself out of the game and moderating the security dilemma that haunts the Washington-Beijing relationship. The cross-strait freeze of 1995-2005 raised fears in Washington that Taiwan was becoming a strategic liability for the United States. Ma's policies have momentarily resolved that concern. And if the United States uses the current opportunity to adjust its own policies and support the détente, that concern could be rendered moot. This would make future provocations by either side less likely.
Taipei's decision to chart a new course is a godsend for a U.S. administration that increasingly needs China's cooperation in achieving its highest priority: maintaining the peaceful international liberal order. The United States requires Beijing's support on a host of pressing world issues -- from climate change to financial stability and nuclear nonproliferation. William Stanton, Washington's de facto ambassador to Taiwan, admitted as much in October 2009, declaring that "it's in everybody's interests, including Taiwan's as well, that the U.S. try to have a cooperative relationship with China."
In recent years, the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship has been increasingly dictated by the interests of narrow lobbies rather than grand strategy. The U.S. arms industry, the Taiwanese military, and Taiwanese independence activists together make a formidable force. Before the current détente, Taiwan's staunch anticommunism and adversarial policy toward China aligned well with Washington's own ideology and militarized approach to the Taiwan Strait. But the recent evolution of tactical and strategic thinking in Taipei and Beijing has created a disjuncture. The adversarial status quo that the United States has protected is no longer the status quo that the Taiwanese want protected.
進年來,台美關係逐漸由少數利益團體遊說取代整體策略. 美國的國防工業,台灣的軍隊,以及獨派活動人士共同形成一股可觀的力量. 在現在的和解出現之前,台灣反共以及仇中的立場與華府的意識形態以及應派一致. 但是近來台北與北京關係改善形成台美間(立場)的分裂. 台灣已經不是當初依賴美國保護的以維現狀的台灣了!
Obviously, if Ma were to compromise Taiwan's democratic institutions in pursuit of détente with China, Washington would have reason to complain. But if a democratic Taiwan continues to move into China's orbit, Washington should follow the lead of the Taiwanese people in redefining their future. In the past, U.S. "noninterference" meant maintaining the balance of power across the strait and challenging Beijing's provocations. Today, it means reducing the militarization of the conflict and not interfering with Taiwan's Finlandization.
很明顯的,如果馬政府犧牲台灣民主體制作為與中國和解的交換,美國政府大有立場抱怨.但是,如果一個民主的台灣繼續在往中國的軌道上邁進,華府則應該順從台灣人民重新定義台灣自己的將來. 在過去,美國的不干預政策指的是兩岸抗衡. 在今天,不干預政策代表減少軍事衝突,並且減少干預台灣的芬蘭化.
Even from a strictly realist perspective, there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit, given that U.S. military security can be attained through other Asian bases and operations. Taiwan's Finlandization should be seen not as a necessary sacrifice to a rising China but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China. Washington should drop its zero-sum view of the Taipei-Beijing relationship and embrace the strategic logic underlying the rapprochement -- in effect "losing China" a second time by allowing Taiwan to drift into the PRC's sphere of influence.
即使是從最務實的角度來看,美國實在沒有必要把台灣放在它的戰略部局裡,美國大可以藉由它在亞洲的其他軍事基地達到美國的安全. 台灣芬蘭化實在不是用來對抗興起中國所必須付出的犧牲,相反的,台灣的芬蘭化反而可以藉此安撫中國. 華府已經放棄它過去的"零和"看法,轉而取代的是與中國共存的想法--美國不想再次在對台影響上輸給中國.
Ma told a visiting congressional delegation in August 2009 that his détente would be "beneficial to all parties concerned." He is right. As was the case with Finland and the Soviet Union, Taiwan has an inherent interest in a peaceful and democratic China. Washington needs to embrace this shift not only because it serves its own long-term strategic aims in Asia and globally but also because what the Taiwanese people choose to do with their sovereign democratic power is up to them.The overburdened giant should happily watch from a distance and focus on other pressing regional and global issues.
在2009年八月,馬英九告訴訪台的國會代表"和解讓所有相關人均受益".此話不差(他是對的).就如同芬蘭與俄羅斯的例子,台灣可以從一個和平與民主的中國中獲益. 華府必須擁抱這個位移不但是因為這符合美國本身在亞洲與在全球的長期戰略目標,更因為台灣人民有權對自己的主權依民主方式做出選擇. 這個已經負荷過度的巨人(按:指美國)應該樂於從距離之外見到這種發展,(這將有利美國)以便將焦點放在其他區域與全球議題上.
SIDELINING UNCLE SAM 與美國分道揚鑣
The United States has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted both strategically and diplomatically. Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the PRC's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei.
In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan -- a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit.
By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture.
The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations -- specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power.
Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift.
Thursday, December 31, 2009
迎新送舊, Happy New Year!
轉眼這個部落閣也走過第三年. 簡短寫下這三年來的轉變:此部落格本來是當作msn spaces 的備份檔,自從有了兩個部落格,一度曾經想過分主題在兩個部落格刊載,後來又因為兩個部落格的編輯功能,流量追蹤功能等不同又回到備份格或是精簡版的作用--本來的構想是每週一篇. 當作備份或是精簡版有個好處,我可以拿來做交叉比對,當然,這完全是方便我個人拿在做統計練習.
在2009的最後一天,就讓多倫多美食之旅(冬季篇)的流水帳來做總結.
展望新的一年,祝自己也祝大家新年快樂!
在2009的最後一天,就讓多倫多美食之旅(冬季篇)的流水帳來做總結.
展望新的一年,祝自己也祝大家新年快樂!
Thursday, December 17, 2009
[轉載] 回應第五封公開信 (updated: 全文英漢對照)
這是蘇俊賓回應 11/13/2009國際學者給馬政府的第五封公開信. 轉載如下,對照我自己的翻譯. 翻到後面很想吐,若有錯譯漏譯,請不吝指正. 感恩!
--------
GIO response to Nov. 13 open letter
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓
Friday, Dec 18, 2009, Page 8
關於各位學者在(2009年)十一月十三日發表對於台灣自由民主,司法系統,與兩岸關係的建言, 我已代表政府公開詳細回覆. (註: 第四封的回函相當長,曾以連續兩天刊載回函)
Rather than repeat myself, therefore, I would like to direct the attention of the signatories to examples of the international community’s assessments and public opinion on these matters.
因此,與其重複,我將針對各位提出的建議,引用國際社會與台灣公眾意見逐一答覆如下. (按: 第五封公開信一開始就提到,雖然多次建議,政府也回覆,但是都沒有針對重點回答啊!第五封公開信開頭第二段就提到: We regret to say that the responses received from Government Information Office (GIO) Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) did not adequately address the issues raised, nor have we seen any substantive ameliorative steps taken to correct the problems.)
Freedom House: Taiwan a model among new Asian democracies. (自由之家: 台灣是亞洲民主的典範)
Following two decades of governmental and judicial reform, Taiwan has created the most flourishing democratic system and freest press environment among Chinese societies in East Asia. According to the Freedom in the World 2009 survey released by Freedom House(詳見此), we not only continue to rank among the world’s “free” countries but count as a model of success among new Asian democracies. (<--妝笑維,人家也知道啊,但人家的問題是說,台灣的排名倒退啊! 完全沒解釋退步的原因!)
經過二十年的政府與司法改造,台灣已經創造出蓬勃的民主系統,在東亞的華人社會裡享有最大的新聞自由. 根據自由之家2009年公布的報告,我們不但依舊被評比為"自由"國度,還是亞洲民主的典範.
Further, our ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and our enactment of legislation requiring all domestic laws to conform with these covenants, have won the praise of international human rights groups. Undeniably, the Republic of China has evolved into a genuinely free and democratic nation respected as such in the international community — not one in which, as claimed in the open letter, freedom and democracy have eroded.
此外,我們簽署了兩個國際人權公約, 並檢視國內法規是否與國際公約符合, 這種認同國際公約並轉化國內法的作法贏得了國際人權組織的嘉許. 不可否認的, 中華民國已經演化到一個真正的,受到國際社會尊敬的自由民主國家,絕對不是公開信裡宣稱的自由民主被傾蝕的國家.
Transparency International: Taiwan progressing in honesty of government.透明國際(Transparency International) 台灣朝誠實政府邁進
The several cases of suspected corruption on the part of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and officials in his administrative team that have erupted since 2008 have seriously damaged the nation’s international image and destroyed citizens’ trust in and respect for the government.
好幾件與前總統陳水扁與其幕僚有關的貪汙案件自從2008年爆發之後已經嚴重傷害到台灣的國際形象,也傾害國民對政府的信任. (<--千錯萬錯都是阿扁的錯啦!)
Since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office in May 2008, his administration has drawn up a new blueprint for cultivating governmental integrity and has energetically promoted reform aimed at enhancing cleanliness of government. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 released by Transparency International on Nov. 17, 2009, our ranking among the 180 countries surveyed rose to 37th place, illustrating international analysts’ affirmation of our reform efforts.
自馬英九執政以來,馬政府團隊已經建立新的藍圖, 以重建政府清廉. 根據透明國際(Transparency International)在今年十一月十七日公佈的2009年貪腐指數,台灣在全球180個國家的排名已經進步到第37名, 透明國際這個調查結果肯定馬政府的清廉政府的改革.
In the future, enjoying the firm support of our citizenry, this government will join forces with other sectors of society to press forward with anti-corruption reform measures to realize the ideal of clean government and a society founded on trust.
在未來, 在全體公民的支持下,政府將與其他社會團體一同努力建立清廉政府.
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy: Taiwan’s judicial system fair, independent. 台灣司法系統公平獨立
Regarding the handling of court cases involving the former president, under President Ma’s leadership, this government has put great importance on maintaining the fairness and independence of our prosecutorial and judicial systems and has in no way interfered in their operations in pursuit of any political agenda.
關於前陳總統的一些司法案件,在馬政府將重點放在公平與獨立的檢調與司法體系, 以杜絕任何政治干預.
On Sept. 11 this year, the Taipei District Court found former president Chen, as well as his wife, son and daughter-in-law, guilty of several crimes, including money laundering and embezzling money from the presidential state affairs fund, for which they were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The latter three had confessed to a number of charges. At a Taiwan High Court hearing on Nov. 24, Chen’s wife, son, daughter and son-in-law pled guilty to charges of perjury. And before the same court on the previous day, a former chairperson of the state-controlled Taipei Financial Center Corp admitted having committed perjury and having given the former first lady a bribe of NT$10 million (US$309,000) in exchange for help in securing the “Taipei 101” chairperson position.
今年的九月十一日,台北法院發現陳前總統與其夫人,兒子與媳婦多項犯罪有罪,包括洗錢收賄等,各被求判處不同年的徒刑. 吳淑珍,陳致中與黃睿靖皆認罪. 此三人在十一月二十四日在高等法院開庭的時候被叛有罪. 就在前一天,陳敏薰也認罪承認以台幣千萬元為代價以鞏固她在台北101的董座職位.
According to the latest Asian Intelligence report issued on Nov. 4 by the widely respected Hong Kong firm Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd (PERC), it is generally believed that in the Chen Shui-bian case, the court proceedings have been transparent, the evidence against him is convincing and the judiciary has operated independently — not as a political tool of the Kuomintang (KMT).
根據Asian Intelligence (按: 一時找不到台灣的譯名,先不翻譯),由廣受尊敬的香港,政治經濟風險顧問公司,在十一月四日的報告指出, 一般大眾相信陳水扁的案件在法院的程序透明,同時證據顯示陳水扁涉案, 法院獨立運作, 而非國民黨的政治操作.
This illustrates the fairness and independence of our judicial system as appraised by international investigative organizations.
這顯示出司法系統的公平獨立,且受到國際組織的肯定.
Cross-strait detente: Supported by the people, in line with international expectations.緩和兩岸關係: 受到民眾支持,符合國際預期
This government’s policies concerning Taiwan-mainland China relations have always upheld the Republic of China’s national sovereignty and have insisted on the principle of putting Taiwan first for the benefit of its people. These stances have not changed, nor will they change. Over the past year, based on the “1992 consensus,” the two sides’ inking of nine agreements related to people’s livelihood has steadily expanded the scope of cooperation across the Taiwan Strait and gradually built up goodwill and mutual trust.
政府的兩岸關係政策向來首重台灣主權,並堅持台灣人民優先. 這個立場從未改變,也不會改變. 在過去一年,基於九二共識,兩岸已簽署九個協議,以促進兩岸建立善意與相互信賴. (<--民調顯示正好相反啊! 馬政府自己感覺良善但卻與一般民眾看法相左)
As the representative of a democratic society, in dealing with cross-strait issues, the ROC government will surely take protection of the nation’s sovereignty and promotion of our people’s prosperity as its highest guiding principles. At the same time, it is open to the public’s and the Legislature’s scrutiny. The two sides signed three Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) on Financial Supervisory Cooperation on Nov. 16, and a public opinion poll conducted by TVBS between Oct. 16 and Oct. 18 indicated that 60 percent of respondents believed that such MOUs would enhance the soundness of cross-strait financial interchange, while 53 percent believed that they would have a positive influence on Taiwan’s financial industry. This shows that the signing of the MOUs is supported by the public.
代表民主社會的一員,在兩岸關係事務上,台灣政府向來以捍衛主權,促進人民繁榮為最高指導原則(<--只是不知道是哪個國家的主權啦!哪個戶籍地的人民繁榮啦! 怎麼辦,太噁心我翻不下去了啦!). 在此同時,兩岸事務也對民眾公開,受到立法院備查. 兩岸所簽訂的備忘錄,在民調如TVBS在十月十六至十月十八日之間的調查顯示,百分之六十的受訪者對此表達支持,而且有百分之五十三民眾相信這將帶來正面影響. 這都顯示出簽訂備忘錄受到大眾支持. (<--只用TVBS的調查,阿其他反對的調查怎都不敢講啊?)
As for the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement currently under consideration, this government is quite willing to work for a nationwide consensus on this and other cross-strait policies through channels of dialogue and communication such as the Legislative Yuan and party-to-party discussion.
至於兩岸經濟合作架構限在正考慮中,政府願意努力達成共識,透過各種對話與溝通的管道,例如透過立法院與黨與黨協商. (按:這個指的是ECFA, 問題是,行政院長都不接受挑戰啊!只會派其他人,然後其他人又是脫口說出失業XXX,毫無基礎,這有啥屁用啊)
This government’s efforts to improve cross-strait relations have won the support of the majority of our people and created new vistas for Taiwan’s development. During his recent visit to mainland China, US President Barack Obama also expressed support for improvements in cross-strait relations. In addition, we have seen breakthrough developments with respect to our participation in the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, our accession to the Government Procurement Agreement of the World Trade Organization and our participation as an observer at the World Health Assembly.
政府極力改善兩岸關係已經贏得多數民眾的支持,也替台灣創造新景象. (按: 這是在說笑話嗎? 明明前幾天天下雜誌的調查才顯示出相反的結果呢!)近期歐巴馬訪中,也曾指出欣見兩岸關係改善. 此外,我們也參與APEC的討論, 加入WTO,並成為WHA的觀察員(<--,別忘了,是自我矮化,在中國准許下才參與的,還鬧出什麼葉金川事件丟人現眼)
In September of this year, we also declared it imperative that Taiwan participate in activities of the UN International Civil Aviation Organization, and that talks be held under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. As such efforts are intimately related to the welfare of Taiwan’s people, our government will continue to pursue these as well as other initiatives to advance the well-being of our nation and people.
今年九月,我們表達讓台灣參與國際民航組織的重要性,如此可在聯合國架構下參加氣象高峰會. 這將密切關係到台灣民眾的福利,政府也將持續追求這些參與國際社會以促進民眾福利的努力.
Since his inauguration, President Ma has focused on promoting a “second wave” of democratic reform, in the hope that, within his term of office, we can significantly enhance the quality of our democracy — that we can make strides toward democratic excellence through which human rights are more firmly secured, the spirit of rule of law is more solidly embodied, judicial independence and fairness are more deeply rooted, and civil society flourishes with greater vitality. Such aims are shared throughout our society, and we hope that those who, like the signatories of the open letter, care about Taiwan will lend us their support. Let us work together to ensure that Taiwan always stands on the side of freedom, democracy and peace.
自從馬政府就任以來,馬總統已展開第二波民主改造(按: 第二波白色恐怖嗎?),希望在他的任期內,可以顯著提升民主品質,確保人權,維持司法獨立與公平,公民活動蓬勃發展. 這些目標都明確地傳達給社會,我們希望關心台灣的國際友人,例如這些署名學者可以繼續支持台灣.讓我們共同為台灣的自由民主與和平共同努力.(<--最後這段話又出現以前反共復國的文章結論了,好八股啊)
Su Jun-pin is the minister of the Government Information Office.
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延伸閱讀
第一封公開信 與 王清峰的回函
第二封公開信 與 王清峰的回函
第三封公開信 與 蘇俊賓的回函
第四封公開信 與 蘇俊賓的回函
--------
GIO response to Nov. 13 open letter
By Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓
Friday, Dec 18, 2009, Page 8
關於各位學者在(2009年)十一月十三日發表對於台灣自由民主,司法系統,與兩岸關係的建言, 我已代表政府公開詳細回覆. (註: 第四封的回函相當長,曾以連續兩天刊載回函)
Rather than repeat myself, therefore, I would like to direct the attention of the signatories to examples of the international community’s assessments and public opinion on these matters.
因此,與其重複,我將針對各位提出的建議,引用國際社會與台灣公眾意見逐一答覆如下. (按: 第五封公開信一開始就提到,雖然多次建議,政府也回覆,但是都沒有針對重點回答啊!第五封公開信開頭第二段就提到: We regret to say that the responses received from Government Information Office (GIO) Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) did not adequately address the issues raised, nor have we seen any substantive ameliorative steps taken to correct the problems.)
Freedom House: Taiwan a model among new Asian democracies. (自由之家: 台灣是亞洲民主的典範)
Following two decades of governmental and judicial reform, Taiwan has created the most flourishing democratic system and freest press environment among Chinese societies in East Asia. According to the Freedom in the World 2009 survey released by Freedom House(詳見此), we not only continue to rank among the world’s “free” countries but count as a model of success among new Asian democracies. (<--妝笑維,人家也知道啊,但人家的問題是說,台灣的排名倒退啊! 完全沒解釋退步的原因!)
經過二十年的政府與司法改造,台灣已經創造出蓬勃的民主系統,在東亞的華人社會裡享有最大的新聞自由. 根據自由之家2009年公布的報告,我們不但依舊被評比為"自由"國度,還是亞洲民主的典範.
Further, our ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and our enactment of legislation requiring all domestic laws to conform with these covenants, have won the praise of international human rights groups. Undeniably, the Republic of China has evolved into a genuinely free and democratic nation respected as such in the international community — not one in which, as claimed in the open letter, freedom and democracy have eroded.
此外,我們簽署了兩個國際人權公約, 並檢視國內法規是否與國際公約符合, 這種認同國際公約並轉化國內法的作法贏得了國際人權組織的嘉許. 不可否認的, 中華民國已經演化到一個真正的,受到國際社會尊敬的自由民主國家,絕對不是公開信裡宣稱的自由民主被傾蝕的國家.
Transparency International: Taiwan progressing in honesty of government.透明國際(Transparency International) 台灣朝誠實政府邁進
The several cases of suspected corruption on the part of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and officials in his administrative team that have erupted since 2008 have seriously damaged the nation’s international image and destroyed citizens’ trust in and respect for the government.
好幾件與前總統陳水扁與其幕僚有關的貪汙案件自從2008年爆發之後已經嚴重傷害到台灣的國際形象,也傾害國民對政府的信任. (<--千錯萬錯都是阿扁的錯啦!)
Since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office in May 2008, his administration has drawn up a new blueprint for cultivating governmental integrity and has energetically promoted reform aimed at enhancing cleanliness of government. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 released by Transparency International on Nov. 17, 2009, our ranking among the 180 countries surveyed rose to 37th place, illustrating international analysts’ affirmation of our reform efforts.
自馬英九執政以來,馬政府團隊已經建立新的藍圖, 以重建政府清廉. 根據透明國際(Transparency International)在今年十一月十七日公佈的2009年貪腐指數,台灣在全球180個國家的排名已經進步到第37名, 透明國際這個調查結果肯定馬政府的清廉政府的改革.
In the future, enjoying the firm support of our citizenry, this government will join forces with other sectors of society to press forward with anti-corruption reform measures to realize the ideal of clean government and a society founded on trust.
在未來, 在全體公民的支持下,政府將與其他社會團體一同努力建立清廉政府.
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy: Taiwan’s judicial system fair, independent. 台灣司法系統公平獨立
Regarding the handling of court cases involving the former president, under President Ma’s leadership, this government has put great importance on maintaining the fairness and independence of our prosecutorial and judicial systems and has in no way interfered in their operations in pursuit of any political agenda.
關於前陳總統的一些司法案件,在馬政府將重點放在公平與獨立的檢調與司法體系, 以杜絕任何政治干預.
On Sept. 11 this year, the Taipei District Court found former president Chen, as well as his wife, son and daughter-in-law, guilty of several crimes, including money laundering and embezzling money from the presidential state affairs fund, for which they were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The latter three had confessed to a number of charges. At a Taiwan High Court hearing on Nov. 24, Chen’s wife, son, daughter and son-in-law pled guilty to charges of perjury. And before the same court on the previous day, a former chairperson of the state-controlled Taipei Financial Center Corp admitted having committed perjury and having given the former first lady a bribe of NT$10 million (US$309,000) in exchange for help in securing the “Taipei 101” chairperson position.
今年的九月十一日,台北法院發現陳前總統與其夫人,兒子與媳婦多項犯罪有罪,包括洗錢收賄等,各被求判處不同年的徒刑. 吳淑珍,陳致中與黃睿靖皆認罪. 此三人在十一月二十四日在高等法院開庭的時候被叛有罪. 就在前一天,陳敏薰也認罪承認以台幣千萬元為代價以鞏固她在台北101的董座職位.
According to the latest Asian Intelligence report issued on Nov. 4 by the widely respected Hong Kong firm Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd (PERC), it is generally believed that in the Chen Shui-bian case, the court proceedings have been transparent, the evidence against him is convincing and the judiciary has operated independently — not as a political tool of the Kuomintang (KMT).
根據Asian Intelligence (按: 一時找不到台灣的譯名,先不翻譯),由廣受尊敬的香港,政治經濟風險顧問公司,在十一月四日的報告指出, 一般大眾相信陳水扁的案件在法院的程序透明,同時證據顯示陳水扁涉案, 法院獨立運作, 而非國民黨的政治操作.
This illustrates the fairness and independence of our judicial system as appraised by international investigative organizations.
這顯示出司法系統的公平獨立,且受到國際組織的肯定.
Cross-strait detente: Supported by the people, in line with international expectations.緩和兩岸關係: 受到民眾支持,符合國際預期
This government’s policies concerning Taiwan-mainland China relations have always upheld the Republic of China’s national sovereignty and have insisted on the principle of putting Taiwan first for the benefit of its people. These stances have not changed, nor will they change. Over the past year, based on the “1992 consensus,” the two sides’ inking of nine agreements related to people’s livelihood has steadily expanded the scope of cooperation across the Taiwan Strait and gradually built up goodwill and mutual trust.
政府的兩岸關係政策向來首重台灣主權,並堅持台灣人民優先. 這個立場從未改變,也不會改變. 在過去一年,基於九二共識,兩岸已簽署九個協議,以促進兩岸建立善意與相互信賴. (<--民調顯示正好相反啊! 馬政府自己感覺良善但卻與一般民眾看法相左)
As the representative of a democratic society, in dealing with cross-strait issues, the ROC government will surely take protection of the nation’s sovereignty and promotion of our people’s prosperity as its highest guiding principles. At the same time, it is open to the public’s and the Legislature’s scrutiny. The two sides signed three Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) on Financial Supervisory Cooperation on Nov. 16, and a public opinion poll conducted by TVBS between Oct. 16 and Oct. 18 indicated that 60 percent of respondents believed that such MOUs would enhance the soundness of cross-strait financial interchange, while 53 percent believed that they would have a positive influence on Taiwan’s financial industry. This shows that the signing of the MOUs is supported by the public.
代表民主社會的一員,在兩岸關係事務上,台灣政府向來以捍衛主權,促進人民繁榮為最高指導原則(<--只是不知道是哪個國家的主權啦!哪個戶籍地的人民繁榮啦! 怎麼辦,太噁心我翻不下去了啦!). 在此同時,兩岸事務也對民眾公開,受到立法院備查. 兩岸所簽訂的備忘錄,在民調如TVBS在十月十六至十月十八日之間的調查顯示,百分之六十的受訪者對此表達支持,而且有百分之五十三民眾相信這將帶來正面影響. 這都顯示出簽訂備忘錄受到大眾支持. (<--只用TVBS的調查,阿其他反對的調查怎都不敢講啊?)
As for the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement currently under consideration, this government is quite willing to work for a nationwide consensus on this and other cross-strait policies through channels of dialogue and communication such as the Legislative Yuan and party-to-party discussion.
至於兩岸經濟合作架構限在正考慮中,政府願意努力達成共識,透過各種對話與溝通的管道,例如透過立法院與黨與黨協商. (按:這個指的是ECFA, 問題是,行政院長都不接受挑戰啊!只會派其他人,然後其他人又是脫口說出失業XXX,毫無基礎,這有啥屁用啊)
This government’s efforts to improve cross-strait relations have won the support of the majority of our people and created new vistas for Taiwan’s development. During his recent visit to mainland China, US President Barack Obama also expressed support for improvements in cross-strait relations. In addition, we have seen breakthrough developments with respect to our participation in the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, our accession to the Government Procurement Agreement of the World Trade Organization and our participation as an observer at the World Health Assembly.
政府極力改善兩岸關係已經贏得多數民眾的支持,也替台灣創造新景象. (按: 這是在說笑話嗎? 明明前幾天天下雜誌的調查才顯示出相反的結果呢!)近期歐巴馬訪中,也曾指出欣見兩岸關係改善. 此外,我們也參與APEC的討論, 加入WTO,並成為WHA的觀察員(<--,別忘了,是自我矮化,在中國准許下才參與的,還鬧出什麼葉金川事件丟人現眼)
In September of this year, we also declared it imperative that Taiwan participate in activities of the UN International Civil Aviation Organization, and that talks be held under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. As such efforts are intimately related to the welfare of Taiwan’s people, our government will continue to pursue these as well as other initiatives to advance the well-being of our nation and people.
今年九月,我們表達讓台灣參與國際民航組織的重要性,如此可在聯合國架構下參加氣象高峰會. 這將密切關係到台灣民眾的福利,政府也將持續追求這些參與國際社會以促進民眾福利的努力.
Since his inauguration, President Ma has focused on promoting a “second wave” of democratic reform, in the hope that, within his term of office, we can significantly enhance the quality of our democracy — that we can make strides toward democratic excellence through which human rights are more firmly secured, the spirit of rule of law is more solidly embodied, judicial independence and fairness are more deeply rooted, and civil society flourishes with greater vitality. Such aims are shared throughout our society, and we hope that those who, like the signatories of the open letter, care about Taiwan will lend us their support. Let us work together to ensure that Taiwan always stands on the side of freedom, democracy and peace.
自從馬政府就任以來,馬總統已展開第二波民主改造(按: 第二波白色恐怖嗎?),希望在他的任期內,可以顯著提升民主品質,確保人權,維持司法獨立與公平,公民活動蓬勃發展. 這些目標都明確地傳達給社會,我們希望關心台灣的國際友人,例如這些署名學者可以繼續支持台灣.讓我們共同為台灣的自由民主與和平共同努力.(<--最後這段話又出現以前反共復國的文章結論了,好八股啊)
Su Jun-pin is the minister of the Government Information Office.
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延伸閱讀
第一封公開信 與 王清峰的回函
第二封公開信 與 王清峰的回函
第三封公開信 與 蘇俊賓的回函
第四封公開信 與 蘇俊賓的回函
Monday, December 14, 2009
總統府到底在澄清什麼? 火大! (final update: 8pm, 12/15, USA central time )
Whether there will be reunification as expected by the mainland side depends very much on what is going to unfold in the next decade.(是否會如對岸預期的統一端看未來十年的發展. 現階段沒有人可以回答這個問題.Emphasis added)
府澄清馬指統一否 看數十年
【聯合晚報╱記者陳志平／即時報導】 2009.12.15 11:54 am
美國亞洲華爾街日報12月14日所刊出專訪馬英九總統報導，指馬總統表示兩岸能否如大陸所期待達成統一，視未來十年的情勢發展。總統府公共事務室代主任張國葆上午舉行記者會澄清，馬總統講的是「未來數十年（decades）」，非報載的「十年（decade）」，差一個S差很多。
-------------
好,我們就來看到底WSJ寫的是什麼:
"While the "three no's" have eased tensions significantly, Mr. Ma still grapples with the question of where the relationship is going long-term. "Whether there will be reunification as expected by the mainland side depends very much on what is going to unfold in the next decade. This is a question no one can answer at this stage. But as the president of this country, I believe that the 23 million people of Taiwan want to secure one or two generations of peace and prosperity so that people on either side of the Taiwan Strait can have sufficient time and freedom to understand, to appreciate, and to decide what to do."
S在哪裡??? 就已經說是下個十年(next decade)了!! 這是在騙肖耶嗎? 真想罵髒話! 總統府既然出來澄清,希望看到他們發文去WSJ要求更正,不然就只是在愚民!
===updated on 12/15 USA central time===
今天(12/15)早上發現有新的新聞稿如下,
華爾街日報專訪內容 馬總統要求澄清
更新日期:2009/12/15 19:34
（中央社記者李淑華台北15日電）國民黨主席馬英九今天表示，美國亞洲華爾街日報專訪用錯decade（10年）與decades（數十年）。他已要求新聞局去函澄清與更正，同時將在元旦文告再次說明兩岸基本理念。
馬英九下午在中山會報再次針對接受美國亞洲華爾街日報專訪內容，提出澄清與說明。總統馬英九接受專訪時表示，「兩岸能否如大陸所期待達成統一，端視未來數十年（decades）情勢的發展」，並非報載所述的10年（decade）。"(後略)
咖啡館裡馬上有朋友提出這個"更正"要求. 在我還沒看到真正的,由WSJ發布更正啟示之前, 我想到之前陸委會宣稱被外電(華盛頓郵報)的一個"誤解",是關於統獨問題的,轉載如下:
Washington Times 務必更正
◎ 陳如媜
七月十六日的華盛頓時報（Washington Times）Ａ十三版「世界新聞」刊登一則訪問陸委會主委賴幸媛的新聞，其中一段話引起我的好奇，賴主委說出「台灣人民贊成政府傾中政策的民意達到前所未有的九十二％高比例」（Reaching an all-times public opinion high,92 percent of Taiwanese agree with the administration’s policy toward China, she said）。
剛好賴主委十七日上午在駐美代表處舉行華文媒體記者會，筆者特地請教賴主委這項民意數據從何而來？賴主委回答是該報記者寫錯了！賴主委說她受訪當時說的是「台灣人民贊成維持現狀的有將近九十二％的比例」，她並補充「事實上正確數字是九十一．八％」，華盛頓時報寫的完全和她說的相反。
筆者當場請她向華盛頓時報要求更正，賴主委不置可否。後來在電梯相遇，筆者又再度提出請求；賴主委表示沒關係、這不重要，不需要向該報要求更正。(後略)
所以, 在沒有真正的更正啟示之前,這些所謂澄清的動作不過更讓人覺得此地無銀三百兩?!
==final update==
12/15晚上我又看了一下,不錯,WSJ在原文最下面加了一小段更正啟示如下:
Corrections & Amplifications
In a Nov. 25 interview with The Wall Street Journal Asia, Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou said that, "Whether there will be reunification as expected by the mainland side depends very much on what is going to unfold in the next decades." An earlier version of this article misquoted him as saying "decade."
這件事算是落幕了! 給兩邊都拍拍手一下! 還有,陸委會是不是該去函要求華盛頓郵報要求更正呢?
------
以下轉載英文原文:
Taiwan's Détente Gamble
Ma Ying-jeou's vision for making peace with China through trade, defense and democracy. DECEMBER 14, 2009, 6:58 A.M. ET
By Leslie Hook
Taipei
Taiwan knows better than most countries what it's like to lie in the shadow of a rising China. Just 100 miles off the mainland's coast—where 1,500 missiles stand aimed and ready to fire—the island is home to a vibrant democracy whose 23 million cast their ballots last March for a president promising détente with Beijing.
That man is Ma Ying-jeou, a Hong Kong-born, U.S.-educated lawyer belonging to the same Kuomintang that lost the civil war to Mao Zedong's army 60 years ago. Mr. Ma has taken a conciliatory approach to Beijing, playing down the differences (technically each side claims the other is part of its territory) and emphasizing their common culture, while trying to sell his constituents on the benefits of economic opening with China.
When I met him at the presidential office last month he had a crisp handshake and dark circles under his eyes—he had been jetting around on Air Force One to stump for KMT candidates in the Dec. 5 local elections. But he brightened when he talked about engaging Beijing. "To defend Taiwan, military means is one of the means we are going to use, and it may not be the most important means. We also depend very much on the soft power of Taiwan to engage the Chinese mainland."
For Mr. Ma, "soft power" has meant direct flights between Beijing and Taipei, direct postal links and cargo shipments, and making it easier for mainland tourists to come visit. Next week delegations from Beijing and Taipei will meet in Taichung, in central Taiwan, for a fourth round of official cross-Strait talks, and they are expected to sign agreements on double-taxation, certification standards, fishing crews, agricultural quarantines and the like. There's a lot to be proud of.
"I don't know whether you have taken a cross-Strait flight before? No?" he asks with a slight grin. "If you did then you would probably see how convenient it is compared to barely a year and a half ago [when travelers had to stop over in Hong Kong or Macau]. Also everybody feels relaxed, people even on the other side of the Strait. And we'll continue the current state of affairs, easing tension across the Taiwan Strait, and trying to forge a closer relationship in economic and other fields." He's not kidding about the relaxed atmosphere in Taipei—earlier I strolled into the presidential office without even a cursory bag inspection or ID check.
Mr. Ma has built his diplomacy around what he calls the "three no's"—no unification during his term in office, no pursuit of de jure independence, and no use of force to resolve differences across the Strait. This has been successful in large part because it contrasts with the policies of his predecessor Chen Shui-bian, who fought tooth and nail for Taiwan's acceptance as a regular member of the international community. Mr. Chen's relations with Beijing were full of spats, some petty, some not. At one point he rolled out postmarks promoting Taiwanese membership in the United Nations; Chinese post offices promptly returned any mail bearing those postmarks.
While the "three no's" have eased tensions significantly, Mr. Ma still grapples with the question of where the relationship is going long-term. "Whether there will be reunification as expected by the mainland side depends very much on what is going to unfold in the next decade. This is a question no one can answer at this stage. But as the president of this country, I believe that the 23 million people of Taiwan want to secure one or two generations of peace and prosperity so that people on either side of the Taiwan Strait can have sufficient time and freedom to understand, to appreciate, and to decide what to do."
Which is where the U.S. comes in. Mr. Ma's critics charge him with jeopardizing Taiwan's democratic integrity and underestimating the lengths to which the mainland is willing to go to "reclaim" the island. But on one score at least he's clear-eyed on the threats facing Taiwan, particularly as China pumps money into a rapid military buildup. "The relaxed tensions [across the Strait] depend very much on the continued supply of arms from the United States to Taiwan," Mr. Ma explains. "Certainly Taiwan will not feel comfortable to go to a negotiating table without sufficient defense buildup in order to protect the safety of the island."
Under the terms of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is obligated to come to Taiwan's defense if the island is attacked—a scenario that used to dominate threat assessments of the region, but now seems unlikely. With President Obama in the White House, does Mr. Ma ever worry about the U.S. commitment to security in the Asia-Pacific region?
He is quick to dismiss any differences, saying that "we feel quite at ease" with Mr. Obama's November visit to the region. "I think his policies toward this part of the world have not deviated from those of the past President of the United States," he explains. "And he also told his [Chinese] host that he would continue to sell arms for the defense to Taiwan."
It will soon be clear whether Mr. Obama will deliver on that: Taiwan is waiting for the State Department to notify Congress about a pending arms package that includes Black Hawk helicopters, submarine designs and an upgrade to the Patriot missile defense system—items first announced under the Bush administration in 2001. Mr. Ma seems in no hurry: "They are already in the pipeline. A few years is not unreasonable."
The more urgent task, as far as Mr. Ma is concerned, is opening up Taiwan's economy to China so that the two sides can strengthen their trade ties—and Taiwanese voters can enjoy the economic benefits of the rapprochement. Mr. Ma's signature project is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, an all-encompassing treaty that would cover tariff reductions, market access and economic cooperation in areas like intellectual-property enforcement.
The ECFA, as it is known, has proved a tough sell: The opposition Democratic Progressive Party says the deal will "steal" millions of Taiwanese jobs and flood Taiwan with cheap Chinese imports—arguments that resonate deeply in Taiwan's agricultural south. This is part of the reason the Democratic Progressive Party saw solid gains in the Dec. 5 local elections. Their arguments are bolstered by the fact that so far, despite the cross-Strait flights and the new, "relaxed" atmosphere, Taiwan's exports to China have actually fallen as a share of China's total imports this year as compared to last year. That's not necessarily Mr. Ma's fault—demand for Taiwan's exports plummeted during the global financial crisis—but the timing is not helpful politically.
Mr. Ma is not exactly a free-trader. He boasts that he has maintained all restrictions on agricultural imports and kept Chinese workers out of the country—two key voter concerns. But he understands Taiwan will suffer badly if it doesn't open up. "As the pace of regional economic integration continues to increase, we are afraid that Taiwan might be left in the cold and marginalized."
He's on a tight deadline, too. "In our case there is an urgency in the sense that when the Asean-mainland China [free trade agreement] comes into existence [in January] it will affect some of our exports to the mainland," because certain goods from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian nations will enter China tariff-free. He cites petrochemicals, machinery, auto parts and some textiles as items of particular concern to Taiwan.
The ECFA is not only about trade with China; Mr. Ma hopes it will solidify trade ties with other countries as well. Taiwan wants to sign free-trade agreements with major economies like the U.S., Japan and Korea, he explains, but can't because "the mainland has always obstructed our efforts to make such an agreement."
Taiwan is also trying to figure out how to benefit from China's growing economy without getting stung by its political system, or flooded with RMB. Mr. Ma says it is important to open up to China in a "very cautious fashion." "We have already allowed mainland business to invest in Taiwan, but only in roughly 100 items or so."
In terms of opening the financial sector, he says the two sides have "by and large" agreed to let each other's banks come in, "but under different conditions." The ECFA will contain some provisions to "make sure the financial order in this country will not be disrupted as a result."
He is also confident Taiwan's institutions will prove resilient in the face of any untoward influence from Beijing. "We have more than 70,000 business firms investing on the Chinese mainland, employing millions of Chinese workers. They could have used that to, you know, interfere in our politics or whatever, and so far that's not that prominent. This is a very democratic and transparent society. Anything of that sort would certainly be reported and affect the cross-Strait relations."
Ultimately Mr. Ma thinks opening up will develop its own momentum—and repercussions for China. "We have already transformed Taiwan from a poor, agricultural, relatively not-so-free society into a modern economy, with model democracy. And that has tremendous impact on the Chinese mainland, when they are also struggling to have more economic freedom and possibly political freedom."
Chinese tourists who visit Taiwan are a central part of his vision. "Not everyone is so impressed with the scenery," he begins modestly. "But they are very impressed by the society. It's really a free society. It's a society [where] individuals respect each other's rights and privacy, and the right to freedom of speech, and all that. And they also admire some of our democratic institutions, although sometimes they may feel that it's a little bit chaotic."
He sees this as a historic opportunity: "I want to create a situation where the two sides could. . . see which system is better for the Chinese culture, for the Chinese people." It's a dream his counterparts in Beijing don't share: China's leaders are a long way from embracing Taiwan's democratic experiment, and they have proved quick to grasp the potential threat of democratic influence from Taiwan, placing specific restrictions on Chinese tourists who go there.
As with any country grappling with China's rise, the success of engagement will turn on how well Mr. Ma knows China. In Taiwan he is seen as being quite Chinese—he speaks Mandarin better than Taiwanese dialect, for example. But critics say he's too naive about the country he is dealing with. All of the various engagement efforts are, in essence, a bet that Beijing will turn out to be a reliable negotiating partner—a partner that can be trusted to, say, move its missiles away from the coast, or allow the full quota of mainland tourists to leave the country.
Mr. Ma is open to the idea that both sides have a lot to learn about each other. "The people on the Chinese mainland do not quite understand my policy," he muses as our interview goes into overtime, referring to his "three no's." "Sometimes they don't understand why we don't want unification. I said, well, it's quite obvious that conditions for unification are not ripe. And we don't even know each other that well."
Ms. Hook is an editorial writer for The Wall Street Journal Asia.
Thursday, December 3, 2009
轉載: 給台灣總統的(第五號)公開信(updated: more links added)
整個十月與十一月都非常忙碌,竟然就漏掉這麼重要的一篇報導. 現在補上. 大致意譯了一下.(老實說,我覺得我的翻譯整篇念起來怎麼怪怪的?)
這篇公開信的重點,依我看來在於對台灣過於親中而忽略其他國際社會的一些警告. 在齋藤辭職,部份人士樂於自貶為區域等的新聞後對照此公開信,更讓人擔憂.
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An open letter to Taiwan’s president
Friday, Nov 13, 2009, Page 8
Dear President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九),
During the past year, we, the undersigned — scholars and writers from the US, Canada, Asia, Europe and Australia — have publicly expressed to your government our concerns about a number of trends and developments in Taiwan. On Nov. 6, 2008, and again on Dec. 2 in letters to Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng (王清峰), we focused on the issues of erosion of justice, significant flaws in the judicial system and judicial abuses against members of the democratic opposition.
在過去一年來，來自美國、加拿大、亞洲、歐洲、澳洲等在內的國際學者，幾度公開向貴政府表達我們對台灣目前的一些發展和走向的顧慮及關心。2008年十一月六日及十二月二[原文見此]日，在致貴法務部長王清峰的信件中，我們特別指出有關台灣司法被傾蝕、制度瑕疵、以及對在野黨成員的司法追究之濫權的擔憂。[版主註:雖然這裡寫的是11/6/2008,但是在原來公開信上註明的日期其實是11/4. ]
On Jan. 21, 2009, and again on May 21, we addressed two open letters to you, Mr. President, expressing concern about the fairness of the judicial system, as well as erosion of press freedom and democratic checks and balances.
We regret to say that the responses received from Government Information Office (GIO) Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) did not adequately address the issues raised, nor have we seen any substantive ameliorative steps taken to correct the problems.
今年一月二十一日和五月二十一日，我們也分別撰寫兩封公開信給您馬總統，明確表達我們對司法公正、新聞自由及民主制衡的關切。
很遺憾的,我們必須說,雖然新聞局長蘇俊賓撥冗回覆[版主註:詳見response to No. 3 and open response to No.4],但其給我們的回函並沒有針對問題核心回覆,而我們也未見到台灣政府拿出具體行動解決問題。
Since then, a number of developments have taken place — some positive and some negative — which prompted us to write to you again to express our views on these issues. We wish to reiterate that we raise these points as strong international supporters of Taiwan’s democracy who care deeply about the country and its future as a free and democratic nation.
從那時起的一些後續發展--含正面的與負面的,無一不促使我們再度撰函予您以表達我們對這些問題的看法. 我們必須再次強調,我們是一群支持台灣民主的國際學者,我們深切希望台灣日後可以成為一個自由與民主的國家.
We also emphasize that we do not take sides in internal political debates, but do have Taiwan’s international image and credibility as an international partner in mind. Because of the hard work and perseverance of the Taiwanese people, Taiwan was able to make the transition to democracy two decades ago.
我們也必須重申,我們並非支持特定(藍綠)陣營,但是我們關切台灣的國際形象與信譽. 因為台灣好不容易經過20年的努力才轉型成為一個民主國家. [註:美國務院的人權報告]
We applaud this achievement and strongly believe that this basic fact, democracy, is the strongest card Taiwan can play in building and strengthening its relations with other countries around the world and the strongest protection against outside interference in Taiwan’s internal affairs.
我們肯定台灣民主這項成就,而民主也是台灣在與國際其他國家強化關係與抗衡外力干涉台灣內政時的最大的王牌.[註:民主才是王牌在當初馬政府拒發熱比婭簽證受到國際批評時,WSJ就有類似的文章了.又,國際試圖干涉台灣內政,如司法嗎?參考此文]
We are sure that you would agree with us that Taiwan’s young democracy can only grow and prosper if it is nurtured through good governance, accountability and transparency based on the fundamental principles of freedom, democracy, justice and human rights. This would also adhere to both the letter and spirit of the two UN human rights covenants signed by you and ratified by the Legislative Yuan, and be enhanced by the implementation of these covenants into national law in accordance with the advice of the International Commission of Jurists.
我們相信您也同意台灣的民主還未臻成熟(young democracy),台灣民主能夠繼續茁壯則有賴政府透明的制度對於民主,司法與人權的規範. 這也符合台灣今年簽署且經立法院核准的的兩項聯合國人權條款的內容和精神, 進一步依照國際法律協會的建議，將其制定為法律，並且在台灣實行。
During the past two decades, Taiwan has made major progress in each of these areas. It thus has been a disappointment for us to see an erosion of justice, a weakening of checks and balances in the democratic system and a decline in press freedom in Taiwan.
台灣在過去20年有長足的進步.然而,令人失望的,(在過去一年中)我們看到司法被侵蝕[版主註:1,2,3],民主制衡體系被削弱[相關連結1,2,3],而且新聞自由倒退[版主註:相關連結1,2,3,4].
These trends are reflected in the significantly downward ratings Taiwan received in the annual reports of international organizations such as Freedom House and Reporters without Borders.
這些趨勢反應在自由之家與無國界記者組織的年度評比(退步)之中(詳見上面相關連結).
They are also reflected in the expressions of concern by international scholars and friends of Taiwan related to the flaws in the judicial proceedings against former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and the apparent lack of neutrality in the continuing “investigations” and indictments of other prominent members of the former DPP government. We thus appeal to you again to ensure that measures are taken to ensure the impartiality and fairness of the judiciary.
這些趨勢也反映在國際學者與友人自扁案與其他前朝民進黨官員的司法案例中,這些案例突顯出司法體系的瑕疵,如缺乏中立的審判.再一次的,我們希望對您表達,也希望貴政府採取措施以確保司法的公正與公平性. [註:扁案判決的一些連結]
Good governance, accountability and transparency based on the fundamental principles of freedom, democracy, justice and human rights are all the more essential now that your government is moving Taiwan on a path of closer economic ties with China. We believe that a decrease of tension across the Taiwan Strait would indeed be welcome, but emphasize that this should not be done at the expense of the hard-won democracy and human rights in Taiwan itself.
Thus, the process of improving relations with your large neighbor across the Taiwan Strait needs to be an open, deliberative and democratic process, in full consultation with both the Legislative Yuan and the democratic opposition, and fully transparent to the general public.
自由民主正義及人權基本原則建立在權責分明、公開透明的的政治制度上。就在台灣政府正把台灣帶向與中國更密切的經濟合作路上，雖然我們肯定降低台海的緊張關係，但要也強調兩岸關係的改善不應該以台灣得來不易的民主及人權為代價。
We are thus pleased to hear that officials of your government have stated that any agreement with China would need to have both a domestic consensus, including approval by the Legislative Yuan, and acceptance by the international community.
我們樂見任何台灣政府與中國政府的協議均將顧及台灣內部的共識與國際社會的接受,包含將兩岸協商報請立法院同意.
We trust this process will be open and consultative in ways that respect the democratic traditions begun so promisingly two decades ago. Indeed, we emphasize that a country can only grow and prosper if it has diversified ties — economically and politically — to other countries.
我們相信與中國對話的過程將會是公開的，諮詢性的，並尊重台灣近二十年來所發展的民主基礎為前提而進行。我們也要強調,一個國家的成長與繁榮必需保持國際多元化,不管是經濟上的或是政治上的.
Too close an embrace with one neighbor will expose that country to the risks of volatility in the neighboring country, in particular if that neighbor remains authoritarian and openly disrespectful of Taiwan’s democratic achievements.
過度的依賴一個鄰國將會把台灣帶入險境,特別是這個鄰國是個專制國家且公開藐視台灣的民主成就.
Mr. President, we wish to emphasize again that, as international scholars and writers who have followed, supported and applauded Taiwan’s impressive transition to democracy, we feel strongly that Taiwan should be more fully accepted by the international community as a full and equal partner.
This can only be achieved if Taiwan ensures that its democratic achievements are safeguarded, that its sovereignty, human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected, and that the democratic fabric of society is strengthened so the country is ready to meet the challenges ahead.
馬總統，我們以國際學者的身份觀察台灣多年，支持並肯定台灣的民主成就，我們深信台灣有資格更加被國際社會接納為平等的一員。而達到此目標的唯一方式是台灣本身必須捍衛台灣的民主成果[註:這個蘇小賓另一個回應顯然也是讓國際學者不滿啊]，確保主權、人權,保障基本自由[版主註:新聞自由外,言論自由的連結參考此]，鞏固社會民主，台灣才有能力面對未來的挑戰。
Respectfully yours,
NAT BELLOCCHIFormer chairman, American Institute in Taiwan
COEN BLAAUWFormosan Association for Public Affairs, Washington
GORDON CHANGAuthor, “The Coming Collapse of China”
EDWARD FRIEDMANProfessor of political science and East Asian studies, University of Wisconsin
PETER CHOWProfessor of economics, City College of New York STEPHANE CORCUFFAssociate professor of political science, China and Taiwan studies, University of Lyon
MICHAEL DANIELSEN Chairman, Taiwan Corner, Copenhagen
JUNE TEUFEL DREYER Professor of political science, University of MiamiJOHN TKACIKFormer senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation and former officer at the Taiwan Coordination Desk, Department of State, Washington
TERRI GILESExecutive director, Formosa Foundation, Los Angeles
MICHAEL RAND HOAREEmeritus reader at the University of London
CHRISTOPHER HUGHESProfessor of international relations, London School of Economics and Political Science
THOMAS HUGHES Former chief of staff to the late senator
Claiborne Pell, Washington
BRUCE JACOBS Professor of Asian languages and studies, Monash University
RICHARD KAGAN Professor emeritus of history, Hamline University
JEROME KEATING Associate professor, National Taipei University (retired).
David KilgourFormer member of parliament and secretary of state for Asia-Pacific (2002-2003), Canada
ANDRE LALIBERTE Associate professor, School of Political Studies, University of OttawaDANIEL LYNCH Associate professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California
LIU SHIH-CHUNG Visiting fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington
VICTOR MAIR Professor of Chinese language and literature, University of Pennsylvania DONALD RODGERS Associate professor of political science, Austin College
CHRISTIAN SCHAFFERER Associate professor, Department of International Trade, Overseas Chinese Institute of Technology, chair of Austrian Associationof East Asian Studies
SCOTT SIMON Associate professor, University of Ottawa, Canada
MICHAEL STAINTON York Center for Asia Research, TorontoPERRY LINK Professor emeritus ofEast Asian Studies,Princeton University
PETER TAGUE Professor of law,Georgetown University
ARTHUR WALDRON Lauder professor of international relations, University of Pennsylvania
VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG Professor of political science, University of Richmond
GERRIT VAN DER WEES Editor of “Taiwan Communique,” Washington
STEPHEN YATES President of DC Asia Advisory and former deputy assistant to the US vice president for nationalsecurity affairs.
這篇公開信的重點,依我看來在於對台灣過於親中而忽略其他國際社會的一些警告. 在齋藤辭職,部份人士樂於自貶為區域等的新聞後對照此公開信,更讓人擔憂.
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An open letter to Taiwan’s president
Friday, Nov 13, 2009, Page 8
Dear President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九),
During the past year, we, the undersigned — scholars and writers from the US, Canada, Asia, Europe and Australia — have publicly expressed to your government our concerns about a number of trends and developments in Taiwan. On Nov. 6, 2008, and again on Dec. 2 in letters to Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng (王清峰), we focused on the issues of erosion of justice, significant flaws in the judicial system and judicial abuses against members of the democratic opposition.
在過去一年來，來自美國、加拿大、亞洲、歐洲、澳洲等在內的國際學者，幾度公開向貴政府表達我們對台灣目前的一些發展和走向的顧慮及關心。2008年十一月六日及十二月二[原文見此]日，在致貴法務部長王清峰的信件中，我們特別指出有關台灣司法被傾蝕、制度瑕疵、以及對在野黨成員的司法追究之濫權的擔憂。[版主註:雖然這裡寫的是11/6/2008,但是在原來公開信上註明的日期其實是11/4. ]
On Jan. 21, 2009, and again on May 21, we addressed two open letters to you, Mr. President, expressing concern about the fairness of the judicial system, as well as erosion of press freedom and democratic checks and balances.
We regret to say that the responses received from Government Information Office (GIO) Minister Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) did not adequately address the issues raised, nor have we seen any substantive ameliorative steps taken to correct the problems.
今年一月二十一日和五月二十一日，我們也分別撰寫兩封公開信給您馬總統，明確表達我們對司法公正、新聞自由及民主制衡的關切。
很遺憾的,我們必須說,雖然新聞局長蘇俊賓撥冗回覆[版主註:詳見response to No. 3 and open response to No.4],但其給我們的回函並沒有針對問題核心回覆,而我們也未見到台灣政府拿出具體行動解決問題。
Since then, a number of developments have taken place — some positive and some negative — which prompted us to write to you again to express our views on these issues. We wish to reiterate that we raise these points as strong international supporters of Taiwan’s democracy who care deeply about the country and its future as a free and democratic nation.
從那時起的一些後續發展--含正面的與負面的,無一不促使我們再度撰函予您以表達我們對這些問題的看法. 我們必須再次強調,我們是一群支持台灣民主的國際學者,我們深切希望台灣日後可以成為一個自由與民主的國家.
We also emphasize that we do not take sides in internal political debates, but do have Taiwan’s international image and credibility as an international partner in mind. Because of the hard work and perseverance of the Taiwanese people, Taiwan was able to make the transition to democracy two decades ago.
我們也必須重申,我們並非支持特定(藍綠)陣營,但是我們關切台灣的國際形象與信譽. 因為台灣好不容易經過20年的努力才轉型成為一個民主國家. [註:美國務院的人權報告]
We applaud this achievement and strongly believe that this basic fact, democracy, is the strongest card Taiwan can play in building and strengthening its relations with other countries around the world and the strongest protection against outside interference in Taiwan’s internal affairs.
我們肯定台灣民主這項成就,而民主也是台灣在與國際其他國家強化關係與抗衡外力干涉台灣內政時的最大的王牌.[註:民主才是王牌在當初馬政府拒發熱比婭簽證受到國際批評時,WSJ就有類似的文章了.又,國際試圖干涉台灣內政,如司法嗎?參考此文]
We are sure that you would agree with us that Taiwan’s young democracy can only grow and prosper if it is nurtured through good governance, accountability and transparency based on the fundamental principles of freedom, democracy, justice and human rights. This would also adhere to both the letter and spirit of the two UN human rights covenants signed by you and ratified by the Legislative Yuan, and be enhanced by the implementation of these covenants into national law in accordance with the advice of the International Commission of Jurists.
我們相信您也同意台灣的民主還未臻成熟(young democracy),台灣民主能夠繼續茁壯則有賴政府透明的制度對於民主,司法與人權的規範. 這也符合台灣今年簽署且經立法院核准的的兩項聯合國人權條款的內容和精神, 進一步依照國際法律協會的建議，將其制定為法律，並且在台灣實行。
During the past two decades, Taiwan has made major progress in each of these areas. It thus has been a disappointment for us to see an erosion of justice, a weakening of checks and balances in the democratic system and a decline in press freedom in Taiwan.
台灣在過去20年有長足的進步.然而,令人失望的,(在過去一年中)我們看到司法被侵蝕[版主註:1,2,3],民主制衡體系被削弱[相關連結1,2,3],而且新聞自由倒退[版主註:相關連結1,2,3,4].
These trends are reflected in the significantly downward ratings Taiwan received in the annual reports of international organizations such as Freedom House and Reporters without Borders.
這些趨勢反應在自由之家與無國界記者組織的年度評比(退步)之中(詳見上面相關連結).
They are also reflected in the expressions of concern by international scholars and friends of Taiwan related to the flaws in the judicial proceedings against former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and the apparent lack of neutrality in the continuing “investigations” and indictments of other prominent members of the former DPP government. We thus appeal to you again to ensure that measures are taken to ensure the impartiality and fairness of the judiciary.
這些趨勢也反映在國際學者與友人自扁案與其他前朝民進黨官員的司法案例中,這些案例突顯出司法體系的瑕疵,如缺乏中立的審判.再一次的,我們希望對您表達,也希望貴政府採取措施以確保司法的公正與公平性. [註:扁案判決的一些連結]
Good governance, accountability and transparency based on the fundamental principles of freedom, democracy, justice and human rights are all the more essential now that your government is moving Taiwan on a path of closer economic ties with China. We believe that a decrease of tension across the Taiwan Strait would indeed be welcome, but emphasize that this should not be done at the expense of the hard-won democracy and human rights in Taiwan itself.
Thus, the process of improving relations with your large neighbor across the Taiwan Strait needs to be an open, deliberative and democratic process, in full consultation with both the Legislative Yuan and the democratic opposition, and fully transparent to the general public.
自由民主正義及人權基本原則建立在權責分明、公開透明的的政治制度上。就在台灣政府正把台灣帶向與中國更密切的經濟合作路上，雖然我們肯定降低台海的緊張關係，但要也強調兩岸關係的改善不應該以台灣得來不易的民主及人權為代價。
We are thus pleased to hear that officials of your government have stated that any agreement with China would need to have both a domestic consensus, including approval by the Legislative Yuan, and acceptance by the international community.
我們樂見任何台灣政府與中國政府的協議均將顧及台灣內部的共識與國際社會的接受,包含將兩岸協商報請立法院同意.
We trust this process will be open and consultative in ways that respect the democratic traditions begun so promisingly two decades ago. Indeed, we emphasize that a country can only grow and prosper if it has diversified ties — economically and politically — to other countries.
我們相信與中國對話的過程將會是公開的，諮詢性的，並尊重台灣近二十年來所發展的民主基礎為前提而進行。我們也要強調,一個國家的成長與繁榮必需保持國際多元化,不管是經濟上的或是政治上的.
Too close an embrace with one neighbor will expose that country to the risks of volatility in the neighboring country, in particular if that neighbor remains authoritarian and openly disrespectful of Taiwan’s democratic achievements.
過度的依賴一個鄰國將會把台灣帶入險境,特別是這個鄰國是個專制國家且公開藐視台灣的民主成就.
Mr. President, we wish to emphasize again that, as international scholars and writers who have followed, supported and applauded Taiwan’s impressive transition to democracy, we feel strongly that Taiwan should be more fully accepted by the international community as a full and equal partner.
This can only be achieved if Taiwan ensures that its democratic achievements are safeguarded, that its sovereignty, human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected, and that the democratic fabric of society is strengthened so the country is ready to meet the challenges ahead.
馬總統，我們以國際學者的身份觀察台灣多年，支持並肯定台灣的民主成就，我們深信台灣有資格更加被國際社會接納為平等的一員。而達到此目標的唯一方式是台灣本身必須捍衛台灣的民主成果[註:這個蘇小賓另一個回應顯然也是讓國際學者不滿啊]，確保主權、人權,保障基本自由[版主註:新聞自由外,言論自由的連結參考此]，鞏固社會民主，台灣才有能力面對未來的挑戰。
Respectfully yours,
NAT BELLOCCHIFormer chairman, American Institute in Taiwan
COEN BLAAUWFormosan Association for Public Affairs, Washington
GORDON CHANGAuthor, “The Coming Collapse of China”
EDWARD FRIEDMANProfessor of political science and East Asian studies, University of Wisconsin
PETER CHOWProfessor of economics, City College of New York STEPHANE CORCUFFAssociate professor of political science, China and Taiwan studies, University of Lyon
MICHAEL DANIELSEN Chairman, Taiwan Corner, Copenhagen
JUNE TEUFEL DREYER Professor of political science, University of MiamiJOHN TKACIKFormer senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation and former officer at the Taiwan Coordination Desk, Department of State, Washington
TERRI GILESExecutive director, Formosa Foundation, Los Angeles
MICHAEL RAND HOAREEmeritus reader at the University of London
CHRISTOPHER HUGHESProfessor of international relations, London School of Economics and Political Science
THOMAS HUGHES Former chief of staff to the late senator
Claiborne Pell, Washington
BRUCE JACOBS Professor of Asian languages and studies, Monash University
RICHARD KAGAN Professor emeritus of history, Hamline University
JEROME KEATING Associate professor, National Taipei University (retired).
David KilgourFormer member of parliament and secretary of state for Asia-Pacific (2002-2003), Canada
ANDRE LALIBERTE Associate professor, School of Political Studies, University of OttawaDANIEL LYNCH Associate professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California
LIU SHIH-CHUNG Visiting fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington
VICTOR MAIR Professor of Chinese language and literature, University of Pennsylvania DONALD RODGERS Associate professor of political science, Austin College
CHRISTIAN SCHAFFERER Associate professor, Department of International Trade, Overseas Chinese Institute of Technology, chair of Austrian Associationof East Asian Studies
SCOTT SIMON Associate professor, University of Ottawa, Canada
MICHAEL STAINTON York Center for Asia Research, TorontoPERRY LINK Professor emeritus ofEast Asian Studies,Princeton University
PETER TAGUE Professor of law,Georgetown University
ARTHUR WALDRON Lauder professor of international relations, University of Pennsylvania
VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG Professor of political science, University of Richmond
GERRIT VAN DER WEES Editor of “Taiwan Communique,” Washington
STEPHEN YATES President of DC Asia Advisory and former deputy assistant to the US vice president for nationalsecurity affairs.
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